2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
|
|
|
|
|
#define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-10-29 19:40:17 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies
|
|
|
|
|
whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
|
|
|
|
|
setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be
|
|
|
|
|
changed from user-level. */
|
|
|
|
|
#define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X))
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __KERNEL__
|
|
|
|
|
#define issecure(X) (issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits))
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
|
|
|
#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support
|
|
|
|
|
inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under
|
|
|
|
|
compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks
|
|
|
|
|
*of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is
|
2008-07-04 20:59:58 +04:00
|
|
|
0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the
|
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
|
|
|
executable file. */
|
capabilities: implement per-process securebits
Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0
based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem
support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually)
possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain
privilege via (set)uid-0.
Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few
user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently
prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many
applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel
will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs.
Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is
desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their
privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable
sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser
from the process' tree of children.
The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege
associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to
initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited
through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the
historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which
has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel.
With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop
all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently
fork()'d/exec()'d children with:
prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f);
This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is
enabled at configure time.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning]
[serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 13:13:40 +04:00
|
|
|
#define SECURE_NOROOT 0
|
|
|
|
|
#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED 1 /* make bit-0 immutable */
|
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-10-29 19:40:17 +03:00
|
|
|
#define SECBIT_NOROOT (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT))
|
|
|
|
|
#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED))
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-07-04 20:59:58 +04:00
|
|
|
/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup".
|
|
|
|
|
When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on
|
|
|
|
|
set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause
|
|
|
|
|
capabilities to be gained/lost. */
|
capabilities: implement per-process securebits
Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0
based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem
support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually)
possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain
privilege via (set)uid-0.
Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few
user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently
prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many
applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel
will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs.
Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is
desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their
privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable
sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser
from the process' tree of children.
The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege
associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to
initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited
through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the
historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which
has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel.
With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop
all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently
fork()'d/exec()'d children with:
prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f);
This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is
enabled at configure time.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning]
[serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 13:13:40 +04:00
|
|
|
#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2
|
|
|
|
|
#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3 /* make bit-2 immutable */
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-10-29 19:40:17 +03:00
|
|
|
#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
|
|
|
|
|
#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \
|
|
|
|
|
(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED))
|
|
|
|
|
|
capabilities: implement per-process securebits
Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0
based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem
support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually)
possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain
privilege via (set)uid-0.
Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few
user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently
prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many
applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel
will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs.
Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is
desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their
privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable
sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser
from the process' tree of children.
The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege
associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to
initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited
through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the
historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which
has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel.
With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop
all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently
fork()'d/exec()'d children with:
prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f);
This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is
enabled at configure time.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning]
[serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 13:13:40 +04:00
|
|
|
/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after
|
|
|
|
|
transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by
|
|
|
|
|
bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both
|
|
|
|
|
bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d
|
|
|
|
|
child can use this feature again. */
|
|
|
|
|
#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS 4
|
|
|
|
|
#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED 5 /* make bit-4 immutable */
|
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-10-29 19:40:17 +03:00
|
|
|
#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
|
|
|
|
|
#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
|
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
capabilities: implement per-process securebits
Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0
based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem
support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually)
possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain
privilege via (set)uid-0.
Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few
user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently
prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many
applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel
will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs.
Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is
desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their
privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable
sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser
from the process' tree of children.
The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege
associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to
initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited
through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the
historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which
has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel.
With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop
all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently
fork()'d/exec()'d children with:
prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f);
This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is
enabled at configure time.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning]
[serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 13:13:40 +04:00
|
|
|
#define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
|
|
|
|
|
issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
|
|
|
|
|
issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
|
|
|
|
|
#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
|
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* !_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
|
