The subsequent call to stat_to_attrib clears the struct as its first step
anyway. From pmeinhardt via github PR#220, ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f5234fc6d7425b607e179acb3383f21716f3029e
~-prefixed paths, in particular ~user ones. Allows scp in sftp mode to accept
these paths, like scp in rcp mode does.
prompted by and much discussion deraadt@
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7d794def9e4de348e1e777f6030fc9bafdfff392
more useful with long paths (that may truncate) and better matches
traditional scp behaviour; spotted by naddy@ ok deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26b544d0074f03ebb8a3ebce42317d8d7ee291a3
tracking expected status replies from the server to what do_download() was
using.
Refactor it to use the same structure and factor out some common
code into helper functions.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c167df8ab6df4a5292c32421922b0cf379e9054
scp(1) by suppressing "Retrieving [path]" lines that were emitted to support
the interactive sftp(1) client. ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 06be293df5f156a18f366079be2f33fa68001acc
downloading from one SFTP server while simultaneously uploading to another.
feedback & ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3982878e29d8df0fa4ddc502f5ff6126ac714235
limits@openssh.com extension but fails when the client tries to invoke it.
Reported by Hector Martin via bz3318
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd9d1839c41811616ede4da467e25746fcd9b967
client select good limits based on what the server supports. Split the
download and upload buffer sizes to allow them to be chosen independently.
In practice (and assuming upgraded sftp/sftp-server at each end), this
increases the download buffer 32->64KiB and the upload buffer
32->255KiB.
Patches from Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ebd61c80d85b951b794164acc4b2f2fd8e88606c
read-only directory, ensure that the directory is created with write and
execute permissions in the interim so that we can actually complete the
transfer, then set the directory permission as the final step. (The execute
bit is only likely to be an issue with a non-POSIX server). bz#3222, ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a82606212f2796e31f0e1af94a63355a7ad5d903
one more concurrent request that desired. This prevented using sftp(1) in
unpipelined request/response mode, which is useful when debugging. Patch from
Stephen Goetze in bz#3054
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 41b394ebe57037dbc43bdd0eef21ff0511191f28
end of each transfer. Fixes the problem recently introduces where very quick
transfers do not display the progressmeter at all. Spotted by naddy@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 68dc46c259e8fdd4f5db3ec2a130f8e4590a7a9a
the progressmeter formatting outside of signal handler context and have the
atomicio callback called for EINTR too. bz#2434 with contributions from djm
and jjelen at redhat.com, ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1af61c1f70e4f3bd8ab140b9f1fa699481db57d8
request they do not follow symlinks. Requires recently-committed
lsetstat@openssh.com extension on the server side.
ok markus@ dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f93bb3f6f7eb2fb7ef1e59126e72714f1626d604
download and fsync). These should return -1 on error, not a sftp status code.
patch from Petr Cerny in bz#2871
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 651aa0220ad23c9167d9297a436162d741f97a09
Have sftp print a warning about shell cleanliness when
decoding the first packet fails, which is usually caused by shells polluting
stdout of non-interactive starups. bz#2800, ok markus@ deraadt@.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 88d6a9bf3470f9324b76ba1cbd53e50120f685b5
check number of entries in SSH2_FXP_NAME response; avoids
unreachable overflow later. Reported by Jann Horn
Upstream-ID: b6b2b434a6d6035b1644ca44f24cd8104057420f
Add MAXIMUM(), MINIMUM(), and ROUNDUP() to misc.h, then
use those definitions rather than pulling <sys/param.h> and unknown namespace
pollution. ok djm markus dtucker
Upstream-ID: 712cafa816c9f012a61628b66b9fbd5687223fb8
To prevent screwing up terminal settings when printing to
the terminal, for ASCII and UTF-8, escape bytes not forming characters and
bytes forming non-printable characters with vis(3) VIS_OCTAL. For other
character sets, abort printing of the current string in these cases. In
particular, * let scp(1) respect the local user's LC_CTYPE locale(1); *
sanitize data received from the remote host; * sanitize filenames, usernames,
and similar data even locally; * take character display widths into account
for the progressmeter.
This is believed to be sufficient to keep the local terminal safe
on OpenBSD, but bad things can still happen on other systems with
state-dependent locales because many places in the code print
unencoded ASCII characters into the output stream.
Using feedback from djm@ and martijn@,
various aspects discussed with many others.
deraadt@ says it should go in now, i probably already hesitated too long
Upstream-ID: e66afbc94ee396ddcaffd433b9a3b80f387647e0
fix signed/unsigned errors reported by clang-3.7; add
sshbuf_dup_string() to replace a common idiom of strdup(sshbuf_ptr()) with
better safety checking; feedback and ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 71f926d9bb3f1efed51319a6daf37e93d57c8820
dtucker@openbsd.org
djm@openbsd.org
Darren Tucker
Damien Miller
deraadt@openbsd.org
schwarze@openbsd.org
jsg@openbsd.org
Darren Tucker