putty/sshgss.h

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6.5 KiB
C
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#ifndef PUTTY_SSHGSS_H
#define PUTTY_SSHGSS_H
#include "putty.h"
#include "pgssapi.h"
#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
#define SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
typedef void *Ssh_gss_ctx;
typedef enum Ssh_gss_stat {
SSH_GSS_OK = 0,
SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED,
SSH_GSS_NO_MEM,
SSH_GSS_BAD_HOST_NAME,
Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only. This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments: * Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT or the old service ticket is nearly expired. * Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials. * Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility. My further comments: The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be _permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose. Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange. However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 09:18:59 +03:00
SSH_GSS_BAD_MIC,
SSH_GSS_NO_CREDS,
SSH_GSS_FAILURE
} Ssh_gss_stat;
#define SSH_GSS_S_COMPLETE SSH_GSS_OK
#define SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(buf) do { \
(*buf).length = 0; \
(*buf).value = NULL; \
} while (0)
typedef gss_buffer_desc Ssh_gss_buf;
typedef gss_name_t Ssh_gss_name;
Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only. This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments: * Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT or the old service ticket is nearly expired. * Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials. * Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility. My further comments: The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be _permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose. Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange. However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 09:18:59 +03:00
#define GSS_NO_EXPIRATION ((time_t)-1)
#define GSS_DEF_REKEY_MINS 2 /* Default minutes between GSS cache checks */
/* Functions, provided by either wingss.c or sshgssc.c */
struct ssh_gss_library;
/*
* Prepare a collection of GSSAPI libraries for use in a single SSH
* connection. Returns a structure containing a list of libraries,
* with their ids (see struct ssh_gss_library below) filled in so
* that the client can go through them in the SSH user's preferred
* order.
*
* Must always return non-NULL. (Even if no libraries are available,
* it must return an empty structure.)
*
* The free function cleans up the structure, and its associated
* libraries (if any).
*/
struct ssh_gss_liblist {
struct ssh_gss_library *libraries;
int nlibraries;
};
Post-release destabilisation! Completely remove the struct type 'Config' in putty.h, which stores all PuTTY's settings and includes an arbitrary length limit on every single one of those settings which is stored in string form. In place of it is 'Conf', an opaque data type everywhere outside the new file conf.c, which stores a list of (key, value) pairs in which every key contains an integer identifying a configuration setting, and for some of those integers the key also contains extra parts (so that, for instance, CONF_environmt is a string-to-string mapping). Everywhere that a Config was previously used, a Conf is now; everywhere there was a Config structure copy, conf_copy() is called; every lookup, adjustment, load and save operation on a Config has been rewritten; and there's a mechanism for serialising a Conf into a binary blob and back for use with Duplicate Session. User-visible effects of this change _should_ be minimal, though I don't doubt I've introduced one or two bugs here and there which will eventually be found. The _intended_ visible effects of this change are that all arbitrary limits on configuration strings and lists (e.g. limit on number of port forwardings) should now disappear; that list boxes in the configuration will now be displayed in a sorted order rather than the arbitrary order in which they were added to the list (since the underlying data structure is now a sorted tree234 rather than an ad-hoc comma-separated string); and one more specific change, which is that local and dynamic port forwardings on the same port number are now mutually exclusive in the configuration (putting 'D' in the key rather than the value was a mistake in the first place). One other reorganisation as a result of this is that I've moved all the dialog.c standard handlers (dlg_stdeditbox_handler and friends) out into config.c, because I can't really justify calling them generic any more. When they took a pointer to an arbitrary structure type and the offset of a field within that structure, they were independent of whether that structure was a Config or something completely different, but now they really do expect to talk to a Conf, which can _only_ be used for PuTTY configuration, so I've renamed them all things like conf_editbox_handler and moved them out of the nominally independent dialog-box management module into the PuTTY-specific config.c. [originally from svn r9214]
2011-07-14 22:52:21 +04:00
struct ssh_gss_liblist *ssh_gss_setup(Conf *conf);
void ssh_gss_cleanup(struct ssh_gss_liblist *list);
/*
* Fills in buf with a string describing the GSSAPI mechanism in
* use. buf->data is not dynamically allocated.
*/
typedef Ssh_gss_stat (*t_ssh_gss_indicate_mech)(struct ssh_gss_library *lib,
Ssh_gss_buf *buf);
/*
* Converts a name such as a hostname into a GSSAPI internal form,
* which is placed in "out". The result should be freed by
* ssh_gss_release_name().
*/
typedef Ssh_gss_stat (*t_ssh_gss_import_name)(struct ssh_gss_library *lib,
char *in, Ssh_gss_name *out);
/*
* Frees the contents of an Ssh_gss_name structure filled in by
* ssh_gss_import_name().
*/
typedef Ssh_gss_stat (*t_ssh_gss_release_name)(struct ssh_gss_library *lib,
Ssh_gss_name *name);
/*
* The main GSSAPI security context setup function. The "out"
* parameter will need to be freed by ssh_gss_free_tok.
*/
typedef Ssh_gss_stat (*t_ssh_gss_init_sec_context)
(struct ssh_gss_library *lib,
Ssh_gss_ctx *ctx, Ssh_gss_name name, int delegate,
Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only. This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments: * Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT or the old service ticket is nearly expired. * Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials. * Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility. My further comments: The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be _permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose. Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange. However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 09:18:59 +03:00
Ssh_gss_buf *in, Ssh_gss_buf *out, time_t *expiry,
unsigned long *lifetime);
/*
* Frees the contents of an Ssh_gss_buf filled in by
* ssh_gss_init_sec_context(). Do not accidentally call this on
* something filled in by ssh_gss_get_mic() (which requires a
* different free function) or something filled in by any other
* way.
*/
typedef Ssh_gss_stat (*t_ssh_gss_free_tok)(struct ssh_gss_library *lib,
Ssh_gss_buf *);
/*
* Acquires the credentials to perform authentication in the first
* place. Needs to be freed by ssh_gss_release_cred().
*/
typedef Ssh_gss_stat (*t_ssh_gss_acquire_cred)(struct ssh_gss_library *lib,
Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only. This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments: * Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT or the old service ticket is nearly expired. * Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials. * Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility. My further comments: The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be _permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose. Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange. However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 09:18:59 +03:00
Ssh_gss_ctx *,
time_t *expiry);
/*
* Frees the contents of an Ssh_gss_ctx filled in by
* ssh_gss_acquire_cred().
*/
typedef Ssh_gss_stat (*t_ssh_gss_release_cred)(struct ssh_gss_library *lib,
Ssh_gss_ctx *);
/*
* Gets a MIC for some input data. "out" needs to be freed by
* ssh_gss_free_mic().
*/
typedef Ssh_gss_stat (*t_ssh_gss_get_mic)(struct ssh_gss_library *lib,
Ssh_gss_ctx ctx, Ssh_gss_buf *in,
Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only. This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments: * Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT or the old service ticket is nearly expired. * Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials. * Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility. My further comments: The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be _permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose. Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange. However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 09:18:59 +03:00
Ssh_gss_buf *out);
/*
* Validates an input MIC for some input data.
*/
typedef Ssh_gss_stat (*t_ssh_gss_verify_mic)(struct ssh_gss_library *lib,
Ssh_gss_ctx ctx,
Ssh_gss_buf *in_data,
Ssh_gss_buf *in_mic);
/*
* Frees the contents of an Ssh_gss_buf filled in by
* ssh_gss_get_mic(). Do not accidentally call this on something
* filled in by ssh_gss_init_sec_context() (which requires a
* different free function) or something filled in by any other
* way.
*/
typedef Ssh_gss_stat (*t_ssh_gss_free_mic)(struct ssh_gss_library *lib,
Ssh_gss_buf *);
/*
* Return an error message after authentication failed. The
* message string is returned in "buf", with buf->len giving the
* number of characters of printable message text and buf->data
* containing one more character which is a trailing NUL.
* buf->data should be manually freed by the caller.
*/
typedef Ssh_gss_stat (*t_ssh_gss_display_status)(struct ssh_gss_library *lib,
Ssh_gss_ctx, Ssh_gss_buf *buf);
struct ssh_gss_library {
/*
* Identifying number in the enumeration used by the
* configuration code to specify a preference order.
*/
int id;
/*
* Filled in at initialisation time, if there's anything
* interesting to say about how GSSAPI was initialised (e.g.
* which of a number of alternative libraries was used).
*/
const char *gsslogmsg;
/*
* Function pointers implementing the SSH wrapper layer on top
* of GSSAPI. (Defined in sshgssc, typically, though Windows
* provides an alternative layer to sit on top of the annoyingly
* different SSPI.)
*/
t_ssh_gss_indicate_mech indicate_mech;
t_ssh_gss_import_name import_name;
t_ssh_gss_release_name release_name;
t_ssh_gss_init_sec_context init_sec_context;
t_ssh_gss_free_tok free_tok;
t_ssh_gss_acquire_cred acquire_cred;
t_ssh_gss_release_cred release_cred;
t_ssh_gss_get_mic get_mic;
Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only. This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments: * Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT or the old service ticket is nearly expired. * Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials. * Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility. My further comments: The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be _permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose. Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange. However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 09:18:59 +03:00
t_ssh_gss_verify_mic verify_mic;
t_ssh_gss_free_mic free_mic;
t_ssh_gss_display_status display_status;
/*
* Additional data for the wrapper layers.
*/
union {
struct gssapi_functions gssapi;
/*
* The SSPI wrappers don't need to store their Windows API
* function pointers in this structure, because there can't
* be more than one set of them available.
*/
} u;
/*
* Wrapper layers will often also need to store a library handle
* of some sort for cleanup time.
*/
void *handle;
};
Move most of ssh.c out into separate source files. I've tried to separate out as many individually coherent changes from this work as I could into their own commits, but here's where I run out and have to commit the rest of this major refactoring as a big-bang change. Most of ssh.c is now no longer in ssh.c: all five of the main coroutines that handle layers of the SSH-1 and SSH-2 protocols now each have their own source file to live in, and a lot of the supporting functions have moved into the appropriate one of those too. The new abstraction is a vtable called 'PacketProtocolLayer', which has an input and output packet queue. Each layer's main coroutine is invoked from the method ssh_ppl_process_queue(), which is usually (though not exclusively) triggered automatically when things are pushed on the input queue. In SSH-2, the base layer is the transport protocol, and it contains a pair of subsidiary queues by which it passes some of its packets to the higher SSH-2 layers - first userauth and then connection, which are peers at the same level, with the former abdicating in favour of the latter at the appropriate moment. SSH-1 is simpler: the whole login phase of the protocol (crypto setup and authentication) is all in one module, and since SSH-1 has no repeat key exchange, that setup layer abdicates in favour of the connection phase when it's done. ssh.c itself is now about a tenth of its old size (which all by itself is cause for celebration!). Its main job is to set up all the layers, hook them up to each other and to the BPP, and to funnel data back and forth between that collection of modules and external things such as the network and the terminal. Once it's set up a collection of packet protocol layers, it communicates with them partly by calling methods of the base layer (and if that's ssh2transport then it will delegate some functionality to the corresponding methods of its higher layer), and partly by talking directly to the connection layer no matter where it is in the stack by means of the separate ConnectionLayer vtable which I introduced in commit 8001dd4cb, and to which I've now added quite a few extra methods replacing services that used to be internal function calls within ssh.c. (One effect of this is that the SSH-1 and SSH-2 channel storage is now no longer shared - there are distinct struct types ssh1_channel and ssh2_channel. That means a bit more code duplication, but on the plus side, a lot fewer confusing conditionals in the middle of half-shared functions, and less risk of a piece of SSH-1 escaping into SSH-2 or vice versa, which I remember has happened at least once in the past.) The bulk of this commit introduces the five new source files, their common header sshppl.h and some shared supporting routines in sshcommon.c, and rewrites nearly all of ssh.c itself. But it also includes a couple of other changes that I couldn't separate easily enough: Firstly, there's a new handling for socket EOF, in which ssh.c sets an 'input_eof' flag in the BPP, and that responds by checking a flag that tells it whether to report the EOF as an error or not. (This is the main reason for those new BPP_READ / BPP_WAITFOR macros - they can check the EOF flag every time the coroutine is resumed.) Secondly, the error reporting itself is changed around again. I'd expected to put some data fields in the public PacketProtocolLayer structure that it could set to report errors in the same way as the BPPs have been doing, but in the end, I decided propagating all those data fields around was a pain and that even the BPPs shouldn't have been doing it that way. So I've reverted to a system where everything calls back to functions in ssh.c itself to report any connection- ending condition. But there's a new family of those functions, categorising the possible such conditions by semantics, and each one has a different set of detailed effects (e.g. how rudely to close the network connection, what exit status should be passed back to the whole application, whether to send a disconnect message and/or display a GUI error box). I don't expect this to be immediately perfect: of course, the code has been through a big upheaval, new bugs are expected, and I haven't been able to do a full job of testing (e.g. I haven't tested every auth or kex method). But I've checked that it _basically_ works - both SSH protocols, all the different kinds of forwarding channel, more than one auth method, Windows and Linux, connection sharing - and I think it's now at the point where the easiest way to find further bugs is to let it out into the wild and see what users can spot.
2018-09-24 20:28:16 +03:00
/*
* State that has to be shared between all GSSAPI-using parts of the
* same SSH connection, in particular between GSS key exchange and the
* subsequent trivial userauth method that reuses its output.
*/
struct ssh_connection_shared_gss_state {
struct ssh_gss_liblist *libs;
struct ssh_gss_library *lib;
Ssh_gss_name srv_name;
Ssh_gss_ctx ctx;
};
#endif /* NO_GSSAPI */
#endif /*PUTTY_SSHGSS_H*/