diff --git a/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/dataflow/TaintTracking.qll b/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/dataflow/TaintTracking.qll
index 24892805242..d8bb02a1f42 100644
--- a/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/dataflow/TaintTracking.qll
+++ b/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/dataflow/TaintTracking.qll
@@ -659,6 +659,20 @@ module TaintTracking {
     }
   }
 
+  /**
+   * A taint step through the NodeJS function `util.inspect(..)`.
+   */
+  class UtilInspectTaintStep extends AdditionalTaintStep, DataFlow::InvokeNode {
+    UtilInspectTaintStep() {
+      this =  DataFlow::moduleImport("util").getAMethodCall("inspect")
+    }
+
+    override predicate step(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+      succ = this and
+      this.(DataFlow::CallNode).getAnArgument() = pred
+    }
+  }
+
   /**
    * A conditional checking a tainted string against a regular expression, which is
    * considered to be a sanitizer for all configurations.
diff --git a/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CleartextLogging.qll b/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CleartextLogging.qll
index 5522d301d05..d88990951dc 100644
--- a/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CleartextLogging.qll
+++ b/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CleartextLogging.qll
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ module CleartextLogging {
   import CleartextLoggingCustomizations::CleartextLogging
 
   /**
-   * A dataflow tracking configuration for clear-text logging of sensitive information.
+   * A taint tracking configuration for clear-text logging of sensitive information.
    *
    * This configuration identifies flows from `Source`s, which are sources of
    * sensitive data, to `Sink`s, which is an abstract class representing all
@@ -21,36 +21,40 @@ module CleartextLogging {
    * added either by extending the relevant class, or by subclassing this configuration itself,
    * and amending the sources and sinks.
    */
-  class Configuration extends DataFlow::Configuration {
+  class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     Configuration() { this = "CleartextLogging" }
 
-    override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof Source }
+    override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source, DataFlow::FlowLabel lbl) {
+      source.(Source).getLabel() = lbl
+    }
 
-    override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof Sink }
+    override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink, DataFlow::FlowLabel lbl) {
+      sink.(Sink).getLabel() = lbl
+    }
 
-    override predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof Barrier }
+    override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof Barrier }
 
-    override predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node trg) {
-      StringConcatenation::taintStep(src, trg)
-      or
-      exists(string name | name = "toString" or name = "valueOf" |
-        src.(DataFlow::SourceNode).getAMethodCall(name) = trg
-      )
-      or
+    override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ, DataFlow::FlowLabel lbl) {
+      // Property reads do not propagate taint.
+      not lbl instanceof ProcessEnvLabel and 
+      succ.(DataFlow::PropRead).getBase() = pred
+    }
+       
+    override predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(
+      DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node trg, DataFlow::FlowLabel inlbl, DataFlow::FlowLabel outlbl
+    ) {
+      trg.(DataFlow::PropRead).getBase() = src and
+      inlbl instanceof ProcessEnvLabel and 
+      outlbl.isData() 
+    }
+    
+    override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node trg) {
       // A taint propagating data flow edge through objects: a tainted write taints the entire object.
       exists(DataFlow::PropWrite write |
         write.getRhs() = src and
         trg.(DataFlow::SourceNode).flowsTo(write.getBase())
       )
       or
-      // Taint step through `util.inspect(..)` from Node.js
-      trg = DataFlow::moduleImport("util").getAMethodCall("inspect") and
-      trg.(DataFlow::CallNode).getAnArgument() = src
-      or
-      // Taint step through a `str.replace(..)` call.
-      trg.(DataFlow::MethodCallNode).getCalleeName() = "replace" and
-      trg.(DataFlow::MethodCallNode).getReceiver() = src
-      or
       // Taint through the arguments object.
       exists(DataFlow::CallNode call, Function f, VarAccess var |
         src = call.getAnArgument() and
diff --git a/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CleartextLoggingCustomizations.qll b/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CleartextLoggingCustomizations.qll
index 9dc11d720e7..68e0357e0cf 100644
--- a/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CleartextLoggingCustomizations.qll
+++ b/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CleartextLoggingCustomizations.qll
@@ -15,12 +15,18 @@ module CleartextLogging {
   abstract class Source extends DataFlow::Node {
     /** Gets a string that describes the type of this data flow source. */
     abstract string describe();
+    
+    abstract DataFlow::FlowLabel getLabel();
   }
 
   /**
    * A data flow sink for clear-text logging of sensitive information.
    */
-  abstract class Sink extends DataFlow::Node { }
+  abstract class Sink extends DataFlow::Node {
+    DataFlow::FlowLabel getLabel() {
+      result.isDataOrTaint()
+    }
+  }
 
   /**
    * A barrier for clear-text logging of sensitive information.
@@ -107,6 +113,10 @@ module CleartextLogging {
     }
 
     override string describe() { result = "an access to " + name }
+    
+    override DataFlow::FlowLabel getLabel() {
+      result.isData()
+    }
   }
 
   /** An access to a variable or property that might contain a password. */
@@ -131,6 +141,10 @@ module CleartextLogging {
     }
 
     override string describe() { result = "an access to " + name }
+    
+    override DataFlow::FlowLabel getLabel() {
+      result.isData()
+    }
   }
 
   /** A call that might return a password. */
@@ -143,14 +157,28 @@ module CleartextLogging {
     }
 
     override string describe() { result = "a call to " + name }
+    
+    override DataFlow::FlowLabel getLabel() {
+      result.isData()
+    }
   }
 
 
-  private class ProcessEnvSource extends Source {
+  class ProcessEnvSource extends Source {
     ProcessEnvSource() {
       this = NodeJSLib::process().getAPropertyRead("env")
     }
 
     override string describe() { result = "process environment" }
+    
+    override DataFlow::FlowLabel getLabel() {
+      result.isData() or 
+      result instanceof ProcessEnvLabel
+    }
+  }
+  class ProcessEnvLabel extends DataFlow::FlowLabel{
+    ProcessEnvLabel() {
+      this = "processEnv"
+    }
   }
 }
diff --git a/javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/CleartextLogging.expected b/javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/CleartextLogging.expected
index fb000e2cee2..74c1329983c 100644
--- a/javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/CleartextLogging.expected
+++ b/javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/CleartextLogging.expected
@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ nodes
 | passwords.js:123:31:123:38 | password |
 | passwords.js:123:31:123:48 | password.valueOf() |
 | passwords.js:127:9:132:5 | config |
+| passwords.js:127:9:132:5 | config |
+| passwords.js:127:18:132:5 | {\\n      ... )\\n    } |
 | passwords.js:127:18:132:5 | {\\n      ... )\\n    } |
 | passwords.js:127:18:132:5 | {\\n      ... )\\n    } |
 | passwords.js:130:12:130:19 | password |
@@ -97,6 +99,7 @@ nodes
 | passwords.js:131:12:131:24 | getPassword() |
 | passwords.js:135:17:135:22 | config |
 | passwords.js:135:17:135:22 | config |
+| passwords.js:135:17:135:22 | config |
 | passwords.js:136:17:136:24 | config.x |
 | passwords.js:136:17:136:24 | config.x |
 | passwords.js:137:17:137:24 | config.y |
@@ -111,6 +114,8 @@ nodes
 | passwords.js:152:33:152:43 | process.env |
 | passwords.js:154:21:154:28 | procdesc |
 | passwords.js:156:17:156:27 | process.env |
+| passwords.js:157:17:157:27 | process.env |
+| passwords.js:157:17:157:32 | process.env.PATH |
 | passwords_in_browser1.js:2:13:2:20 | password |
 | passwords_in_browser1.js:2:13:2:20 | password |
 | passwords_in_browser1.js:2:13:2:20 | password |
@@ -209,6 +214,8 @@ edges
 | passwords.js:123:31:123:48 | password.valueOf() | passwords.js:123:17:123:48 | name +  ... lueOf() |
 | passwords.js:127:9:132:5 | config | passwords.js:135:17:135:22 | config |
 | passwords.js:127:9:132:5 | config | passwords.js:135:17:135:22 | config |
+| passwords.js:127:9:132:5 | config | passwords.js:135:17:135:22 | config |
+| passwords.js:127:18:132:5 | {\\n      ... )\\n    } | passwords.js:127:9:132:5 | config |
 | passwords.js:127:18:132:5 | {\\n      ... )\\n    } | passwords.js:127:9:132:5 | config |
 | passwords.js:127:18:132:5 | {\\n      ... )\\n    } | passwords.js:127:9:132:5 | config |
 | passwords.js:130:12:130:19 | password | passwords.js:127:18:132:5 | {\\n      ... )\\n    } |
@@ -228,6 +235,7 @@ edges
 | passwords.js:152:20:152:63 | Util.in ... /g, '') | passwords.js:152:9:152:63 | procdesc |
 | passwords.js:152:33:152:43 | process.env | passwords.js:152:20:152:44 | Util.in ... ss.env) |
 | passwords.js:154:21:154:28 | procdesc | passwords.js:142:26:142:34 | arguments |
+| passwords.js:157:17:157:27 | process.env | passwords.js:157:17:157:32 | process.env.PATH |
 | passwords_in_server_5.js:4:7:4:24 | req.query.password | passwords_in_server_5.js:7:12:7:12 | x |
 | passwords_in_server_5.js:7:12:7:12 | x | passwords_in_server_5.js:8:17:8:17 | x |
 | passwords_in_server_5.js:7:12:7:12 | x | passwords_in_server_5.js:8:17:8:17 | x |
@@ -262,6 +270,7 @@ edges
 | passwords.js:142:26:142:34 | arguments | passwords.js:150:21:150:31 | process.env | passwords.js:142:26:142:34 | arguments | Sensitive data returned by $@ is logged here. | passwords.js:150:21:150:31 | process.env | process environment |
 | passwords.js:142:26:142:34 | arguments | passwords.js:152:33:152:43 | process.env | passwords.js:142:26:142:34 | arguments | Sensitive data returned by $@ is logged here. | passwords.js:152:33:152:43 | process.env | process environment |
 | passwords.js:156:17:156:27 | process.env | passwords.js:156:17:156:27 | process.env | passwords.js:156:17:156:27 | process.env | Sensitive data returned by $@ is logged here. | passwords.js:156:17:156:27 | process.env | process environment |
+| passwords.js:157:17:157:32 | process.env.PATH | passwords.js:157:17:157:27 | process.env | passwords.js:157:17:157:32 | process.env.PATH | Sensitive data returned by $@ is logged here. | passwords.js:157:17:157:27 | process.env | process environment |
 | passwords_in_server_1.js:6:13:6:20 | password | passwords_in_server_1.js:6:13:6:20 | password | passwords_in_server_1.js:6:13:6:20 | password | Sensitive data returned by $@ is logged here. | passwords_in_server_1.js:6:13:6:20 | password | an access to password |
 | passwords_in_server_2.js:3:13:3:20 | password | passwords_in_server_2.js:3:13:3:20 | password | passwords_in_server_2.js:3:13:3:20 | password | Sensitive data returned by $@ is logged here. | passwords_in_server_2.js:3:13:3:20 | password | an access to password |
 | passwords_in_server_3.js:2:13:2:20 | password | passwords_in_server_3.js:2:13:2:20 | password | passwords_in_server_3.js:2:13:2:20 | password | Sensitive data returned by $@ is logged here. | passwords_in_server_3.js:2:13:2:20 | password | an access to password |
diff --git a/javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/passwords.js b/javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/passwords.js
index 8441438a8f4..d248af3db21 100644
--- a/javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/passwords.js
+++ b/javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/passwords.js
@@ -154,5 +154,5 @@ var Util = require('util');
     indirectLogCall(procdesc); // NOT OK
 
     console.log(process.env); // NOT OK
-    console.log(process.env.PATH); // <- Should be marked, but isn't. Hopefully fixed when introducing flow-labels.
+    console.log(process.env.PATH); // NOT OK.
 });
\ No newline at end of file