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putty/ssh2bpp.c

926 строки
33 KiB
C
Исходник Ответственный История

/*
* Binary packet protocol for SSH-2.
*/
#include <assert.h>
#include "putty.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshbpp.h"
#include "sshcr.h"
struct ssh2_bpp_direction {
unsigned long sequence;
ssh_cipher *cipher;
ssh2_mac *mac;
bool etm_mode;
const ssh_compression_alg *pending_compression;
};
struct ssh2_bpp_state {
int crState;
long len, pad, payload, packetlen, maclen, length, maxlen;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t bufsize;
unsigned char *data;
unsigned cipherblk;
PktIn *pktin;
struct DataTransferStats *stats;
bool cbc_ignore_workaround;
struct ssh2_bpp_direction in, out;
/* comp and decomp logically belong in the per-direction
* substructure, except that they have different types */
ssh_decompressor *in_decomp;
ssh_compressor *out_comp;
bool is_server;
bool pending_newkeys;
bool pending_compression, seen_userauth_success;
BinaryPacketProtocol bpp;
};
static void ssh2_bpp_free(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp);
static void ssh2_bpp_handle_input(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp);
static void ssh2_bpp_handle_output(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp);
static PktOut *ssh2_bpp_new_pktout(int type);
static const struct BinaryPacketProtocolVtable ssh2_bpp_vtable = {
ssh2_bpp_free,
ssh2_bpp_handle_input,
ssh2_bpp_handle_output,
ssh2_bpp_new_pktout,
ssh2_bpp_queue_disconnect, /* in sshcommon.c */
0xFFFFFFFF, /* no special packet size limit for this bpp */
};
BinaryPacketProtocol *ssh2_bpp_new(
LogContext *logctx, struct DataTransferStats *stats, bool is_server)
{
struct ssh2_bpp_state *s = snew(struct ssh2_bpp_state);
memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
s->bpp.vt = &ssh2_bpp_vtable;
s->bpp.logctx = logctx;
s->stats = stats;
s->is_server = is_server;
ssh_bpp_common_setup(&s->bpp);
return &s->bpp;
}
static void ssh2_bpp_free_outgoing_crypto(struct ssh2_bpp_state *s)
{
/*
* We must free the MAC before the cipher, because sometimes the
* MAC is not actually separately allocated but just a different
* facet of the same object as the cipher, in which case
* ssh2_mac_free does nothing and ssh_cipher_free does the actual
* freeing. So if we freed the cipher first and then tried to
* dereference the MAC's vtable pointer to find out how to free
* that too, we'd be accessing freed memory.
*/
if (s->out.mac)
ssh2_mac_free(s->out.mac);
if (s->out.cipher)
ssh_cipher_free(s->out.cipher);
if (s->out_comp)
ssh_compressor_free(s->out_comp);
}
static void ssh2_bpp_free_incoming_crypto(struct ssh2_bpp_state *s)
{
/* As above, take care to free in.mac before in.cipher */
if (s->in.mac)
ssh2_mac_free(s->in.mac);
if (s->in.cipher)
ssh_cipher_free(s->in.cipher);
if (s->in_decomp)
ssh_decompressor_free(s->in_decomp);
}
static void ssh2_bpp_free(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp)
{
struct ssh2_bpp_state *s = container_of(bpp, struct ssh2_bpp_state, bpp);
sfree(s->buf);
ssh2_bpp_free_outgoing_crypto(s);
ssh2_bpp_free_incoming_crypto(s);
sfree(s->pktin);
sfree(s);
}
void ssh2_bpp_new_outgoing_crypto(
BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp,
const ssh_cipheralg *cipher, const void *ckey, const void *iv,
const ssh2_macalg *mac, bool etm_mode, const void *mac_key,
const ssh_compression_alg *compression, bool delayed_compression)
{
struct ssh2_bpp_state *s;
assert(bpp->vt == &ssh2_bpp_vtable);
s = container_of(bpp, struct ssh2_bpp_state, bpp);
ssh2_bpp_free_outgoing_crypto(s);
if (cipher) {
s->out.cipher = ssh_cipher_new(cipher);
ssh_cipher_setkey(s->out.cipher, ckey);
ssh_cipher_setiv(s->out.cipher, iv);
s->cbc_ignore_workaround = (
(ssh_cipher_alg(s->out.cipher)->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
!(s->bpp.remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE));
bpp_logevent("Initialised %s outbound encryption",
ssh_cipher_alg(s->out.cipher)->text_name);
} else {
s->out.cipher = NULL;
s->cbc_ignore_workaround = false;
}
s->out.etm_mode = etm_mode;
if (mac) {
s->out.mac = ssh2_mac_new(mac, s->out.cipher);
ssh2_mac_setkey(s->out.mac, make_ptrlen(mac_key, mac->keylen));
bpp_logevent("Initialised %s outbound MAC algorithm%s%s",
ssh2_mac_text_name(s->out.mac),
etm_mode ? " (in ETM mode)" : "",
(s->out.cipher &&
ssh_cipher_alg(s->out.cipher)->required_mac ?
" (required by cipher)" : ""));
} else {
s->out.mac = NULL;
}
if (delayed_compression && !s->seen_userauth_success) {
s->out.pending_compression = compression;
s->out_comp = NULL;
bpp_logevent("Will enable %s compression after user authentication",
s->out.pending_compression->text_name);
} else {
s->out.pending_compression = NULL;
/* 'compression' is always non-NULL, because no compression is
* indicated by ssh_comp_none. But this setup call may return a
* null out_comp. */
s->out_comp = ssh_compressor_new(compression);
if (s->out_comp)
bpp_logevent("Initialised %s compression",
ssh_compressor_alg(s->out_comp)->text_name);
}
}
void ssh2_bpp_new_incoming_crypto(
BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp,
const ssh_cipheralg *cipher, const void *ckey, const void *iv,
const ssh2_macalg *mac, bool etm_mode, const void *mac_key,
const ssh_compression_alg *compression, bool delayed_compression)
{
struct ssh2_bpp_state *s;
assert(bpp->vt == &ssh2_bpp_vtable);
s = container_of(bpp, struct ssh2_bpp_state, bpp);
ssh2_bpp_free_incoming_crypto(s);
if (cipher) {
s->in.cipher = ssh_cipher_new(cipher);
ssh_cipher_setkey(s->in.cipher, ckey);
ssh_cipher_setiv(s->in.cipher, iv);
bpp_logevent("Initialised %s inbound encryption",
ssh_cipher_alg(s->in.cipher)->text_name);
} else {
s->in.cipher = NULL;
}
s->in.etm_mode = etm_mode;
if (mac) {
s->in.mac = ssh2_mac_new(mac, s->in.cipher);
ssh2_mac_setkey(s->in.mac, make_ptrlen(mac_key, mac->keylen));
bpp_logevent("Initialised %s inbound MAC algorithm%s%s",
ssh2_mac_text_name(s->in.mac),
etm_mode ? " (in ETM mode)" : "",
(s->in.cipher &&
ssh_cipher_alg(s->in.cipher)->required_mac ?
" (required by cipher)" : ""));
} else {
s->in.mac = NULL;
}
if (delayed_compression && !s->seen_userauth_success) {
s->in.pending_compression = compression;
s->in_decomp = NULL;
bpp_logevent("Will enable %s decompression after user authentication",
s->in.pending_compression->text_name);
} else {
s->in.pending_compression = NULL;
/* 'compression' is always non-NULL, because no compression is
* indicated by ssh_comp_none. But this setup call may return a
* null in_decomp. */
s->in_decomp = ssh_decompressor_new(compression);
if (s->in_decomp)
bpp_logevent("Initialised %s decompression",
ssh_decompressor_alg(s->in_decomp)->text_name);
}
/* Clear the pending_newkeys flag, so that handle_input below will
* start consuming the input data again. */
s->pending_newkeys = false;
/* And schedule a run of handle_input, in case there's already
* input data in the queue. */
queue_idempotent_callback(&s->bpp.ic_in_raw);
}
bool ssh2_bpp_rekey_inadvisable(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp)
{
struct ssh2_bpp_state *s;
assert(bpp->vt == &ssh2_bpp_vtable);
s = container_of(bpp, struct ssh2_bpp_state, bpp);
return s->pending_compression;
}
static void ssh2_bpp_enable_pending_compression(struct ssh2_bpp_state *s)
{
BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp = &s->bpp; /* for bpp_logevent */
if (s->in.pending_compression) {
s->in_decomp = ssh_decompressor_new(s->in.pending_compression);
bpp_logevent("Initialised delayed %s decompression",
ssh_decompressor_alg(s->in_decomp)->text_name);
s->in.pending_compression = NULL;
}
if (s->out.pending_compression) {
s->out_comp = ssh_compressor_new(s->out.pending_compression);
bpp_logevent("Initialised delayed %s compression",
ssh_compressor_alg(s->out_comp)->text_name);
s->out.pending_compression = NULL;
}
}
#define BPP_READ(ptr, len) do \
{ \
bool success; \
crMaybeWaitUntilV((success = bufchain_try_fetch_consume( \
s->bpp.in_raw, ptr, len)) || \
s->bpp.input_eof); \
if (!success) \
goto eof; \
ssh_check_frozen(s->bpp.ssh); \
} while (0)
#define userauth_range(pkttype) ((unsigned)((pkttype) - 50) < 20)
static void ssh2_bpp_handle_input(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp)
{
struct ssh2_bpp_state *s = container_of(bpp, struct ssh2_bpp_state, bpp);
crBegin(s->crState);
while (1) {
s->maxlen = 0;
s->length = 0;
if (s->in.cipher)
s->cipherblk = ssh_cipher_alg(s->in.cipher)->blksize;
else
s->cipherblk = 8;
if (s->cipherblk < 8)
s->cipherblk = 8;
s->maclen = s->in.mac ? ssh2_mac_alg(s->in.mac)->len : 0;
if (s->in.cipher &&
(ssh_cipher_alg(s->in.cipher)->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
s->in.mac && !s->in.etm_mode) {
/*
* When dealing with a CBC-mode cipher, we want to avoid the
* possibility of an attacker's tweaking the ciphertext stream
* so as to cause us to feed the same block to the block
* cipher more than once and thus leak information
* (VU#958563). The way we do this is not to take any
* decisions on the basis of anything we've decrypted until
* we've verified it with a MAC. That includes the packet
* length, so we just read data and check the MAC repeatedly,
* and when the MAC passes, see if the length we've got is
* plausible.
*
* This defence is unnecessary in OpenSSH ETM mode, because
* the whole point of ETM mode is that the attacker can't
* tweak the ciphertext stream at all without the MAC
* detecting it before we decrypt anything.
*/
/*
* Make sure we have buffer space for a maximum-size packet.
*/
unsigned buflimit = OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT + s->maclen;
if (s->bufsize < buflimit) {
s->bufsize = buflimit;
s->buf = sresize(s->buf, s->bufsize, unsigned char);
}
/* Read an amount corresponding to the MAC. */
BPP_READ(s->buf, s->maclen);
s->packetlen = 0;
ssh2_mac_start(s->in.mac);
put_uint32(s->in.mac, s->in.sequence);
for (;;) { /* Once around this loop per cipher block. */
/* Read another cipher-block's worth, and tack it on to
* the end. */
BPP_READ(s->buf + (s->packetlen + s->maclen), s->cipherblk);
/* Decrypt one more block (a little further back in
* the stream). */
ssh_cipher_decrypt(s->in.cipher,
s->buf + s->packetlen, s->cipherblk);
/* Feed that block to the MAC. */
put_data(s->in.mac,
s->buf + s->packetlen, s->cipherblk);
s->packetlen += s->cipherblk;
/* See if that gives us a valid packet. */
if (ssh2_mac_verresult(s->in.mac, s->buf + s->packetlen) &&
((s->len = toint(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(s->buf))) ==
s->packetlen-4))
break;
if (s->packetlen >= (long)OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT) {
ssh_sw_abort(s->bpp.ssh,
"No valid incoming packet found");
crStopV;
}
}
s->maxlen = s->packetlen + s->maclen;
/*
* Now transfer the data into an output packet.
*/
s->pktin = snew_plus(PktIn, s->maxlen);
s->pktin->qnode.prev = s->pktin->qnode.next = NULL;
s->pktin->type = 0;
s->pktin->qnode.on_free_queue = false;
s->data = snew_plus_get_aux(s->pktin);
memcpy(s->data, s->buf, s->maxlen);
} else if (s->in.mac && s->in.etm_mode) {
if (s->bufsize < 4) {
s->bufsize = 4;
s->buf = sresize(s->buf, s->bufsize, unsigned char);
}
/*
* OpenSSH encrypt-then-MAC mode: the packet length is
* unencrypted, unless the cipher supports length encryption.
*/
BPP_READ(s->buf, 4);
/* Cipher supports length decryption, so do it */
if (s->in.cipher && (ssh_cipher_alg(s->in.cipher)->flags &
SSH_CIPHER_SEPARATE_LENGTH)) {
/* Keep the packet the same though, so the MAC passes */
unsigned char len[4];
memcpy(len, s->buf, 4);
ssh_cipher_decrypt_length(
s->in.cipher, len, 4, s->in.sequence);
s->len = toint(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(len));
} else {
s->len = toint(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(s->buf));
}
/*
* _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
* do us any more damage.
*/
if (s->len < 0 || s->len > (long)OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT ||
s->len % s->cipherblk != 0) {
ssh_sw_abort(s->bpp.ssh,
"Incoming packet length field was garbled");
crStopV;
}
/*
* So now we can work out the total packet length.
*/
s->packetlen = s->len + 4;
/*
* Allocate the packet to return, now we know its length.
*/
s->pktin = snew_plus(PktIn, OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT + s->maclen);
s->pktin->qnode.prev = s->pktin->qnode.next = NULL;
s->pktin->type = 0;
s->pktin->qnode.on_free_queue = false;
s->data = snew_plus_get_aux(s->pktin);
memcpy(s->data, s->buf, 4);
/*
* Read the remainder of the packet.
*/
BPP_READ(s->data + 4, s->packetlen + s->maclen - 4);
/*
* Check the MAC.
*/
if (s->in.mac && !ssh2_mac_verify(
s->in.mac, s->data, s->len + 4, s->in.sequence)) {
ssh_sw_abort(s->bpp.ssh, "Incorrect MAC received on packet");
crStopV;
}
/* Decrypt everything between the length field and the MAC. */
if (s->in.cipher)
ssh_cipher_decrypt(
s->in.cipher, s->data + 4, s->packetlen - 4);
} else {
if (s->bufsize < s->cipherblk) {
s->bufsize = s->cipherblk;
s->buf = sresize(s->buf, s->bufsize, unsigned char);
}
/*
* Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
* contain the length and padding details.
*/
BPP_READ(s->buf, s->cipherblk);
if (s->in.cipher)
ssh_cipher_decrypt(s->in.cipher, s->buf, s->cipherblk);
/*
* Now get the length figure.
*/
s->len = toint(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(s->buf));
/*
* _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
* do us any more damage.
*/
if (s->len < 0 || s->len > (long)OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT ||
(s->len + 4) % s->cipherblk != 0) {
ssh_sw_abort(s->bpp.ssh,
"Incoming packet was garbled on decryption");
crStopV;
}
/*
* So now we can work out the total packet length.
*/
s->packetlen = s->len + 4;
/*
* Allocate the packet to return, now we know its length.
*/
s->maxlen = s->packetlen + s->maclen;
s->pktin = snew_plus(PktIn, s->maxlen);
s->pktin->qnode.prev = s->pktin->qnode.next = NULL;
s->pktin->type = 0;
s->pktin->qnode.on_free_queue = false;
s->data = snew_plus_get_aux(s->pktin);
memcpy(s->data, s->buf, s->cipherblk);
/*
* Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
*/
BPP_READ(s->data + s->cipherblk,
s->packetlen + s->maclen - s->cipherblk);
/* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
if (s->in.cipher)
ssh_cipher_decrypt(
s->in.cipher,
s->data + s->cipherblk, s->packetlen - s->cipherblk);
/*
* Check the MAC.
*/
if (s->in.mac && !ssh2_mac_verify(
s->in.mac, s->data, s->len + 4, s->in.sequence)) {
ssh_sw_abort(s->bpp.ssh, "Incorrect MAC received on packet");
crStopV;
}
}
/* Get and sanity-check the amount of random padding. */
s->pad = s->data[4];
if (s->pad < 4 || s->len - s->pad < 1) {
ssh_sw_abort(s->bpp.ssh,
"Invalid padding length on received packet");
crStopV;
}
/*
* This enables us to deduce the payload length.
*/
s->payload = s->len - s->pad - 1;
s->length = s->payload + 5;
dts_consume(&s->stats->in, s->packetlen);
s->pktin->sequence = s->in.sequence++;
s->length = s->packetlen - s->pad;
assert(s->length >= 0);
/*
* Decompress packet payload.
*/
{
unsigned char *newpayload;
int newlen;
if (s->in_decomp && ssh_decompressor_decompress(
s->in_decomp, s->data + 5, s->length - 5,
&newpayload, &newlen)) {
if (s->maxlen < newlen + 5) {
PktIn *old_pktin = s->pktin;
s->maxlen = newlen + 5;
s->pktin = snew_plus(PktIn, s->maxlen);
*s->pktin = *old_pktin; /* structure copy */
s->data = snew_plus_get_aux(s->pktin);
smemclr(old_pktin, s->packetlen + s->maclen);
sfree(old_pktin);
}
s->length = 5 + newlen;
memcpy(s->data + 5, newpayload, newlen);
sfree(newpayload);
}
}
/*
* Now we can identify the semantic content of the packet,
* and also the initial type byte.
*/
if (s->length <= 5) { /* == 5 we hope, but robustness */
/*
* RFC 4253 doesn't explicitly say that completely empty
* packets with no type byte are forbidden. We handle them
* here by giving them a type code larger than 0xFF, which
* will be picked up at the next layer and trigger
* SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
*/
s->pktin->type = SSH_MSG_NO_TYPE_CODE;
s->data += 5;
s->length = 0;
} else {
s->pktin->type = s->data[5];
s->data += 6;
s->length -= 6;
}
BinarySource_INIT(s->pktin, s->data, s->length);
if (s->bpp.logctx) {
logblank_t blanks[MAX_BLANKS];
int nblanks = ssh2_censor_packet(
s->bpp.pls, s->pktin->type, false,
make_ptrlen(s->data, s->length), blanks);
log_packet(s->bpp.logctx, PKT_INCOMING, s->pktin->type,
ssh2_pkt_type(s->bpp.pls->kctx, s->bpp.pls->actx,
s->pktin->type),
s->data, s->length, nblanks, blanks,
&s->pktin->sequence, 0, NULL);
}
if (ssh2_bpp_check_unimplemented(&s->bpp, s->pktin)) {
sfree(s->pktin);
s->pktin = NULL;
continue;
}
s->pktin->qnode.formal_size = get_avail(s->pktin);
pq_push(&s->bpp.in_pq, s->pktin);
{
int type = s->pktin->type;
s->pktin = NULL;
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
/*
* Mild layer violation: in this situation we must
* suspend processing of the input byte stream until
* the transport layer has initialised the new keys by
* calling ssh2_bpp_new_incoming_crypto above.
*/
s->pending_newkeys = true;
crWaitUntilV(!s->pending_newkeys);
continue;
}
if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !s->is_server) {
/*
* Another one: if we were configured with OpenSSH's
* deferred compression which is triggered on receipt
* of USERAUTH_SUCCESS, then this is the moment to
* turn on compression.
*/
ssh2_bpp_enable_pending_compression(s);
/*
* Whether or not we were doing delayed compression in
* _this_ set of crypto parameters, we should set a
* flag indicating that we're now authenticated, so
* that a delayed compression method enabled in any
* future rekey will be treated as un-delayed.
*/
s->seen_userauth_success = true;
}
if (s->pending_compression && userauth_range(type)) {
/*
* Receiving any userauth message at all indicates
* that we're not about to turn on delayed compression
* - either because we just _have_ done, or because
* this message is a USERAUTH_FAILURE or some kind of
* intermediate 'please send more data' continuation
* message. Either way, we turn off the outgoing
* packet blockage for now, and release any queued
* output packets, so that we can make another attempt
* to authenticate. The next userauth packet we send
* will re-block the output direction.
*/
s->pending_compression = false;
queue_idempotent_callback(&s->bpp.ic_out_pq);
}
}
}
eof:
/*
* We've seen EOF. But we might have pushed stuff on the outgoing
* packet queue first, and that stuff _might_ include a DISCONNECT
* message, in which case we'd like to use that as the diagnostic.
* So first wait for the queue to have been processed.
*/
crMaybeWaitUntilV(!pq_peek(&s->bpp.in_pq));
if (!s->bpp.expect_close) {
ssh_remote_error(s->bpp.ssh,
"Remote side unexpectedly closed network connection");
} else {
ssh_remote_eof(s->bpp.ssh, "Remote side closed network connection");
}
return; /* avoid touching s now it's been freed */
crFinishV;
}
static PktOut *ssh2_bpp_new_pktout(int pkt_type)
{
PktOut *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
pkt->length = 5; /* space for packet length + padding length */
pkt->minlen = 0;
pkt->type = pkt_type;
put_byte(pkt, pkt_type);
pkt->prefix = pkt->length;
return pkt;
}
static void ssh2_bpp_format_packet_inner(struct ssh2_bpp_state *s, PktOut *pkt)
{
int origlen, cipherblk, maclen, padding, unencrypted_prefix, i;
if (s->bpp.logctx) {
ptrlen pktdata = make_ptrlen(pkt->data + pkt->prefix,
pkt->length - pkt->prefix);
logblank_t blanks[MAX_BLANKS];
int nblanks = ssh2_censor_packet(
s->bpp.pls, pkt->type, true, pktdata, blanks);
log_packet(s->bpp.logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->type,
ssh2_pkt_type(s->bpp.pls->kctx, s->bpp.pls->actx,
pkt->type),
pktdata.ptr, pktdata.len, nblanks, blanks, &s->out.sequence,
pkt->downstream_id, pkt->additional_log_text);
}
cipherblk = s->out.cipher ? ssh_cipher_alg(s->out.cipher)->blksize : 8;
cipherblk = cipherblk < 8 ? 8 : cipherblk; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
if (s->out_comp) {
unsigned char *newpayload;
int minlen, newlen;
/*
* Compress packet payload.
*/
minlen = pkt->minlen;
if (minlen) {
/*
* Work out how much compressed data we need (at least) to
* make the overall packet length come to pkt->minlen.
*/
if (s->out.mac)
minlen -= ssh2_mac_alg(s->out.mac)->len;
minlen -= 8; /* length field + min padding */
}
ssh_compressor_compress(s->out_comp, pkt->data + 5, pkt->length - 5,
&newpayload, &newlen, minlen);
pkt->length = 5;
put_data(pkt, newpayload, newlen);
sfree(newpayload);
}
/*
* Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
* length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
* If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
* after padding.
*/
padding = 4;
unencrypted_prefix = (s->out.mac && s->out.etm_mode) ? 4 : 0;
padding +=
(cipherblk - (pkt->length - unencrypted_prefix + padding) % cipherblk)
% cipherblk;
assert(padding <= 255);
maclen = s->out.mac ? ssh2_mac_alg(s->out.mac)->len : 0;
origlen = pkt->length;
for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
put_byte(pkt, 0); /* make space for random padding */
random_read(pkt->data + origlen, padding);
pkt->data[4] = padding;
PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(pkt->data, origlen + padding - 4);
/* Encrypt length if the scheme requires it */
if (s->out.cipher &&
(ssh_cipher_alg(s->out.cipher)->flags & SSH_CIPHER_SEPARATE_LENGTH)) {
ssh_cipher_encrypt_length(s->out.cipher, pkt->data, 4,
s->out.sequence);
}
put_padding(pkt, maclen, 0);
if (s->out.mac && s->out.etm_mode) {
/*
* OpenSSH-defined encrypt-then-MAC protocol.
*/
if (s->out.cipher)
ssh_cipher_encrypt(s->out.cipher,
pkt->data + 4, origlen + padding - 4);
ssh2_mac_generate(s->out.mac, pkt->data, origlen + padding,
s->out.sequence);
} else {
/*
* SSH-2 standard protocol.
*/
if (s->out.mac)
ssh2_mac_generate(s->out.mac, pkt->data, origlen + padding,
s->out.sequence);
if (s->out.cipher)
ssh_cipher_encrypt(s->out.cipher, pkt->data, origlen + padding);
}
s->out.sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
dts_consume(&s->stats->out, origlen + padding);
}
static void ssh2_bpp_format_packet(struct ssh2_bpp_state *s, PktOut *pkt)
{
if (pkt->minlen > 0 && !s->out_comp) {
/*
* If we've been told to pad the packet out to a given minimum
* length, but we're not compressing (and hence can't get the
* compression to do the padding by pointlessly opening and
* closing zlib blocks), then our other strategy is to precede
* this message with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE that makes it up to the
* right length.
*
* A third option in principle, and the most obviously
* sensible, would be to set the explicit padding field in the
* packet to more than its minimum value. Sadly, that turns
* out to break some servers (our institutional memory thinks
* Cisco in particular) and so we abandoned that idea shortly
* after trying it.
*/
/*
* Calculate the length we expect the real packet to have.
*/
int block, length;
PktOut *ignore_pkt;
block = s->out.cipher ? ssh_cipher_alg(s->out.cipher)->blksize : 0;
if (block < 8)
block = 8;
length = pkt->length;
length += 4; /* minimum 4 byte padding */
length += block-1;
length -= (length % block);
if (s->out.mac)
length += ssh2_mac_alg(s->out.mac)->len;
if (length < pkt->minlen) {
/*
* We need an ignore message. Calculate its length.
*/
length = pkt->minlen - length;
/*
* And work backwards from that to the length of the
* contained string.
*/
if (s->out.mac)
length -= ssh2_mac_alg(s->out.mac)->len;
length -= 8; /* length field + min padding */
length -= 5; /* type code + string length prefix */
if (length < 0)
length = 0;
ignore_pkt = ssh2_bpp_new_pktout(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
put_uint32(ignore_pkt, length);
size_t origlen = ignore_pkt->length;
for (size_t i = 0; i < length; i++)
put_byte(ignore_pkt, 0); /* make space for random padding */
random_read(ignore_pkt->data + origlen, length);
ssh2_bpp_format_packet_inner(s, ignore_pkt);
bufchain_add(s->bpp.out_raw, ignore_pkt->data, ignore_pkt->length);
ssh_free_pktout(ignore_pkt);
}
}
ssh2_bpp_format_packet_inner(s, pkt);
bufchain_add(s->bpp.out_raw, pkt->data, pkt->length);
}
static void ssh2_bpp_handle_output(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp)
{
struct ssh2_bpp_state *s = container_of(bpp, struct ssh2_bpp_state, bpp);
PktOut *pkt;
int n_userauth;
/*
* Count the userauth packets in the queue.
*/
n_userauth = 0;
for (pkt = pq_first(&s->bpp.out_pq); pkt != NULL;
pkt = pq_next(&s->bpp.out_pq, pkt))
if (userauth_range(pkt->type))
n_userauth++;
if (s->pending_compression && !n_userauth) {
/*
* We're currently blocked from sending any outgoing packets
* until the other end tells us whether we're going to have to
* enable compression or not.
*
* If our end has pushed a userauth packet on the queue, that
* must mean it knows that a USERAUTH_SUCCESS is not
* immediately forthcoming, so we unblock ourselves and send
* up to and including that packet. But in this if statement,
* there aren't any, so we're still blocked.
*/
return;
}
if (s->cbc_ignore_workaround) {
/*
* When using a CBC-mode cipher in SSH-2, it's necessary to
* ensure that an attacker can't provide data to be encrypted
* using an IV that they know. We ensure this by inserting an
* SSH_MSG_IGNORE if the last cipher block of the previous
* packet has already been sent to the network (which we
* approximate conservatively by checking if it's vanished
* from out_raw).
*/
if (bufchain_size(s->bpp.out_raw) <
(ssh_cipher_alg(s->out.cipher)->blksize +
ssh2_mac_alg(s->out.mac)->len)) {
/*
* There's less data in out_raw than the MAC size plus the
* cipher block size, which means at least one byte of
* that cipher block must already have left. Add an
* IGNORE.
*/
pkt = ssh_bpp_new_pktout(&s->bpp, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
put_stringz(pkt, "");
ssh2_bpp_format_packet(s, pkt);
}
}
while ((pkt = pq_pop(&s->bpp.out_pq)) != NULL) {
int type = pkt->type;
if (userauth_range(type))
n_userauth--;
ssh2_bpp_format_packet(s, pkt);
ssh_free_pktout(pkt);
if (n_userauth == 0 && s->out.pending_compression && !s->is_server) {
/*
* This is the last userauth packet in the queue, so
* unless our side decides to send another one in future,
* we have to assume will potentially provoke
* USERAUTH_SUCCESS. Block (non-userauth) outgoing packets
* until we see the reply.
*/
s->pending_compression = true;
return;
} else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && s->is_server) {
ssh2_bpp_enable_pending_compression(s);
}
}
}
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