WSL2-Linux-Kernel/include/linux/string.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 17:07:57 +03:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _LINUX_STRING_H_
#define _LINUX_STRING_H_
#include <linux/compiler.h> /* for inline */
#include <linux/types.h> /* for size_t */
#include <linux/stddef.h> /* for NULL */
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <uapi/linux/string.h>
extern char *strndup_user(const char __user *, long);
extern void *memdup_user(const void __user *, size_t);
extern void *vmemdup_user(const void __user *, size_t);
extern void *memdup_user_nul(const void __user *, size_t);
/*
* Include machine specific inline routines
*/
#include <asm/string.h>
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRCPY
extern char * strcpy(char *,const char *);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRNCPY
extern char * strncpy(char *,const char *, __kernel_size_t);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRLCPY
size_t strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRSCPY
string: drop __must_check from strscpy() and restore strscpy() usages in cgroup e7fd37ba1217 ("cgroup: avoid copying strings longer than the buffers") converted possibly unsafe strncpy() usages in cgroup to strscpy(). However, although the callsites are completely fine with truncated copied, because strscpy() is marked __must_check, it led to the following warnings. kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c: In function ‘cgroup_file_name’: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:1400:10: warning: ignoring return value of ‘strscpy’, declared with attribute warn_unused_result [-Wunused-result] strscpy(buf, cft->name, CGROUP_FILE_NAME_MAX); ^ To avoid the warnings, 50034ed49645 ("cgroup: use strlcpy() instead of strscpy() to avoid spurious warning") switched them to strlcpy(). strlcpy() is worse than strlcpy() because it unconditionally runs strlen() on the source string, and the only reason we switched to strlcpy() here was because it was lacking __must_check, which doesn't reflect any material differences between the two function. It's just that someone added __must_check to strscpy() and not to strlcpy(). These basic string copy operations are used in variety of ways, and one of not-so-uncommon use cases is safely handling truncated copies, where the caller naturally doesn't care about the return value. The __must_check doesn't match the actual use cases and forces users to opt for inferior variants which lack __must_check by happenstance or spread ugly (void) casts. Remove __must_check from strscpy() and restore strscpy() usages in cgroup. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ma Shimiao <mashimiao.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
2018-01-09 18:21:15 +03:00
ssize_t strscpy(char *, const char *, size_t);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRCAT
extern char * strcat(char *, const char *);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRNCAT
extern char * strncat(char *, const char *, __kernel_size_t);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRLCAT
extern size_t strlcat(char *, const char *, __kernel_size_t);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRCMP
extern int strcmp(const char *,const char *);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRNCMP
extern int strncmp(const char *,const char *,__kernel_size_t);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRCASECMP
extern int strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRNCASECMP
extern int strncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRCHR
extern char * strchr(const char *,int);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRCHRNUL
extern char * strchrnul(const char *,int);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRNCHR
extern char * strnchr(const char *, size_t, int);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRRCHR
extern char * strrchr(const char *,int);
#endif
extern char * __must_check skip_spaces(const char *);
extern char *strim(char *);
static inline __must_check char *strstrip(char *str)
{
return strim(str);
}
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRSTR
extern char * strstr(const char *, const char *);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRNSTR
extern char * strnstr(const char *, const char *, size_t);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRLEN
extern __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRNLEN
extern __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char *,__kernel_size_t);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRPBRK
extern char * strpbrk(const char *,const char *);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRSEP
extern char * strsep(char **,const char *);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRSPN
extern __kernel_size_t strspn(const char *,const char *);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRCSPN
extern __kernel_size_t strcspn(const char *,const char *);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET
extern void * memset(void *,int,__kernel_size_t);
#endif
lib/string.c: add multibyte memset functions Patch series "Multibyte memset variations", v4. A relatively common idiom we're missing is a function to fill an area of memory with a pattern which is larger than a single byte. I first noticed this with a zram patch which wanted to fill a page with an 'unsigned long' value. There turn out to be quite a few places in the kernel which can benefit from using an optimised function rather than a loop; sometimes text size, sometimes speed, and sometimes both. The optimised PowerPC version (not included here) improves performance by about 30% on POWER8 on just the raw memset_l(). Most of the extra lines of code come from the three testcases I added. This patch (of 8): memset16(), memset32() and memset64() are like memset(), but allow the caller to fill the destination with a value larger than a single byte. memset_l() and memset_p() allow the caller to use unsigned long and pointer values respectively. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170720184539.31609-2-willy@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-09-09 02:13:48 +03:00
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET16
extern void *memset16(uint16_t *, uint16_t, __kernel_size_t);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET32
extern void *memset32(uint32_t *, uint32_t, __kernel_size_t);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET64
extern void *memset64(uint64_t *, uint64_t, __kernel_size_t);
#endif
static inline void *memset_l(unsigned long *p, unsigned long v,
__kernel_size_t n)
{
if (BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
return memset32((uint32_t *)p, v, n);
else
return memset64((uint64_t *)p, v, n);
}
static inline void *memset_p(void **p, void *v, __kernel_size_t n)
{
if (BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
return memset32((uint32_t *)p, (uintptr_t)v, n);
else
return memset64((uint64_t *)p, (uintptr_t)v, n);
}
extern void **__memcat_p(void **a, void **b);
#define memcat_p(a, b) ({ \
BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(!__same_type(*(a), *(b)), \
"type mismatch in memcat_p()"); \
(typeof(*a) *)__memcat_p((void **)(a), (void **)(b)); \
})
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCPY
extern void * memcpy(void *,const void *,__kernel_size_t);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMMOVE
extern void * memmove(void *,const void *,__kernel_size_t);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSCAN
extern void * memscan(void *,int,__kernel_size_t);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCMP
extern int memcmp(const void *,const void *,__kernel_size_t);
#endif
lib/string.c: implement a basic bcmp A recent optimization in Clang (r355672) lowers comparisons of the return value of memcmp against zero to comparisons of the return value of bcmp against zero. This helps some platforms that implement bcmp more efficiently than memcmp. glibc simply aliases bcmp to memcmp, but an optimized implementation is in the works. This results in linkage failures for all targets with Clang due to the undefined symbol. For now, just implement bcmp as a tailcail to memcmp to unbreak the build. This routine can be further optimized in the future. Other ideas discussed: * A weak alias was discussed, but breaks for architectures that define their own implementations of memcmp since aliases to declarations are not permitted (only definitions). Arch-specific memcmp implementations typically declare memcmp in C headers, but implement them in assembly. * -ffreestanding also is used sporadically throughout the kernel. * -fno-builtin-bcmp doesn't work when doing LTO. Link: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41035 Link: https://code.woboq.org/userspace/glibc/string/memcmp.c.html#bcmp Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/8e16d73346f8091461319a7dfc4ddd18eedcff13 Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/416 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190313211335.165605-1-ndesaulniers@google.com Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Reported-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Suggested-by: James Y Knight <jyknight@google.com> Suggested-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-04-06 04:38:45 +03:00
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_BCMP
extern int bcmp(const void *,const void *,__kernel_size_t);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCHR
extern void * memchr(const void *,int,__kernel_size_t);
#endif
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCPY_MCSAFE
static inline __must_check unsigned long memcpy_mcsafe(void *dst,
const void *src, size_t cnt)
{
memcpy(dst, src, cnt);
return 0;
}
#endif
x86, uaccess: introduce copy_from_iter_flushcache for pmem / cache-bypass operations The pmem driver has a need to transfer data with a persistent memory destination and be able to rely on the fact that the destination writes are not cached. It is sufficient for the writes to be flushed to a cpu-store-buffer (non-temporal / "movnt" in x86 terms), as we expect userspace to call fsync() to ensure data-writes have reached a power-fail-safe zone in the platform. The fsync() triggers a REQ_FUA or REQ_FLUSH to the pmem driver which will turn around and fence previous writes with an "sfence". Implement a __copy_from_user_inatomic_flushcache, memcpy_page_flushcache, and memcpy_flushcache, that guarantee that the destination buffer is not dirty in the cpu cache on completion. The new copy_from_iter_flushcache and sub-routines will be used to replace the "pmem api" (include/linux/pmem.h + arch/x86/include/asm/pmem.h). The availability of copy_from_iter_flushcache() and memcpy_flushcache() are gated by the CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE config symbol, and fallback to copy_from_iter_nocache() and plain memcpy() otherwise. This is meant to satisfy the concern from Linus that if a driver wants to do something beyond the normal nocache semantics it should be something private to that driver [1], and Al's concern that anything uaccess related belongs with the rest of the uaccess code [2]. The first consumer of this interface is a new 'copy_from_iter' dax operation so that pmem can inject cache maintenance operations without imposing this overhead on other dax-capable drivers. [1]: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/linux-nvdimm/2017-January/008364.html [2]: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/linux-nvdimm/2017-April/009942.html Cc: <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2017-05-29 22:22:50 +03:00
#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCPY_FLUSHCACHE
static inline void memcpy_flushcache(void *dst, const void *src, size_t cnt)
{
memcpy(dst, src, cnt);
}
#endif
void *memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n);
char *strreplace(char *s, char old, char new);
mm/util: add kstrdup_const kstrdup() is often used to duplicate strings where neither source neither destination will be ever modified. In such case we can just reuse the source instead of duplicating it. The problem is that we must be sure that the source is non-modifiable and its life-time is long enough. I suspect the good candidates for such strings are strings located in kernel .rodata section, they cannot be modifed because the section is read-only and their life-time is equal to kernel life-time. This small patchset proposes alternative version of kstrdup - kstrdup_const, which returns source string if it is located in .rodata otherwise it fallbacks to kstrdup. To verify if the source is in .rodata function checks if the address is between sentinels __start_rodata, __end_rodata. I guess it should work with all architectures. The main patch is accompanied by four patches constifying kstrdup for cases where situtation described above happens frequently. I have tested the patchset on mobile platform (exynos4210-trats) and it saves 3272 string allocations. Since minimal allocation is 32 or 64 bytes depending on Kconfig options the patchset saves respectively about 100KB or 200KB of memory. Stats from tested platform show that the main offender is sysfs: By caller: 2260 __kernfs_new_node 631 clk_register+0xc8/0x1b8 318 clk_register+0x34/0x1b8 51 kmem_cache_create 12 alloc_vfsmnt By string (with count >= 5): 883 power 876 subsystem 135 parameters 132 device 61 iommu_group ... This patch (of 5): Add an alternative version of kstrdup which returns pointer to constant char array. The function checks if input string is in persistent and read-only memory section, if yes it returns the input string, otherwise it fallbacks to kstrdup. kstrdup_const is accompanied by kfree_const performing conditional memory deallocation of the string. Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Kyungmin Park <kyungmin.park@samsung.com> Cc: Mike Turquette <mturquette@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 01:36:24 +03:00
extern void kfree_const(const void *x);
extern char *kstrdup(const char *s, gfp_t gfp) __malloc;
mm/util: add kstrdup_const kstrdup() is often used to duplicate strings where neither source neither destination will be ever modified. In such case we can just reuse the source instead of duplicating it. The problem is that we must be sure that the source is non-modifiable and its life-time is long enough. I suspect the good candidates for such strings are strings located in kernel .rodata section, they cannot be modifed because the section is read-only and their life-time is equal to kernel life-time. This small patchset proposes alternative version of kstrdup - kstrdup_const, which returns source string if it is located in .rodata otherwise it fallbacks to kstrdup. To verify if the source is in .rodata function checks if the address is between sentinels __start_rodata, __end_rodata. I guess it should work with all architectures. The main patch is accompanied by four patches constifying kstrdup for cases where situtation described above happens frequently. I have tested the patchset on mobile platform (exynos4210-trats) and it saves 3272 string allocations. Since minimal allocation is 32 or 64 bytes depending on Kconfig options the patchset saves respectively about 100KB or 200KB of memory. Stats from tested platform show that the main offender is sysfs: By caller: 2260 __kernfs_new_node 631 clk_register+0xc8/0x1b8 318 clk_register+0x34/0x1b8 51 kmem_cache_create 12 alloc_vfsmnt By string (with count >= 5): 883 power 876 subsystem 135 parameters 132 device 61 iommu_group ... This patch (of 5): Add an alternative version of kstrdup which returns pointer to constant char array. The function checks if input string is in persistent and read-only memory section, if yes it returns the input string, otherwise it fallbacks to kstrdup. kstrdup_const is accompanied by kfree_const performing conditional memory deallocation of the string. Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Kyungmin Park <kyungmin.park@samsung.com> Cc: Mike Turquette <mturquette@linaro.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 01:36:24 +03:00
extern const char *kstrdup_const(const char *s, gfp_t gfp);
extern char *kstrndup(const char *s, size_t len, gfp_t gfp);
extern void *kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp);
extern char *kmemdup_nul(const char *s, size_t len, gfp_t gfp);
extern char **argv_split(gfp_t gfp, const char *str, int *argcp);
extern void argv_free(char **argv);
extern bool sysfs_streq(const char *s1, const char *s2);
extern int kstrtobool(const char *s, bool *res);
static inline int strtobool(const char *s, bool *res)
{
return kstrtobool(s, res);
}
int match_string(const char * const *array, size_t n, const char *string);
int __sysfs_match_string(const char * const *array, size_t n, const char *s);
/**
* sysfs_match_string - matches given string in an array
* @_a: array of strings
* @_s: string to match with
*
* Helper for __sysfs_match_string(). Calculates the size of @a automatically.
*/
#define sysfs_match_string(_a, _s) __sysfs_match_string(_a, ARRAY_SIZE(_a), _s)
#ifdef CONFIG_BINARY_PRINTF
int vbin_printf(u32 *bin_buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args);
int bstr_printf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, const u32 *bin_buf);
int bprintf(u32 *bin_buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, ...) __printf(3, 4);
#endif
extern ssize_t memory_read_from_buffer(void *to, size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
const void *from, size_t available);
/**
* strstarts - does @str start with @prefix?
* @str: string to examine
* @prefix: prefix to look for.
*/
static inline bool strstarts(const char *str, const char *prefix)
{
return strncmp(str, prefix, strlen(prefix)) == 0;
}
size_t memweight(const void *ptr, size_t bytes);
void memzero_explicit(void *s, size_t count);
/**
* kbasename - return the last part of a pathname.
*
* @path: path to extract the filename from.
*/
static inline const char *kbasename(const char *path)
{
const char *tail = strrchr(path, '/');
return tail ? tail + 1 : path;
}
include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc, it covers buffer reads in addition to writes. GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper overhead. This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in regular use at runtime too. Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity, as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally: * Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of the source buffer. * Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat. * It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative approach to avoid likely compatibility issues. * The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed. Kees said: "This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already" [arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de [keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast [keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-13 00:36:10 +03:00
#define __FORTIFY_INLINE extern __always_inline __attribute__((gnu_inline))
#define __RENAME(x) __asm__(#x)
void fortify_panic(const char *name) __noreturn __cold;
void __read_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter");
void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object passed as 2nd parameter");
void __read_overflow3(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object passed as 3rd parameter");
include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc, it covers buffer reads in addition to writes. GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper overhead. This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in regular use at runtime too. Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity, as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally: * Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of the source buffer. * Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat. * It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative approach to avoid likely compatibility issues. * The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed. Kees said: "This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already" [arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de [keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast [keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-13 00:36:10 +03:00
void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter");
#if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
{
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
__write_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
fortify_panic(__func__);
return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size);
}
__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q)
{
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
return __builtin_strcat(p, q);
if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
fortify_panic(__func__);
return p;
}
__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p)
{
__kernel_size_t ret;
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
string.h: workaround for increased stack usage The hardened strlen() function causes rather large stack usage in at least one file in the kernel, in particular when CONFIG_KASAN is enabled: drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-dvb.c: In function 'em28xx_dvb_init': drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-dvb.c:2062:1: error: the frame size of 3256 bytes is larger than 204 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=] Analyzing this problem led to the discovery that gcc fails to merge the stack slots for the i2c_board_info[] structures after we strlcpy() into them, due to the 'noreturn' attribute on the source string length check. I reported this as a gcc bug, but it is unlikely to get fixed for gcc-8, since it is relatively easy to work around, and it gets triggered rarely. An earlier workaround I did added an empty inline assembly statement before the call to fortify_panic(), which works surprisingly well, but is really ugly and unintuitive. This is a new approach to the same problem, this time addressing it by not calling the 'extern __real_strnlen()' function for string constants where __builtin_strlen() is a compile-time constant and therefore known to be safe. We do this by checking if the last character in the string is a compile-time constant '\0'. If it is, we can assume that strlen() of the string is also constant. As a side-effect, this should also improve the object code output for any other call of strlen() on a string constant. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171205215143.3085755-1-arnd@arndb.de Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=82365 Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9980413/ Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9974047/ Fixes: 6974f0c4555 ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Martin Wilck <mwilck@suse.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-12-15 02:32:34 +03:00
/* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */
if (p_size == (size_t)-1 ||
(__builtin_constant_p(p[p_size - 1]) && p[p_size - 1] == '\0'))
include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc, it covers buffer reads in addition to writes. GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper overhead. This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in regular use at runtime too. Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity, as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally: * Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of the source buffer. * Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat. * It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative approach to avoid likely compatibility issues. * The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed. Kees said: "This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already" [arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de [keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast [keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-13 00:36:10 +03:00
return __builtin_strlen(p);
ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
if (p_size <= ret)
fortify_panic(__func__);
return ret;
}
extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen);
__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char *p, __kernel_size_t maxlen)
{
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
__kernel_size_t ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size);
if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret)
fortify_panic(__func__);
return ret;
}
/* defined after fortified strlen to reuse it */
extern size_t __real_strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strlcpy);
__FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size)
{
size_t ret;
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
return __real_strlcpy(p, q, size);
ret = strlen(q);
if (size) {
size_t len = (ret >= size) ? size - 1 : ret;
if (__builtin_constant_p(len) && len >= p_size)
__write_overflow();
if (len >= p_size)
fortify_panic(__func__);
__builtin_memcpy(p, q, len);
p[len] = '\0';
}
return ret;
}
/* defined after fortified strlen and strnlen to reuse them */
__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count)
{
size_t p_len, copy_len;
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
return __builtin_strncat(p, q, count);
p_len = strlen(p);
copy_len = strnlen(q, count);
if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1)
fortify_panic(__func__);
__builtin_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0';
return p;
}
__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
{
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
__write_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
fortify_panic(__func__);
return __builtin_memset(p, c, size);
}
__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
{
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
if (p_size < size)
__write_overflow();
if (q_size < size)
__read_overflow2();
}
if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
fortify_panic(__func__);
return __builtin_memcpy(p, q, size);
}
__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
{
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
if (p_size < size)
__write_overflow();
if (q_size < size)
__read_overflow2();
}
if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
fortify_panic(__func__);
return __builtin_memmove(p, q, size);
}
extern void *__real_memscan(void *, int, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(memscan);
__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
{
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
__read_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
fortify_panic(__func__);
return __real_memscan(p, c, size);
}
__FORTIFY_INLINE int memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
{
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
if (p_size < size)
__read_overflow();
if (q_size < size)
__read_overflow2();
}
if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
fortify_panic(__func__);
return __builtin_memcmp(p, q, size);
}
__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
{
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
__read_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
fortify_panic(__func__);
return __builtin_memchr(p, c, size);
}
void *__real_memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n) __RENAME(memchr_inv);
__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void *p, int c, size_t size)
{
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
__read_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
fortify_panic(__func__);
return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size);
}
extern void *__real_kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __RENAME(kmemdup);
__FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void *p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
{
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
__read_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
fortify_panic(__func__);
return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp);
}
/* defined after fortified strlen and memcpy to reuse them */
__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q)
{
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
return __builtin_strcpy(p, q);
memcpy(p, q, strlen(q) + 1);
return p;
}
include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc, it covers buffer reads in addition to writes. GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper overhead. This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in regular use at runtime too. Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity, as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally: * Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of the source buffer. * Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat. * It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative approach to avoid likely compatibility issues. * The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed. Kees said: "This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already" [arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de [keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast [keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-13 00:36:10 +03:00
#endif
/**
* memcpy_and_pad - Copy one buffer to another with padding
* @dest: Where to copy to
* @dest_len: The destination buffer size
* @src: Where to copy from
* @count: The number of bytes to copy
* @pad: Character to use for padding if space is left in destination.
*/
static inline void memcpy_and_pad(void *dest, size_t dest_len,
const void *src, size_t count, int pad)
{
if (dest_len > count) {
memcpy(dest, src, count);
memset(dest + count, pad, dest_len - count);
} else
memcpy(dest, src, dest_len);
}
string.h: Add str_has_prefix() helper function A discussion came up in the trace triggers thread about converting a bunch of: strncmp(str, "const", sizeof("const") - 1) use cases into a helper macro. It started with: strncmp(str, const, sizeof(const) - 1) But then Joe Perches mentioned that if a const is not used, the sizeof() will be the size of a pointer, which can be bad. And that gcc will optimize strlen("const") into "sizeof("const") - 1". Thinking about this more, a quick grep in the kernel tree found several (thousands!) of cases that use this construct. A quick grep also revealed that there's probably several bugs in that use case. Some are that people forgot the "- 1" (which I found) and others could be that the constant for the sizeof is different than the constant (although, I haven't found any of those, but I also didn't look hard). I figured the best thing to do is to create a helper macro and place it into include/linux/string.h. And go around and fix all the open coded versions of it later. Note, gcc appears to optimize this when we make it into an always_inline static function, which removes a lot of issues that a macro produces. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e3e754f2bd18e56eaa8baf79bee619316ebf4cfc.1545161087.git.tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181219211615.2298e781@gandalf.local.home Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wg_sR-UEC1ggmkZpypOUYanL5CMX4R7ceuaV4QMf5jBtg@mail.gmail.com Cc: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Suggestions-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Suggestions-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Suggestions-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2018-12-22 02:10:14 +03:00
/**
* str_has_prefix - Test if a string has a given prefix
* @str: The string to test
* @prefix: The string to see if @str starts with
*
* A common way to test a prefix of a string is to do:
* strncmp(str, prefix, sizeof(prefix) - 1)
*
* But this can lead to bugs due to typos, or if prefix is a pointer
* and not a constant. Instead use str_has_prefix().
*
* Returns: 0 if @str does not start with @prefix
strlen(@prefix) if @str does start with @prefix
*/
static __always_inline size_t str_has_prefix(const char *str, const char *prefix)
{
size_t len = strlen(prefix);
return strncmp(str, prefix, len) == 0 ? len : 0;
}
#endif /* _LINUX_STRING_H_ */