зеркало из https://github.com/github/putty.git
118 строки
4.1 KiB
C
118 строки
4.1 KiB
C
/*
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* RSA key generation.
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*/
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#include <assert.h>
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#include "ssh.h"
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#include "mpint.h"
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#define RSA_EXPONENT 37 /* we like this prime */
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int rsa_generate(RSAKey *key, int bits, progfn_t pfn,
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void *pfnparam)
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{
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unsigned pfirst, qfirst;
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key->sshk.vt = &ssh_rsa;
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/*
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* Set up the phase limits for the progress report. We do this
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* by passing minus the phase number.
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*
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* For prime generation: our initial filter finds things
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* coprime to everything below 2^16. Computing the product of
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* (p-1)/p for all prime p below 2^16 gives about 20.33; so
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* among B-bit integers, one in every 20.33 will get through
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* the initial filter to be a candidate prime.
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*
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* Meanwhile, we are searching for primes in the region of 2^B;
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* since pi(x) ~ x/log(x), when x is in the region of 2^B, the
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* prime density will be d/dx pi(x) ~ 1/log(B), i.e. about
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* 1/0.6931B. So the chance of any given candidate being prime
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* is 20.33/0.6931B, which is roughly 29.34 divided by B.
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*
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* So now we have this probability P, we're looking at an
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* exponential distribution with parameter P: we will manage in
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* one attempt with probability P, in two with probability
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* P(1-P), in three with probability P(1-P)^2, etc. The
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* probability that we have still not managed to find a prime
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* after N attempts is (1-P)^N.
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*
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* We therefore inform the progress indicator of the number B
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* (29.34/B), so that it knows how much to increment by each
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* time. We do this in 16-bit fixed point, so 29.34 becomes
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* 0x1D.57C4.
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*/
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pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PHASE_EXTENT, 1, 0x10000);
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pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_EXP_PHASE, 1, -0x1D57C4 / (bits / 2));
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pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PHASE_EXTENT, 2, 0x10000);
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pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_EXP_PHASE, 2, -0x1D57C4 / (bits - bits / 2));
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pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PHASE_EXTENT, 3, 0x4000);
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pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_LIN_PHASE, 3, 5);
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pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_READY, 0, 0);
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/*
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* We don't generate e; we just use a standard one always.
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*/
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mp_int *exponent = mp_from_integer(RSA_EXPONENT);
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/*
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* Generate p and q: primes with combined length `bits', not
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* congruent to 1 modulo e. (Strictly speaking, we wanted (p-1)
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* and e to be coprime, and (q-1) and e to be coprime, but in
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* general that's slightly more fiddly to arrange. By choosing
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* a prime e, we can simplify the criterion.)
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*
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* We give a min_separation of 2 to invent_firstbits(), ensuring
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* that the two primes won't be very close to each other. (The
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* chance of them being _dangerously_ close is negligible - even
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* more so than an attacker guessing a whole 256-bit session key -
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* but it doesn't cost much to make sure.)
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*/
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invent_firstbits(&pfirst, &qfirst, 2);
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mp_int *p = primegen(bits / 2, RSA_EXPONENT, 1, NULL,
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1, pfn, pfnparam, pfirst);
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mp_int *q = primegen(bits - bits / 2, RSA_EXPONENT, 1, NULL,
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2, pfn, pfnparam, qfirst);
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/*
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* Ensure p > q, by swapping them if not.
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*/
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mp_cond_swap(p, q, mp_cmp_hs(q, p));
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/*
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* Now we have p, q and e. All we need to do now is work out
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* the other helpful quantities: n=pq, d=e^-1 mod (p-1)(q-1),
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* and (q^-1 mod p).
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*/
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pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PROGRESS, 3, 1);
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mp_int *modulus = mp_mul(p, q);
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pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PROGRESS, 3, 2);
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mp_int *pm1 = mp_copy(p);
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mp_sub_integer_into(pm1, pm1, 1);
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mp_int *qm1 = mp_copy(q);
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mp_sub_integer_into(qm1, qm1, 1);
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mp_int *phi_n = mp_mul(pm1, qm1);
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pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PROGRESS, 3, 3);
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mp_free(pm1);
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mp_free(qm1);
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mp_int *private_exponent = mp_invert(exponent, phi_n);
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pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PROGRESS, 3, 4);
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mp_free(phi_n);
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mp_int *iqmp = mp_invert(q, p);
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pfn(pfnparam, PROGFN_PROGRESS, 3, 5);
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/*
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* Populate the returned structure.
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*/
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key->modulus = modulus;
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key->exponent = exponent;
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key->private_exponent = private_exponent;
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key->p = p;
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key->q = q;
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key->iqmp = iqmp;
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return 1;
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}
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