зеркало из https://github.com/github/putty.git
326 строки
9.1 KiB
C
326 строки
9.1 KiB
C
/*
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* winsecur.c: implementation of winsecur.h.
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include "putty.h"
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#if !defined NO_SECURITY
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#define WINSECUR_GLOBAL
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#include "winsecur.h"
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/* Initialised once, then kept around to reuse forever */
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static PSID worldsid, networksid, usersid;
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bool got_advapi(void)
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{
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static bool attempted = false;
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static bool successful;
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static HMODULE advapi;
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if (!attempted) {
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attempted = true;
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advapi = load_system32_dll("advapi32.dll");
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successful = advapi &&
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GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, GetSecurityInfo) &&
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GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, SetSecurityInfo) &&
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GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, OpenProcessToken) &&
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GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, GetTokenInformation) &&
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GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, InitializeSecurityDescriptor) &&
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GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, SetSecurityDescriptorOwner) &&
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GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, SetEntriesInAclA);
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}
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return successful;
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}
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PSID get_user_sid(void)
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{
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HANDLE proc = NULL, tok = NULL;
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TOKEN_USER *user = NULL;
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DWORD toklen, sidlen;
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PSID sid = NULL, ret = NULL;
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if (usersid)
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return usersid;
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if (!got_advapi())
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goto cleanup;
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if ((proc = OpenProcess(MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, false,
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GetCurrentProcessId())) == NULL)
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goto cleanup;
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if (!p_OpenProcessToken(proc, TOKEN_QUERY, &tok))
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goto cleanup;
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if (!p_GetTokenInformation(tok, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &toklen) &&
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GetLastError() != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
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goto cleanup;
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if ((user = (TOKEN_USER *)LocalAlloc(LPTR, toklen)) == NULL)
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goto cleanup;
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if (!p_GetTokenInformation(tok, TokenUser, user, toklen, &toklen))
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goto cleanup;
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sidlen = GetLengthSid(user->User.Sid);
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sid = (PSID)smalloc(sidlen);
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if (!CopySid(sidlen, sid, user->User.Sid))
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goto cleanup;
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/* Success. Move sid into the return value slot, and null it out
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* to stop the cleanup code freeing it. */
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ret = usersid = sid;
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sid = NULL;
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cleanup:
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if (proc != NULL)
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CloseHandle(proc);
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if (tok != NULL)
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CloseHandle(tok);
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if (user != NULL)
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LocalFree(user);
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if (sid != NULL)
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sfree(sid);
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return ret;
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}
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bool getsids(char **error)
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{
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#ifdef __clang__
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#pragma clang diagnostic push
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#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wmissing-braces"
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#endif
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SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY world_auth = SECURITY_WORLD_SID_AUTHORITY;
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SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY nt_auth = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;
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#ifdef __clang__
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#pragma clang diagnostic pop
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#endif
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bool ret = false;
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*error = NULL;
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if (!usersid) {
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if ((usersid = get_user_sid()) == NULL) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to construct SID for current user: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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}
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if (!worldsid) {
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if (!AllocateAndInitializeSid(&world_auth, 1, SECURITY_WORLD_RID,
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0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &worldsid)) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to construct SID for world: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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}
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if (!networksid) {
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if (!AllocateAndInitializeSid(&nt_auth, 1, SECURITY_NETWORK_RID,
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0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &networksid)) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to construct SID for "
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"local same-user access only: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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}
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ret = true;
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cleanup:
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return ret;
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}
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bool make_private_security_descriptor(DWORD permissions,
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PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *psd,
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PACL *acl,
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char **error)
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{
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EXPLICIT_ACCESS ea[3];
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int acl_err;
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bool ret = false;
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*psd = NULL;
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*acl = NULL;
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*error = NULL;
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if (!getsids(error))
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goto cleanup;
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memset(ea, 0, sizeof(ea));
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ea[0].grfAccessPermissions = permissions;
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ea[0].grfAccessMode = REVOKE_ACCESS;
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ea[0].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE;
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ea[0].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
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ea[0].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)worldsid;
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ea[1].grfAccessPermissions = permissions;
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ea[1].grfAccessMode = GRANT_ACCESS;
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ea[1].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE;
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ea[1].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
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ea[1].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)usersid;
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ea[2].grfAccessPermissions = permissions;
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ea[2].grfAccessMode = REVOKE_ACCESS;
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ea[2].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE;
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ea[2].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
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ea[2].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)networksid;
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acl_err = p_SetEntriesInAclA(3, ea, NULL, acl);
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if (acl_err != ERROR_SUCCESS || *acl == NULL) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to construct ACL: %s",
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win_strerror(acl_err));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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*psd = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR)
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LocalAlloc(LPTR, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_MIN_LENGTH);
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if (!*psd) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to allocate security descriptor: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if (!InitializeSecurityDescriptor(*psd, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION)) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to initialise security descriptor: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if (!SetSecurityDescriptorOwner(*psd, usersid, false)) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to set owner in security descriptor: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if (!SetSecurityDescriptorDacl(*psd, true, *acl, false)) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to set DACL in security descriptor: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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ret = true;
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cleanup:
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if (!ret) {
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if (*psd) {
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LocalFree(*psd);
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*psd = NULL;
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}
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if (*acl) {
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LocalFree(*acl);
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*acl = NULL;
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}
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} else {
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sfree(*error);
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*error = NULL;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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static bool really_restrict_process_acl(char **error)
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{
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EXPLICIT_ACCESS ea[2];
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int acl_err;
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bool ret = false;
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PACL acl = NULL;
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static const DWORD nastyace=WRITE_DAC | WRITE_OWNER |
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PROCESS_CREATE_PROCESS | PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD |
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PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE |
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PROCESS_SET_QUOTA | PROCESS_SET_INFORMATION |
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PROCESS_VM_OPERATION | PROCESS_VM_READ | PROCESS_VM_WRITE |
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PROCESS_SUSPEND_RESUME;
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if (!getsids(error))
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goto cleanup;
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memset(ea, 0, sizeof(ea));
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/* Everyone: deny */
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ea[0].grfAccessPermissions = nastyace;
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ea[0].grfAccessMode = DENY_ACCESS;
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ea[0].grfInheritance = SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT;
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ea[0].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
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ea[0].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)worldsid;
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/* User: user ace */
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ea[1].grfAccessPermissions = ~nastyace & 0x1fff;
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ea[1].grfAccessMode = GRANT_ACCESS;
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ea[1].grfInheritance = SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT;
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ea[1].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
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ea[1].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)usersid;
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acl_err = p_SetEntriesInAclA(2, ea, NULL, &acl);
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if (acl_err != ERROR_SUCCESS || acl == NULL) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to construct ACL: %s",
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win_strerror(acl_err));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if (ERROR_SUCCESS != p_SetSecurityInfo
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(GetCurrentProcess(), SE_KERNEL_OBJECT,
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OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION | DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
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usersid, NULL, acl, NULL)) {
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*error = dupprintf("Unable to set process ACL: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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ret=true;
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cleanup:
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if (!ret) {
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if (acl) {
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LocalFree(acl);
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acl = NULL;
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}
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}
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return ret;
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}
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#endif /* !defined NO_SECURITY */
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/*
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* Lock down our process's ACL, to present an obstacle to malware
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* trying to write into its memory. This can't be a full defence,
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* because well timed malware could attack us before this code runs -
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* even if it was unconditionally run at the very start of main(),
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* which we wouldn't want to do anyway because it turns out in practie
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* that interfering with other processes in this way has significant
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* non-infringing uses on Windows (e.g. screen reader software).
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*
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* If we've been requested to do this and are unsuccessful, bomb out
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* via modalfatalbox rather than continue in a less protected mode.
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*
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* This function is intentionally outside the #ifndef NO_SECURITY that
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* covers the rest of this file, because when PuTTY is compiled
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* without the ability to restrict its ACL, we don't want it to
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* silently pretend to honour the instruction to do so.
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*/
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void restrict_process_acl(void)
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{
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char *error = NULL;
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bool ret;
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#if !defined NO_SECURITY
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ret = really_restrict_process_acl(&error);
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#else
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ret = false;
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error = dupstr("ACL restrictions not compiled into this binary");
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#endif
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if (!ret)
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modalfatalbox("Could not restrict process ACL: %s", error);
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}
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