2019-04-05 14:49:55 +03:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
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//
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// Copyright 2012 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
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// Copyright 2012 Linaro Ltd.
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// Copyright 2009 Pengutronix, Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
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//
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// Initial development of this code was funded by
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// Phytec Messtechnik GmbH, http://www.phytec.de
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2009-10-29 19:12:39 +03:00
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#include <linux/clk.h>
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2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
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#include <linux/debugfs.h>
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2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/io.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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2012-03-05 18:31:04 +04:00
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#include <linux/of.h>
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#include <linux/of_device.h>
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2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
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#include <linux/platform_device.h>
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include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 11:04:11 +03:00
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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2012-03-05 18:30:53 +04:00
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#include "imx-audmux.h"
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2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
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#define DRIVER_NAME "imx-audmux"
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2009-10-29 19:12:39 +03:00
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static struct clk *audmux_clk;
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static void __iomem *audmux_base;
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2012-03-05 18:30:54 +04:00
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#define IMX_AUDMUX_V2_PTCR(x) ((x) * 8)
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#define IMX_AUDMUX_V2_PDCR(x) ((x) * 8 + 4)
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2009-10-29 19:12:39 +03:00
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2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
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static struct dentry *audmux_debugfs_root;
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/* There is an annoying discontinuity in the SSI numbering with regard
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* to the Linux number of the devices */
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static const char *audmux_port_string(int port)
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{
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switch (port) {
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case MX31_AUDMUX_PORT1_SSI0:
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return "imx-ssi.0";
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case MX31_AUDMUX_PORT2_SSI1:
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return "imx-ssi.1";
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case MX31_AUDMUX_PORT3_SSI_PINS_3:
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return "SSI3";
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case MX31_AUDMUX_PORT4_SSI_PINS_4:
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return "SSI4";
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case MX31_AUDMUX_PORT5_SSI_PINS_5:
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return "SSI5";
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case MX31_AUDMUX_PORT6_SSI_PINS_6:
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return "SSI6";
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default:
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return "UNKNOWN";
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}
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}
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static ssize_t audmux_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
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size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
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{
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ssize_t ret;
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2013-10-13 02:35:06 +04:00
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char *buf;
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2014-08-01 20:55:55 +04:00
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uintptr_t port = (uintptr_t)file->private_data;
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2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
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u32 pdcr, ptcr;
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2013-07-21 20:39:08 +04:00
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if (audmux_clk) {
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ret = clk_prepare_enable(audmux_clk);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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}
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2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
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2012-03-05 18:30:54 +04:00
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ptcr = readl(audmux_base + IMX_AUDMUX_V2_PTCR(port));
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pdcr = readl(audmux_base + IMX_AUDMUX_V2_PDCR(port));
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2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
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if (audmux_clk)
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2011-11-15 10:48:02 +04:00
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clk_disable_unprepare(audmux_clk);
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2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
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2013-10-13 02:35:06 +04:00
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buf = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!buf)
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return -ENOMEM;
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ASoC: imx-audmux: change snprintf to scnprintf for possible overflow
Change snprintf to scnprintf. There are generally two cases where using
snprintf causes problems.
1) Uses of size += snprintf(buf, SIZE - size, fmt, ...)
In this case, if snprintf would have written more characters than what the
buffer size (SIZE) is, then size will end up larger than SIZE. In later
uses of snprintf, SIZE - size will result in a negative number, leading
to problems. Note that size might already be too large by using
size = snprintf before the code reaches a case of size += snprintf.
2) If size is ultimately used as a length parameter for a copy back to user
space, then it will potentially allow for a buffer overflow and information
disclosure when size is greater than SIZE. When the size is used to index
the buffer directly, we can have memory corruption. This also means when
size = snprintf... is used, it may also cause problems since size may become
large. Copying to userspace is mitigated by the HARDENED_USERCOPY kernel
configuration.
The solution to these issues is to use scnprintf which returns the number of
characters actually written to the buffer, so the size variable will never
exceed SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiubo Li <Xiubo.Lee@gmail.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Acked-by: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
2019-01-15 06:27:27 +03:00
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ret = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "PDCR: %08x\nPTCR: %08x\n",
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2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
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pdcr, ptcr);
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2012-03-05 18:30:54 +04:00
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if (ptcr & IMX_AUDMUX_V2_PTCR_TFSDIR)
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ASoC: imx-audmux: change snprintf to scnprintf for possible overflow
Change snprintf to scnprintf. There are generally two cases where using
snprintf causes problems.
1) Uses of size += snprintf(buf, SIZE - size, fmt, ...)
In this case, if snprintf would have written more characters than what the
buffer size (SIZE) is, then size will end up larger than SIZE. In later
uses of snprintf, SIZE - size will result in a negative number, leading
to problems. Note that size might already be too large by using
size = snprintf before the code reaches a case of size += snprintf.
2) If size is ultimately used as a length parameter for a copy back to user
space, then it will potentially allow for a buffer overflow and information
disclosure when size is greater than SIZE. When the size is used to index
the buffer directly, we can have memory corruption. This also means when
size = snprintf... is used, it may also cause problems since size may become
large. Copying to userspace is mitigated by the HARDENED_USERCOPY kernel
configuration.
The solution to these issues is to use scnprintf which returns the number of
characters actually written to the buffer, so the size variable will never
exceed SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiubo Li <Xiubo.Lee@gmail.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Acked-by: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
2019-01-15 06:27:27 +03:00
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ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, PAGE_SIZE - ret,
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2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
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"TxFS output from %s, ",
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audmux_port_string((ptcr >> 27) & 0x7));
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else
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ASoC: imx-audmux: change snprintf to scnprintf for possible overflow
Change snprintf to scnprintf. There are generally two cases where using
snprintf causes problems.
1) Uses of size += snprintf(buf, SIZE - size, fmt, ...)
In this case, if snprintf would have written more characters than what the
buffer size (SIZE) is, then size will end up larger than SIZE. In later
uses of snprintf, SIZE - size will result in a negative number, leading
to problems. Note that size might already be too large by using
size = snprintf before the code reaches a case of size += snprintf.
2) If size is ultimately used as a length parameter for a copy back to user
space, then it will potentially allow for a buffer overflow and information
disclosure when size is greater than SIZE. When the size is used to index
the buffer directly, we can have memory corruption. This also means when
size = snprintf... is used, it may also cause problems since size may become
large. Copying to userspace is mitigated by the HARDENED_USERCOPY kernel
configuration.
The solution to these issues is to use scnprintf which returns the number of
characters actually written to the buffer, so the size variable will never
exceed SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiubo Li <Xiubo.Lee@gmail.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Acked-by: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
2019-01-15 06:27:27 +03:00
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ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, PAGE_SIZE - ret,
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2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
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"TxFS input, ");
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2012-03-05 18:30:54 +04:00
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if (ptcr & IMX_AUDMUX_V2_PTCR_TCLKDIR)
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ASoC: imx-audmux: change snprintf to scnprintf for possible overflow
Change snprintf to scnprintf. There are generally two cases where using
snprintf causes problems.
1) Uses of size += snprintf(buf, SIZE - size, fmt, ...)
In this case, if snprintf would have written more characters than what the
buffer size (SIZE) is, then size will end up larger than SIZE. In later
uses of snprintf, SIZE - size will result in a negative number, leading
to problems. Note that size might already be too large by using
size = snprintf before the code reaches a case of size += snprintf.
2) If size is ultimately used as a length parameter for a copy back to user
space, then it will potentially allow for a buffer overflow and information
disclosure when size is greater than SIZE. When the size is used to index
the buffer directly, we can have memory corruption. This also means when
size = snprintf... is used, it may also cause problems since size may become
large. Copying to userspace is mitigated by the HARDENED_USERCOPY kernel
configuration.
The solution to these issues is to use scnprintf which returns the number of
characters actually written to the buffer, so the size variable will never
exceed SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiubo Li <Xiubo.Lee@gmail.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Acked-by: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
2019-01-15 06:27:27 +03:00
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ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, PAGE_SIZE - ret,
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2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
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"TxClk output from %s",
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audmux_port_string((ptcr >> 22) & 0x7));
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else
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ASoC: imx-audmux: change snprintf to scnprintf for possible overflow
Change snprintf to scnprintf. There are generally two cases where using
snprintf causes problems.
1) Uses of size += snprintf(buf, SIZE - size, fmt, ...)
In this case, if snprintf would have written more characters than what the
buffer size (SIZE) is, then size will end up larger than SIZE. In later
uses of snprintf, SIZE - size will result in a negative number, leading
to problems. Note that size might already be too large by using
size = snprintf before the code reaches a case of size += snprintf.
2) If size is ultimately used as a length parameter for a copy back to user
space, then it will potentially allow for a buffer overflow and information
disclosure when size is greater than SIZE. When the size is used to index
the buffer directly, we can have memory corruption. This also means when
size = snprintf... is used, it may also cause problems since size may become
large. Copying to userspace is mitigated by the HARDENED_USERCOPY kernel
configuration.
The solution to these issues is to use scnprintf which returns the number of
characters actually written to the buffer, so the size variable will never
exceed SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiubo Li <Xiubo.Lee@gmail.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Acked-by: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
2019-01-15 06:27:27 +03:00
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ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, PAGE_SIZE - ret,
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2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
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"TxClk input");
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ASoC: imx-audmux: change snprintf to scnprintf for possible overflow
Change snprintf to scnprintf. There are generally two cases where using
snprintf causes problems.
1) Uses of size += snprintf(buf, SIZE - size, fmt, ...)
In this case, if snprintf would have written more characters than what the
buffer size (SIZE) is, then size will end up larger than SIZE. In later
uses of snprintf, SIZE - size will result in a negative number, leading
to problems. Note that size might already be too large by using
size = snprintf before the code reaches a case of size += snprintf.
2) If size is ultimately used as a length parameter for a copy back to user
space, then it will potentially allow for a buffer overflow and information
disclosure when size is greater than SIZE. When the size is used to index
the buffer directly, we can have memory corruption. This also means when
size = snprintf... is used, it may also cause problems since size may become
large. Copying to userspace is mitigated by the HARDENED_USERCOPY kernel
configuration.
The solution to these issues is to use scnprintf which returns the number of
characters actually written to the buffer, so the size variable will never
exceed SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiubo Li <Xiubo.Lee@gmail.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Acked-by: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
2019-01-15 06:27:27 +03:00
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ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, PAGE_SIZE - ret, "\n");
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2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
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2012-03-05 18:30:54 +04:00
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if (ptcr & IMX_AUDMUX_V2_PTCR_SYN) {
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ASoC: imx-audmux: change snprintf to scnprintf for possible overflow
Change snprintf to scnprintf. There are generally two cases where using
snprintf causes problems.
1) Uses of size += snprintf(buf, SIZE - size, fmt, ...)
In this case, if snprintf would have written more characters than what the
buffer size (SIZE) is, then size will end up larger than SIZE. In later
uses of snprintf, SIZE - size will result in a negative number, leading
to problems. Note that size might already be too large by using
size = snprintf before the code reaches a case of size += snprintf.
2) If size is ultimately used as a length parameter for a copy back to user
space, then it will potentially allow for a buffer overflow and information
disclosure when size is greater than SIZE. When the size is used to index
the buffer directly, we can have memory corruption. This also means when
size = snprintf... is used, it may also cause problems since size may become
large. Copying to userspace is mitigated by the HARDENED_USERCOPY kernel
configuration.
The solution to these issues is to use scnprintf which returns the number of
characters actually written to the buffer, so the size variable will never
exceed SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiubo Li <Xiubo.Lee@gmail.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Acked-by: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
2019-01-15 06:27:27 +03:00
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ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, PAGE_SIZE - ret,
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2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
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"Port is symmetric");
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} else {
|
2012-03-05 18:30:54 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ptcr & IMX_AUDMUX_V2_PTCR_RFSDIR)
|
ASoC: imx-audmux: change snprintf to scnprintf for possible overflow
Change snprintf to scnprintf. There are generally two cases where using
snprintf causes problems.
1) Uses of size += snprintf(buf, SIZE - size, fmt, ...)
In this case, if snprintf would have written more characters than what the
buffer size (SIZE) is, then size will end up larger than SIZE. In later
uses of snprintf, SIZE - size will result in a negative number, leading
to problems. Note that size might already be too large by using
size = snprintf before the code reaches a case of size += snprintf.
2) If size is ultimately used as a length parameter for a copy back to user
space, then it will potentially allow for a buffer overflow and information
disclosure when size is greater than SIZE. When the size is used to index
the buffer directly, we can have memory corruption. This also means when
size = snprintf... is used, it may also cause problems since size may become
large. Copying to userspace is mitigated by the HARDENED_USERCOPY kernel
configuration.
The solution to these issues is to use scnprintf which returns the number of
characters actually written to the buffer, so the size variable will never
exceed SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiubo Li <Xiubo.Lee@gmail.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Acked-by: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
2019-01-15 06:27:27 +03:00
|
|
|
ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, PAGE_SIZE - ret,
|
2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
|
|
|
"RxFS output from %s, ",
|
|
|
|
audmux_port_string((ptcr >> 17) & 0x7));
|
|
|
|
else
|
ASoC: imx-audmux: change snprintf to scnprintf for possible overflow
Change snprintf to scnprintf. There are generally two cases where using
snprintf causes problems.
1) Uses of size += snprintf(buf, SIZE - size, fmt, ...)
In this case, if snprintf would have written more characters than what the
buffer size (SIZE) is, then size will end up larger than SIZE. In later
uses of snprintf, SIZE - size will result in a negative number, leading
to problems. Note that size might already be too large by using
size = snprintf before the code reaches a case of size += snprintf.
2) If size is ultimately used as a length parameter for a copy back to user
space, then it will potentially allow for a buffer overflow and information
disclosure when size is greater than SIZE. When the size is used to index
the buffer directly, we can have memory corruption. This also means when
size = snprintf... is used, it may also cause problems since size may become
large. Copying to userspace is mitigated by the HARDENED_USERCOPY kernel
configuration.
The solution to these issues is to use scnprintf which returns the number of
characters actually written to the buffer, so the size variable will never
exceed SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiubo Li <Xiubo.Lee@gmail.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Acked-by: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
2019-01-15 06:27:27 +03:00
|
|
|
ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, PAGE_SIZE - ret,
|
2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
|
|
|
"RxFS input, ");
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-05 18:30:54 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ptcr & IMX_AUDMUX_V2_PTCR_RCLKDIR)
|
ASoC: imx-audmux: change snprintf to scnprintf for possible overflow
Change snprintf to scnprintf. There are generally two cases where using
snprintf causes problems.
1) Uses of size += snprintf(buf, SIZE - size, fmt, ...)
In this case, if snprintf would have written more characters than what the
buffer size (SIZE) is, then size will end up larger than SIZE. In later
uses of snprintf, SIZE - size will result in a negative number, leading
to problems. Note that size might already be too large by using
size = snprintf before the code reaches a case of size += snprintf.
2) If size is ultimately used as a length parameter for a copy back to user
space, then it will potentially allow for a buffer overflow and information
disclosure when size is greater than SIZE. When the size is used to index
the buffer directly, we can have memory corruption. This also means when
size = snprintf... is used, it may also cause problems since size may become
large. Copying to userspace is mitigated by the HARDENED_USERCOPY kernel
configuration.
The solution to these issues is to use scnprintf which returns the number of
characters actually written to the buffer, so the size variable will never
exceed SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiubo Li <Xiubo.Lee@gmail.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Acked-by: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
2019-01-15 06:27:27 +03:00
|
|
|
ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, PAGE_SIZE - ret,
|
2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
|
|
|
"RxClk output from %s",
|
|
|
|
audmux_port_string((ptcr >> 12) & 0x7));
|
|
|
|
else
|
ASoC: imx-audmux: change snprintf to scnprintf for possible overflow
Change snprintf to scnprintf. There are generally two cases where using
snprintf causes problems.
1) Uses of size += snprintf(buf, SIZE - size, fmt, ...)
In this case, if snprintf would have written more characters than what the
buffer size (SIZE) is, then size will end up larger than SIZE. In later
uses of snprintf, SIZE - size will result in a negative number, leading
to problems. Note that size might already be too large by using
size = snprintf before the code reaches a case of size += snprintf.
2) If size is ultimately used as a length parameter for a copy back to user
space, then it will potentially allow for a buffer overflow and information
disclosure when size is greater than SIZE. When the size is used to index
the buffer directly, we can have memory corruption. This also means when
size = snprintf... is used, it may also cause problems since size may become
large. Copying to userspace is mitigated by the HARDENED_USERCOPY kernel
configuration.
The solution to these issues is to use scnprintf which returns the number of
characters actually written to the buffer, so the size variable will never
exceed SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiubo Li <Xiubo.Lee@gmail.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Acked-by: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
2019-01-15 06:27:27 +03:00
|
|
|
ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, PAGE_SIZE - ret,
|
2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
|
|
|
"RxClk input");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ASoC: imx-audmux: change snprintf to scnprintf for possible overflow
Change snprintf to scnprintf. There are generally two cases where using
snprintf causes problems.
1) Uses of size += snprintf(buf, SIZE - size, fmt, ...)
In this case, if snprintf would have written more characters than what the
buffer size (SIZE) is, then size will end up larger than SIZE. In later
uses of snprintf, SIZE - size will result in a negative number, leading
to problems. Note that size might already be too large by using
size = snprintf before the code reaches a case of size += snprintf.
2) If size is ultimately used as a length parameter for a copy back to user
space, then it will potentially allow for a buffer overflow and information
disclosure when size is greater than SIZE. When the size is used to index
the buffer directly, we can have memory corruption. This also means when
size = snprintf... is used, it may also cause problems since size may become
large. Copying to userspace is mitigated by the HARDENED_USERCOPY kernel
configuration.
The solution to these issues is to use scnprintf which returns the number of
characters actually written to the buffer, so the size variable will never
exceed SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiubo Li <Xiubo.Lee@gmail.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Acked-by: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
2019-01-15 06:27:27 +03:00
|
|
|
ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, PAGE_SIZE - ret,
|
2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
|
|
|
"\nData received from %s\n",
|
|
|
|
audmux_port_string((pdcr >> 13) & 0x7));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, ret);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kfree(buf);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct file_operations audmux_debugfs_fops = {
|
2012-04-06 01:25:11 +04:00
|
|
|
.open = simple_open,
|
2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
|
|
|
.read = audmux_read_file,
|
llseek: automatically add .llseek fop
All file_operations should get a .llseek operation so we can make
nonseekable_open the default for future file operations without a
.llseek pointer.
The three cases that we can automatically detect are no_llseek, seq_lseek
and default_llseek. For cases where we can we can automatically prove that
the file offset is always ignored, we use noop_llseek, which maintains
the current behavior of not returning an error from a seek.
New drivers should normally not use noop_llseek but instead use no_llseek
and call nonseekable_open at open time. Existing drivers can be converted
to do the same when the maintainer knows for certain that no user code
relies on calling seek on the device file.
The generated code is often incorrectly indented and right now contains
comments that clarify for each added line why a specific variant was
chosen. In the version that gets submitted upstream, the comments will
be gone and I will manually fix the indentation, because there does not
seem to be a way to do that using coccinelle.
Some amount of new code is currently sitting in linux-next that should get
the same modifications, which I will do at the end of the merge window.
Many thanks to Julia Lawall for helping me learn to write a semantic
patch that does all this.
===== begin semantic patch =====
// This adds an llseek= method to all file operations,
// as a preparation for making no_llseek the default.
//
// The rules are
// - use no_llseek explicitly if we do nonseekable_open
// - use seq_lseek for sequential files
// - use default_llseek if we know we access f_pos
// - use noop_llseek if we know we don't access f_pos,
// but we still want to allow users to call lseek
//
@ open1 exists @
identifier nested_open;
@@
nested_open(...)
{
<+...
nonseekable_open(...)
...+>
}
@ open exists@
identifier open_f;
identifier i, f;
identifier open1.nested_open;
@@
int open_f(struct inode *i, struct file *f)
{
<+...
(
nonseekable_open(...)
|
nested_open(...)
)
...+>
}
@ read disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ read_no_fpos disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ write @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ write_no_fpos @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ fops0 @
identifier fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
};
@ has_llseek depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier llseek_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.llseek = llseek_f,
...
};
@ has_read depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.read = read_f,
...
};
@ has_write depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
...
};
@ has_open depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.open = open_f,
...
};
// use no_llseek if we call nonseekable_open
////////////////////////////////////////////
@ nonseekable1 depends on !has_llseek && has_open @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier nso ~= "nonseekable_open";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = nso, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* nonseekable */
};
@ nonseekable2 depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open.open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = open_f, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* open uses nonseekable */
};
// use seq_lseek for sequential files
/////////////////////////////////////
@ seq depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier sr ~= "seq_read";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = sr, ...
+.llseek = seq_lseek, /* we have seq_read */
};
// use default_llseek if there is a readdir
///////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops1 depends on !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier readdir_e;
@@
// any other fop is used that changes pos
struct file_operations fops = {
... .readdir = readdir_e, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* readdir is present */
};
// use default_llseek if at least one of read/write touches f_pos
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops2 depends on !fops1 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read.read_f;
@@
// read fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* read accesses f_pos */
};
@ fops3 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+ .llseek = default_llseek, /* write accesses f_pos */
};
// Use noop_llseek if neither read nor write accesses f_pos
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops4 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !fops3 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
.read = read_f,
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read and write both use no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_write && !has_read && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* write uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on !has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* no read or write fn */
};
===== End semantic patch =====
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
2010-08-15 20:52:59 +04:00
|
|
|
.llseek = default_llseek,
|
2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-24 10:25:56 +04:00
|
|
|
static void audmux_debugfs_init(void)
|
2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-08-01 20:55:55 +04:00
|
|
|
uintptr_t i;
|
2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
|
|
|
char buf[20];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
audmux_debugfs_root = debugfs_create_dir("audmux", NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (!audmux_debugfs_root) {
|
|
|
|
pr_warning("Failed to create AUDMUX debugfs root\n");
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-07-18 17:01:17 +04:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < MX31_AUDMUX_PORT7_SSI_PINS_7 + 1; i++) {
|
2014-08-01 20:55:55 +04:00
|
|
|
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "ssi%lu", i);
|
2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!debugfs_create_file(buf, 0444, audmux_debugfs_root,
|
|
|
|
(void *)i, &audmux_debugfs_fops))
|
2014-08-01 20:55:55 +04:00
|
|
|
pr_warning("Failed to create AUDMUX port %lu debugfs file\n",
|
2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
|
|
|
i);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2012-12-07 18:26:16 +04:00
|
|
|
static void audmux_debugfs_remove(void)
|
2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
debugfs_remove_recursive(audmux_debugfs_root);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
static inline void audmux_debugfs_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void audmux_debugfs_remove(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-11 19:39:08 +04:00
|
|
|
static enum imx_audmux_type {
|
2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
|
|
|
IMX21_AUDMUX,
|
|
|
|
IMX31_AUDMUX,
|
|
|
|
} audmux_type;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-01 19:00:13 +03:00
|
|
|
static const struct platform_device_id imx_audmux_ids[] = {
|
2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "imx21-audmux",
|
|
|
|
.driver_data = IMX21_AUDMUX,
|
|
|
|
}, {
|
|
|
|
.name = "imx31-audmux",
|
|
|
|
.driver_data = IMX31_AUDMUX,
|
|
|
|
}, {
|
|
|
|
/* sentinel */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(platform, imx_audmux_ids);
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-05 18:31:04 +04:00
|
|
|
static const struct of_device_id imx_audmux_dt_ids[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ .compatible = "fsl,imx21-audmux", .data = &imx_audmux_ids[0], },
|
|
|
|
{ .compatible = "fsl,imx31-audmux", .data = &imx_audmux_ids[1], },
|
|
|
|
{ /* sentinel */ }
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, imx_audmux_dt_ids);
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-05 18:30:51 +04:00
|
|
|
static const uint8_t port_mapping[] = {
|
|
|
|
0x0, 0x4, 0x8, 0x10, 0x14, 0x1c,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-05 18:30:54 +04:00
|
|
|
int imx_audmux_v1_configure_port(unsigned int port, unsigned int pcr)
|
2012-03-05 18:30:51 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
|
|
|
if (audmux_type != IMX21_AUDMUX)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-05 18:30:51 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!audmux_base)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (port >= ARRAY_SIZE(port_mapping))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
writel(pcr, audmux_base + port_mapping[port]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-03-05 18:30:54 +04:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(imx_audmux_v1_configure_port);
|
2012-03-05 18:30:51 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2012-03-05 18:30:54 +04:00
|
|
|
int imx_audmux_v2_configure_port(unsigned int port, unsigned int ptcr,
|
2009-10-29 19:12:39 +03:00
|
|
|
unsigned int pdcr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-07-21 20:39:08 +04:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
|
|
|
if (audmux_type != IMX31_AUDMUX)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-10-29 19:12:39 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!audmux_base)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-21 20:39:08 +04:00
|
|
|
if (audmux_clk) {
|
|
|
|
ret = clk_prepare_enable(audmux_clk);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-10-29 19:12:39 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2012-03-05 18:30:54 +04:00
|
|
|
writel(ptcr, audmux_base + IMX_AUDMUX_V2_PTCR(port));
|
|
|
|
writel(pdcr, audmux_base + IMX_AUDMUX_V2_PDCR(port));
|
2009-10-29 19:12:39 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (audmux_clk)
|
2011-11-15 10:48:02 +04:00
|
|
|
clk_disable_unprepare(audmux_clk);
|
2009-10-29 19:12:39 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-03-05 18:30:54 +04:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(imx_audmux_v2_configure_port);
|
2009-10-29 19:12:39 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2013-07-27 15:31:52 +04:00
|
|
|
static int imx_audmux_parse_dt_defaults(struct platform_device *pdev,
|
|
|
|
struct device_node *of_node)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct device_node *child;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for_each_available_child_of_node(of_node, child) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned int port;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int ptcr = 0;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int pdcr = 0;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int pcr = 0;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int val;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
int i = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = of_property_read_u32(child, "fsl,audmux-port", &port);
|
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
2017-08-08 02:29:18 +03:00
|
|
|
dev_warn(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get fsl,audmux-port of child node \"%pOF\"\n",
|
|
|
|
child);
|
2013-07-27 15:31:52 +04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!of_property_read_bool(child, "fsl,port-config")) {
|
2017-08-08 02:29:18 +03:00
|
|
|
dev_warn(&pdev->dev, "child node \"%pOF\" does not have property fsl,port-config\n",
|
|
|
|
child);
|
2013-07-27 15:31:52 +04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; (ret = of_property_read_u32_index(child,
|
2013-08-10 16:55:57 +04:00
|
|
|
"fsl,port-config", i, &val)) == 0;
|
2013-07-27 15:31:52 +04:00
|
|
|
++i) {
|
|
|
|
if (audmux_type == IMX31_AUDMUX) {
|
|
|
|
if (i % 2)
|
|
|
|
pdcr |= val;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ptcr |= val;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
pcr |= val;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-10 16:55:57 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ret != -EOVERFLOW) {
|
2017-08-08 02:29:18 +03:00
|
|
|
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to read u32 at index %d of child %pOF\n",
|
|
|
|
i, child);
|
2013-07-27 15:31:52 +04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (audmux_type == IMX31_AUDMUX) {
|
|
|
|
if (i % 2) {
|
2017-08-08 02:29:18 +03:00
|
|
|
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "One pdcr value is missing in child node %pOF\n",
|
|
|
|
child);
|
2013-07-27 15:31:52 +04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
imx_audmux_v2_configure_port(port, ptcr, pdcr);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
imx_audmux_v1_configure_port(port, pcr);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-12-07 18:26:16 +04:00
|
|
|
static int imx_audmux_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
|
2009-10-29 19:12:39 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
|
|
|
struct resource *res;
|
2012-03-05 18:31:04 +04:00
|
|
|
const struct of_device_id *of_id =
|
|
|
|
of_match_device(imx_audmux_dt_ids, &pdev->dev);
|
2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
|
2013-01-21 14:09:26 +04:00
|
|
|
audmux_base = devm_ioremap_resource(&pdev->dev, res);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(audmux_base))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(audmux_base);
|
2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2013-03-13 03:51:28 +04:00
|
|
|
audmux_clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "audmux");
|
2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(audmux_clk)) {
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "cannot get clock: %ld\n",
|
|
|
|
PTR_ERR(audmux_clk));
|
|
|
|
audmux_clk = NULL;
|
2010-06-08 13:03:00 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-08-23 23:24:57 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2012-03-05 18:31:04 +04:00
|
|
|
if (of_id)
|
|
|
|
pdev->id_entry = of_id->data;
|
2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
|
|
|
audmux_type = pdev->id_entry->driver_data;
|
|
|
|
if (audmux_type == IMX31_AUDMUX)
|
2012-03-05 18:30:51 +04:00
|
|
|
audmux_debugfs_init();
|
2010-01-11 19:33:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-03 22:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
if (of_id)
|
|
|
|
imx_audmux_parse_dt_defaults(pdev, pdev->dev.of_node);
|
2013-07-27 15:31:52 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-10-29 19:12:39 +03:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-12-07 18:26:16 +04:00
|
|
|
static int imx_audmux_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
|
2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (audmux_type == IMX31_AUDMUX)
|
|
|
|
audmux_debugfs_remove();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct platform_driver imx_audmux_driver = {
|
|
|
|
.probe = imx_audmux_probe,
|
2012-12-07 18:26:16 +04:00
|
|
|
.remove = imx_audmux_remove,
|
2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
|
|
|
.id_table = imx_audmux_ids,
|
|
|
|
.driver = {
|
|
|
|
.name = DRIVER_NAME,
|
2012-03-05 18:31:04 +04:00
|
|
|
.of_match_table = imx_audmux_dt_ids,
|
2012-03-05 18:30:52 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init imx_audmux_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return platform_driver_register(&imx_audmux_driver);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
subsys_initcall(imx_audmux_init);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void __exit imx_audmux_exit(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
platform_driver_unregister(&imx_audmux_driver);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
module_exit(imx_audmux_exit);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Freescale i.MX AUDMUX driver");
|
|
|
|
MODULE_AUTHOR("Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>");
|
|
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
|
|
|
|
MODULE_ALIAS("platform:" DRIVER_NAME);
|