apply patch for CVE-2023-48795 (#7329)

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@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
From 9d2ee975ef9fe627bf0a6f01c1f69e8ef1d4f05d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 12:06:18 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] ssh: implement strict KEX protocol changes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Implement the "strict KEX" protocol changes, as described in section
1.9 of the OpenSSH PROTOCOL file (as of OpenSSH version 9.6/9.6p1).
Namely this makes the following changes:
* Both the server and the client add an additional algorithm to the
initial KEXINIT message, indicating support for the strict KEX mode.
* When one side of the connection sees the strict KEX extension
algorithm, the strict KEX mode is enabled for messages originating
from the other side of the connection. If the sequence number for
the side which requested the extension is not 1 (indicating that it
has already received non-KEXINIT packets), the connection is
terminated.
* When strict kex mode is enabled, unexpected messages during the
handshake are considered fatal. Additionally when a key change
occurs (on the receipt of the NEWKEYS message) the message sequence
numbers are reset.
Thanks to Fabian Bäumer, Marcus Brinkmann, and Jörg Schwenk from Ruhr
University Bochum for reporting this issue.
Fixes CVE-2023-48795
Fixes golang/go#64784
Change-Id: I96b53afd2bd2fb94d2b6f2a46a5dacf325357604
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/550715
Reviewed-by: Nicola Murino <nicola.murino@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Modified patch 9d2ee975ef9fe627bf0a6f01c1f69e8ef1d4f05d to apply to CBL-Mariner:
Removed handshake_test.go because cert-manager's vendored code does not include it.
Modified paths for handshake.go and transport.go to line up with the vendor directory.
Modified-by: Tobias Brick <tobiasb@microsoft.com>
---
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go | 56 +++++++++++++++++++--
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go | 32 ++++++++++--
2 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go
index 07a1843..6d89c8a 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go
@@ -34,6 +34,16 @@ type keyingTransport interface {
// direction will be effected if a msgNewKeys message is sent
// or received.
prepareKeyChange(*algorithms, *kexResult) error
+
+ // setStrictMode sets the strict KEX mode, notably triggering
+ // sequence number resets on sending or receiving msgNewKeys.
+ // If the sequence number is already > 1 when setStrictMode
+ // is called, an error is returned.
+ setStrictMode() error
+
+ // setInitialKEXDone indicates to the transport that the initial key exchange
+ // was completed
+ setInitialKEXDone()
}
// handshakeTransport implements rekeying on top of a keyingTransport
@@ -95,6 +105,10 @@ type handshakeTransport struct {
// The session ID or nil if first kex did not complete yet.
sessionID []byte
+
+ // strictMode indicates if the other side of the handshake indicated
+ // that we should be following the strict KEX protocol restrictions.
+ strictMode bool
}
type pendingKex struct {
@@ -203,7 +217,10 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) readLoop() {
close(t.incoming)
break
}
- if p[0] == msgIgnore || p[0] == msgDebug {
+ // If this is the first kex, and strict KEX mode is enabled,
+ // we don't ignore any messages, as they may be used to manipulate
+ // the packet sequence numbers.
+ if !(t.sessionID == nil && t.strictMode) && (p[0] == msgIgnore || p[0] == msgDebug) {
continue
}
t.incoming <- p
@@ -435,6 +452,11 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) readOnePacket(first bool) ([]byte, error) {
return successPacket, nil
}
+const (
+ kexStrictClient = "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com"
+ kexStrictServer = "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com"
+)
+
// sendKexInit sends a key change message.
func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error {
t.mu.Lock()
@@ -448,7 +470,6 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error {
}
msg := &kexInitMsg{
- KexAlgos: t.config.KeyExchanges,
CiphersClientServer: t.config.Ciphers,
CiphersServerClient: t.config.Ciphers,
MACsClientServer: t.config.MACs,
@@ -458,6 +479,13 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error {
}
io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, msg.Cookie[:])
+ // We mutate the KexAlgos slice, in order to add the kex-strict extension algorithm,
+ // and possibly to add the ext-info extension algorithm. Since the slice may be the
+ // user owned KeyExchanges, we create our own slice in order to avoid using user
+ // owned memory by mistake.
+ msg.KexAlgos = make([]string, 0, len(t.config.KeyExchanges)+2) // room for kex-strict and ext-info
+ msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, t.config.KeyExchanges...)
+
isServer := len(t.hostKeys) > 0
if isServer {
for _, k := range t.hostKeys {
@@ -477,17 +505,24 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error {
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, keyFormat)
}
}
+
+ if t.sessionID == nil {
+ msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, kexStrictServer)
+ }
} else {
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = t.hostKeyAlgorithms
// As a client we opt in to receiving SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO so we know what
// algorithms the server supports for public key authentication. See RFC
// 8308, Section 2.1.
+ //
+ // We also send the strict KEX mode extension algorithm, in order to opt
+ // into the strict KEX mode.
if firstKeyExchange := t.sessionID == nil; firstKeyExchange {
- msg.KexAlgos = make([]string, 0, len(t.config.KeyExchanges)+1)
- msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, t.config.KeyExchanges...)
msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, "ext-info-c")
+ msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, kexStrictClient)
}
+
}
packet := Marshal(msg)
@@ -593,6 +628,13 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error {
return err
}
+ if t.sessionID == nil && ((isClient && contains(serverInit.KexAlgos, kexStrictServer)) || (!isClient && contains(clientInit.KexAlgos, kexStrictClient))) {
+ t.strictMode = true
+ if err := t.conn.setStrictMode(); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ }
+
// We don't send FirstKexFollows, but we handle receiving it.
//
// RFC 4253 section 7 defines the kex and the agreement method for
@@ -663,6 +705,12 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error {
return unexpectedMessageError(msgNewKeys, packet[0])
}
+ if firstKeyExchange {
+ // Indicates to the transport that the first key exchange is completed
+ // after receiving SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS.
+ t.conn.setInitialKEXDone()
+ }
+
return nil
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go
index acf5a21..4df45fc 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ type transport struct {
rand io.Reader
isClient bool
io.Closer
+
+ strictMode bool
+ initialKEXDone bool
}
// packetCipher represents a combination of SSH encryption/MAC
@@ -73,6 +76,18 @@ type connectionState struct {
pendingKeyChange chan packetCipher
}
+func (t *transport) setStrictMode() error {
+ if t.reader.seqNum != 1 {
+ return errors.New("ssh: sequence number != 1 when strict KEX mode requested")
+ }
+ t.strictMode = true
+ return nil
+}
+
+func (t *transport) setInitialKEXDone() {
+ t.initialKEXDone = true
+}
+
// prepareKeyChange sets up key material for a keychange. The key changes in
// both directions are triggered by reading and writing a msgNewKey packet
// respectively.
@@ -111,11 +126,12 @@ func (t *transport) printPacket(p []byte, write bool) {
// Read and decrypt next packet.
func (t *transport) readPacket() (p []byte, err error) {
for {
- p, err = t.reader.readPacket(t.bufReader)
+ p, err = t.reader.readPacket(t.bufReader, t.strictMode)
if err != nil {
break
}
- if len(p) == 0 || (p[0] != msgIgnore && p[0] != msgDebug) {
+ // in strict mode we pass through DEBUG and IGNORE packets only during the initial KEX
+ if len(p) == 0 || (t.strictMode && !t.initialKEXDone) || (p[0] != msgIgnore && p[0] != msgDebug) {
break
}
}
@@ -126,7 +142,7 @@ func (t *transport) readPacket() (p []byte, err error) {
return p, err
}
-func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
+func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader, strictMode bool) ([]byte, error) {
packet, err := s.packetCipher.readCipherPacket(s.seqNum, r)
s.seqNum++
if err == nil && len(packet) == 0 {
@@ -139,6 +155,9 @@ func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
select {
case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange:
s.packetCipher = cipher
+ if strictMode {
+ s.seqNum = 0
+ }
default:
return nil, errors.New("ssh: got bogus newkeys message")
}
@@ -169,10 +188,10 @@ func (t *transport) writePacket(packet []byte) error {
if debugTransport {
t.printPacket(packet, true)
}
- return t.writer.writePacket(t.bufWriter, t.rand, packet)
+ return t.writer.writePacket(t.bufWriter, t.rand, packet, t.strictMode)
}
-func (s *connectionState) writePacket(w *bufio.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error {
+func (s *connectionState) writePacket(w *bufio.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte, strictMode bool) error {
changeKeys := len(packet) > 0 && packet[0] == msgNewKeys
err := s.packetCipher.writeCipherPacket(s.seqNum, w, rand, packet)
@@ -187,6 +206,9 @@ func (s *connectionState) writePacket(w *bufio.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []
select {
case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange:
s.packetCipher = cipher
+ if strictMode {
+ s.seqNum = 0
+ }
default:
panic("ssh: no key material for msgNewKeys")
}
--
2.33.8

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Summary: Automatically provision and manage TLS certificates in Kubernetes
Name: cert-manager
Version: 1.11.2
Release: 6%{?dist}
Release: 7%{?dist}
License: ASL 2.0
Vendor: Microsoft Corporation
Distribution: Mariner
@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ Source0: https://github.com/jetstack/%{name}/archive/refs/tags/v%{version
# --pax-option=exthdr.name=%d/PaxHeaders/%f,delete=atime,delete=ctime \
# -cf %%{name}-%%{version}-govendor.tar.gz vendor
Source1: %{name}-%{version}-govendor.tar.gz
Patch0: CVE-2023-48795.patch
BuildRequires: golang
Requires: %{name}-acmesolver
Requires: %{name}-cainjector
@ -63,8 +64,10 @@ Summary: cert-manager's webhook binary
Webhook component providing API validation, mutation and conversion functionality for cert-manager.
%prep
%autosetup -p1
%setup -q -T -D -a 1
# We need setup instead of autosetup because we have two sources and need the patch applied
# after both sources have been extracted.
%setup -q -a 1
%patch -P 0 -p1
%build
go build -o bin/acmesolver cmd/acmesolver/main.go
@ -109,6 +112,9 @@ install -D -m0755 bin/webhook %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/
%{_bindir}/webhook
%changelog
* Fri Jan 18 2024 Tobias Brick <tobiasb@microsoft.com> - 1.11.2-7
- Patch for CVE-2023-48795
* Mon Oct 16 2023 CBL-Mariner Servicing Account <cblmargh@microsoft.com> - 1.11.2-6
- Bump release to rebuild with go 1.20.9