2019-11-08 08:05:11 +03:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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2020-11-29 21:32:43 +03:00
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/*
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2019-11-08 08:05:11 +03:00
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* net/tipc/crypto.h: Include file for TIPC crypto
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2019, Ericsson AB
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. Neither the names of the copyright holders nor the names of its
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* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
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* this software without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of the
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* GNU General Public License ("GPL") version 2 as published by the Free
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* Software Foundation.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
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* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
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* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
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* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
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* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
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* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
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* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
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* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
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#ifndef _TIPC_CRYPTO_H
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#define _TIPC_CRYPTO_H
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#include "core.h"
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#include "node.h"
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#include "msg.h"
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#include "bearer.h"
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#define TIPC_EVERSION 7
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/* AEAD aes(gcm) */
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#define TIPC_AES_GCM_KEY_SIZE_128 16
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#define TIPC_AES_GCM_KEY_SIZE_192 24
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#define TIPC_AES_GCM_KEY_SIZE_256 32
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#define TIPC_AES_GCM_SALT_SIZE 4
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#define TIPC_AES_GCM_IV_SIZE 12
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#define TIPC_AES_GCM_TAG_SIZE 16
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2020-11-29 21:32:43 +03:00
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/*
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2019-11-08 08:05:11 +03:00
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* TIPC crypto modes:
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* - CLUSTER_KEY:
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* One single key is used for both TX & RX in all nodes in the cluster.
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* - PER_NODE_KEY:
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* Each nodes in the cluster has one TX key, for RX a node needs to know
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* its peers' TX key for the decryption of messages from those nodes.
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*/
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enum {
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CLUSTER_KEY = 1,
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PER_NODE_KEY = (1 << 1),
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};
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extern int sysctl_tipc_max_tfms __read_mostly;
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tipc: add automatic session key exchange
With support from the master key option in the previous commit, it
becomes easy to make frequent updates/exchanges of session keys between
authenticated cluster nodes.
Basically, there are two situations where the key exchange will take in
place:
- When a new node joins the cluster (with the master key), it will need
to get its peer's TX key, so that be able to decrypt further messages
from that peer.
- When a new session key is generated (by either user manual setting or
later automatic rekeying feature), the key will be distributed to all
peer nodes in the cluster.
A key to be exchanged is encapsulated in the data part of a 'MSG_CRYPTO
/KEY_DISTR_MSG' TIPC v2 message, then xmit-ed as usual and encrypted by
using the master key before sending out. Upon receipt of the message it
will be decrypted in the same way as regular messages, then attached as
the sender's RX key in the receiver node.
In this way, the key exchange is reliable by the link layer, as well as
security, integrity and authenticity by the crypto layer.
Also, the forward security will be easily achieved by user changing the
master key actively but this should not be required very frequently.
The key exchange feature is independent on the presence of a master key
Note however that the master key still is needed for new nodes to be
able to join the cluster. It is also optional, and can be turned off/on
via the sysfs: 'net/tipc/key_exchange_enabled' [default 1: enabled].
Backward compatibility is guaranteed because for nodes that do not have
master key support, key exchange using master key ie. tx_key = 0 if any
will be shortly discarded at the message validation step. In other
words, the key exchange feature will be automatically disabled to those
nodes.
v2: fix the "implicit declaration of function 'tipc_crypto_key_flush'"
error in node.c. The function only exists when built with the TIPC
"CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO" option.
v3: use 'info->extack' for a message emitted due to netlink operations
instead (- David's comment).
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-18 04:17:28 +03:00
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extern int sysctl_tipc_key_exchange_enabled __read_mostly;
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2019-11-08 08:05:11 +03:00
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2020-11-29 21:32:43 +03:00
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/*
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2019-11-08 08:05:11 +03:00
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* TIPC encryption message format:
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*
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* 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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* 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4|3 2 1 0 9 8 7 6|5 4 3 2 1 0 9 8|7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
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* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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tipc: introduce encryption master key
In addition to the supported cluster & per-node encryption keys for the
en/decryption of TIPC messages, we now introduce one option for user to
set a cluster key as 'master key', which is simply a symmetric key like
the former but has a longer life cycle. It has two purposes:
- Authentication of new member nodes in the cluster. New nodes, having
no knowledge of current session keys in the cluster will still be
able to join the cluster as long as they know the master key. This is
because all neighbor discovery (LINK_CONFIG) messages must be
encrypted with this key.
- Encryption of session encryption keys during automatic exchange and
update of those.This is a feature we will introduce in a later commit
in this series.
We insert the new key into the currently unused slot 0 in the key array
and start using it immediately once the user has set it.
After joining, a node only knowing the master key should be fully
communicable to existing nodes in the cluster, although those nodes may
have their own session keys activated (i.e. not the master one). To
support this, we define a 'grace period', starting from the time a node
itself reports having no RX keys, so the existing nodes will use the
master key for encryption instead. The grace period can be extended but
will automatically stop after e.g. 5 seconds without a new report. This
is also the basis for later key exchanging feature as the new node will
be impossible to decrypt anything without the support from master key.
For user to set a master key, we define a new netlink flag -
'TIPC_NLA_NODE_KEY_MASTER', so it can be added to the current 'set key'
netlink command to specify the setting key to be a master key.
Above all, the traditional cluster/per-node key mechanism is guaranteed
to work when user comes not to use this master key option. This is also
compatible to legacy nodes without the feature supported.
Even this master key can be updated without any interruption of cluster
connectivity but is so is needed, this has to be coordinated and set by
the user.
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-18 04:17:27 +03:00
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* w0:|Ver=7| User |D|TX |RX |K|M|N| Rsvd |
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2019-11-08 08:05:11 +03:00
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* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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* w1:| Seqno |
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* w2:| (8 octets) |
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* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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* w3:\ Prevnode \
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* / (4 or 16 octets) /
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* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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* \ \
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* / Encrypted complete TIPC V2 header and user data /
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* \ \
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* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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* | |
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* | AuthTag |
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* | (16 octets) |
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* | |
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* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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*
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* Word0:
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* Ver : = 7 i.e. TIPC encryption message version
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* User : = 7 (for LINK_PROTOCOL); = 13 (for LINK_CONFIG) or = 0
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* D : The destined bit i.e. the message's destination node is
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* "known" or not at the message encryption
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* TX : TX key used for the message encryption
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* RX : Currently RX active key corresponding to the destination
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* node's TX key (when the "D" bit is set)
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* K : Keep-alive bit (for RPS, LINK_PROTOCOL/STATE_MSG only)
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tipc: introduce encryption master key
In addition to the supported cluster & per-node encryption keys for the
en/decryption of TIPC messages, we now introduce one option for user to
set a cluster key as 'master key', which is simply a symmetric key like
the former but has a longer life cycle. It has two purposes:
- Authentication of new member nodes in the cluster. New nodes, having
no knowledge of current session keys in the cluster will still be
able to join the cluster as long as they know the master key. This is
because all neighbor discovery (LINK_CONFIG) messages must be
encrypted with this key.
- Encryption of session encryption keys during automatic exchange and
update of those.This is a feature we will introduce in a later commit
in this series.
We insert the new key into the currently unused slot 0 in the key array
and start using it immediately once the user has set it.
After joining, a node only knowing the master key should be fully
communicable to existing nodes in the cluster, although those nodes may
have their own session keys activated (i.e. not the master one). To
support this, we define a 'grace period', starting from the time a node
itself reports having no RX keys, so the existing nodes will use the
master key for encryption instead. The grace period can be extended but
will automatically stop after e.g. 5 seconds without a new report. This
is also the basis for later key exchanging feature as the new node will
be impossible to decrypt anything without the support from master key.
For user to set a master key, we define a new netlink flag -
'TIPC_NLA_NODE_KEY_MASTER', so it can be added to the current 'set key'
netlink command to specify the setting key to be a master key.
Above all, the traditional cluster/per-node key mechanism is guaranteed
to work when user comes not to use this master key option. This is also
compatible to legacy nodes without the feature supported.
Even this master key can be updated without any interruption of cluster
connectivity but is so is needed, this has to be coordinated and set by
the user.
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-18 04:17:27 +03:00
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* M : Bit indicates if sender has master key
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* N : Bit indicates if sender has no RX keys corresponding to the
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* receiver's TX (when the "D" bit is set)
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2019-11-08 08:05:11 +03:00
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* Rsvd : Reserved bit, field
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* Word1-2:
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* Seqno : The 64-bit sequence number of the encrypted message, also
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* part of the nonce used for the message encryption/decryption
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* Word3-:
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* Prevnode: The source node address, or ID in case LINK_CONFIG only
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* AuthTag : The authentication tag for the message integrity checking
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* generated by the message encryption
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*/
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struct tipc_ehdr {
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union {
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struct {
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#if defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
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__u8 destined:1,
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user:4,
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version:3;
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tipc: introduce encryption master key
In addition to the supported cluster & per-node encryption keys for the
en/decryption of TIPC messages, we now introduce one option for user to
set a cluster key as 'master key', which is simply a symmetric key like
the former but has a longer life cycle. It has two purposes:
- Authentication of new member nodes in the cluster. New nodes, having
no knowledge of current session keys in the cluster will still be
able to join the cluster as long as they know the master key. This is
because all neighbor discovery (LINK_CONFIG) messages must be
encrypted with this key.
- Encryption of session encryption keys during automatic exchange and
update of those.This is a feature we will introduce in a later commit
in this series.
We insert the new key into the currently unused slot 0 in the key array
and start using it immediately once the user has set it.
After joining, a node only knowing the master key should be fully
communicable to existing nodes in the cluster, although those nodes may
have their own session keys activated (i.e. not the master one). To
support this, we define a 'grace period', starting from the time a node
itself reports having no RX keys, so the existing nodes will use the
master key for encryption instead. The grace period can be extended but
will automatically stop after e.g. 5 seconds without a new report. This
is also the basis for later key exchanging feature as the new node will
be impossible to decrypt anything without the support from master key.
For user to set a master key, we define a new netlink flag -
'TIPC_NLA_NODE_KEY_MASTER', so it can be added to the current 'set key'
netlink command to specify the setting key to be a master key.
Above all, the traditional cluster/per-node key mechanism is guaranteed
to work when user comes not to use this master key option. This is also
compatible to legacy nodes without the feature supported.
Even this master key can be updated without any interruption of cluster
connectivity but is so is needed, this has to be coordinated and set by
the user.
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-18 04:17:27 +03:00
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__u8 reserved_1:1,
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rx_nokey:1,
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master_key:1,
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2019-11-08 08:05:11 +03:00
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keepalive:1,
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rx_key_active:2,
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tx_key:2;
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#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
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__u8 version:3,
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user:4,
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destined:1;
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__u8 tx_key:2,
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rx_key_active:2,
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keepalive:1,
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tipc: introduce encryption master key
In addition to the supported cluster & per-node encryption keys for the
en/decryption of TIPC messages, we now introduce one option for user to
set a cluster key as 'master key', which is simply a symmetric key like
the former but has a longer life cycle. It has two purposes:
- Authentication of new member nodes in the cluster. New nodes, having
no knowledge of current session keys in the cluster will still be
able to join the cluster as long as they know the master key. This is
because all neighbor discovery (LINK_CONFIG) messages must be
encrypted with this key.
- Encryption of session encryption keys during automatic exchange and
update of those.This is a feature we will introduce in a later commit
in this series.
We insert the new key into the currently unused slot 0 in the key array
and start using it immediately once the user has set it.
After joining, a node only knowing the master key should be fully
communicable to existing nodes in the cluster, although those nodes may
have their own session keys activated (i.e. not the master one). To
support this, we define a 'grace period', starting from the time a node
itself reports having no RX keys, so the existing nodes will use the
master key for encryption instead. The grace period can be extended but
will automatically stop after e.g. 5 seconds without a new report. This
is also the basis for later key exchanging feature as the new node will
be impossible to decrypt anything without the support from master key.
For user to set a master key, we define a new netlink flag -
'TIPC_NLA_NODE_KEY_MASTER', so it can be added to the current 'set key'
netlink command to specify the setting key to be a master key.
Above all, the traditional cluster/per-node key mechanism is guaranteed
to work when user comes not to use this master key option. This is also
compatible to legacy nodes without the feature supported.
Even this master key can be updated without any interruption of cluster
connectivity but is so is needed, this has to be coordinated and set by
the user.
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-18 04:17:27 +03:00
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master_key:1,
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rx_nokey:1,
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reserved_1:1;
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2019-11-08 08:05:11 +03:00
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#else
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#error "Please fix <asm/byteorder.h>"
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#endif
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__be16 reserved_2;
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} __packed;
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__be32 w0;
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};
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__be64 seqno;
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union {
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__be32 addr;
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__u8 id[NODE_ID_LEN]; /* For a LINK_CONFIG message only! */
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};
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#define EHDR_SIZE (offsetof(struct tipc_ehdr, addr) + sizeof(__be32))
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#define EHDR_CFG_SIZE (sizeof(struct tipc_ehdr))
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#define EHDR_MIN_SIZE (EHDR_SIZE)
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#define EHDR_MAX_SIZE (EHDR_CFG_SIZE)
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#define EMSG_OVERHEAD (EHDR_SIZE + TIPC_AES_GCM_TAG_SIZE)
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} __packed;
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int tipc_crypto_start(struct tipc_crypto **crypto, struct net *net,
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struct tipc_node *node);
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void tipc_crypto_stop(struct tipc_crypto **crypto);
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void tipc_crypto_timeout(struct tipc_crypto *rx);
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int tipc_crypto_xmit(struct net *net, struct sk_buff **skb,
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struct tipc_bearer *b, struct tipc_media_addr *dst,
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struct tipc_node *__dnode);
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int tipc_crypto_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_crypto *rx,
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struct sk_buff **skb, struct tipc_bearer *b);
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int tipc_crypto_key_init(struct tipc_crypto *c, struct tipc_aead_key *ukey,
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tipc: introduce encryption master key
In addition to the supported cluster & per-node encryption keys for the
en/decryption of TIPC messages, we now introduce one option for user to
set a cluster key as 'master key', which is simply a symmetric key like
the former but has a longer life cycle. It has two purposes:
- Authentication of new member nodes in the cluster. New nodes, having
no knowledge of current session keys in the cluster will still be
able to join the cluster as long as they know the master key. This is
because all neighbor discovery (LINK_CONFIG) messages must be
encrypted with this key.
- Encryption of session encryption keys during automatic exchange and
update of those.This is a feature we will introduce in a later commit
in this series.
We insert the new key into the currently unused slot 0 in the key array
and start using it immediately once the user has set it.
After joining, a node only knowing the master key should be fully
communicable to existing nodes in the cluster, although those nodes may
have their own session keys activated (i.e. not the master one). To
support this, we define a 'grace period', starting from the time a node
itself reports having no RX keys, so the existing nodes will use the
master key for encryption instead. The grace period can be extended but
will automatically stop after e.g. 5 seconds without a new report. This
is also the basis for later key exchanging feature as the new node will
be impossible to decrypt anything without the support from master key.
For user to set a master key, we define a new netlink flag -
'TIPC_NLA_NODE_KEY_MASTER', so it can be added to the current 'set key'
netlink command to specify the setting key to be a master key.
Above all, the traditional cluster/per-node key mechanism is guaranteed
to work when user comes not to use this master key option. This is also
compatible to legacy nodes without the feature supported.
Even this master key can be updated without any interruption of cluster
connectivity but is so is needed, this has to be coordinated and set by
the user.
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-18 04:17:27 +03:00
|
|
|
u8 mode, bool master_key);
|
2019-11-08 08:05:11 +03:00
|
|
|
void tipc_crypto_key_flush(struct tipc_crypto *c);
|
tipc: add automatic session key exchange
With support from the master key option in the previous commit, it
becomes easy to make frequent updates/exchanges of session keys between
authenticated cluster nodes.
Basically, there are two situations where the key exchange will take in
place:
- When a new node joins the cluster (with the master key), it will need
to get its peer's TX key, so that be able to decrypt further messages
from that peer.
- When a new session key is generated (by either user manual setting or
later automatic rekeying feature), the key will be distributed to all
peer nodes in the cluster.
A key to be exchanged is encapsulated in the data part of a 'MSG_CRYPTO
/KEY_DISTR_MSG' TIPC v2 message, then xmit-ed as usual and encrypted by
using the master key before sending out. Upon receipt of the message it
will be decrypted in the same way as regular messages, then attached as
the sender's RX key in the receiver node.
In this way, the key exchange is reliable by the link layer, as well as
security, integrity and authenticity by the crypto layer.
Also, the forward security will be easily achieved by user changing the
master key actively but this should not be required very frequently.
The key exchange feature is independent on the presence of a master key
Note however that the master key still is needed for new nodes to be
able to join the cluster. It is also optional, and can be turned off/on
via the sysfs: 'net/tipc/key_exchange_enabled' [default 1: enabled].
Backward compatibility is guaranteed because for nodes that do not have
master key support, key exchange using master key ie. tx_key = 0 if any
will be shortly discarded at the message validation step. In other
words, the key exchange feature will be automatically disabled to those
nodes.
v2: fix the "implicit declaration of function 'tipc_crypto_key_flush'"
error in node.c. The function only exists when built with the TIPC
"CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO" option.
v3: use 'info->extack' for a message emitted due to netlink operations
instead (- David's comment).
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-18 04:17:28 +03:00
|
|
|
int tipc_crypto_key_distr(struct tipc_crypto *tx, u8 key,
|
|
|
|
|
struct tipc_node *dest);
|
|
|
|
|
void tipc_crypto_msg_rcv(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb);
|
2020-09-18 04:17:29 +03:00
|
|
|
void tipc_crypto_rekeying_sched(struct tipc_crypto *tx, bool changed,
|
|
|
|
|
u32 new_intv);
|
2020-09-18 04:17:26 +03:00
|
|
|
int tipc_aead_key_validate(struct tipc_aead_key *ukey, struct genl_info *info);
|
2019-11-08 08:05:11 +03:00
|
|
|
bool tipc_ehdr_validate(struct sk_buff *skb);
|
|
|
|
|
|
tipc: add automatic session key exchange
With support from the master key option in the previous commit, it
becomes easy to make frequent updates/exchanges of session keys between
authenticated cluster nodes.
Basically, there are two situations where the key exchange will take in
place:
- When a new node joins the cluster (with the master key), it will need
to get its peer's TX key, so that be able to decrypt further messages
from that peer.
- When a new session key is generated (by either user manual setting or
later automatic rekeying feature), the key will be distributed to all
peer nodes in the cluster.
A key to be exchanged is encapsulated in the data part of a 'MSG_CRYPTO
/KEY_DISTR_MSG' TIPC v2 message, then xmit-ed as usual and encrypted by
using the master key before sending out. Upon receipt of the message it
will be decrypted in the same way as regular messages, then attached as
the sender's RX key in the receiver node.
In this way, the key exchange is reliable by the link layer, as well as
security, integrity and authenticity by the crypto layer.
Also, the forward security will be easily achieved by user changing the
master key actively but this should not be required very frequently.
The key exchange feature is independent on the presence of a master key
Note however that the master key still is needed for new nodes to be
able to join the cluster. It is also optional, and can be turned off/on
via the sysfs: 'net/tipc/key_exchange_enabled' [default 1: enabled].
Backward compatibility is guaranteed because for nodes that do not have
master key support, key exchange using master key ie. tx_key = 0 if any
will be shortly discarded at the message validation step. In other
words, the key exchange feature will be automatically disabled to those
nodes.
v2: fix the "implicit declaration of function 'tipc_crypto_key_flush'"
error in node.c. The function only exists when built with the TIPC
"CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO" option.
v3: use 'info->extack' for a message emitted due to netlink operations
instead (- David's comment).
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-18 04:17:28 +03:00
|
|
|
static inline u32 msg_key_gen(struct tipc_msg *m)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return msg_bits(m, 4, 16, 0xffff);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void msg_set_key_gen(struct tipc_msg *m, u32 gen)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
msg_set_bits(m, 4, 16, 0xffff, gen);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline u32 msg_key_mode(struct tipc_msg *m)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return msg_bits(m, 4, 0, 0xf);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void msg_set_key_mode(struct tipc_msg *m, u32 mode)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
msg_set_bits(m, 4, 0, 0xf, mode);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-08 08:05:11 +03:00
|
|
|
#endif /* _TIPC_CRYPTO_H */
|
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|
|
#endif
|
