Shmulik Regev brought cryptographically secure transaction IDs

This commit is contained in:
Daniel Stenberg 2007-05-30 21:11:10 +00:00
Родитель 79d59ec97b
Коммит 2faba57c85
4 изменённых файлов: 173 добавлений и 13 удалений

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@ -2,6 +2,32 @@
* May 30 2007 * May 30 2007
- Shmulik Regev brought cryptographically secure transaction IDs:
The c-ares library implementation uses a DNS "Transaction ID" field that is
seeded with a pseudo random number (based on gettimeofday) which is
incremented (++) between consecutive calls and is therefore rather
predictable. In general, predictability of DNS Transaction ID is a well
known security problem (e.g.
http://bak.spc.org/dms/archive/dns_id_attack.txt) and makes a c-ares based
implementation vulnerable to DNS poisoning. Credit goes to Amit Klein
(Trusteer) for identifying this problem.
The patch I wrote changes the implementation to use a more secure way of
generating unique IDs. It starts by obtaining a key with reasonable entropy
which is used with an RC4 stream to generate the cryptographically secure
transaction IDs.
Note that the key generation code (in ares_init:randomize_key) has two
versions, the Windows specific one uses a cryptographically safe function
provided (but undocumented :) by the operating system (described at
http://blogs.msdn.com/michael_howard/archive/2005/01/14/353379.aspx). The
default implementation is a bit naive and uses the standard 'rand'
function. Surely a better way to generate random keys exists for other
platforms.
The patch can be tested by using the adig utility and using the '-s' option.
- Brad House added ares_save_options() and ares_destroy_options() that can be - Brad House added ares_save_options() and ares_destroy_options() that can be
used to keep options for later re-usal when ares_init_options() is used. used to keep options for later re-usal when ares_init_options() is used.

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@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ static int config_nameserver(struct server_state **servers, int *nservers,
static int set_search(ares_channel channel, const char *str); static int set_search(ares_channel channel, const char *str);
static int set_options(ares_channel channel, const char *str); static int set_options(ares_channel channel, const char *str);
static const char *try_option(const char *p, const char *q, const char *opt); static const char *try_option(const char *p, const char *q, const char *opt);
static void init_id_key(rc4_key* key,int key_data_len);
#ifndef WIN32 #ifndef WIN32
static int sortlist_alloc(struct apattern **sortlist, int *nsort, struct apattern *pat); static int sortlist_alloc(struct apattern **sortlist, int *nsort, struct apattern *pat);
static int ip_addr(const char *s, int len, struct in_addr *addr); static int ip_addr(const char *s, int len, struct in_addr *addr);
@ -85,10 +87,10 @@ static char *try_config(char *s, const char *opt);
#endif #endif
#define ARES_CONFIG_CHECK(x) (x->lookups && x->nsort > -1 && \ #define ARES_CONFIG_CHECK(x) (x->lookups && x->nsort > -1 && \
x->nservers > -1 && \ x->nservers > -1 && \
x->ndomains > -1 && \ x->ndomains > -1 && \
x->ndots > -1 && x->timeout > -1 && \ x->ndots > -1 && x->timeout > -1 && \
x->tries > -1) x->tries > -1)
int ares_init(ares_channel *channelptr) int ares_init(ares_channel *channelptr)
{ {
@ -102,7 +104,6 @@ int ares_init_options(ares_channel *channelptr, struct ares_options *options,
int i; int i;
int status = ARES_SUCCESS; int status = ARES_SUCCESS;
struct server_state *server; struct server_state *server;
struct timeval tv;
#ifdef CURLDEBUG #ifdef CURLDEBUG
const char *env = getenv("CARES_MEMDEBUG"); const char *env = getenv("CARES_MEMDEBUG");
@ -203,15 +204,9 @@ int ares_init_options(ares_channel *channelptr, struct ares_options *options,
server->qtail = NULL; server->qtail = NULL;
} }
/* Choose a somewhat random query ID. The main point is to avoid init_id_key(&channel->id_key, ARES_ID_KEY_LEN);
* collisions with stale queries. An attacker trying to spoof a DNS
* answer also has to guess the query ID, but it's only a 16-bit
* field, so there's not much to be done about that.
*/
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
channel->next_id = (unsigned short)
((tv.tv_sec ^ tv.tv_usec ^ getpid()) & 0xffff);
channel->next_id = ares__generate_new_id(&channel->id_key);
channel->queries = NULL; channel->queries = NULL;
*channelptr = channel; *channelptr = channel;
@ -1271,3 +1266,67 @@ static void natural_mask(struct apattern *pat)
pat->mask.addr.addr4.s_addr = htonl(IN_CLASSC_NET); pat->mask.addr.addr4.s_addr = htonl(IN_CLASSC_NET);
} }
#endif #endif
/* initialize an rc4 key. If possible a cryptographically secure random key
is generated using a suitable function (for example win32's RtlGenRandom as
described in
http://blogs.msdn.com/michael_howard/archive/2005/01/14/353379.aspx
otherwise the code defaults to cross-platform albeit less secure mechanism
using rand
*/
static void randomize_key(unsigned char* key,int key_data_len)
{
int randomized = 0;
#ifdef WIN32
HMODULE lib=LoadLibrary("ADVAPI32.DLL");
if (lib) {
BOOLEAN (APIENTRY *pfn)(void*, ULONG) =
(BOOLEAN (APIENTRY *)(void*,ULONG))GetProcAddress(lib,"SystemFunction036");
if (pfn && pfn(key,key_data_len) )
randomized = 1;
FreeLibrary(lib);
}
#endif
if ( !randomized ) {
int counter;
for (counter=0;counter<key_data_len;counter++)
key[counter]=rand() % 256;
}
}
static void init_id_key(rc4_key* key,int key_data_len)
{
unsigned char index1;
unsigned char index2;
unsigned char* state;
short counter;
unsigned char *key_data_ptr = 0;
key_data_ptr = calloc(1,key_data_len);
randomize_key(key->state,key_data_len);
state = &key->state[0];
for(counter = 0; counter < 256; counter++)
state[counter] = counter;
key->x = 0;
key->y = 0;
index1 = 0;
index2 = 0;
for(counter = 0; counter < 256; counter++)
{
index2 = (key_data_ptr[index1] + state[counter] +
index2) % 256;
ARES_SWAP_BYTE(&state[counter], &state[index2]);
index1 = (index1 + 1) % key_data_len;
}
free(key_data_ptr);
}
short ares__generate_new_id(rc4_key* key)
{
short r;
ares__rc4(key, (unsigned char *)&r, sizeof(r));
return r;
}

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@ -80,6 +80,8 @@
#endif #endif
#define ARES_ID_KEY_LEN 31
#include "ares_ipv6.h" #include "ares_ipv6.h"
struct send_request { struct send_request {
@ -156,6 +158,13 @@ struct apattern {
unsigned short type; unsigned short type;
}; };
typedef struct rc4_key
{
unsigned char state[256];
unsigned char x;
unsigned char y;
} rc4_key;
struct ares_channeldata { struct ares_channeldata {
/* Configuration data */ /* Configuration data */
int flags; int flags;
@ -176,6 +185,8 @@ struct ares_channeldata {
/* ID to use for next query */ /* ID to use for next query */
unsigned short next_id; unsigned short next_id;
/* key to use when generating new ids */
rc4_key id_key;
/* Active queries */ /* Active queries */
struct query *queries; struct query *queries;
@ -184,10 +195,15 @@ struct ares_channeldata {
void *sock_state_cb_data; void *sock_state_cb_data;
}; };
void ares__rc4(rc4_key* key,unsigned char *buffer_ptr, int buffer_len);
void ares__send_query(ares_channel channel, struct query *query, time_t now); void ares__send_query(ares_channel channel, struct query *query, time_t now);
void ares__close_sockets(ares_channel channel, struct server_state *server); void ares__close_sockets(ares_channel channel, struct server_state *server);
int ares__get_hostent(FILE *fp, int family, struct hostent **host); int ares__get_hostent(FILE *fp, int family, struct hostent **host);
int ares__read_line(FILE *fp, char **buf, int *bufsize); int ares__read_line(FILE *fp, char **buf, int *bufsize);
short ares__generate_new_id(rc4_key* key);
#define ARES_SWAP_BYTE(a,b) \
{ unsigned char swapByte = *(a); *(a) = *(b); *(b) = swapByte; }
#define SOCK_STATE_CALLBACK(c, s, r, w) \ #define SOCK_STATE_CALLBACK(c, s, r, w) \
do { \ do { \

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@ -39,6 +39,64 @@ struct qquery {
static void qcallback(void *arg, int status, unsigned char *abuf, int alen); static void qcallback(void *arg, int status, unsigned char *abuf, int alen);
void ares__rc4(rc4_key* key, unsigned char *buffer_ptr, int buffer_len)
{
unsigned char x;
unsigned char y;
unsigned char* state;
unsigned char xorIndex;
short counter;
x = key->x;
y = key->y;
state = &key->state[0];
for(counter = 0; counter < buffer_len; counter ++)
{
x = (x + 1) % 256;
y = (state[x] + y) % 256;
ARES_SWAP_BYTE(&state[x], &state[y]);
xorIndex = (state[x] + state[y]) % 256;
buffer_ptr[counter] ^= state[xorIndex];
}
key->x = x;
key->y = y;
}
static struct query* find_query_by_id(ares_channel channel, int id)
{
int qid;
struct query* q;
DNS_HEADER_SET_QID(((unsigned char*)&qid), id);
/* Find the query corresponding to this packet. */
for (q = channel->queries; q; q = q->next)
{
if (q->qid == qid)
return q;
}
return NULL;
}
/* a unique query id is generated using an rc4 key. Since the id may already
be used by a running query (as infrequent as it may be), a lookup is
performed per id generation. In practice this search should happen only
once per newly generated id
*/
static int generate_unique_id(ares_channel channel)
{
int id;
do {
id = ares__generate_new_id(&channel->id_key);
} while (find_query_by_id(channel,id));
return id;
}
void ares_query(ares_channel channel, const char *name, int dnsclass, void ares_query(ares_channel channel, const char *name, int dnsclass,
int type, ares_callback callback, void *arg) int type, ares_callback callback, void *arg)
{ {
@ -50,7 +108,8 @@ void ares_query(ares_channel channel, const char *name, int dnsclass,
rd = !(channel->flags & ARES_FLAG_NORECURSE); rd = !(channel->flags & ARES_FLAG_NORECURSE);
status = ares_mkquery(name, dnsclass, type, channel->next_id, rd, &qbuf, status = ares_mkquery(name, dnsclass, type, channel->next_id, rd, &qbuf,
&qlen); &qlen);
channel->next_id++; channel->next_id = generate_unique_id(channel);
if (status != ARES_SUCCESS) if (status != ARES_SUCCESS)
{ {
callback(arg, status, NULL, 0); callback(arg, status, NULL, 0);