WSL2-Linux-Kernel/arch/hexagon/kernel/signal.c

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C
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Signal support for Hexagon processor
*
* Copyright (c) 2010-2012, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <asm/registers.h>
#include <asm/thread_info.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/ucontext.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/signal.h>
#include <asm/vdso.h>
struct rt_sigframe {
unsigned long tramp[2];
struct siginfo info;
struct ucontext uc;
};
static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs,
size_t frame_size)
{
unsigned long sp = sigsp(regs->r29, ksig);
return (void __user *)((sp - frame_size) & ~(sizeof(long long) - 1));
}
static int setup_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs, struct sigcontext __user *sc)
{
unsigned long tmp;
int err = 0;
err |= copy_to_user(&sc->sc_regs.r0, &regs->r00,
32*sizeof(unsigned long));
err |= __put_user(regs->sa0, &sc->sc_regs.sa0);
err |= __put_user(regs->lc0, &sc->sc_regs.lc0);
err |= __put_user(regs->sa1, &sc->sc_regs.sa1);
err |= __put_user(regs->lc1, &sc->sc_regs.lc1);
err |= __put_user(regs->m0, &sc->sc_regs.m0);
err |= __put_user(regs->m1, &sc->sc_regs.m1);
err |= __put_user(regs->usr, &sc->sc_regs.usr);
err |= __put_user(regs->preds, &sc->sc_regs.p3_0);
err |= __put_user(regs->gp, &sc->sc_regs.gp);
err |= __put_user(regs->ugp, &sc->sc_regs.ugp);
#if CONFIG_HEXAGON_ARCH_VERSION >= 4
err |= __put_user(regs->cs0, &sc->sc_regs.cs0);
err |= __put_user(regs->cs1, &sc->sc_regs.cs1);
#endif
tmp = pt_elr(regs); err |= __put_user(tmp, &sc->sc_regs.pc);
tmp = pt_cause(regs); err |= __put_user(tmp, &sc->sc_regs.cause);
tmp = pt_badva(regs); err |= __put_user(tmp, &sc->sc_regs.badva);
return err;
}
static int restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs,
struct sigcontext __user *sc)
{
unsigned long tmp;
int err = 0;
err |= copy_from_user(&regs->r00, &sc->sc_regs.r0,
32 * sizeof(unsigned long));
err |= __get_user(regs->sa0, &sc->sc_regs.sa0);
err |= __get_user(regs->lc0, &sc->sc_regs.lc0);
err |= __get_user(regs->sa1, &sc->sc_regs.sa1);
err |= __get_user(regs->lc1, &sc->sc_regs.lc1);
err |= __get_user(regs->m0, &sc->sc_regs.m0);
err |= __get_user(regs->m1, &sc->sc_regs.m1);
err |= __get_user(regs->usr, &sc->sc_regs.usr);
err |= __get_user(regs->preds, &sc->sc_regs.p3_0);
err |= __get_user(regs->gp, &sc->sc_regs.gp);
err |= __get_user(regs->ugp, &sc->sc_regs.ugp);
#if CONFIG_HEXAGON_ARCH_VERSION >= 4
err |= __get_user(regs->cs0, &sc->sc_regs.cs0);
err |= __get_user(regs->cs1, &sc->sc_regs.cs1);
#endif
err |= __get_user(tmp, &sc->sc_regs.pc); pt_set_elr(regs, tmp);
return err;
}
/*
* Setup signal stack frame with siginfo structure
*/
static int setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int err = 0;
struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
struct hexagon_vdso *vdso = current->mm->context.vdso;
frame = get_sigframe(ksig, regs, sizeof(struct rt_sigframe));
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 05:57:57 +03:00
if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(struct rt_sigframe)))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_siginfo_to_user(&frame->info, &ksig->info))
return -EFAULT;
/* The on-stack signal trampoline is no longer executed;
* however, the libgcc signal frame unwinding code checks for
* the presence of these two numeric magic values.
*/
err |= __put_user(0x7800d166, &frame->tramp[0]);
err |= __put_user(0x5400c004, &frame->tramp[1]);
err |= setup_sigcontext(regs, &frame->uc.uc_mcontext);
err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
err |= __save_altstack(&frame->uc.uc_stack, user_stack_pointer(regs));
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
/* Load r0/r1 pair with signumber/siginfo pointer... */
regs->r0100 = ((unsigned long long)((unsigned long)&frame->info) << 32)
| (unsigned long long)ksig->sig;
regs->r02 = (unsigned long) &frame->uc;
regs->r31 = (unsigned long) vdso->rt_signal_trampoline;
pt_psp(regs) = (unsigned long) frame;
pt_set_elr(regs, (unsigned long)ksig->ka.sa.sa_handler);
return 0;
}
/*
* Setup invocation of signal handler
*/
static void handle_signal(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int ret;
/*
* If we're handling a signal that aborted a system call,
* set up the error return value before adding the signal
* frame to the stack.
*/
if (regs->syscall_nr >= 0) {
switch (regs->r00) {
case -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK:
case -ERESTARTNOHAND:
regs->r00 = -EINTR;
break;
case -ERESTARTSYS:
if (!(ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTART)) {
regs->r00 = -EINTR;
break;
}
fallthrough;
case -ERESTARTNOINTR:
regs->r06 = regs->syscall_nr;
pt_set_elr(regs, pt_elr(regs) - 4);
regs->r00 = regs->restart_r0;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/*
* Set up the stack frame; not doing the SA_SIGINFO thing. We
* only set up the rt_frame flavor.
*/
/* If there was an error on setup, no signal was delivered. */
ret = setup_rt_frame(ksig, sigmask_to_save(), regs);
signal_setup_done(ret, ksig, test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP));
}
/*
* Called from return-from-event code.
*/
void do_signal(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct ksignal ksig;
if (!user_mode(regs))
return;
if (get_signal(&ksig)) {
handle_signal(&ksig, regs);
return;
}
/*
* No (more) signals; if we came from a system call, handle the restart.
*/
if (regs->syscall_nr >= 0) {
switch (regs->r00) {
case -ERESTARTNOHAND:
case -ERESTARTSYS:
case -ERESTARTNOINTR:
regs->r06 = regs->syscall_nr;
break;
case -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK:
regs->r06 = __NR_restart_syscall;
break;
default:
goto no_restart;
}
pt_set_elr(regs, pt_elr(regs) - 4);
regs->r00 = regs->restart_r0;
}
no_restart:
/* If there's no signal to deliver, put the saved sigmask back */
restore_saved_sigmask();
}
/*
* Architecture-specific wrappers for signal-related system calls
*/
asmlinkage int sys_rt_sigreturn(void)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
sigset_t blocked;
/* Always make any pending restarted system calls return -EINTR */
all arches, signal: move restart_block to struct task_struct If an attacker can cause a controlled kernel stack overflow, overwriting the restart block is a very juicy exploit target. This is because the restart_block is held in the same memory allocation as the kernel stack. Moving the restart block to struct task_struct prevents this exploit by making the restart_block harder to locate. Note that there are other fields in thread_info that are also easy targets, at least on some architectures. It's also a decent simplification, since the restart code is more or less identical on all architectures. [james.hogan@imgtec.com: metag: align thread_info::supervisor_stack] Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com> Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no> Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <a-jacquiot@ti.com> Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-13 02:01:14 +03:00
current->restart_block.fn = do_no_restart_syscall;
frame = (struct rt_sigframe __user *)pt_psp(regs);
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 05:57:57 +03:00
if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame)))
goto badframe;
if (__copy_from_user(&blocked, &frame->uc.uc_sigmask, sizeof(blocked)))
goto badframe;
set_current_blocked(&blocked);
if (restore_sigcontext(regs, &frame->uc.uc_mcontext))
goto badframe;
/* Restore the user's stack as well */
pt_psp(regs) = regs->r29;
regs->syscall_nr = -1;
if (restore_altstack(&frame->uc.uc_stack))
goto badframe;
return regs->r00;
badframe:
force_sig(SIGSEGV);
return 0;
}