WSL2-Linux-Kernel/fs/9p/fid.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* V9FS FID Management
*
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
* Copyright (C) 2007 by Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net>
* Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 by Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 11:04:11 +03:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/idr.h>
#include <net/9p/9p.h>
#include <net/9p/client.h>
#include "v9fs.h"
#include "v9fs_vfs.h"
#include "fid.h"
static inline void __add_fid(struct dentry *dentry, struct p9_fid *fid)
{
hlist_add_head(&fid->dlist, (struct hlist_head *)&dentry->d_fsdata);
}
/**
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
* v9fs_fid_add - add a fid to a dentry
* @dentry: dentry that the fid is being added to
* @fid: fid to add
*
*/
void v9fs_fid_add(struct dentry *dentry, struct p9_fid *fid)
{
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
__add_fid(dentry, fid);
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
}
/**
* v9fs_fid_find_inode - search for an open fid off of the inode list
* @inode: return a fid pointing to a specific inode
* @uid: return a fid belonging to the specified user
*
*/
static struct p9_fid *v9fs_fid_find_inode(struct inode *inode, kuid_t uid)
{
struct hlist_head *h;
struct p9_fid *fid, *ret = NULL;
p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_VFS, " inode: %p\n", inode);
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
h = (struct hlist_head *)&inode->i_private;
hlist_for_each_entry(fid, h, ilist) {
if (uid_eq(fid->uid, uid)) {
refcount_inc(&fid->count);
ret = fid;
break;
}
}
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
return ret;
}
/**
* v9fs_open_fid_add - add an open fid to an inode
* @inode: inode that the fid is being added to
* @fid: fid to add
*
*/
void v9fs_open_fid_add(struct inode *inode, struct p9_fid *fid)
{
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
hlist_add_head(&fid->ilist, (struct hlist_head *)&inode->i_private);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
}
/**
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
* v9fs_fid_find - retrieve a fid that belongs to the specified uid
* @dentry: dentry to look for fid in
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
* @uid: return fid that belongs to the specified user
* @any: if non-zero, return any fid associated with the dentry
*
*/
static struct p9_fid *v9fs_fid_find(struct dentry *dentry, kuid_t uid, int any)
{
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
struct p9_fid *fid, *ret;
p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_VFS, " dentry: %pd (%p) uid %d any %d\n",
dentry, dentry, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
any);
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
ret = NULL;
/* we'll recheck under lock if there's anything to look in */
if (dentry->d_fsdata) {
struct hlist_head *h = (struct hlist_head *)&dentry->d_fsdata;
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry(fid, h, dlist) {
if (any || uid_eq(fid->uid, uid)) {
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
ret = fid;
refcount_inc(&ret->count);
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
break;
}
}
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
} else {
if (dentry->d_inode)
ret = v9fs_fid_find_inode(dentry->d_inode, uid);
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
}
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
return ret;
}
/*
* We need to hold v9ses->rename_sem as long as we hold references
* to returned path array. Array element contain pointers to
* dentry names.
*/
static int build_path_from_dentry(struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses,
struct dentry *dentry, const unsigned char ***names)
{
int n = 0, i;
const unsigned char **wnames;
struct dentry *ds;
for (ds = dentry; !IS_ROOT(ds); ds = ds->d_parent)
n++;
treewide: kmalloc() -> kmalloc_array() The kmalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kmalloc_array(). This patch replaces cases of: kmalloc(a * b, gfp) with: kmalloc_array(a * b, gfp) as well as handling cases of: kmalloc(a * b * c, gfp) with: kmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp) as it's slightly less ugly than: kmalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp) This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like: kmalloc(4 * 1024, gfp) though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion. Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were dropped, since they're redundant. The tools/ directory was manually excluded, since it has its own implementation of kmalloc(). The Coccinelle script used for this was: // Fix redundant parens around sizeof(). @@ type TYPE; expression THING, E; @@ ( kmalloc( - (sizeof(TYPE)) * E + sizeof(TYPE) * E , ...) | kmalloc( - (sizeof(THING)) * E + sizeof(THING) * E , ...) ) // Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens. @@ expression COUNT; typedef u8; typedef __u8; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) ) // 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant. @@ type TYPE; expression THING; identifier COUNT_ID; constant COUNT_CONST; @@ ( - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) ) // 2-factor product, only identifiers. @@ identifier SIZE, COUNT; @@ - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - SIZE * COUNT + COUNT, SIZE , ...) // 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with // redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING; identifier STRIDE, COUNT; type TYPE; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING1, THING2; identifier COUNT; type TYPE1, TYPE2; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed. @@ identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT; @@ ( kmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) ) // Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products, // when they're not all constants... @@ expression E1, E2, E3; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * (E3) + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - E1 * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) ) // And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants, // keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument. @@ expression THING, E1, E2; type TYPE; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kmalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...) | kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...) | kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kmalloc(C1 * C2, ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * E2 + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * E2 + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - (E1) * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - (E1) * (E2) + E1, E2 , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - E1 * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) ) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-12 23:55:00 +03:00
wnames = kmalloc_array(n, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!wnames)
goto err_out;
for (ds = dentry, i = (n-1); i >= 0; i--, ds = ds->d_parent)
wnames[i] = ds->d_name.name;
*names = wnames;
return n;
err_out:
return -ENOMEM;
}
static struct p9_fid *v9fs_fid_lookup_with_uid(struct dentry *dentry,
kuid_t uid, int any)
{
struct dentry *ds;
const unsigned char **wnames, *uname;
int i, n, l, clone, access;
struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses;
struct p9_fid *fid, *old_fid = NULL;
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
v9ses = v9fs_dentry2v9ses(dentry);
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
access = v9ses->flags & V9FS_ACCESS_MASK;
fid = v9fs_fid_find(dentry, uid, any);
if (fid)
return fid;
/*
* we don't have a matching fid. To do a TWALK we need
* parent fid. We need to prevent rename when we want to
* look at the parent.
*/
down_read(&v9ses->rename_sem);
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
ds = dentry->d_parent;
fid = v9fs_fid_find(ds, uid, any);
if (fid) {
/* Found the parent fid do a lookup with that */
9p: add refcount to p9_fid struct Fix race issue in fid contention. Eric's and Greg's patch offer a mechanism to fix open-unlink-f*syscall bug in 9p. But there is race issue in fid parallel accesses. As Greg's patch stores all of fids from opened files into according inode, so all the lookup fid ops can retrieve fid from inode preferentially. But there is no mechanism to handle the fid contention issue. For example, there are two threads get the same fid in the same time and one of them clunk the fid before the other thread ready to discard the fid. In this scenario, it will lead to some fatal problems, even kernel core dump. I introduce a mechanism to fix this race issue. A counter field introduced into p9_fid struct to store the reference counter to the fid. When a fid is allocated from the inode or dentry, the counter will increase, and will decrease at the end of its occupation. It is guaranteed that the fid won't be clunked before the reference counter go down to 0, then we can avoid the clunked fid to be used. tests: race issue test from the old test case: for file in {01..50}; do touch f.${file}; done seq 1 1000 | xargs -n 1 -P 50 -I{} cat f.* > /dev/null open-unlink-f*syscall test: I have tested for f*syscall include: ftruncate fstat fchown fchmod faccessat. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200923141146.90046-5-jianyong.wu@arm.com Fixes: 478ba09edc1f ("fs/9p: search open fids first") Signed-off-by: Jianyong Wu <jianyong.wu@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
2020-09-23 17:11:46 +03:00
struct p9_fid *ofid = fid;
fid = p9_client_walk(ofid, 1, &dentry->d_name.name, 1);
p9_client_clunk(ofid);
goto fid_out;
}
up_read(&v9ses->rename_sem);
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
/* start from the root and try to do a lookup */
fid = v9fs_fid_find(dentry->d_sb->s_root, uid, any);
if (!fid) {
/* the user is not attached to the fs yet */
if (access == V9FS_ACCESS_SINGLE)
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
if (v9fs_proto_dotu(v9ses) || v9fs_proto_dotl(v9ses))
uname = NULL;
else
uname = v9ses->uname;
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
fid = p9_client_attach(v9ses->clnt, NULL, uname, uid,
v9ses->aname);
if (IS_ERR(fid))
return fid;
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
v9fs_fid_add(dentry->d_sb->s_root, fid);
}
/* If we are root ourself just return that */
9p: add refcount to p9_fid struct Fix race issue in fid contention. Eric's and Greg's patch offer a mechanism to fix open-unlink-f*syscall bug in 9p. But there is race issue in fid parallel accesses. As Greg's patch stores all of fids from opened files into according inode, so all the lookup fid ops can retrieve fid from inode preferentially. But there is no mechanism to handle the fid contention issue. For example, there are two threads get the same fid in the same time and one of them clunk the fid before the other thread ready to discard the fid. In this scenario, it will lead to some fatal problems, even kernel core dump. I introduce a mechanism to fix this race issue. A counter field introduced into p9_fid struct to store the reference counter to the fid. When a fid is allocated from the inode or dentry, the counter will increase, and will decrease at the end of its occupation. It is guaranteed that the fid won't be clunked before the reference counter go down to 0, then we can avoid the clunked fid to be used. tests: race issue test from the old test case: for file in {01..50}; do touch f.${file}; done seq 1 1000 | xargs -n 1 -P 50 -I{} cat f.* > /dev/null open-unlink-f*syscall test: I have tested for f*syscall include: ftruncate fstat fchown fchmod faccessat. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200923141146.90046-5-jianyong.wu@arm.com Fixes: 478ba09edc1f ("fs/9p: search open fids first") Signed-off-by: Jianyong Wu <jianyong.wu@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
2020-09-23 17:11:46 +03:00
if (dentry->d_sb->s_root == dentry) {
refcount_inc(&fid->count);
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
return fid;
9p: add refcount to p9_fid struct Fix race issue in fid contention. Eric's and Greg's patch offer a mechanism to fix open-unlink-f*syscall bug in 9p. But there is race issue in fid parallel accesses. As Greg's patch stores all of fids from opened files into according inode, so all the lookup fid ops can retrieve fid from inode preferentially. But there is no mechanism to handle the fid contention issue. For example, there are two threads get the same fid in the same time and one of them clunk the fid before the other thread ready to discard the fid. In this scenario, it will lead to some fatal problems, even kernel core dump. I introduce a mechanism to fix this race issue. A counter field introduced into p9_fid struct to store the reference counter to the fid. When a fid is allocated from the inode or dentry, the counter will increase, and will decrease at the end of its occupation. It is guaranteed that the fid won't be clunked before the reference counter go down to 0, then we can avoid the clunked fid to be used. tests: race issue test from the old test case: for file in {01..50}; do touch f.${file}; done seq 1 1000 | xargs -n 1 -P 50 -I{} cat f.* > /dev/null open-unlink-f*syscall test: I have tested for f*syscall include: ftruncate fstat fchown fchmod faccessat. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200923141146.90046-5-jianyong.wu@arm.com Fixes: 478ba09edc1f ("fs/9p: search open fids first") Signed-off-by: Jianyong Wu <jianyong.wu@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
2020-09-23 17:11:46 +03:00
}
/*
* Do a multipath walk with attached root.
* When walking parent we need to make sure we
* don't have a parallel rename happening
*/
down_read(&v9ses->rename_sem);
n = build_path_from_dentry(v9ses, dentry, &wnames);
if (n < 0) {
fid = ERR_PTR(n);
goto err_out;
}
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
clone = 1;
i = 0;
while (i < n) {
l = min(n - i, P9_MAXWELEM);
/*
* We need to hold rename lock when doing a multipath
* walk to ensure none of the patch component change
*/
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
fid = p9_client_walk(fid, l, &wnames[i], clone);
if (IS_ERR(fid)) {
if (old_fid) {
/*
* If we fail, clunk fid which are mapping
* to path component and not the last component
* of the path.
*/
p9_client_clunk(old_fid);
}
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
kfree(wnames);
goto err_out;
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
}
old_fid = fid;
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
i += l;
clone = 0;
}
kfree(wnames);
fid_out:
if (!IS_ERR(fid)) {
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
if (d_unhashed(dentry)) {
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
p9_client_clunk(fid);
fid = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
} else {
__add_fid(dentry, fid);
refcount_inc(&fid->count);
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
}
}
err_out:
up_read(&v9ses->rename_sem);
return fid;
}
9p: attach-per-user The 9P2000 protocol requires the authentication and permission checks to be done in the file server. For that reason every user that accesses the file server tree has to authenticate and attach to the server separately. Multiple users can share the same connection to the server. Currently v9fs does a single attach and executes all I/O operations as a single user. This makes using v9fs in multiuser environment unsafe as it depends on the client doing the permission checking. This patch improves the 9P2000 support by allowing every user to attach separately. The patch defines three modes of access (new mount option 'access'): - attach-per-user (access=user) (default mode for 9P2000.u) If a user tries to access a file served by v9fs for the first time, v9fs sends an attach command to the server (Tattach) specifying the user. If the attach succeeds, the user can access the v9fs tree. As there is no uname->uid (string->integer) mapping yet, this mode works only with the 9P2000.u dialect. - allow only one user to access the tree (access=<uid>) Only the user with uid can access the v9fs tree. Other users that attempt to access it will get EPERM error. - do all operations as a single user (access=any) (default for 9P2000) V9fs does a single attach and all operations are done as a single user. If this mode is selected, the v9fs behavior is identical with the current one. Signed-off-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
2007-10-17 23:31:07 +04:00
/**
* v9fs_fid_lookup - lookup for a fid, try to walk if not found
* @dentry: dentry to look for fid in
*
* Look for a fid in the specified dentry for the current user.
* If no fid is found, try to create one walking from a fid from the parent
* dentry (if it has one), or the root dentry. If the user haven't accessed
* the fs yet, attach now and walk from the root.
*/
struct p9_fid *v9fs_fid_lookup(struct dentry *dentry)
{
kuid_t uid;
int any, access;
struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses;
v9ses = v9fs_dentry2v9ses(dentry);
access = v9ses->flags & V9FS_ACCESS_MASK;
switch (access) {
case V9FS_ACCESS_SINGLE:
case V9FS_ACCESS_USER:
case V9FS_ACCESS_CLIENT:
uid = current_fsuid();
any = 0;
break;
case V9FS_ACCESS_ANY:
uid = v9ses->uid;
any = 1;
break;
default:
uid = INVALID_UID;
any = 0;
break;
}
return v9fs_fid_lookup_with_uid(dentry, uid, any);
}
struct p9_fid *v9fs_writeback_fid(struct dentry *dentry)
{
int err;
9p: add refcount to p9_fid struct Fix race issue in fid contention. Eric's and Greg's patch offer a mechanism to fix open-unlink-f*syscall bug in 9p. But there is race issue in fid parallel accesses. As Greg's patch stores all of fids from opened files into according inode, so all the lookup fid ops can retrieve fid from inode preferentially. But there is no mechanism to handle the fid contention issue. For example, there are two threads get the same fid in the same time and one of them clunk the fid before the other thread ready to discard the fid. In this scenario, it will lead to some fatal problems, even kernel core dump. I introduce a mechanism to fix this race issue. A counter field introduced into p9_fid struct to store the reference counter to the fid. When a fid is allocated from the inode or dentry, the counter will increase, and will decrease at the end of its occupation. It is guaranteed that the fid won't be clunked before the reference counter go down to 0, then we can avoid the clunked fid to be used. tests: race issue test from the old test case: for file in {01..50}; do touch f.${file}; done seq 1 1000 | xargs -n 1 -P 50 -I{} cat f.* > /dev/null open-unlink-f*syscall test: I have tested for f*syscall include: ftruncate fstat fchown fchmod faccessat. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200923141146.90046-5-jianyong.wu@arm.com Fixes: 478ba09edc1f ("fs/9p: search open fids first") Signed-off-by: Jianyong Wu <jianyong.wu@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
2020-09-23 17:11:46 +03:00
struct p9_fid *fid, *ofid;
9p: add refcount to p9_fid struct Fix race issue in fid contention. Eric's and Greg's patch offer a mechanism to fix open-unlink-f*syscall bug in 9p. But there is race issue in fid parallel accesses. As Greg's patch stores all of fids from opened files into according inode, so all the lookup fid ops can retrieve fid from inode preferentially. But there is no mechanism to handle the fid contention issue. For example, there are two threads get the same fid in the same time and one of them clunk the fid before the other thread ready to discard the fid. In this scenario, it will lead to some fatal problems, even kernel core dump. I introduce a mechanism to fix this race issue. A counter field introduced into p9_fid struct to store the reference counter to the fid. When a fid is allocated from the inode or dentry, the counter will increase, and will decrease at the end of its occupation. It is guaranteed that the fid won't be clunked before the reference counter go down to 0, then we can avoid the clunked fid to be used. tests: race issue test from the old test case: for file in {01..50}; do touch f.${file}; done seq 1 1000 | xargs -n 1 -P 50 -I{} cat f.* > /dev/null open-unlink-f*syscall test: I have tested for f*syscall include: ftruncate fstat fchown fchmod faccessat. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200923141146.90046-5-jianyong.wu@arm.com Fixes: 478ba09edc1f ("fs/9p: search open fids first") Signed-off-by: Jianyong Wu <jianyong.wu@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
2020-09-23 17:11:46 +03:00
ofid = v9fs_fid_lookup_with_uid(dentry, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, 0);
fid = clone_fid(ofid);
if (IS_ERR(fid))
goto error_out;
9p: add refcount to p9_fid struct Fix race issue in fid contention. Eric's and Greg's patch offer a mechanism to fix open-unlink-f*syscall bug in 9p. But there is race issue in fid parallel accesses. As Greg's patch stores all of fids from opened files into according inode, so all the lookup fid ops can retrieve fid from inode preferentially. But there is no mechanism to handle the fid contention issue. For example, there are two threads get the same fid in the same time and one of them clunk the fid before the other thread ready to discard the fid. In this scenario, it will lead to some fatal problems, even kernel core dump. I introduce a mechanism to fix this race issue. A counter field introduced into p9_fid struct to store the reference counter to the fid. When a fid is allocated from the inode or dentry, the counter will increase, and will decrease at the end of its occupation. It is guaranteed that the fid won't be clunked before the reference counter go down to 0, then we can avoid the clunked fid to be used. tests: race issue test from the old test case: for file in {01..50}; do touch f.${file}; done seq 1 1000 | xargs -n 1 -P 50 -I{} cat f.* > /dev/null open-unlink-f*syscall test: I have tested for f*syscall include: ftruncate fstat fchown fchmod faccessat. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200923141146.90046-5-jianyong.wu@arm.com Fixes: 478ba09edc1f ("fs/9p: search open fids first") Signed-off-by: Jianyong Wu <jianyong.wu@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
2020-09-23 17:11:46 +03:00
p9_client_clunk(ofid);
/*
* writeback fid will only be used to write back the
* dirty pages. We always request for the open fid in read-write
* mode so that a partial page write which result in page
* read can work.
*/
err = p9_client_open(fid, O_RDWR);
if (err < 0) {
p9_client_clunk(fid);
fid = ERR_PTR(err);
goto error_out;
}
error_out:
return fid;
}