1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
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/*
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1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
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* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
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* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
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* All rights reserved
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* RSA-based authentication. This code determines whether to admit a login
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* based on RSA authentication. This file also contains functions to check
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* validity of the host key.
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2000-04-16 05:18:38 +04:00
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*
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2000-09-16 06:29:08 +04:00
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* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
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* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
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* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
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* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
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* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
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1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
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*/
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1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
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#include "includes.h"
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2001-04-08 22:26:59 +04:00
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RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.40 2001/04/06 21:00:07 markus Exp $");
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2001-01-22 08:34:40 +03:00
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
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#include "rsa.h"
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#include "packet.h"
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#include "xmalloc.h"
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2001-01-22 08:34:40 +03:00
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#include "ssh1.h"
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1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
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#include "mpaux.h"
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#include "uidswap.h"
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2000-03-26 07:04:51 +04:00
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#include "match.h"
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2000-06-18 08:50:44 +04:00
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#include "auth-options.h"
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2001-01-22 08:34:40 +03:00
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#include "pathnames.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "servconf.h"
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#include "auth.h"
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2000-10-14 09:23:11 +04:00
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/* import */
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extern ServerOptions options;
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1999-11-25 03:54:57 +03:00
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/*
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* Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication
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* responses to a particular session.
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*/
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2000-12-22 04:43:59 +03:00
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extern u_char session_id[16];
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1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
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1999-11-25 03:54:57 +03:00
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/*
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* The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the
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* following format:
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* options bits e n comment
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* where bits, e and n are decimal numbers,
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* and comment is any string of characters up to newline. The maximum
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* length of a line is 8000 characters. See the documentation for a
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* description of the options.
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*/
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1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
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1999-11-25 03:54:57 +03:00
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/*
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* Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
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* and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
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* our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
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*/
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1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
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int
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2000-03-26 07:04:51 +04:00
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auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(RSA *pk)
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1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
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{
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- OpenBSD CVS updates to v1.2.3
[ssh.h atomicio.c]
- int atomicio -> ssize_t (for alpha). ok deraadt@
[auth-rsa.c]
- delay MD5 computation until client sends response, free() early, cleanup.
[cipher.c]
- void* -> unsigned char*, ok niels@
[hostfile.c]
- remove unused variable 'len'. fix comments.
- remove unused variable
[log-client.c log-server.c]
- rename a cpp symbol, to avoid param.h collision
[packet.c]
- missing xfree()
- getsockname() requires initialized tolen; andy@guildsoftware.com
- use getpeername() in packet_connection_is_on_socket(), fixes sshd -i;
from Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE
[pty.c pty.h]
- register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
[readconf.c]
- turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
[rsa.c]
- PKCS#1 padding
[scp.c]
- allow '.' in usernames; from jedgar@fxp.org
[servconf.c]
- typo: ignore_user_known_hosts int->flag; naddy@mips.rhein-neckar.de
- sync with sshd_config
[ssh-keygen.c]
- enable ssh-keygen -l -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ok deraadt@
[ssh.1]
- Change invalid 'CHAT' loglevel to 'VERBOSE'
[ssh.c]
- suppress AAAA query host when '-4' is used; from shin@nd.net.fujitsu.co.jp
- turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
[sshconnect.c]
- missing xfree()
- retry rresvport_af(), too. from sumikawa@ebina.hitachi.co.jp.
- read error vs. "Connection closed by remote host"
[sshd.8]
- ie. -> i.e.,
- do not link to a commercial page..
- sync with sshd_config
[sshd.c]
- no need for poll.h; from bright@wintelcom.net
- log with level log() not fatal() if peer behaves badly.
- don't panic if client behaves strange. ok deraadt@
- make no-port-forwarding for RSA keys deny both -L and -R style fwding
- delay close() of pty until the pty has been chowned back to root
- oops, fix comment, too.
- missing xfree()
- move XAUTHORITY to subdir. ok dugsong@. fixes debian bug #57907, too.
(http://cgi.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?archive=no&bug=57907)
- register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
- create x11 cookie file
- fix pr 1113, fclose() -> pclose(), todo: remote popen()
- version 1.2.3
- Cleaned up
2000-03-09 13:27:49 +03:00
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BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
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BN_CTX *ctx;
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2000-12-22 04:43:59 +03:00
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u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], response[16];
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1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
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MD5_CTX md;
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2000-12-22 04:43:59 +03:00
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u_int i;
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1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
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int plen, len;
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encrypted_challenge = BN_new();
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challenge = BN_new();
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/* Generate a random challenge. */
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BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0);
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- OpenBSD CVS updates to v1.2.3
[ssh.h atomicio.c]
- int atomicio -> ssize_t (for alpha). ok deraadt@
[auth-rsa.c]
- delay MD5 computation until client sends response, free() early, cleanup.
[cipher.c]
- void* -> unsigned char*, ok niels@
[hostfile.c]
- remove unused variable 'len'. fix comments.
- remove unused variable
[log-client.c log-server.c]
- rename a cpp symbol, to avoid param.h collision
[packet.c]
- missing xfree()
- getsockname() requires initialized tolen; andy@guildsoftware.com
- use getpeername() in packet_connection_is_on_socket(), fixes sshd -i;
from Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE
[pty.c pty.h]
- register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
[readconf.c]
- turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
[rsa.c]
- PKCS#1 padding
[scp.c]
- allow '.' in usernames; from jedgar@fxp.org
[servconf.c]
- typo: ignore_user_known_hosts int->flag; naddy@mips.rhein-neckar.de
- sync with sshd_config
[ssh-keygen.c]
- enable ssh-keygen -l -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ok deraadt@
[ssh.1]
- Change invalid 'CHAT' loglevel to 'VERBOSE'
[ssh.c]
- suppress AAAA query host when '-4' is used; from shin@nd.net.fujitsu.co.jp
- turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
[sshconnect.c]
- missing xfree()
- retry rresvport_af(), too. from sumikawa@ebina.hitachi.co.jp.
- read error vs. "Connection closed by remote host"
[sshd.8]
- ie. -> i.e.,
- do not link to a commercial page..
- sync with sshd_config
[sshd.c]
- no need for poll.h; from bright@wintelcom.net
- log with level log() not fatal() if peer behaves badly.
- don't panic if client behaves strange. ok deraadt@
- make no-port-forwarding for RSA keys deny both -L and -R style fwding
- delay close() of pty until the pty has been chowned back to root
- oops, fix comment, too.
- missing xfree()
- move XAUTHORITY to subdir. ok dugsong@. fixes debian bug #57907, too.
(http://cgi.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?archive=no&bug=57907)
- register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
- create x11 cookie file
- fix pr 1113, fclose() -> pclose(), todo: remote popen()
- version 1.2.3
- Cleaned up
2000-03-09 13:27:49 +03:00
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ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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2000-03-26 07:04:51 +04:00
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BN_mod(challenge, challenge, pk->n, ctx);
|
- OpenBSD CVS updates to v1.2.3
[ssh.h atomicio.c]
- int atomicio -> ssize_t (for alpha). ok deraadt@
[auth-rsa.c]
- delay MD5 computation until client sends response, free() early, cleanup.
[cipher.c]
- void* -> unsigned char*, ok niels@
[hostfile.c]
- remove unused variable 'len'. fix comments.
- remove unused variable
[log-client.c log-server.c]
- rename a cpp symbol, to avoid param.h collision
[packet.c]
- missing xfree()
- getsockname() requires initialized tolen; andy@guildsoftware.com
- use getpeername() in packet_connection_is_on_socket(), fixes sshd -i;
from Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE
[pty.c pty.h]
- register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
[readconf.c]
- turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
[rsa.c]
- PKCS#1 padding
[scp.c]
- allow '.' in usernames; from jedgar@fxp.org
[servconf.c]
- typo: ignore_user_known_hosts int->flag; naddy@mips.rhein-neckar.de
- sync with sshd_config
[ssh-keygen.c]
- enable ssh-keygen -l -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ok deraadt@
[ssh.1]
- Change invalid 'CHAT' loglevel to 'VERBOSE'
[ssh.c]
- suppress AAAA query host when '-4' is used; from shin@nd.net.fujitsu.co.jp
- turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
[sshconnect.c]
- missing xfree()
- retry rresvport_af(), too. from sumikawa@ebina.hitachi.co.jp.
- read error vs. "Connection closed by remote host"
[sshd.8]
- ie. -> i.e.,
- do not link to a commercial page..
- sync with sshd_config
[sshd.c]
- no need for poll.h; from bright@wintelcom.net
- log with level log() not fatal() if peer behaves badly.
- don't panic if client behaves strange. ok deraadt@
- make no-port-forwarding for RSA keys deny both -L and -R style fwding
- delay close() of pty until the pty has been chowned back to root
- oops, fix comment, too.
- missing xfree()
- move XAUTHORITY to subdir. ok dugsong@. fixes debian bug #57907, too.
(http://cgi.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?archive=no&bug=57907)
- register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
- create x11 cookie file
- fix pr 1113, fclose() -> pclose(), todo: remote popen()
- version 1.2.3
- Cleaned up
2000-03-09 13:27:49 +03:00
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
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/* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
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rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, pk);
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/* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
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packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
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packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge);
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packet_send();
|
- OpenBSD CVS updates to v1.2.3
[ssh.h atomicio.c]
- int atomicio -> ssize_t (for alpha). ok deraadt@
[auth-rsa.c]
- delay MD5 computation until client sends response, free() early, cleanup.
[cipher.c]
- void* -> unsigned char*, ok niels@
[hostfile.c]
- remove unused variable 'len'. fix comments.
- remove unused variable
[log-client.c log-server.c]
- rename a cpp symbol, to avoid param.h collision
[packet.c]
- missing xfree()
- getsockname() requires initialized tolen; andy@guildsoftware.com
- use getpeername() in packet_connection_is_on_socket(), fixes sshd -i;
from Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE
[pty.c pty.h]
- register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
[readconf.c]
- turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
[rsa.c]
- PKCS#1 padding
[scp.c]
- allow '.' in usernames; from jedgar@fxp.org
[servconf.c]
- typo: ignore_user_known_hosts int->flag; naddy@mips.rhein-neckar.de
- sync with sshd_config
[ssh-keygen.c]
- enable ssh-keygen -l -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ok deraadt@
[ssh.1]
- Change invalid 'CHAT' loglevel to 'VERBOSE'
[ssh.c]
- suppress AAAA query host when '-4' is used; from shin@nd.net.fujitsu.co.jp
- turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
[sshconnect.c]
- missing xfree()
- retry rresvport_af(), too. from sumikawa@ebina.hitachi.co.jp.
- read error vs. "Connection closed by remote host"
[sshd.8]
- ie. -> i.e.,
- do not link to a commercial page..
- sync with sshd_config
[sshd.c]
- no need for poll.h; from bright@wintelcom.net
- log with level log() not fatal() if peer behaves badly.
- don't panic if client behaves strange. ok deraadt@
- make no-port-forwarding for RSA keys deny both -L and -R style fwding
- delay close() of pty until the pty has been chowned back to root
- oops, fix comment, too.
- missing xfree()
- move XAUTHORITY to subdir. ok dugsong@. fixes debian bug #57907, too.
(http://cgi.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?archive=no&bug=57907)
- register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
- create x11 cookie file
- fix pr 1113, fclose() -> pclose(), todo: remote popen()
- version 1.2.3
- Cleaned up
2000-03-09 13:27:49 +03:00
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BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
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1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
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packet_write_wait();
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|
|
|
|
- OpenBSD CVS updates to v1.2.3
[ssh.h atomicio.c]
- int atomicio -> ssize_t (for alpha). ok deraadt@
[auth-rsa.c]
- delay MD5 computation until client sends response, free() early, cleanup.
[cipher.c]
- void* -> unsigned char*, ok niels@
[hostfile.c]
- remove unused variable 'len'. fix comments.
- remove unused variable
[log-client.c log-server.c]
- rename a cpp symbol, to avoid param.h collision
[packet.c]
- missing xfree()
- getsockname() requires initialized tolen; andy@guildsoftware.com
- use getpeername() in packet_connection_is_on_socket(), fixes sshd -i;
from Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE
[pty.c pty.h]
- register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
[readconf.c]
- turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
[rsa.c]
- PKCS#1 padding
[scp.c]
- allow '.' in usernames; from jedgar@fxp.org
[servconf.c]
- typo: ignore_user_known_hosts int->flag; naddy@mips.rhein-neckar.de
- sync with sshd_config
[ssh-keygen.c]
- enable ssh-keygen -l -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ok deraadt@
[ssh.1]
- Change invalid 'CHAT' loglevel to 'VERBOSE'
[ssh.c]
- suppress AAAA query host when '-4' is used; from shin@nd.net.fujitsu.co.jp
- turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
[sshconnect.c]
- missing xfree()
- retry rresvport_af(), too. from sumikawa@ebina.hitachi.co.jp.
- read error vs. "Connection closed by remote host"
[sshd.8]
- ie. -> i.e.,
- do not link to a commercial page..
- sync with sshd_config
[sshd.c]
- no need for poll.h; from bright@wintelcom.net
- log with level log() not fatal() if peer behaves badly.
- don't panic if client behaves strange. ok deraadt@
- make no-port-forwarding for RSA keys deny both -L and -R style fwding
- delay close() of pty until the pty has been chowned back to root
- oops, fix comment, too.
- missing xfree()
- move XAUTHORITY to subdir. ok dugsong@. fixes debian bug #57907, too.
(http://cgi.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?archive=no&bug=57907)
- register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
- create x11 cookie file
- fix pr 1113, fclose() -> pclose(), todo: remote popen()
- version 1.2.3
- Cleaned up
2000-03-09 13:27:49 +03:00
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/* Wait for a response. */
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packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
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packet_integrity_check(plen, 16, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
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for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
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response[i] = packet_get_char();
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1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
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/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
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len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
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if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
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fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: bad challenge length %d", len);
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memset(buf, 0, 32);
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BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
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MD5_Init(&md);
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MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
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MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
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MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
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BN_clear_free(challenge);
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/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
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if (memcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
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/* Wrong answer. */
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return 0;
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}
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/* Correct answer. */
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return 1;
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1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
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}
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|
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|
1999-11-25 03:54:57 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
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|
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* Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns
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* 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
|
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* successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
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*/
|
1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
|
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int
|
1999-11-12 07:19:27 +03:00
|
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auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n)
|
1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
|
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|
{
|
2001-01-22 08:34:40 +03:00
|
|
|
char line[8192], file[MAXPATHLEN];
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
int authenticated;
|
2000-12-22 04:43:59 +03:00
|
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u_int bits;
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
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FILE *f;
|
2000-12-22 04:43:59 +03:00
|
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|
u_long linenum = 0;
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
struct stat st;
|
2000-03-26 07:04:51 +04:00
|
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RSA *pk;
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
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|
|
2000-10-14 09:23:11 +04:00
|
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/* no user given */
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if (pw == NULL)
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return 0;
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|
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|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
|
2001-04-08 22:26:59 +04:00
|
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|
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
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|
|
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/* The authorized keys. */
|
|
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|
snprintf(file, sizeof file, "%.500s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir,
|
2001-01-22 08:34:40 +03:00
|
|
|
_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS);
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Fail quietly if file does not exist */
|
|
|
|
if (stat(file, &st) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
|
|
|
|
restore_uid();
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Open the file containing the authorized keys. */
|
|
|
|
f = fopen(file, "r");
|
|
|
|
if (!f) {
|
|
|
|
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
|
|
|
|
restore_uid();
|
|
|
|
packet_send_debug("Could not open %.900s for reading.", file);
|
|
|
|
packet_send_debug("If your home is on an NFS volume, it may need to be world-readable.");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
if (options.strict_modes) {
|
|
|
|
int fail = 0;
|
|
|
|
char buf[1024];
|
|
|
|
/* Check open file in order to avoid open/stat races */
|
|
|
|
if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
|
|
|
|
(st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
|
|
|
|
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "RSA authentication refused for %.100s: "
|
|
|
|
"bad ownership or modes for '%s'.", pw->pw_name, file);
|
|
|
|
fail = 1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2001-01-22 08:34:40 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Check path to _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS */
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
static const char *check[] = {
|
2001-01-22 08:34:40 +03:00
|
|
|
"", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR, NULL
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; check[i]; i++) {
|
|
|
|
snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%.500s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, check[i]);
|
|
|
|
if (stat(line, &st) < 0 ||
|
|
|
|
(st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
|
|
|
|
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "RSA authentication refused for %.100s: "
|
|
|
|
"bad ownership or modes for '%s'.", pw->pw_name, line);
|
|
|
|
fail = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
if (fail) {
|
2000-04-29 17:57:08 +04:00
|
|
|
fclose(f);
|
2001-03-05 09:47:00 +03:00
|
|
|
log("%s", buf);
|
|
|
|
packet_send_debug("%s", buf);
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
restore_uid();
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Flag indicating whether authentication has succeeded. */
|
|
|
|
authenticated = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2000-03-26 07:04:51 +04:00
|
|
|
pk = RSA_new();
|
|
|
|
pk->e = BN_new();
|
|
|
|
pk->n = BN_new();
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-11-25 03:54:57 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If
|
|
|
|
* found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
|
|
|
|
* user really has the corresponding private key.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
|
|
|
|
char *cp;
|
|
|
|
char *options;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
linenum++;
|
|
|
|
|
1999-11-25 03:54:57 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
|
|
|
|
for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
|
|
|
|
;
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
1999-11-25 03:54:57 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check if there are options for this key, and if so,
|
|
|
|
* save their starting address and skip the option part
|
|
|
|
* for now. If there are no options, set the starting
|
|
|
|
* address to NULL.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') {
|
|
|
|
int quoted = 0;
|
|
|
|
options = cp;
|
|
|
|
for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
|
|
|
|
if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
|
|
|
|
cp++; /* Skip both */
|
|
|
|
else if (*cp == '"')
|
|
|
|
quoted = !quoted;
|
1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
options = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Parse the key from the line. */
|
2000-03-26 07:04:51 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!auth_rsa_read_key(&cp, &bits, pk->e, pk->n)) {
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
debug("%.100s, line %lu: bad key syntax",
|
2001-01-22 08:34:40 +03:00
|
|
|
file, linenum);
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
packet_send_debug("%.100s, line %lu: bad key syntax",
|
2001-01-22 08:34:40 +03:00
|
|
|
file, linenum);
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
/* cp now points to the comment part. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check if the we have found the desired key (identified by its modulus). */
|
2000-03-26 07:04:51 +04:00
|
|
|
if (BN_cmp(pk->n, client_n) != 0)
|
1999-11-25 03:54:57 +03:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-12-06 03:47:28 +03:00
|
|
|
/* check the real bits */
|
2000-03-26 07:04:51 +04:00
|
|
|
if (bits != BN_num_bits(pk->n))
|
1999-12-06 03:47:28 +03:00
|
|
|
log("Warning: %s, line %ld: keysize mismatch: "
|
|
|
|
"actual %d vs. announced %d.",
|
2000-03-26 07:04:51 +04:00
|
|
|
file, linenum, BN_num_bits(pk->n), bits);
|
1999-12-06 03:47:28 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
/* We have found the desired key. */
|
2000-11-22 00:24:55 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If our options do not allow this key to be used,
|
|
|
|
* do not send challenge.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2001-01-22 08:34:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!auth_parse_options(pw, options, file, linenum))
|
2000-11-22 00:24:55 +03:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
|
2000-03-26 07:04:51 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(pk)) {
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Wrong response. */
|
|
|
|
verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
|
|
|
|
packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-11-25 03:54:57 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Correct response. The client has been successfully
|
|
|
|
* authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
|
|
|
|
* options; this will be reset if the options cause the
|
|
|
|
* authentication to be rejected.
|
|
|
|
* Break out of the loop if authentication was successful;
|
|
|
|
* otherwise continue searching.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2000-10-16 05:14:42 +04:00
|
|
|
authenticated = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
|
|
|
|
restore_uid();
|
1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Close the file. */
|
|
|
|
fclose(f);
|
1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2000-03-26 07:04:51 +04:00
|
|
|
RSA_free(pk);
|
1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
if (authenticated)
|
|
|
|
packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
|
2000-10-14 09:23:11 +04:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
auth_clear_options();
|
1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1999-11-24 16:26:21 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Return authentication result. */
|
|
|
|
return authenticated;
|
1999-10-27 07:42:43 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|