Move binary packet protocols and censoring out of ssh.c.
sshbpp.h now defines a classoid that encapsulates both directions of
an SSH binary packet protocol - that is, a system for reading a
bufchain of incoming data and turning it into a stream of PktIn, and
another system for taking a PktOut and turning it into data on an
outgoing bufchain.
The state structure in each of those files contains everything that
used to be in the 'rdpkt2_state' structure and its friends, and also
quite a lot of bits and pieces like cipher and MAC states that used to
live in the main Ssh structure.
One minor effect of this layer separation is that I've had to extend
the packet dispatch table by one, because the BPP layer can no longer
directly trigger sending of SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for a message too
short to have a type byte. Instead, I extend the PktIn type field to
use an out-of-range value to encode that, and the easiest way to make
that trigger an UNIMPLEMENTED message is to have the dispatch table
contain an entry for it.
(That's a system that may come in useful again - I was also wondering
about inventing a fake type code to indicate network EOF, so that that
could be propagated through the layers and be handled by whichever one
currently knew best how to respond.)
I've also moved the packet-censoring code into its own pair of files,
partly because I was going to want to do that anyway sooner or later,
and mostly because it's called from the BPP code, and the SSH-2
version in particular has to be called from both the main SSH-2 BPP
and the bare unencrypted protocol used for connection sharing. While I
was at it, I took the opportunity to merge the outgoing and incoming
censor functions, so that the parts that were common between them
(e.g. CHANNEL_DATA messages look the same in both directions) didn't
need to be repeated.
2018-06-09 11:09:10 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Binary packet protocol for SSH-1.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <assert.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include "putty.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "ssh.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "sshbpp.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "sshcr.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct ssh1_bpp_state {
|
|
|
|
int crState;
|
|
|
|
long len, pad, biglen, length, maxlen;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *data;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long realcrc, gotcrc;
|
|
|
|
int chunk;
|
|
|
|
PktIn *pktin;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-13 15:29:32 +03:00
|
|
|
ssh1_cipher *cipher;
|
Move binary packet protocols and censoring out of ssh.c.
sshbpp.h now defines a classoid that encapsulates both directions of
an SSH binary packet protocol - that is, a system for reading a
bufchain of incoming data and turning it into a stream of PktIn, and
another system for taking a PktOut and turning it into data on an
outgoing bufchain.
The state structure in each of those files contains everything that
used to be in the 'rdpkt2_state' structure and its friends, and also
quite a lot of bits and pieces like cipher and MAC states that used to
live in the main Ssh structure.
One minor effect of this layer separation is that I've had to extend
the packet dispatch table by one, because the BPP layer can no longer
directly trigger sending of SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for a message too
short to have a type byte. Instead, I extend the PktIn type field to
use an out-of-range value to encode that, and the easiest way to make
that trigger an UNIMPLEMENTED message is to have the dispatch table
contain an entry for it.
(That's a system that may come in useful again - I was also wondering
about inventing a fake type code to indicate network EOF, so that that
could be propagated through the layers and be handled by whichever one
currently knew best how to respond.)
I've also moved the packet-censoring code into its own pair of files,
partly because I was going to want to do that anyway sooner or later,
and mostly because it's called from the BPP code, and the SSH-2
version in particular has to be called from both the main SSH-2 BPP
and the bare unencrypted protocol used for connection sharing. While I
was at it, I took the opportunity to merge the outgoing and incoming
censor functions, so that the parts that were common between them
(e.g. CHANNEL_DATA messages look the same in both directions) didn't
need to be repeated.
2018-06-09 11:09:10 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2018-09-13 15:00:56 +03:00
|
|
|
struct crcda_ctx *crcda_ctx;
|
Move binary packet protocols and censoring out of ssh.c.
sshbpp.h now defines a classoid that encapsulates both directions of
an SSH binary packet protocol - that is, a system for reading a
bufchain of incoming data and turning it into a stream of PktIn, and
another system for taking a PktOut and turning it into data on an
outgoing bufchain.
The state structure in each of those files contains everything that
used to be in the 'rdpkt2_state' structure and its friends, and also
quite a lot of bits and pieces like cipher and MAC states that used to
live in the main Ssh structure.
One minor effect of this layer separation is that I've had to extend
the packet dispatch table by one, because the BPP layer can no longer
directly trigger sending of SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for a message too
short to have a type byte. Instead, I extend the PktIn type field to
use an out-of-range value to encode that, and the easiest way to make
that trigger an UNIMPLEMENTED message is to have the dispatch table
contain an entry for it.
(That's a system that may come in useful again - I was also wondering
about inventing a fake type code to indicate network EOF, so that that
could be propagated through the layers and be handled by whichever one
currently knew best how to respond.)
I've also moved the packet-censoring code into its own pair of files,
partly because I was going to want to do that anyway sooner or later,
and mostly because it's called from the BPP code, and the SSH-2
version in particular has to be called from both the main SSH-2 BPP
and the bare unencrypted protocol used for connection sharing. While I
was at it, I took the opportunity to merge the outgoing and incoming
censor functions, so that the parts that were common between them
(e.g. CHANNEL_DATA messages look the same in both directions) didn't
need to be repeated.
2018-06-09 11:09:10 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void *compctx, *decompctx;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BinaryPacketProtocol bpp;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ssh1_bpp_free(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp);
|
|
|
|
static void ssh1_bpp_handle_input(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp);
|
|
|
|
static PktOut *ssh1_bpp_new_pktout(int type);
|
|
|
|
static void ssh1_bpp_format_packet(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp, PktOut *pkt);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const struct BinaryPacketProtocolVtable ssh1_bpp_vtable = {
|
|
|
|
ssh1_bpp_free,
|
|
|
|
ssh1_bpp_handle_input,
|
|
|
|
ssh1_bpp_new_pktout,
|
|
|
|
ssh1_bpp_format_packet,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BinaryPacketProtocol *ssh1_bpp_new(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ssh1_bpp_state *s = snew(struct ssh1_bpp_state);
|
|
|
|
memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
|
|
|
|
s->bpp.vt = &ssh1_bpp_vtable;
|
|
|
|
return &s->bpp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ssh1_bpp_free(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ssh1_bpp_state *s = FROMFIELD(bpp, struct ssh1_bpp_state, bpp);
|
|
|
|
if (s->cipher)
|
2018-09-13 15:29:32 +03:00
|
|
|
ssh1_cipher_free(s->cipher);
|
Move binary packet protocols and censoring out of ssh.c.
sshbpp.h now defines a classoid that encapsulates both directions of
an SSH binary packet protocol - that is, a system for reading a
bufchain of incoming data and turning it into a stream of PktIn, and
another system for taking a PktOut and turning it into data on an
outgoing bufchain.
The state structure in each of those files contains everything that
used to be in the 'rdpkt2_state' structure and its friends, and also
quite a lot of bits and pieces like cipher and MAC states that used to
live in the main Ssh structure.
One minor effect of this layer separation is that I've had to extend
the packet dispatch table by one, because the BPP layer can no longer
directly trigger sending of SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for a message too
short to have a type byte. Instead, I extend the PktIn type field to
use an out-of-range value to encode that, and the easiest way to make
that trigger an UNIMPLEMENTED message is to have the dispatch table
contain an entry for it.
(That's a system that may come in useful again - I was also wondering
about inventing a fake type code to indicate network EOF, so that that
could be propagated through the layers and be handled by whichever one
currently knew best how to respond.)
I've also moved the packet-censoring code into its own pair of files,
partly because I was going to want to do that anyway sooner or later,
and mostly because it's called from the BPP code, and the SSH-2
version in particular has to be called from both the main SSH-2 BPP
and the bare unencrypted protocol used for connection sharing. While I
was at it, I took the opportunity to merge the outgoing and incoming
censor functions, so that the parts that were common between them
(e.g. CHANNEL_DATA messages look the same in both directions) didn't
need to be repeated.
2018-06-09 11:09:10 +03:00
|
|
|
if (s->compctx)
|
|
|
|
zlib_compress_cleanup(s->compctx);
|
|
|
|
if (s->decompctx)
|
|
|
|
zlib_decompress_cleanup(s->decompctx);
|
|
|
|
if (s->crcda_ctx)
|
|
|
|
crcda_free_context(s->crcda_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (s->pktin)
|
|
|
|
ssh_unref_packet(s->pktin);
|
|
|
|
sfree(s);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void ssh1_bpp_new_cipher(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp,
|
2018-09-13 15:29:32 +03:00
|
|
|
const struct ssh1_cipheralg *cipher,
|
Move binary packet protocols and censoring out of ssh.c.
sshbpp.h now defines a classoid that encapsulates both directions of
an SSH binary packet protocol - that is, a system for reading a
bufchain of incoming data and turning it into a stream of PktIn, and
another system for taking a PktOut and turning it into data on an
outgoing bufchain.
The state structure in each of those files contains everything that
used to be in the 'rdpkt2_state' structure and its friends, and also
quite a lot of bits and pieces like cipher and MAC states that used to
live in the main Ssh structure.
One minor effect of this layer separation is that I've had to extend
the packet dispatch table by one, because the BPP layer can no longer
directly trigger sending of SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for a message too
short to have a type byte. Instead, I extend the PktIn type field to
use an out-of-range value to encode that, and the easiest way to make
that trigger an UNIMPLEMENTED message is to have the dispatch table
contain an entry for it.
(That's a system that may come in useful again - I was also wondering
about inventing a fake type code to indicate network EOF, so that that
could be propagated through the layers and be handled by whichever one
currently knew best how to respond.)
I've also moved the packet-censoring code into its own pair of files,
partly because I was going to want to do that anyway sooner or later,
and mostly because it's called from the BPP code, and the SSH-2
version in particular has to be called from both the main SSH-2 BPP
and the bare unencrypted protocol used for connection sharing. While I
was at it, I took the opportunity to merge the outgoing and incoming
censor functions, so that the parts that were common between them
(e.g. CHANNEL_DATA messages look the same in both directions) didn't
need to be repeated.
2018-06-09 11:09:10 +03:00
|
|
|
const void *session_key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ssh1_bpp_state *s;
|
|
|
|
assert(bpp->vt == &ssh1_bpp_vtable);
|
|
|
|
s = FROMFIELD(bpp, struct ssh1_bpp_state, bpp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert(!s->cipher);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-13 15:29:32 +03:00
|
|
|
if (cipher) {
|
|
|
|
s->cipher = ssh1_cipher_new(cipher);
|
|
|
|
ssh1_cipher_sesskey(s->cipher, session_key);
|
Move binary packet protocols and censoring out of ssh.c.
sshbpp.h now defines a classoid that encapsulates both directions of
an SSH binary packet protocol - that is, a system for reading a
bufchain of incoming data and turning it into a stream of PktIn, and
another system for taking a PktOut and turning it into data on an
outgoing bufchain.
The state structure in each of those files contains everything that
used to be in the 'rdpkt2_state' structure and its friends, and also
quite a lot of bits and pieces like cipher and MAC states that used to
live in the main Ssh structure.
One minor effect of this layer separation is that I've had to extend
the packet dispatch table by one, because the BPP layer can no longer
directly trigger sending of SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for a message too
short to have a type byte. Instead, I extend the PktIn type field to
use an out-of-range value to encode that, and the easiest way to make
that trigger an UNIMPLEMENTED message is to have the dispatch table
contain an entry for it.
(That's a system that may come in useful again - I was also wondering
about inventing a fake type code to indicate network EOF, so that that
could be propagated through the layers and be handled by whichever one
currently knew best how to respond.)
I've also moved the packet-censoring code into its own pair of files,
partly because I was going to want to do that anyway sooner or later,
and mostly because it's called from the BPP code, and the SSH-2
version in particular has to be called from both the main SSH-2 BPP
and the bare unencrypted protocol used for connection sharing. While I
was at it, I took the opportunity to merge the outgoing and incoming
censor functions, so that the parts that were common between them
(e.g. CHANNEL_DATA messages look the same in both directions) didn't
need to be repeated.
2018-06-09 11:09:10 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert(!s->crcda_ctx);
|
|
|
|
s->crcda_ctx = crcda_make_context();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void ssh1_bpp_start_compression(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ssh1_bpp_state *s;
|
|
|
|
assert(bpp->vt == &ssh1_bpp_vtable);
|
|
|
|
s = FROMFIELD(bpp, struct ssh1_bpp_state, bpp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert(!s->compctx);
|
|
|
|
assert(!s->decompctx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->compctx = zlib_compress_init();
|
|
|
|
s->decompctx = zlib_decompress_init();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ssh1_bpp_handle_input(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ssh1_bpp_state *s = FROMFIELD(bpp, struct ssh1_bpp_state, bpp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crBegin(s->crState);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
|
|
s->maxlen = 0;
|
|
|
|
s->length = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char lenbuf[4];
|
|
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV(bufchain_try_fetch_consume(
|
|
|
|
bpp->in_raw, lenbuf, 4));
|
|
|
|
s->len = toint(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(lenbuf));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->len < 0 || s->len > 262144) { /* SSH1.5-mandated max size */
|
|
|
|
s->bpp.error = dupprintf(
|
|
|
|
"Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
|
|
|
|
" data stream corruption");
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->pad = 8 - (s->len % 8);
|
|
|
|
s->biglen = s->len + s->pad;
|
|
|
|
s->length = s->len - 5;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Allocate the packet to return, now we know its length.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
s->pktin = snew_plus(PktIn, s->biglen);
|
|
|
|
s->pktin->qnode.prev = s->pktin->qnode.next = NULL;
|
|
|
|
s->pktin->refcount = 1;
|
|
|
|
s->pktin->type = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->maxlen = s->biglen;
|
|
|
|
s->data = snew_plus_get_aux(s->pktin);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV(bufchain_try_fetch_consume(
|
|
|
|
bpp->in_raw, s->data, s->biglen));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->cipher && detect_attack(s->crcda_ctx,
|
|
|
|
s->data, s->biglen, NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
s->bpp.error = dupprintf(
|
|
|
|
"Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!");
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->cipher)
|
2018-09-13 15:29:32 +03:00
|
|
|
ssh1_cipher_decrypt(s->cipher, s->data, s->biglen);
|
Move binary packet protocols and censoring out of ssh.c.
sshbpp.h now defines a classoid that encapsulates both directions of
an SSH binary packet protocol - that is, a system for reading a
bufchain of incoming data and turning it into a stream of PktIn, and
another system for taking a PktOut and turning it into data on an
outgoing bufchain.
The state structure in each of those files contains everything that
used to be in the 'rdpkt2_state' structure and its friends, and also
quite a lot of bits and pieces like cipher and MAC states that used to
live in the main Ssh structure.
One minor effect of this layer separation is that I've had to extend
the packet dispatch table by one, because the BPP layer can no longer
directly trigger sending of SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for a message too
short to have a type byte. Instead, I extend the PktIn type field to
use an out-of-range value to encode that, and the easiest way to make
that trigger an UNIMPLEMENTED message is to have the dispatch table
contain an entry for it.
(That's a system that may come in useful again - I was also wondering
about inventing a fake type code to indicate network EOF, so that that
could be propagated through the layers and be handled by whichever one
currently knew best how to respond.)
I've also moved the packet-censoring code into its own pair of files,
partly because I was going to want to do that anyway sooner or later,
and mostly because it's called from the BPP code, and the SSH-2
version in particular has to be called from both the main SSH-2 BPP
and the bare unencrypted protocol used for connection sharing. While I
was at it, I took the opportunity to merge the outgoing and incoming
censor functions, so that the parts that were common between them
(e.g. CHANNEL_DATA messages look the same in both directions) didn't
need to be repeated.
2018-06-09 11:09:10 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->realcrc = crc32_compute(s->data, s->biglen - 4);
|
|
|
|
s->gotcrc = GET_32BIT(s->data + s->biglen - 4);
|
|
|
|
if (s->gotcrc != s->realcrc) {
|
|
|
|
s->bpp.error = dupprintf(
|
|
|
|
"Incorrect CRC received on packet");
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->decompctx) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *decompblk;
|
|
|
|
int decomplen;
|
|
|
|
if (!zlib_decompress_block(s->decompctx,
|
|
|
|
s->data + s->pad, s->length + 1,
|
|
|
|
&decompblk, &decomplen)) {
|
|
|
|
s->bpp.error = dupprintf(
|
|
|
|
"Zlib decompression encountered invalid data");
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->maxlen < s->pad + decomplen) {
|
|
|
|
PktIn *old_pktin = s->pktin;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->maxlen = s->pad + decomplen;
|
|
|
|
s->pktin = snew_plus(PktIn, s->maxlen);
|
|
|
|
*s->pktin = *old_pktin; /* structure copy */
|
|
|
|
s->data = snew_plus_get_aux(s->pktin);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smemclr(old_pktin, s->biglen);
|
|
|
|
sfree(old_pktin);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(s->data + s->pad, decompblk, decomplen);
|
|
|
|
sfree(decompblk);
|
|
|
|
s->length = decomplen - 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Now we can find the bounds of the semantic content of the
|
|
|
|
* packet, and the initial type byte.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
s->data += s->pad;
|
|
|
|
s->pktin->type = *s->data++;
|
|
|
|
BinarySource_INIT(s->pktin, s->data, s->length);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->bpp.logctx) {
|
|
|
|
logblank_t blanks[MAX_BLANKS];
|
|
|
|
int nblanks = ssh1_censor_packet(
|
|
|
|
s->bpp.pls, s->pktin->type, FALSE,
|
|
|
|
make_ptrlen(s->data, s->length), blanks);
|
|
|
|
log_packet(s->bpp.logctx, PKT_INCOMING, s->pktin->type,
|
|
|
|
ssh1_pkt_type(s->pktin->type),
|
|
|
|
get_ptr(s->pktin), get_avail(s->pktin), nblanks, blanks,
|
|
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pq_push(s->bpp.in_pq, s->pktin);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int type = s->pktin->type;
|
|
|
|
s->pktin = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (type == SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT)
|
|
|
|
s->bpp.seen_disconnect = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crFinishV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static PktOut *ssh1_bpp_new_pktout(int pkt_type)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
PktOut *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
|
|
|
|
pkt->length = 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pkt, pkt_type);
|
|
|
|
pkt->prefix = pkt->length;
|
|
|
|
pkt->type = pkt_type;
|
|
|
|
pkt->downstream_id = 0;
|
|
|
|
pkt->additional_log_text = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return pkt;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ssh1_bpp_format_packet(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp, PktOut *pkt)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ssh1_bpp_state *s = FROMFIELD(bpp, struct ssh1_bpp_state, bpp);
|
|
|
|
int pad, biglen, i, pktoffs;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long crc;
|
|
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->bpp.logctx) {
|
|
|
|
ptrlen pktdata = make_ptrlen(pkt->data + pkt->prefix,
|
|
|
|
pkt->length - pkt->prefix);
|
|
|
|
logblank_t blanks[MAX_BLANKS];
|
|
|
|
int nblanks = ssh1_censor_packet(
|
|
|
|
s->bpp.pls, pkt->type, TRUE, pktdata, blanks);
|
|
|
|
log_packet(s->bpp.logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->type,
|
|
|
|
ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->type),
|
|
|
|
pktdata.ptr, pktdata.len, nblanks, blanks,
|
|
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->compctx) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *compblk;
|
|
|
|
int complen;
|
|
|
|
zlib_compress_block(s->compctx, pkt->data + 12, pkt->length - 12,
|
Move password-packet padding into the BPP module.
Now when we construct a packet containing sensitive data, we just set
a field saying '... and make it take up at least this much space, to
disguise its true size', and nothing in the rest of the system worries
about that flag until ssh2bpp.c acts on it.
Also, I've changed the strategy for doing the padding. Previously, we
were following the real packet with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to make up the
size. But that was only a partial defence: it works OK against passive
traffic analysis, but an attacker proxying the TCP stream and
dribbling it out one byte at a time could still have found out the
size of the real packet by noting when the dribbled data provoked a
response. Now I put the SSH_MSG_IGNORE _first_, which should defeat
that attack.
But that in turn doesn't work when we're doing compression, because we
can't predict the compressed sizes accurately enough to make that
strategy sensible. Fortunately, compression provides an alternative
strategy anyway: if we've got zlib turned on when we send one of these
sensitive packets, then we can pad out the compressed zlib data as
much as we like by adding empty RFC1951 blocks (effectively chaining
ZLIB_PARTIAL_FLUSHes). So both strategies should now be dribble-proof.
2018-07-09 22:30:11 +03:00
|
|
|
&compblk, &complen, 0);
|
Move binary packet protocols and censoring out of ssh.c.
sshbpp.h now defines a classoid that encapsulates both directions of
an SSH binary packet protocol - that is, a system for reading a
bufchain of incoming data and turning it into a stream of PktIn, and
another system for taking a PktOut and turning it into data on an
outgoing bufchain.
The state structure in each of those files contains everything that
used to be in the 'rdpkt2_state' structure and its friends, and also
quite a lot of bits and pieces like cipher and MAC states that used to
live in the main Ssh structure.
One minor effect of this layer separation is that I've had to extend
the packet dispatch table by one, because the BPP layer can no longer
directly trigger sending of SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for a message too
short to have a type byte. Instead, I extend the PktIn type field to
use an out-of-range value to encode that, and the easiest way to make
that trigger an UNIMPLEMENTED message is to have the dispatch table
contain an entry for it.
(That's a system that may come in useful again - I was also wondering
about inventing a fake type code to indicate network EOF, so that that
could be propagated through the layers and be handled by whichever one
currently knew best how to respond.)
I've also moved the packet-censoring code into its own pair of files,
partly because I was going to want to do that anyway sooner or later,
and mostly because it's called from the BPP code, and the SSH-2
version in particular has to be called from both the main SSH-2 BPP
and the bare unencrypted protocol used for connection sharing. While I
was at it, I took the opportunity to merge the outgoing and incoming
censor functions, so that the parts that were common between them
(e.g. CHANNEL_DATA messages look the same in both directions) didn't
need to be repeated.
2018-06-09 11:09:10 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Replace the uncompressed packet data with the compressed
|
|
|
|
* version. */
|
|
|
|
pkt->length = 12;
|
|
|
|
put_data(pkt, compblk, complen);
|
|
|
|
sfree(compblk);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
put_uint32(pkt, 0); /* space for CRC */
|
|
|
|
len = pkt->length - 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
|
|
|
|
pad = 8 - (len % 8);
|
|
|
|
pktoffs = 8 - pad;
|
|
|
|
biglen = len + pad; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = pktoffs; i < 4+8; i++)
|
|
|
|
pkt->data[i] = random_byte();
|
|
|
|
crc = crc32_compute(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4,
|
|
|
|
biglen - 4); /* all ex len */
|
|
|
|
PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4 + biglen - 4, crc);
|
|
|
|
PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->cipher)
|
2018-09-13 15:29:32 +03:00
|
|
|
ssh1_cipher_encrypt(s->cipher, pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen);
|
Move binary packet protocols and censoring out of ssh.c.
sshbpp.h now defines a classoid that encapsulates both directions of
an SSH binary packet protocol - that is, a system for reading a
bufchain of incoming data and turning it into a stream of PktIn, and
another system for taking a PktOut and turning it into data on an
outgoing bufchain.
The state structure in each of those files contains everything that
used to be in the 'rdpkt2_state' structure and its friends, and also
quite a lot of bits and pieces like cipher and MAC states that used to
live in the main Ssh structure.
One minor effect of this layer separation is that I've had to extend
the packet dispatch table by one, because the BPP layer can no longer
directly trigger sending of SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for a message too
short to have a type byte. Instead, I extend the PktIn type field to
use an out-of-range value to encode that, and the easiest way to make
that trigger an UNIMPLEMENTED message is to have the dispatch table
contain an entry for it.
(That's a system that may come in useful again - I was also wondering
about inventing a fake type code to indicate network EOF, so that that
could be propagated through the layers and be handled by whichever one
currently knew best how to respond.)
I've also moved the packet-censoring code into its own pair of files,
partly because I was going to want to do that anyway sooner or later,
and mostly because it's called from the BPP code, and the SSH-2
version in particular has to be called from both the main SSH-2 BPP
and the bare unencrypted protocol used for connection sharing. While I
was at it, I took the opportunity to merge the outgoing and incoming
censor functions, so that the parts that were common between them
(e.g. CHANNEL_DATA messages look the same in both directions) didn't
need to be repeated.
2018-06-09 11:09:10 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bufchain_add(s->bpp.out_raw, pkt->data + pktoffs,
|
|
|
|
biglen + 4); /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
|
2018-07-09 22:59:36 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssh_free_pktout(pkt);
|
Move binary packet protocols and censoring out of ssh.c.
sshbpp.h now defines a classoid that encapsulates both directions of
an SSH binary packet protocol - that is, a system for reading a
bufchain of incoming data and turning it into a stream of PktIn, and
another system for taking a PktOut and turning it into data on an
outgoing bufchain.
The state structure in each of those files contains everything that
used to be in the 'rdpkt2_state' structure and its friends, and also
quite a lot of bits and pieces like cipher and MAC states that used to
live in the main Ssh structure.
One minor effect of this layer separation is that I've had to extend
the packet dispatch table by one, because the BPP layer can no longer
directly trigger sending of SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for a message too
short to have a type byte. Instead, I extend the PktIn type field to
use an out-of-range value to encode that, and the easiest way to make
that trigger an UNIMPLEMENTED message is to have the dispatch table
contain an entry for it.
(That's a system that may come in useful again - I was also wondering
about inventing a fake type code to indicate network EOF, so that that
could be propagated through the layers and be handled by whichever one
currently knew best how to respond.)
I've also moved the packet-censoring code into its own pair of files,
partly because I was going to want to do that anyway sooner or later,
and mostly because it's called from the BPP code, and the SSH-2
version in particular has to be called from both the main SSH-2 BPP
and the bare unencrypted protocol used for connection sharing. While I
was at it, I took the opportunity to merge the outgoing and incoming
censor functions, so that the parts that were common between them
(e.g. CHANNEL_DATA messages look the same in both directions) didn't
need to be repeated.
2018-06-09 11:09:10 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|