default preferred cipher), add code to inject SSH_MSG_IGNOREs to randomise
the IV when using CBC-mode ciphers. Each cipher has a flag to indicate
whether it needs this workaround, and the SSH packet output maze has gained
some extra complexity to implement it.
[originally from svn r5659]
"rijndael128-cbc" names for AES. These are in the IANA namespace, but
never appeared in any secsh-transport draft, and no version of OpenSSH
has supported them without also supporting the aes*-cbc names.
"rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se" gets to live because it's in the private
namespace.
[originally from svn r5607]
aes128-ctr, aes192-ctr, and aes256-ctr. blowfish-ctr and 3des-ctr are
present but disabled, since I haven't tested them yet.
In addition, change the user-visible names of ciphers (as displayed in the
Event Log) to include the mode name and, in Blowfish's case, the key size.
[originally from svn r5605]
malloc functions, which automatically cast to the same type they're
allocating the size of. Should prevent any future errors involving
mallocing the size of the wrong structure type, and will also make
life easier if we ever need to turn the PuTTY core code from real C
into C++-friendly C. I haven't touched the Mac frontend in this
checkin because I couldn't compile or test it.
[originally from svn r3014]
objects to incomplete static array declarations, which I introduced to work
around a bug in SC/MrC. Use #ifdefs to decide whether to enable the workaround
or not.
[originally from svn r2488]
arrya as full definitions, and hence gets upset when it finds a full definition
later. This is a bug (see K&R2 A10.2), but an easy one to work around by
making the tentative definitions incomplete, so I've done that.
[originally from svn r2462]
error messages are currently wrong, and Pageant doesn't yet support
the new key type, and I haven't thoroughly tested that falling back
to password authentication and trying invalid keys etc all work. But
what I have here has successfully performed a public key
authentication, so it's working to at least some extent.
[originally from svn r973]
introduce another layer of abstraction in SSH2 ciphers, such that a
single `logical cipher' (as desired by a user) can equate to more
than one `physical cipher'. This is because AES comes in several key
lengths (PuTTY will pick the highest supported by the remote end)
and several different SSH2-protocol-level names (aes*-cbc,
rijndael*-cbc, and an unofficial one rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se).
[originally from svn r967]
Ben Harris
Jacob Nevins
Simon Tatham