Shmulik Regev brought cryptographically secure transaction IDs
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ares/CHANGES
26
ares/CHANGES
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@ -2,6 +2,32 @@
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* May 30 2007
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- Shmulik Regev brought cryptographically secure transaction IDs:
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The c-ares library implementation uses a DNS "Transaction ID" field that is
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seeded with a pseudo random number (based on gettimeofday) which is
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incremented (++) between consecutive calls and is therefore rather
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predictable. In general, predictability of DNS Transaction ID is a well
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known security problem (e.g.
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http://bak.spc.org/dms/archive/dns_id_attack.txt) and makes a c-ares based
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implementation vulnerable to DNS poisoning. Credit goes to Amit Klein
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(Trusteer) for identifying this problem.
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The patch I wrote changes the implementation to use a more secure way of
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generating unique IDs. It starts by obtaining a key with reasonable entropy
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which is used with an RC4 stream to generate the cryptographically secure
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transaction IDs.
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Note that the key generation code (in ares_init:randomize_key) has two
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versions, the Windows specific one uses a cryptographically safe function
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provided (but undocumented :) by the operating system (described at
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http://blogs.msdn.com/michael_howard/archive/2005/01/14/353379.aspx). The
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default implementation is a bit naive and uses the standard 'rand'
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function. Surely a better way to generate random keys exists for other
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platforms.
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The patch can be tested by using the adig utility and using the '-s' option.
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- Brad House added ares_save_options() and ares_destroy_options() that can be
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used to keep options for later re-usal when ares_init_options() is used.
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@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ static int config_nameserver(struct server_state **servers, int *nservers,
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static int set_search(ares_channel channel, const char *str);
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static int set_options(ares_channel channel, const char *str);
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static const char *try_option(const char *p, const char *q, const char *opt);
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static void init_id_key(rc4_key* key,int key_data_len);
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#ifndef WIN32
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static int sortlist_alloc(struct apattern **sortlist, int *nsort, struct apattern *pat);
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static int ip_addr(const char *s, int len, struct in_addr *addr);
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@ -85,10 +87,10 @@ static char *try_config(char *s, const char *opt);
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#endif
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#define ARES_CONFIG_CHECK(x) (x->lookups && x->nsort > -1 && \
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x->nservers > -1 && \
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x->nservers > -1 && \
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x->ndomains > -1 && \
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x->ndots > -1 && x->timeout > -1 && \
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x->tries > -1)
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x->ndots > -1 && x->timeout > -1 && \
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x->tries > -1)
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int ares_init(ares_channel *channelptr)
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{
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@ -102,7 +104,6 @@ int ares_init_options(ares_channel *channelptr, struct ares_options *options,
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int i;
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int status = ARES_SUCCESS;
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struct server_state *server;
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struct timeval tv;
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#ifdef CURLDEBUG
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const char *env = getenv("CARES_MEMDEBUG");
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@ -203,15 +204,9 @@ int ares_init_options(ares_channel *channelptr, struct ares_options *options,
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server->qtail = NULL;
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}
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/* Choose a somewhat random query ID. The main point is to avoid
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* collisions with stale queries. An attacker trying to spoof a DNS
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* answer also has to guess the query ID, but it's only a 16-bit
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* field, so there's not much to be done about that.
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*/
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gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
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channel->next_id = (unsigned short)
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((tv.tv_sec ^ tv.tv_usec ^ getpid()) & 0xffff);
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init_id_key(&channel->id_key, ARES_ID_KEY_LEN);
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channel->next_id = ares__generate_new_id(&channel->id_key);
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channel->queries = NULL;
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*channelptr = channel;
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@ -1271,3 +1266,67 @@ static void natural_mask(struct apattern *pat)
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pat->mask.addr.addr4.s_addr = htonl(IN_CLASSC_NET);
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}
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#endif
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/* initialize an rc4 key. If possible a cryptographically secure random key
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is generated using a suitable function (for example win32's RtlGenRandom as
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described in
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http://blogs.msdn.com/michael_howard/archive/2005/01/14/353379.aspx
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otherwise the code defaults to cross-platform albeit less secure mechanism
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using rand
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*/
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static void randomize_key(unsigned char* key,int key_data_len)
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{
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int randomized = 0;
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#ifdef WIN32
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HMODULE lib=LoadLibrary("ADVAPI32.DLL");
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if (lib) {
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BOOLEAN (APIENTRY *pfn)(void*, ULONG) =
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(BOOLEAN (APIENTRY *)(void*,ULONG))GetProcAddress(lib,"SystemFunction036");
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if (pfn && pfn(key,key_data_len) )
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randomized = 1;
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FreeLibrary(lib);
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}
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#endif
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if ( !randomized ) {
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int counter;
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for (counter=0;counter<key_data_len;counter++)
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key[counter]=rand() % 256;
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}
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}
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static void init_id_key(rc4_key* key,int key_data_len)
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{
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unsigned char index1;
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unsigned char index2;
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unsigned char* state;
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short counter;
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unsigned char *key_data_ptr = 0;
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key_data_ptr = calloc(1,key_data_len);
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randomize_key(key->state,key_data_len);
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state = &key->state[0];
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for(counter = 0; counter < 256; counter++)
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state[counter] = counter;
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key->x = 0;
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key->y = 0;
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index1 = 0;
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index2 = 0;
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for(counter = 0; counter < 256; counter++)
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{
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index2 = (key_data_ptr[index1] + state[counter] +
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index2) % 256;
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ARES_SWAP_BYTE(&state[counter], &state[index2]);
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index1 = (index1 + 1) % key_data_len;
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}
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free(key_data_ptr);
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}
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short ares__generate_new_id(rc4_key* key)
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{
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short r;
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ares__rc4(key, (unsigned char *)&r, sizeof(r));
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return r;
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}
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@ -80,6 +80,8 @@
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#endif
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#define ARES_ID_KEY_LEN 31
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#include "ares_ipv6.h"
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struct send_request {
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@ -156,6 +158,13 @@ struct apattern {
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unsigned short type;
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};
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typedef struct rc4_key
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{
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unsigned char state[256];
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unsigned char x;
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unsigned char y;
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} rc4_key;
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struct ares_channeldata {
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/* Configuration data */
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int flags;
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@ -176,6 +185,8 @@ struct ares_channeldata {
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/* ID to use for next query */
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unsigned short next_id;
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/* key to use when generating new ids */
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rc4_key id_key;
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/* Active queries */
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struct query *queries;
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void *sock_state_cb_data;
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};
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void ares__rc4(rc4_key* key,unsigned char *buffer_ptr, int buffer_len);
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void ares__send_query(ares_channel channel, struct query *query, time_t now);
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void ares__close_sockets(ares_channel channel, struct server_state *server);
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int ares__get_hostent(FILE *fp, int family, struct hostent **host);
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int ares__read_line(FILE *fp, char **buf, int *bufsize);
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short ares__generate_new_id(rc4_key* key);
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#define ARES_SWAP_BYTE(a,b) \
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{ unsigned char swapByte = *(a); *(a) = *(b); *(b) = swapByte; }
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#define SOCK_STATE_CALLBACK(c, s, r, w) \
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do { \
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@ -39,6 +39,64 @@ struct qquery {
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static void qcallback(void *arg, int status, unsigned char *abuf, int alen);
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void ares__rc4(rc4_key* key, unsigned char *buffer_ptr, int buffer_len)
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{
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unsigned char x;
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unsigned char y;
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unsigned char* state;
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unsigned char xorIndex;
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short counter;
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x = key->x;
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y = key->y;
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state = &key->state[0];
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for(counter = 0; counter < buffer_len; counter ++)
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{
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x = (x + 1) % 256;
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y = (state[x] + y) % 256;
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ARES_SWAP_BYTE(&state[x], &state[y]);
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xorIndex = (state[x] + state[y]) % 256;
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buffer_ptr[counter] ^= state[xorIndex];
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}
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key->x = x;
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key->y = y;
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}
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static struct query* find_query_by_id(ares_channel channel, int id)
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{
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int qid;
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struct query* q;
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DNS_HEADER_SET_QID(((unsigned char*)&qid), id);
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/* Find the query corresponding to this packet. */
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for (q = channel->queries; q; q = q->next)
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{
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if (q->qid == qid)
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return q;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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/* a unique query id is generated using an rc4 key. Since the id may already
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be used by a running query (as infrequent as it may be), a lookup is
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performed per id generation. In practice this search should happen only
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once per newly generated id
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*/
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static int generate_unique_id(ares_channel channel)
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{
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int id;
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do {
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id = ares__generate_new_id(&channel->id_key);
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} while (find_query_by_id(channel,id));
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return id;
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}
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void ares_query(ares_channel channel, const char *name, int dnsclass,
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int type, ares_callback callback, void *arg)
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{
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rd = !(channel->flags & ARES_FLAG_NORECURSE);
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status = ares_mkquery(name, dnsclass, type, channel->next_id, rd, &qbuf,
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&qlen);
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channel->next_id++;
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channel->next_id = generate_unique_id(channel);
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if (status != ARES_SUCCESS)
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{
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callback(arg, status, NULL, 0);
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