WSL2-Linux-Kernel/fs/posix_acl.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 2002,2003 by Andreas Gruenbacher <a.gruenbacher@computer.org>
*
* Fixes from William Schumacher incorporated on 15 March 2001.
* (Reported by Charles Bertsch, <CBertsch@microtest.com>).
*/
/*
* This file contains generic functions for manipulating
* POSIX 1003.1e draft standard 17 ACLs.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
#include <linux/iversion.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include "internal.h"
static struct posix_acl **acl_by_type(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
return &inode->i_acl;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
return &inode->i_default_acl;
default:
BUG();
}
}
struct posix_acl *get_cached_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct posix_acl **p = acl_by_type(inode, type);
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
struct posix_acl *acl;
for (;;) {
rcu_read_lock();
acl = rcu_dereference(*p);
if (!acl || is_uncached_acl(acl) ||
posix_acl: convert posix_acl.a_refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable posix_acl.a_refcount is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. **Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the posix_acl.a_refcount it might make a difference in following places: - get_cached_acl(): increment in refcount_inc_not_zero() only guarantees control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart. However this operation is performed under rcu_read_lock(), so this should be fine. - posix_acl_release(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
2017-11-29 14:19:31 +03:00
refcount_inc_not_zero(&acl->a_refcount))
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
break;
rcu_read_unlock();
cpu_relax();
}
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
rcu_read_unlock();
return acl;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_cached_acl);
struct posix_acl *get_cached_acl_rcu(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct posix_acl *acl = rcu_dereference(*acl_by_type(inode, type));
if (acl == ACL_DONT_CACHE) {
struct posix_acl *ret;
fs: rename current get acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. The current inode operation for getting posix acls takes an inode argument but various filesystems (e.g., 9p, cifs, overlayfs) need access to the dentry. In contrast to the ->set_acl() inode operation we cannot simply extend ->get_acl() to take a dentry argument. The ->get_acl() inode operation is called from: acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() which is part of generic_permission() which in turn is part of inode_permission(). Both generic_permission() and inode_permission() are called in the ->permission() handler of various filesystems (e.g., overlayfs). So simply passing a dentry argument to ->get_acl() would amount to also having to pass a dentry argument to ->permission(). We should avoid this unnecessary change. So instead of extending the existing inode operation rename it from ->get_acl() to ->get_inode_acl() and add a ->get_acl() method later that passes a dentry argument and which filesystems that need access to the dentry can implement instead of ->get_inode_acl(). Filesystems like cifs which allow setting and getting posix acls but not using them for permission checking during lookup can simply not implement ->get_inode_acl(). This is intended to be a non-functional change. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Suggested-by/Inspired-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-22 18:17:00 +03:00
ret = inode->i_op->get_inode_acl(inode, type, LOOKUP_RCU);
if (!IS_ERR(ret))
acl = ret;
}
return acl;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_cached_acl_rcu);
void set_cached_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
{
struct posix_acl **p = acl_by_type(inode, type);
struct posix_acl *old;
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
old = xchg(p, posix_acl_dup(acl));
if (!is_uncached_acl(old))
posix_acl_release(old);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_cached_acl);
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
static void __forget_cached_acl(struct posix_acl **p)
{
struct posix_acl *old;
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
old = xchg(p, ACL_NOT_CACHED);
if (!is_uncached_acl(old))
posix_acl_release(old);
}
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
void forget_cached_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
__forget_cached_acl(acl_by_type(inode, type));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(forget_cached_acl);
void forget_all_cached_acls(struct inode *inode)
{
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
__forget_cached_acl(&inode->i_acl);
__forget_cached_acl(&inode->i_default_acl);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(forget_all_cached_acls);
static struct posix_acl *__get_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
int type)
{
struct posix_acl *sentinel;
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
struct posix_acl **p;
struct posix_acl *acl;
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
/*
* The sentinel is used to detect when another operation like
fs: rename current get acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. The current inode operation for getting posix acls takes an inode argument but various filesystems (e.g., 9p, cifs, overlayfs) need access to the dentry. In contrast to the ->set_acl() inode operation we cannot simply extend ->get_acl() to take a dentry argument. The ->get_acl() inode operation is called from: acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() which is part of generic_permission() which in turn is part of inode_permission(). Both generic_permission() and inode_permission() are called in the ->permission() handler of various filesystems (e.g., overlayfs). So simply passing a dentry argument to ->get_acl() would amount to also having to pass a dentry argument to ->permission(). We should avoid this unnecessary change. So instead of extending the existing inode operation rename it from ->get_acl() to ->get_inode_acl() and add a ->get_acl() method later that passes a dentry argument and which filesystems that need access to the dentry can implement instead of ->get_inode_acl(). Filesystems like cifs which allow setting and getting posix acls but not using them for permission checking during lookup can simply not implement ->get_inode_acl(). This is intended to be a non-functional change. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Suggested-by/Inspired-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-22 18:17:00 +03:00
* set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() races with get_inode_acl().
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
* It is guaranteed that is_uncached_acl(sentinel) is true.
*/
acl = get_cached_acl(inode, type);
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
if (!is_uncached_acl(acl))
return acl;
if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode))
return NULL;
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
sentinel = uncached_acl_sentinel(current);
p = acl_by_type(inode, type);
/*
* If the ACL isn't being read yet, set our sentinel. Otherwise, the
* current value of the ACL will not be ACL_NOT_CACHED and so our own
* sentinel will not be set; another task will update the cache. We
* could wait for that other task to complete its job, but it's easier
fs: rename current get acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. The current inode operation for getting posix acls takes an inode argument but various filesystems (e.g., 9p, cifs, overlayfs) need access to the dentry. In contrast to the ->set_acl() inode operation we cannot simply extend ->get_acl() to take a dentry argument. The ->get_acl() inode operation is called from: acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() which is part of generic_permission() which in turn is part of inode_permission(). Both generic_permission() and inode_permission() are called in the ->permission() handler of various filesystems (e.g., overlayfs). So simply passing a dentry argument to ->get_acl() would amount to also having to pass a dentry argument to ->permission(). We should avoid this unnecessary change. So instead of extending the existing inode operation rename it from ->get_acl() to ->get_inode_acl() and add a ->get_acl() method later that passes a dentry argument and which filesystems that need access to the dentry can implement instead of ->get_inode_acl(). Filesystems like cifs which allow setting and getting posix acls but not using them for permission checking during lookup can simply not implement ->get_inode_acl(). This is intended to be a non-functional change. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Suggested-by/Inspired-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-22 18:17:00 +03:00
* to just call ->get_inode_acl to fetch the ACL ourself. (This is
* going to be an unlikely race.)
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
*/
cmpxchg(p, ACL_NOT_CACHED, sentinel);
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
/*
* Normally, the ACL returned by ->get{_inode}_acl will be cached.
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
* A filesystem can prevent that by calling
* forget_cached_acl(inode, type) in ->get{_inode}_acl.
*
* If the filesystem doesn't have a get{_inode}_ acl() function at all,
fs: rename current get acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. The current inode operation for getting posix acls takes an inode argument but various filesystems (e.g., 9p, cifs, overlayfs) need access to the dentry. In contrast to the ->set_acl() inode operation we cannot simply extend ->get_acl() to take a dentry argument. The ->get_acl() inode operation is called from: acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() which is part of generic_permission() which in turn is part of inode_permission(). Both generic_permission() and inode_permission() are called in the ->permission() handler of various filesystems (e.g., overlayfs). So simply passing a dentry argument to ->get_acl() would amount to also having to pass a dentry argument to ->permission(). We should avoid this unnecessary change. So instead of extending the existing inode operation rename it from ->get_acl() to ->get_inode_acl() and add a ->get_acl() method later that passes a dentry argument and which filesystems that need access to the dentry can implement instead of ->get_inode_acl(). Filesystems like cifs which allow setting and getting posix acls but not using them for permission checking during lookup can simply not implement ->get_inode_acl(). This is intended to be a non-functional change. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Suggested-by/Inspired-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-22 18:17:00 +03:00
* we'll just create the negative cache entry.
*/
if (dentry && inode->i_op->get_acl) {
acl = inode->i_op->get_acl(mnt_userns, dentry, type);
} else if (inode->i_op->get_inode_acl) {
acl = inode->i_op->get_inode_acl(inode, type, false);
} else {
set_cached_acl(inode, type, NULL);
return NULL;
}
posix_acl: Inode acl caching fixes When get_acl() is called for an inode whose ACL is not cached yet, the get_acl inode operation is called to fetch the ACL from the filesystem. The inode operation is responsible for updating the cached acl with set_cached_acl(). This is done without locking at the VFS level, so another task can call set_cached_acl() or forget_cached_acl() before the get_acl inode operation gets to calling set_cached_acl(), and then get_acl's call to set_cached_acl() results in caching an outdate ACL. Prevent this from happening by setting the cached ACL pointer to a task-specific sentinel value before calling the get_acl inode operation. Move the responsibility for updating the cached ACL from the get_acl inode operations to get_acl(). There, only set the cached ACL if the sentinel value hasn't changed. The sentinel values are chosen to have odd values. Likewise, the value of ACL_NOT_CACHED is odd. In contrast, ACL object pointers always have an even value (ACLs are aligned in memory). This allows to distinguish uncached ACLs values from ACL objects. In addition, switch from guarding inode->i_acl and inode->i_default_acl upates by the inode->i_lock spinlock to using xchg() and cmpxchg(). Filesystems that do not want ACLs returned from their get_acl inode operations to be cached must call forget_cached_acl() to prevent the VFS from doing so. (Patch written by Al Viro and Andreas Gruenbacher.) Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-24 16:38:37 +03:00
if (IS_ERR(acl)) {
/*
* Remove our sentinel so that we don't block future attempts
* to cache the ACL.
*/
cmpxchg(p, sentinel, ACL_NOT_CACHED);
return acl;
}
/*
* Cache the result, but only if our sentinel is still in place.
*/
posix_acl_dup(acl);
if (unlikely(cmpxchg(p, sentinel, acl) != sentinel))
posix_acl_release(acl);
return acl;
}
struct posix_acl *get_inode_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
return __get_acl(&init_user_ns, NULL, inode, type);
}
fs: rename current get acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. The current inode operation for getting posix acls takes an inode argument but various filesystems (e.g., 9p, cifs, overlayfs) need access to the dentry. In contrast to the ->set_acl() inode operation we cannot simply extend ->get_acl() to take a dentry argument. The ->get_acl() inode operation is called from: acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() which is part of generic_permission() which in turn is part of inode_permission(). Both generic_permission() and inode_permission() are called in the ->permission() handler of various filesystems (e.g., overlayfs). So simply passing a dentry argument to ->get_acl() would amount to also having to pass a dentry argument to ->permission(). We should avoid this unnecessary change. So instead of extending the existing inode operation rename it from ->get_acl() to ->get_inode_acl() and add a ->get_acl() method later that passes a dentry argument and which filesystems that need access to the dentry can implement instead of ->get_inode_acl(). Filesystems like cifs which allow setting and getting posix acls but not using them for permission checking during lookup can simply not implement ->get_inode_acl(). This is intended to be a non-functional change. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Suggested-by/Inspired-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-22 18:17:00 +03:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_inode_acl);
/*
* Init a fresh posix_acl
*/
void
posix_acl_init(struct posix_acl *acl, int count)
{
posix_acl: convert posix_acl.a_refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable posix_acl.a_refcount is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. **Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the posix_acl.a_refcount it might make a difference in following places: - get_cached_acl(): increment in refcount_inc_not_zero() only guarantees control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart. However this operation is performed under rcu_read_lock(), so this should be fine. - posix_acl_release(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
2017-11-29 14:19:31 +03:00
refcount_set(&acl->a_refcount, 1);
acl->a_count = count;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_init);
/*
* Allocate a new ACL with the specified number of entries.
*/
struct posix_acl *
posix_acl_alloc(int count, gfp_t flags)
{
const size_t size = sizeof(struct posix_acl) +
count * sizeof(struct posix_acl_entry);
struct posix_acl *acl = kmalloc(size, flags);
if (acl)
posix_acl_init(acl, count);
return acl;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_alloc);
/*
* Clone an ACL.
*/
struct posix_acl *
posix_acl_clone(const struct posix_acl *acl, gfp_t flags)
{
struct posix_acl *clone = NULL;
if (acl) {
int size = sizeof(struct posix_acl) + acl->a_count *
sizeof(struct posix_acl_entry);
clone = kmemdup(acl, size, flags);
if (clone)
posix_acl: convert posix_acl.a_refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters with the following properties: - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set() - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero - once counter reaches zero, its further increments aren't allowed - counter schema uses basic atomic operations (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.) Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable. The variable posix_acl.a_refcount is used as pure reference counter. Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations. **Important note for maintainers: Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage. For the posix_acl.a_refcount it might make a difference in following places: - get_cached_acl(): increment in refcount_inc_not_zero() only guarantees control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart. However this operation is performed under rcu_read_lock(), so this should be fine. - posix_acl_release(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
2017-11-29 14:19:31 +03:00
refcount_set(&clone->a_refcount, 1);
}
return clone;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(posix_acl_clone);
/*
* Check if an acl is valid. Returns 0 if it is, or -E... otherwise.
*/
int
posix_acl_valid(struct user_namespace *user_ns, const struct posix_acl *acl)
{
const struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe;
int state = ACL_USER_OBJ;
int needs_mask = 0;
FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
if (pa->e_perm & ~(ACL_READ|ACL_WRITE|ACL_EXECUTE))
return -EINVAL;
switch (pa->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
if (state == ACL_USER_OBJ) {
state = ACL_USER;
break;
}
return -EINVAL;
case ACL_USER:
if (state != ACL_USER)
return -EINVAL;
if (!kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, pa->e_uid))
return -EINVAL;
needs_mask = 1;
break;
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
if (state == ACL_USER) {
state = ACL_GROUP;
break;
}
return -EINVAL;
case ACL_GROUP:
if (state != ACL_GROUP)
return -EINVAL;
if (!kgid_has_mapping(user_ns, pa->e_gid))
2012-02-08 06:52:57 +04:00
return -EINVAL;
needs_mask = 1;
break;
case ACL_MASK:
if (state != ACL_GROUP)
return -EINVAL;
state = ACL_OTHER;
break;
case ACL_OTHER:
if (state == ACL_OTHER ||
(state == ACL_GROUP && !needs_mask)) {
state = 0;
break;
}
return -EINVAL;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
if (state == 0)
return 0;
return -EINVAL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_valid);
/*
* Returns 0 if the acl can be exactly represented in the traditional
* file mode permission bits, or else 1. Returns -E... on error.
*/
int
posix_acl_equiv_mode(const struct posix_acl *acl, umode_t *mode_p)
{
const struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe;
umode_t mode = 0;
int not_equiv = 0;
/*
* A null ACL can always be presented as mode bits.
*/
if (!acl)
return 0;
FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
switch (pa->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
mode |= (pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO) << 6;
break;
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
mode |= (pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO) << 3;
break;
case ACL_OTHER:
mode |= pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO;
break;
case ACL_MASK:
mode = (mode & ~S_IRWXG) |
((pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO) << 3);
not_equiv = 1;
break;
case ACL_USER:
case ACL_GROUP:
not_equiv = 1;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
if (mode_p)
*mode_p = (*mode_p & ~S_IRWXUGO) | mode;
return not_equiv;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_equiv_mode);
/*
* Create an ACL representing the file mode permission bits of an inode.
*/
struct posix_acl *
posix_acl_from_mode(umode_t mode, gfp_t flags)
{
struct posix_acl *acl = posix_acl_alloc(3, flags);
if (!acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
acl->a_entries[0].e_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ;
acl->a_entries[0].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6;
acl->a_entries[1].e_tag = ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
acl->a_entries[1].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3;
acl->a_entries[2].e_tag = ACL_OTHER;
acl->a_entries[2].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXO);
return acl;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_from_mode);
/*
* Return 0 if current is granted want access to the inode
* by the acl. Returns -E... otherwise.
*/
int
posix_acl_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
const struct posix_acl *acl, int want)
{
const struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe, *mask_obj;
acl: handle idmapped mounts for idmapped filesystems Ensure that POSIX ACLs checking, getting, and setting works correctly for filesystems mountable with a filesystem idmapping ("fs_idmapping") that want to support idmapped mounts ("mnt_idmapping"). Note that no filesystems mountable with an fs_idmapping do yet support idmapped mounts. This is required infrastructure work to unblock this. As we explained in detail in [1] the fs_idmapping is irrelevant for getxattr() and setxattr() when mapping the ACL_{GROUP,USER} {g,u}ids stored in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry in posix_acl_fix_xattr_{from,to}_user(). But for acl_permission_check() and posix_acl_{g,s}etxattr_idmapped_mnt() the fs_idmapping matters. acl_permission_check(): During lookup POSIX ACLs are retrieved directly via i_op->get_acl() and are returned via the kernel internal struct posix_acl which contains e_{g,u}id members of type k{g,u}id_t that already take the fs_idmapping into acccount. For example, a POSIX ACL stored with u4 on the backing store is mapped to k10000004 in the fs_idmapping. The mnt_idmapping remaps the POSIX ACL to k20000004. In order to do that the fs_idmapping needs to be taken into account but that doesn't happen yet (Again, this is a counterfactual currently as fuse doesn't support idmapped mounts currently. It's just used as a convenient example.): fs_idmapping: u0:k10000000:r65536 mnt_idmapping: u0:v20000000:r65536 ACL_USER: k10000004 acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() -> i_op->get_acl() == fuse_get_acl() -> posix_acl_from_xattr(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, ...) { k10000004 = make_kuid(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, u4 /* ACL_USER */); } -> posix_acl_permission() { -1 = make_vfsuid(u0:v20000000:r65536 /* mnt_idmapping */, &init_user_ns, k10000004); vfsuid_eq_kuid(-1, k10000004 /* caller_fsuid */) } In order to correctly map from the fs_idmapping into mnt_idmapping we require the relevant fs_idmaping to be passed: acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() -> i_op->get_acl() == fuse_get_acl() -> posix_acl_from_xattr(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, ...) { k10000004 = make_kuid(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, u4 /* ACL_USER */); } -> posix_acl_permission() { v20000004 = make_vfsuid(u0:v20000000:r65536 /* mnt_idmapping */, u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, k10000004); vfsuid_eq_kuid(v20000004, k10000004 /* caller_fsuid */) } The initial_idmapping is only correct for the current situation because all filesystems that currently support idmapped mounts do not support being mounted with an fs_idmapping. Note that ovl_get_acl() is used to retrieve the POSIX ACLs from the relevant lower layer and the lower layer's mnt_idmapping needs to be taken into account and so does the fs_idmapping. See 0c5fd887d2bb ("acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()") for more details. For posix_acl_{g,s}etxattr_idmapped_mnt() it is not as obvious why the fs_idmapping matters as it is for acl_permission_check(). Especially because it doesn't matter for posix_acl_fix_xattr_{from,to}_user() (See [1] for more context.). Because posix_acl_{g,s}etxattr_idmapped_mnt() operate on the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry which contains {g,u}id_t values and thus give the impression that the fs_idmapping is irrelevant as at this point appropriate {g,u}id_t values have seemlingly been generated. As we've stated multiple times this assumption is wrong and in fact the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry is taking idmappings into account depending at what place it is operated on. posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() When posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() is called the values stored in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry are mapped according to the fs_idmapping. This happened when they were read from the backing store and then translated from struct posix_acl into the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry during posix_acl_to_xattr(). In other words, the fs_idmapping matters as the values stored as {g,u}id_t in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry have been generated by it. So we need to take the fs_idmapping into account during make_vfsuid() in posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt(). posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() When posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() is called the values stored as {g,u}id_t in uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry are intended to be the values that ultimately get turned back into a k{g,u}id_t in posix_acl_from_xattr() (which turns the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry into the kernel internal struct posix_acl). In other words, the fs_idmapping matters as the values stored as {g,u}id_t in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry are intended to be the values that will be undone in the fs_idmapping when writing to the backing store. So we need to take the fs_idmapping into account during from_vfsuid() in posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Fixes: 0c5fd887d2bb ("acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()") Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220816113514.43304-1-brauner@kernel.org
2022-08-16 14:35:13 +03:00
struct user_namespace *fs_userns = i_user_ns(inode);
int found = 0;
vfsuid_t vfsuid;
vfsgid_t vfsgid;
want &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
switch(pa->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
/* (May have been checked already) */
vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode);
if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid()))
goto check_perm;
break;
case ACL_USER:
acl: handle idmapped mounts for idmapped filesystems Ensure that POSIX ACLs checking, getting, and setting works correctly for filesystems mountable with a filesystem idmapping ("fs_idmapping") that want to support idmapped mounts ("mnt_idmapping"). Note that no filesystems mountable with an fs_idmapping do yet support idmapped mounts. This is required infrastructure work to unblock this. As we explained in detail in [1] the fs_idmapping is irrelevant for getxattr() and setxattr() when mapping the ACL_{GROUP,USER} {g,u}ids stored in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry in posix_acl_fix_xattr_{from,to}_user(). But for acl_permission_check() and posix_acl_{g,s}etxattr_idmapped_mnt() the fs_idmapping matters. acl_permission_check(): During lookup POSIX ACLs are retrieved directly via i_op->get_acl() and are returned via the kernel internal struct posix_acl which contains e_{g,u}id members of type k{g,u}id_t that already take the fs_idmapping into acccount. For example, a POSIX ACL stored with u4 on the backing store is mapped to k10000004 in the fs_idmapping. The mnt_idmapping remaps the POSIX ACL to k20000004. In order to do that the fs_idmapping needs to be taken into account but that doesn't happen yet (Again, this is a counterfactual currently as fuse doesn't support idmapped mounts currently. It's just used as a convenient example.): fs_idmapping: u0:k10000000:r65536 mnt_idmapping: u0:v20000000:r65536 ACL_USER: k10000004 acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() -> i_op->get_acl() == fuse_get_acl() -> posix_acl_from_xattr(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, ...) { k10000004 = make_kuid(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, u4 /* ACL_USER */); } -> posix_acl_permission() { -1 = make_vfsuid(u0:v20000000:r65536 /* mnt_idmapping */, &init_user_ns, k10000004); vfsuid_eq_kuid(-1, k10000004 /* caller_fsuid */) } In order to correctly map from the fs_idmapping into mnt_idmapping we require the relevant fs_idmaping to be passed: acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() -> i_op->get_acl() == fuse_get_acl() -> posix_acl_from_xattr(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, ...) { k10000004 = make_kuid(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, u4 /* ACL_USER */); } -> posix_acl_permission() { v20000004 = make_vfsuid(u0:v20000000:r65536 /* mnt_idmapping */, u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, k10000004); vfsuid_eq_kuid(v20000004, k10000004 /* caller_fsuid */) } The initial_idmapping is only correct for the current situation because all filesystems that currently support idmapped mounts do not support being mounted with an fs_idmapping. Note that ovl_get_acl() is used to retrieve the POSIX ACLs from the relevant lower layer and the lower layer's mnt_idmapping needs to be taken into account and so does the fs_idmapping. See 0c5fd887d2bb ("acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()") for more details. For posix_acl_{g,s}etxattr_idmapped_mnt() it is not as obvious why the fs_idmapping matters as it is for acl_permission_check(). Especially because it doesn't matter for posix_acl_fix_xattr_{from,to}_user() (See [1] for more context.). Because posix_acl_{g,s}etxattr_idmapped_mnt() operate on the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry which contains {g,u}id_t values and thus give the impression that the fs_idmapping is irrelevant as at this point appropriate {g,u}id_t values have seemlingly been generated. As we've stated multiple times this assumption is wrong and in fact the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry is taking idmappings into account depending at what place it is operated on. posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() When posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() is called the values stored in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry are mapped according to the fs_idmapping. This happened when they were read from the backing store and then translated from struct posix_acl into the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry during posix_acl_to_xattr(). In other words, the fs_idmapping matters as the values stored as {g,u}id_t in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry have been generated by it. So we need to take the fs_idmapping into account during make_vfsuid() in posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt(). posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() When posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() is called the values stored as {g,u}id_t in uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry are intended to be the values that ultimately get turned back into a k{g,u}id_t in posix_acl_from_xattr() (which turns the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry into the kernel internal struct posix_acl). In other words, the fs_idmapping matters as the values stored as {g,u}id_t in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry are intended to be the values that will be undone in the fs_idmapping when writing to the backing store. So we need to take the fs_idmapping into account during from_vfsuid() in posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Fixes: 0c5fd887d2bb ("acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()") Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220816113514.43304-1-brauner@kernel.org
2022-08-16 14:35:13 +03:00
vfsuid = make_vfsuid(mnt_userns, fs_userns,
fs: support mapped mounts of mapped filesystems In previous patches we added new and modified existing helpers to handle idmapped mounts of filesystems mounted with an idmapping. In this final patch we convert all relevant places in the vfs to actually pass the filesystem's idmapping into these helpers. With this the vfs is in shape to handle idmapped mounts of filesystems mounted with an idmapping. Note that this is just the generic infrastructure. Actually adding support for idmapped mounts to a filesystem mountable with an idmapping is follow-up work. In this patch we extend the definition of an idmapped mount from a mount that that has the initial idmapping attached to it to a mount that has an idmapping attached to it which is not the same as the idmapping the filesystem was mounted with. As before we do not allow the initial idmapping to be attached to a mount. In addition this patch prevents that the idmapping the filesystem was mounted with can be attached to a mount created based on this filesystem. This has multiple reasons and advantages. First, attaching the initial idmapping or the filesystem's idmapping doesn't make much sense as in both cases the values of the i_{g,u}id and other places where k{g,u}ids are used do not change. Second, a user that really wants to do this for whatever reason can just create a separate dedicated identical idmapping to attach to the mount. Third, we can continue to use the initial idmapping as an indicator that a mount is not idmapped allowing us to continue to keep passing the initial idmapping into the mapping helpers to tell them that something isn't an idmapped mount even if the filesystem is mounted with an idmapping. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211123114227.3124056-11-brauner@kernel.org (v1) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130121032.3753852-11-brauner@kernel.org (v2) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211203111707.3901969-11-brauner@kernel.org Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-12-03 14:17:07 +03:00
pa->e_uid);
if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid()))
goto mask;
break;
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
if (vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid)) {
found = 1;
if ((pa->e_perm & want) == want)
goto mask;
}
break;
case ACL_GROUP:
acl: handle idmapped mounts for idmapped filesystems Ensure that POSIX ACLs checking, getting, and setting works correctly for filesystems mountable with a filesystem idmapping ("fs_idmapping") that want to support idmapped mounts ("mnt_idmapping"). Note that no filesystems mountable with an fs_idmapping do yet support idmapped mounts. This is required infrastructure work to unblock this. As we explained in detail in [1] the fs_idmapping is irrelevant for getxattr() and setxattr() when mapping the ACL_{GROUP,USER} {g,u}ids stored in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry in posix_acl_fix_xattr_{from,to}_user(). But for acl_permission_check() and posix_acl_{g,s}etxattr_idmapped_mnt() the fs_idmapping matters. acl_permission_check(): During lookup POSIX ACLs are retrieved directly via i_op->get_acl() and are returned via the kernel internal struct posix_acl which contains e_{g,u}id members of type k{g,u}id_t that already take the fs_idmapping into acccount. For example, a POSIX ACL stored with u4 on the backing store is mapped to k10000004 in the fs_idmapping. The mnt_idmapping remaps the POSIX ACL to k20000004. In order to do that the fs_idmapping needs to be taken into account but that doesn't happen yet (Again, this is a counterfactual currently as fuse doesn't support idmapped mounts currently. It's just used as a convenient example.): fs_idmapping: u0:k10000000:r65536 mnt_idmapping: u0:v20000000:r65536 ACL_USER: k10000004 acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() -> i_op->get_acl() == fuse_get_acl() -> posix_acl_from_xattr(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, ...) { k10000004 = make_kuid(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, u4 /* ACL_USER */); } -> posix_acl_permission() { -1 = make_vfsuid(u0:v20000000:r65536 /* mnt_idmapping */, &init_user_ns, k10000004); vfsuid_eq_kuid(-1, k10000004 /* caller_fsuid */) } In order to correctly map from the fs_idmapping into mnt_idmapping we require the relevant fs_idmaping to be passed: acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() -> i_op->get_acl() == fuse_get_acl() -> posix_acl_from_xattr(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, ...) { k10000004 = make_kuid(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, u4 /* ACL_USER */); } -> posix_acl_permission() { v20000004 = make_vfsuid(u0:v20000000:r65536 /* mnt_idmapping */, u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, k10000004); vfsuid_eq_kuid(v20000004, k10000004 /* caller_fsuid */) } The initial_idmapping is only correct for the current situation because all filesystems that currently support idmapped mounts do not support being mounted with an fs_idmapping. Note that ovl_get_acl() is used to retrieve the POSIX ACLs from the relevant lower layer and the lower layer's mnt_idmapping needs to be taken into account and so does the fs_idmapping. See 0c5fd887d2bb ("acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()") for more details. For posix_acl_{g,s}etxattr_idmapped_mnt() it is not as obvious why the fs_idmapping matters as it is for acl_permission_check(). Especially because it doesn't matter for posix_acl_fix_xattr_{from,to}_user() (See [1] for more context.). Because posix_acl_{g,s}etxattr_idmapped_mnt() operate on the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry which contains {g,u}id_t values and thus give the impression that the fs_idmapping is irrelevant as at this point appropriate {g,u}id_t values have seemlingly been generated. As we've stated multiple times this assumption is wrong and in fact the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry is taking idmappings into account depending at what place it is operated on. posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() When posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() is called the values stored in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry are mapped according to the fs_idmapping. This happened when they were read from the backing store and then translated from struct posix_acl into the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry during posix_acl_to_xattr(). In other words, the fs_idmapping matters as the values stored as {g,u}id_t in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry have been generated by it. So we need to take the fs_idmapping into account during make_vfsuid() in posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt(). posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() When posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() is called the values stored as {g,u}id_t in uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry are intended to be the values that ultimately get turned back into a k{g,u}id_t in posix_acl_from_xattr() (which turns the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry into the kernel internal struct posix_acl). In other words, the fs_idmapping matters as the values stored as {g,u}id_t in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry are intended to be the values that will be undone in the fs_idmapping when writing to the backing store. So we need to take the fs_idmapping into account during from_vfsuid() in posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Fixes: 0c5fd887d2bb ("acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()") Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220816113514.43304-1-brauner@kernel.org
2022-08-16 14:35:13 +03:00
vfsgid = make_vfsgid(mnt_userns, fs_userns,
fs: support mapped mounts of mapped filesystems In previous patches we added new and modified existing helpers to handle idmapped mounts of filesystems mounted with an idmapping. In this final patch we convert all relevant places in the vfs to actually pass the filesystem's idmapping into these helpers. With this the vfs is in shape to handle idmapped mounts of filesystems mounted with an idmapping. Note that this is just the generic infrastructure. Actually adding support for idmapped mounts to a filesystem mountable with an idmapping is follow-up work. In this patch we extend the definition of an idmapped mount from a mount that that has the initial idmapping attached to it to a mount that has an idmapping attached to it which is not the same as the idmapping the filesystem was mounted with. As before we do not allow the initial idmapping to be attached to a mount. In addition this patch prevents that the idmapping the filesystem was mounted with can be attached to a mount created based on this filesystem. This has multiple reasons and advantages. First, attaching the initial idmapping or the filesystem's idmapping doesn't make much sense as in both cases the values of the i_{g,u}id and other places where k{g,u}ids are used do not change. Second, a user that really wants to do this for whatever reason can just create a separate dedicated identical idmapping to attach to the mount. Third, we can continue to use the initial idmapping as an indicator that a mount is not idmapped allowing us to continue to keep passing the initial idmapping into the mapping helpers to tell them that something isn't an idmapped mount even if the filesystem is mounted with an idmapping. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211123114227.3124056-11-brauner@kernel.org (v1) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130121032.3753852-11-brauner@kernel.org (v2) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211203111707.3901969-11-brauner@kernel.org Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-12-03 14:17:07 +03:00
pa->e_gid);
if (vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid)) {
found = 1;
if ((pa->e_perm & want) == want)
goto mask;
}
break;
case ACL_MASK:
break;
case ACL_OTHER:
if (found)
return -EACCES;
else
goto check_perm;
default:
return -EIO;
}
}
return -EIO;
mask:
for (mask_obj = pa+1; mask_obj != pe; mask_obj++) {
if (mask_obj->e_tag == ACL_MASK) {
if ((pa->e_perm & mask_obj->e_perm & want) == want)
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
}
check_perm:
if ((pa->e_perm & want) == want)
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
/*
* Modify acl when creating a new inode. The caller must ensure the acl is
* only referenced once.
*
* mode_p initially must contain the mode parameter to the open() / creat()
* system calls. All permissions that are not granted by the acl are removed.
* The permissions in the acl are changed to reflect the mode_p parameter.
*/
static int posix_acl_create_masq(struct posix_acl *acl, umode_t *mode_p)
{
struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe;
struct posix_acl_entry *group_obj = NULL, *mask_obj = NULL;
umode_t mode = *mode_p;
int not_equiv = 0;
/* assert(atomic_read(acl->a_refcount) == 1); */
FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
switch(pa->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
pa->e_perm &= (mode >> 6) | ~S_IRWXO;
mode &= (pa->e_perm << 6) | ~S_IRWXU;
break;
case ACL_USER:
case ACL_GROUP:
not_equiv = 1;
break;
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
group_obj = pa;
break;
case ACL_OTHER:
pa->e_perm &= mode | ~S_IRWXO;
mode &= pa->e_perm | ~S_IRWXO;
break;
case ACL_MASK:
mask_obj = pa;
not_equiv = 1;
break;
default:
return -EIO;
}
}
if (mask_obj) {
mask_obj->e_perm &= (mode >> 3) | ~S_IRWXO;
mode &= (mask_obj->e_perm << 3) | ~S_IRWXG;
} else {
if (!group_obj)
return -EIO;
group_obj->e_perm &= (mode >> 3) | ~S_IRWXO;
mode &= (group_obj->e_perm << 3) | ~S_IRWXG;
}
*mode_p = (*mode_p & ~S_IRWXUGO) | mode;
return not_equiv;
}
/*
* Modify the ACL for the chmod syscall.
*/
static int __posix_acl_chmod_masq(struct posix_acl *acl, umode_t mode)
{
struct posix_acl_entry *group_obj = NULL, *mask_obj = NULL;
struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe;
/* assert(atomic_read(acl->a_refcount) == 1); */
FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
switch(pa->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
pa->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6;
break;
case ACL_USER:
case ACL_GROUP:
break;
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
group_obj = pa;
break;
case ACL_MASK:
mask_obj = pa;
break;
case ACL_OTHER:
pa->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXO);
break;
default:
return -EIO;
}
}
if (mask_obj) {
mask_obj->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3;
} else {
if (!group_obj)
return -EIO;
group_obj->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3;
}
return 0;
}
int
__posix_acl_create(struct posix_acl **acl, gfp_t gfp, umode_t *mode_p)
{
struct posix_acl *clone = posix_acl_clone(*acl, gfp);
int err = -ENOMEM;
if (clone) {
err = posix_acl_create_masq(clone, mode_p);
if (err < 0) {
posix_acl_release(clone);
clone = NULL;
}
}
posix_acl_release(*acl);
*acl = clone;
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__posix_acl_create);
int
__posix_acl_chmod(struct posix_acl **acl, gfp_t gfp, umode_t mode)
{
struct posix_acl *clone = posix_acl_clone(*acl, gfp);
int err = -ENOMEM;
if (clone) {
err = __posix_acl_chmod_masq(clone, mode);
if (err) {
posix_acl_release(clone);
clone = NULL;
}
}
posix_acl_release(*acl);
*acl = clone;
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__posix_acl_chmod);
acl: handle idmapped mounts The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped mounts. The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which direction we're translating. Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace. In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode() helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass the mount's user namespace down. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 16:19:27 +03:00
/**
* posix_acl_chmod - chmod a posix acl
*
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount @inode was found from
fs: pass dentry to set acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. Since some filesystem rely on the dentry being available to them when setting posix acls (e.g., 9p and cifs) they cannot rely on set acl inode operation. But since ->set_acl() is required in order to use the generic posix acl xattr handlers filesystems that do not implement this inode operation cannot use the handler and need to implement their own dedicated posix acl handlers. Update the ->set_acl() inode method to take a dentry argument. This allows all filesystems to rely on ->set_acl(). As far as I can tell all codepaths can be switched to rely on the dentry instead of just the inode. Note that the original motivation for passing the dentry separate from the inode instead of just the dentry in the xattr handlers was because of security modules that call security_d_instantiate(). This hook is called during d_instantiate_new(), d_add(), __d_instantiate_anon(), and d_splice_alias() to initialize the inode's security context and possibly to set security.* xattrs. Since this only affects security.* xattrs this is completely irrelevant for posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-23 11:29:39 +03:00
* @dentry: dentry to check permissions on
acl: handle idmapped mounts The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped mounts. The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which direction we're translating. Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace. In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode() helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass the mount's user namespace down. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 16:19:27 +03:00
* @mode: the new mode of @inode
*
fs: pass dentry to set acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. Since some filesystem rely on the dentry being available to them when setting posix acls (e.g., 9p and cifs) they cannot rely on set acl inode operation. But since ->set_acl() is required in order to use the generic posix acl xattr handlers filesystems that do not implement this inode operation cannot use the handler and need to implement their own dedicated posix acl handlers. Update the ->set_acl() inode method to take a dentry argument. This allows all filesystems to rely on ->set_acl(). As far as I can tell all codepaths can be switched to rely on the dentry instead of just the inode. Note that the original motivation for passing the dentry separate from the inode instead of just the dentry in the xattr handlers was because of security modules that call security_d_instantiate(). This hook is called during d_instantiate_new(), d_add(), __d_instantiate_anon(), and d_splice_alias() to initialize the inode's security context and possibly to set security.* xattrs. Since this only affects security.* xattrs this is completely irrelevant for posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-23 11:29:39 +03:00
* If the dentry has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
acl: handle idmapped mounts The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped mounts. The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which direction we're translating. Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace. In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode() helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass the mount's user namespace down. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 16:19:27 +03:00
* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
*/
int
fs: pass dentry to set acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. Since some filesystem rely on the dentry being available to them when setting posix acls (e.g., 9p and cifs) they cannot rely on set acl inode operation. But since ->set_acl() is required in order to use the generic posix acl xattr handlers filesystems that do not implement this inode operation cannot use the handler and need to implement their own dedicated posix acl handlers. Update the ->set_acl() inode method to take a dentry argument. This allows all filesystems to rely on ->set_acl(). As far as I can tell all codepaths can be switched to rely on the dentry instead of just the inode. Note that the original motivation for passing the dentry separate from the inode instead of just the dentry in the xattr handlers was because of security modules that call security_d_instantiate(). This hook is called during d_instantiate_new(), d_add(), __d_instantiate_anon(), and d_splice_alias() to initialize the inode's security context and possibly to set security.* xattrs. Since this only affects security.* xattrs this is completely irrelevant for posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-23 11:29:39 +03:00
posix_acl_chmod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
acl: handle idmapped mounts The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped mounts. The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which direction we're translating. Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace. In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode() helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass the mount's user namespace down. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 16:19:27 +03:00
umode_t mode)
{
fs: pass dentry to set acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. Since some filesystem rely on the dentry being available to them when setting posix acls (e.g., 9p and cifs) they cannot rely on set acl inode operation. But since ->set_acl() is required in order to use the generic posix acl xattr handlers filesystems that do not implement this inode operation cannot use the handler and need to implement their own dedicated posix acl handlers. Update the ->set_acl() inode method to take a dentry argument. This allows all filesystems to rely on ->set_acl(). As far as I can tell all codepaths can be switched to rely on the dentry instead of just the inode. Note that the original motivation for passing the dentry separate from the inode instead of just the dentry in the xattr handlers was because of security modules that call security_d_instantiate(). This hook is called during d_instantiate_new(), d_add(), __d_instantiate_anon(), and d_splice_alias() to initialize the inode's security context and possibly to set security.* xattrs. Since this only affects security.* xattrs this is completely irrelevant for posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-23 11:29:39 +03:00
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
struct posix_acl *acl;
int ret = 0;
if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode))
return 0;
if (!inode->i_op->set_acl)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
fs: rename current get acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. The current inode operation for getting posix acls takes an inode argument but various filesystems (e.g., 9p, cifs, overlayfs) need access to the dentry. In contrast to the ->set_acl() inode operation we cannot simply extend ->get_acl() to take a dentry argument. The ->get_acl() inode operation is called from: acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() which is part of generic_permission() which in turn is part of inode_permission(). Both generic_permission() and inode_permission() are called in the ->permission() handler of various filesystems (e.g., overlayfs). So simply passing a dentry argument to ->get_acl() would amount to also having to pass a dentry argument to ->permission(). We should avoid this unnecessary change. So instead of extending the existing inode operation rename it from ->get_acl() to ->get_inode_acl() and add a ->get_acl() method later that passes a dentry argument and which filesystems that need access to the dentry can implement instead of ->get_inode_acl(). Filesystems like cifs which allow setting and getting posix acls but not using them for permission checking during lookup can simply not implement ->get_inode_acl(). This is intended to be a non-functional change. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Suggested-by/Inspired-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-22 18:17:00 +03:00
acl = get_inode_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acl)) {
if (acl == ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP))
return 0;
return PTR_ERR(acl);
}
ret = __posix_acl_chmod(&acl, GFP_KERNEL, mode);
if (ret)
return ret;
fs: pass dentry to set acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. Since some filesystem rely on the dentry being available to them when setting posix acls (e.g., 9p and cifs) they cannot rely on set acl inode operation. But since ->set_acl() is required in order to use the generic posix acl xattr handlers filesystems that do not implement this inode operation cannot use the handler and need to implement their own dedicated posix acl handlers. Update the ->set_acl() inode method to take a dentry argument. This allows all filesystems to rely on ->set_acl(). As far as I can tell all codepaths can be switched to rely on the dentry instead of just the inode. Note that the original motivation for passing the dentry separate from the inode instead of just the dentry in the xattr handlers was because of security modules that call security_d_instantiate(). This hook is called during d_instantiate_new(), d_add(), __d_instantiate_anon(), and d_splice_alias() to initialize the inode's security context and possibly to set security.* xattrs. Since this only affects security.* xattrs this is completely irrelevant for posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-23 11:29:39 +03:00
ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(mnt_userns, dentry, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
posix_acl_release(acl);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_chmod);
int
posix_acl_create(struct inode *dir, umode_t *mode,
struct posix_acl **default_acl, struct posix_acl **acl)
{
struct posix_acl *p;
struct posix_acl *clone;
int ret;
*acl = NULL;
*default_acl = NULL;
if (S_ISLNK(*mode) || !IS_POSIXACL(dir))
return 0;
fs: rename current get acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. The current inode operation for getting posix acls takes an inode argument but various filesystems (e.g., 9p, cifs, overlayfs) need access to the dentry. In contrast to the ->set_acl() inode operation we cannot simply extend ->get_acl() to take a dentry argument. The ->get_acl() inode operation is called from: acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() which is part of generic_permission() which in turn is part of inode_permission(). Both generic_permission() and inode_permission() are called in the ->permission() handler of various filesystems (e.g., overlayfs). So simply passing a dentry argument to ->get_acl() would amount to also having to pass a dentry argument to ->permission(). We should avoid this unnecessary change. So instead of extending the existing inode operation rename it from ->get_acl() to ->get_inode_acl() and add a ->get_acl() method later that passes a dentry argument and which filesystems that need access to the dentry can implement instead of ->get_inode_acl(). Filesystems like cifs which allow setting and getting posix acls but not using them for permission checking during lookup can simply not implement ->get_inode_acl(). This is intended to be a non-functional change. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Suggested-by/Inspired-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-22 18:17:00 +03:00
p = get_inode_acl(dir, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
if (!p || p == ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP)) {
*mode &= ~current_umask();
return 0;
}
if (IS_ERR(p))
return PTR_ERR(p);
ret = -ENOMEM;
clone = posix_acl_clone(p, GFP_NOFS);
if (!clone)
goto err_release;
ret = posix_acl_create_masq(clone, mode);
if (ret < 0)
goto err_release_clone;
if (ret == 0)
posix_acl_release(clone);
else
*acl = clone;
if (!S_ISDIR(*mode))
posix_acl_release(p);
else
*default_acl = p;
return 0;
err_release_clone:
posix_acl_release(clone);
err_release:
posix_acl_release(p);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(posix_acl_create);
/**
* posix_acl_update_mode - update mode in set_acl
acl: handle idmapped mounts The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped mounts. The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which direction we're translating. Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace. In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode() helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass the mount's user namespace down. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 16:19:27 +03:00
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount @inode was found from
* @inode: target inode
* @mode_p: mode (pointer) for update
* @acl: acl pointer
*
* Update the file mode when setting an ACL: compute the new file permission
* bits based on the ACL. In addition, if the ACL is equivalent to the new
* file mode, set *@acl to NULL to indicate that no ACL should be set.
*
* As with chmod, clear the setgid bit if the caller is not in the owning group
* or capable of CAP_FSETID (see inode_change_ok).
*
acl: handle idmapped mounts The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped mounts. The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which direction we're translating. Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace. In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode() helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass the mount's user namespace down. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 16:19:27 +03:00
* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
*
* Called from set_acl inode operations.
*/
acl: handle idmapped mounts The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped mounts. The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which direction we're translating. Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace. In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode() helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass the mount's user namespace down. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 16:19:27 +03:00
int posix_acl_update_mode(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *inode, umode_t *mode_p,
struct posix_acl **acl)
{
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
int error;
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(*acl, &mode);
if (error < 0)
return error;
if (error == 0)
*acl = NULL;
if (!vfsgid_in_group_p(i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode)) &&
acl: handle idmapped mounts The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped mounts. The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which direction we're translating. Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace. In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode() helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass the mount's user namespace down. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 16:19:27 +03:00
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
*mode_p = mode;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_update_mode);
/*
* Fix up the uids and gids in posix acl extended attributes in place.
*/
static int posix_acl_fix_xattr_common(const void *value, size_t size)
acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr() This cycle we added support for mounting overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts. Recently I've started looking into potential corner cases when trying to add additional tests and I noticed that reporting for POSIX ACLs is currently wrong when using idmapped layers with overlayfs mounted on top of it. I'm going to give a rather detailed explanation to both the origin of the problem and the solution. Let's assume the user creates the following directory layout and they have a rootfs /var/lib/lxc/c1/rootfs. The files in this rootfs are owned as you would expect files on your host system to be owned. For example, ~/.bashrc for your regular user would be owned by 1000:1000 and /root/.bashrc would be owned by 0:0. IOW, this is just regular boring filesystem tree on an ext4 or xfs filesystem. The user chooses to set POSIX ACLs using the setfacl binary granting the user with uid 4 read, write, and execute permissions for their .bashrc file: setfacl -m u:4:rwx /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc Now they to expose the whole rootfs to a container using an idmapped mount. So they first create: mkdir -pv /vol/contpool/{ctrover,merge,lowermap,overmap} mkdir -pv /vol/contpool/ctrover/{over,work} chown 10000000:10000000 /vol/contpool/ctrover/{over,work} The user now creates an idmapped mount for the rootfs: mount-idmapped/mount-idmapped --map-mount=b:0:10000000:65536 \ /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs \ /vol/contpool/lowermap This for example makes it so that /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc which is owned by uid and gid 1000 as being owned by uid and gid 10001000 at /vol/contpool/lowermap/home/ubuntu/.bashrc. Assume the user wants to expose these idmapped mounts through an overlayfs mount to a container. mount -t overlay overlay \ -o lowerdir=/vol/contpool/lowermap, \ upperdir=/vol/contpool/overmap/over, \ workdir=/vol/contpool/overmap/work \ /vol/contpool/merge The user can do this in two ways: (1) Mount overlayfs in the initial user namespace and expose it to the container. (2) Mount overlayfs on top of the idmapped mounts inside of the container's user namespace. Let's assume the user chooses the (1) option and mounts overlayfs on the host and then changes into a container which uses the idmapping 0:10000000:65536 which is the same used for the two idmapped mounts. Now the user tries to retrieve the POSIX ACLs using the getfacl command getfacl -n /vol/contpool/lowermap/home/ubuntu/.bashrc and to their surprise they see: # file: vol/contpool/merge/home/ubuntu/.bashrc # owner: 1000 # group: 1000 user::rw- user:4294967295:rwx group::r-- mask::rwx other::r-- indicating the the uid wasn't correctly translated according to the idmapped mount. The problem is how we currently translate POSIX ACLs. Let's inspect the callchain in this example: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */ sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | -> ovl_xattr_get() | -> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() { 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); 4 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 4); /* FAILURE */ -1 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 4); } If the user chooses to use option (2) and mounts overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts inside the container things don't look that much better: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536 sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | -> ovl_xattr_get() | -> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() { 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); 4 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns, 4); /* FAILURE */ -1 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 4); } As is easily seen the problem arises because the idmapping of the lower mount isn't taken into account as all of this happens in do_gexattr(). But do_getxattr() is always called on an overlayfs mount and inode and thus cannot possible take the idmapping of the lower layers into account. This problem is similar for fscaps but there the translation happens as part of vfs_getxattr() already. Let's walk through an fscaps overlayfs callchain: setcap 'cap_net_raw+ep' /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc The expected outcome here is that we'll receive the cap_net_raw capability as we are able to map the uid associated with the fscap to 0 within our container. IOW, we want to see 0 as the result of the idmapping translations. If the user chooses option (1) we get the following callchain for fscaps: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */ sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() -> vfs_getxattr() -> xattr_getsecurity() -> security_inode_getsecurity() ________________________________ -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | | { V | 10000000 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:0:4k /* no idmapped mount */, 10000000); | /* Expected result is 0 and thus that we own the fscap. */ | 0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000000); | } | -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() | -> handler->get == ovl_other_xattr_get() | -> vfs_getxattr() | -> xattr_getsecurity() | -> security_inode_getsecurity() | -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | { | 0 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* lower s_user_ns */, 0); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* idmapped mount */, 0); | 10000000 = from_kuid(0:0:4k /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); | |____________________________________________________________________| } -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() -> handler->get == /* lower filesystem callback */ And if the user chooses option (2) we get: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536 sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() -> vfs_getxattr() -> xattr_getsecurity() -> security_inode_getsecurity() _______________________________ -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | | { V | 10000000 = make_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* overlayfs idmapping */, 0); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:0:4k /* no idmapped mount */, 10000000); | /* Expected result is 0 and thus that we own the fscap. */ | 0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000000); | } | -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() | -> handler->get == ovl_other_xattr_get() | |-> vfs_getxattr() | -> xattr_getsecurity() | -> security_inode_getsecurity() | -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | { | 0 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* lower s_user_ns */, 0); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* idmapped mount */, 0); | 0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); | |____________________________________________________________________| } -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() -> handler->get == /* lower filesystem callback */ We can see how the translation happens correctly in those cases as the conversion happens within the vfs_getxattr() helper. For POSIX ACLs we need to do something similar. However, in contrast to fscaps we cannot apply the fix directly to the kernel internal posix acl data structure as this would alter the cached values and would also require a rework of how we currently deal with POSIX ACLs in general which almost never take the filesystem idmapping into account (the noteable exception being FUSE but even there the implementation is special) and instead retrieve the raw values based on the initial idmapping. The correct values are then generated right before returning to userspace. The fix for this is to move taking the mount's idmapping into account directly in vfs_getxattr() instead of having it be part of posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(). To this end we split out two small and unexported helpers posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() and posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt(). The former to be called in vfs_getxattr() and the latter to be called in vfs_setxattr(). Let's go back to the original example. Assume the user chose option (1) and mounted overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts on the host: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */ sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | | -> ovl_xattr_get() | | -> vfs_getxattr() | | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { | | 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); | | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* lower idmapped mount */, 4); | | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | | |_______________________ | | } | | | | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { | | V | 10000004 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 10000004); | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | } |_________________________________________________ | | | | |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() | { V 10000004 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* init_user_ns */, 10000004); /* SUCCESS */ 4 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000004); } And similarly if the user chooses option (1) and mounted overayfs on top of idmapped mounts inside the container: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536 sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | | -> ovl_xattr_get() | | -> vfs_getxattr() | | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { | | 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); | | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* lower idmapped mount */, 4); | | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | | |_______________________ | | } | | | | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { V | 10000004 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 10000004); | 10000004 = from_kuid(0(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | |_________________________________________________ | } | | | |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() | { V 10000004 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* init_user_ns */, 10000004); /* SUCCESS */ 4 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmappings */, 10000004); } The last remaining problem we need to fix here is ovl_get_acl(). During ovl_permission() overlayfs will call: ovl_permission() -> generic_permission() -> acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() -> inode->i_op->get_acl() == ovl_get_acl() > get_acl() /* on the underlying filesystem) ->inode->i_op->get_acl() == /*lower filesystem callback */ -> posix_acl_permission() passing through the get_acl request to the underlying filesystem. This will retrieve the acls stored in the lower filesystem without taking the idmapping of the underlying mount into account as this would mean altering the cached values for the lower filesystem. So we block using ACLs for now until we decided on a nice way to fix this. Note this limitation both in the documentation and in the code. The most straightforward solution would be to have ovl_get_acl() simply duplicate the ACLs, update the values according to the idmapped mount and return it to acl_permission_check() so it can be used in posix_acl_permission() forgetting them afterwards. This is a bit heavy handed but fairly straightforward otherwise. Link: https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped/issues/9 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220708090134.385160-2-brauner@kernel.org Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-07-06 19:30:59 +03:00
{
const struct posix_acl_xattr_header *header = value;
acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr() This cycle we added support for mounting overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts. Recently I've started looking into potential corner cases when trying to add additional tests and I noticed that reporting for POSIX ACLs is currently wrong when using idmapped layers with overlayfs mounted on top of it. I'm going to give a rather detailed explanation to both the origin of the problem and the solution. Let's assume the user creates the following directory layout and they have a rootfs /var/lib/lxc/c1/rootfs. The files in this rootfs are owned as you would expect files on your host system to be owned. For example, ~/.bashrc for your regular user would be owned by 1000:1000 and /root/.bashrc would be owned by 0:0. IOW, this is just regular boring filesystem tree on an ext4 or xfs filesystem. The user chooses to set POSIX ACLs using the setfacl binary granting the user with uid 4 read, write, and execute permissions for their .bashrc file: setfacl -m u:4:rwx /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc Now they to expose the whole rootfs to a container using an idmapped mount. So they first create: mkdir -pv /vol/contpool/{ctrover,merge,lowermap,overmap} mkdir -pv /vol/contpool/ctrover/{over,work} chown 10000000:10000000 /vol/contpool/ctrover/{over,work} The user now creates an idmapped mount for the rootfs: mount-idmapped/mount-idmapped --map-mount=b:0:10000000:65536 \ /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs \ /vol/contpool/lowermap This for example makes it so that /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc which is owned by uid and gid 1000 as being owned by uid and gid 10001000 at /vol/contpool/lowermap/home/ubuntu/.bashrc. Assume the user wants to expose these idmapped mounts through an overlayfs mount to a container. mount -t overlay overlay \ -o lowerdir=/vol/contpool/lowermap, \ upperdir=/vol/contpool/overmap/over, \ workdir=/vol/contpool/overmap/work \ /vol/contpool/merge The user can do this in two ways: (1) Mount overlayfs in the initial user namespace and expose it to the container. (2) Mount overlayfs on top of the idmapped mounts inside of the container's user namespace. Let's assume the user chooses the (1) option and mounts overlayfs on the host and then changes into a container which uses the idmapping 0:10000000:65536 which is the same used for the two idmapped mounts. Now the user tries to retrieve the POSIX ACLs using the getfacl command getfacl -n /vol/contpool/lowermap/home/ubuntu/.bashrc and to their surprise they see: # file: vol/contpool/merge/home/ubuntu/.bashrc # owner: 1000 # group: 1000 user::rw- user:4294967295:rwx group::r-- mask::rwx other::r-- indicating the the uid wasn't correctly translated according to the idmapped mount. The problem is how we currently translate POSIX ACLs. Let's inspect the callchain in this example: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */ sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | -> ovl_xattr_get() | -> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() { 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); 4 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 4); /* FAILURE */ -1 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 4); } If the user chooses to use option (2) and mounts overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts inside the container things don't look that much better: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536 sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | -> ovl_xattr_get() | -> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() { 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); 4 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns, 4); /* FAILURE */ -1 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 4); } As is easily seen the problem arises because the idmapping of the lower mount isn't taken into account as all of this happens in do_gexattr(). But do_getxattr() is always called on an overlayfs mount and inode and thus cannot possible take the idmapping of the lower layers into account. This problem is similar for fscaps but there the translation happens as part of vfs_getxattr() already. Let's walk through an fscaps overlayfs callchain: setcap 'cap_net_raw+ep' /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc The expected outcome here is that we'll receive the cap_net_raw capability as we are able to map the uid associated with the fscap to 0 within our container. IOW, we want to see 0 as the result of the idmapping translations. If the user chooses option (1) we get the following callchain for fscaps: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */ sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() -> vfs_getxattr() -> xattr_getsecurity() -> security_inode_getsecurity() ________________________________ -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | | { V | 10000000 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:0:4k /* no idmapped mount */, 10000000); | /* Expected result is 0 and thus that we own the fscap. */ | 0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000000); | } | -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() | -> handler->get == ovl_other_xattr_get() | -> vfs_getxattr() | -> xattr_getsecurity() | -> security_inode_getsecurity() | -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | { | 0 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* lower s_user_ns */, 0); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* idmapped mount */, 0); | 10000000 = from_kuid(0:0:4k /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); | |____________________________________________________________________| } -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() -> handler->get == /* lower filesystem callback */ And if the user chooses option (2) we get: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536 sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() -> vfs_getxattr() -> xattr_getsecurity() -> security_inode_getsecurity() _______________________________ -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | | { V | 10000000 = make_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* overlayfs idmapping */, 0); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:0:4k /* no idmapped mount */, 10000000); | /* Expected result is 0 and thus that we own the fscap. */ | 0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000000); | } | -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() | -> handler->get == ovl_other_xattr_get() | |-> vfs_getxattr() | -> xattr_getsecurity() | -> security_inode_getsecurity() | -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | { | 0 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* lower s_user_ns */, 0); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* idmapped mount */, 0); | 0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); | |____________________________________________________________________| } -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() -> handler->get == /* lower filesystem callback */ We can see how the translation happens correctly in those cases as the conversion happens within the vfs_getxattr() helper. For POSIX ACLs we need to do something similar. However, in contrast to fscaps we cannot apply the fix directly to the kernel internal posix acl data structure as this would alter the cached values and would also require a rework of how we currently deal with POSIX ACLs in general which almost never take the filesystem idmapping into account (the noteable exception being FUSE but even there the implementation is special) and instead retrieve the raw values based on the initial idmapping. The correct values are then generated right before returning to userspace. The fix for this is to move taking the mount's idmapping into account directly in vfs_getxattr() instead of having it be part of posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(). To this end we split out two small and unexported helpers posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() and posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt(). The former to be called in vfs_getxattr() and the latter to be called in vfs_setxattr(). Let's go back to the original example. Assume the user chose option (1) and mounted overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts on the host: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */ sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | | -> ovl_xattr_get() | | -> vfs_getxattr() | | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { | | 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); | | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* lower idmapped mount */, 4); | | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | | |_______________________ | | } | | | | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { | | V | 10000004 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 10000004); | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | } |_________________________________________________ | | | | |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() | { V 10000004 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* init_user_ns */, 10000004); /* SUCCESS */ 4 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000004); } And similarly if the user chooses option (1) and mounted overayfs on top of idmapped mounts inside the container: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536 sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | | -> ovl_xattr_get() | | -> vfs_getxattr() | | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { | | 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); | | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* lower idmapped mount */, 4); | | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | | |_______________________ | | } | | | | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { V | 10000004 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 10000004); | 10000004 = from_kuid(0(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | |_________________________________________________ | } | | | |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() | { V 10000004 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* init_user_ns */, 10000004); /* SUCCESS */ 4 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmappings */, 10000004); } The last remaining problem we need to fix here is ovl_get_acl(). During ovl_permission() overlayfs will call: ovl_permission() -> generic_permission() -> acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() -> inode->i_op->get_acl() == ovl_get_acl() > get_acl() /* on the underlying filesystem) ->inode->i_op->get_acl() == /*lower filesystem callback */ -> posix_acl_permission() passing through the get_acl request to the underlying filesystem. This will retrieve the acls stored in the lower filesystem without taking the idmapping of the underlying mount into account as this would mean altering the cached values for the lower filesystem. So we block using ACLs for now until we decided on a nice way to fix this. Note this limitation both in the documentation and in the code. The most straightforward solution would be to have ovl_get_acl() simply duplicate the ACLs, update the values according to the idmapped mount and return it to acl_permission_check() so it can be used in posix_acl_permission() forgetting them afterwards. This is a bit heavy handed but fairly straightforward otherwise. Link: https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped/issues/9 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220708090134.385160-2-brauner@kernel.org Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-07-06 19:30:59 +03:00
int count;
if (!header)
return -EINVAL;
if (size < sizeof(struct posix_acl_xattr_header))
return -EINVAL;
if (header->a_version != cpu_to_le32(POSIX_ACL_XATTR_VERSION))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr() This cycle we added support for mounting overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts. Recently I've started looking into potential corner cases when trying to add additional tests and I noticed that reporting for POSIX ACLs is currently wrong when using idmapped layers with overlayfs mounted on top of it. I'm going to give a rather detailed explanation to both the origin of the problem and the solution. Let's assume the user creates the following directory layout and they have a rootfs /var/lib/lxc/c1/rootfs. The files in this rootfs are owned as you would expect files on your host system to be owned. For example, ~/.bashrc for your regular user would be owned by 1000:1000 and /root/.bashrc would be owned by 0:0. IOW, this is just regular boring filesystem tree on an ext4 or xfs filesystem. The user chooses to set POSIX ACLs using the setfacl binary granting the user with uid 4 read, write, and execute permissions for their .bashrc file: setfacl -m u:4:rwx /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc Now they to expose the whole rootfs to a container using an idmapped mount. So they first create: mkdir -pv /vol/contpool/{ctrover,merge,lowermap,overmap} mkdir -pv /vol/contpool/ctrover/{over,work} chown 10000000:10000000 /vol/contpool/ctrover/{over,work} The user now creates an idmapped mount for the rootfs: mount-idmapped/mount-idmapped --map-mount=b:0:10000000:65536 \ /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs \ /vol/contpool/lowermap This for example makes it so that /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc which is owned by uid and gid 1000 as being owned by uid and gid 10001000 at /vol/contpool/lowermap/home/ubuntu/.bashrc. Assume the user wants to expose these idmapped mounts through an overlayfs mount to a container. mount -t overlay overlay \ -o lowerdir=/vol/contpool/lowermap, \ upperdir=/vol/contpool/overmap/over, \ workdir=/vol/contpool/overmap/work \ /vol/contpool/merge The user can do this in two ways: (1) Mount overlayfs in the initial user namespace and expose it to the container. (2) Mount overlayfs on top of the idmapped mounts inside of the container's user namespace. Let's assume the user chooses the (1) option and mounts overlayfs on the host and then changes into a container which uses the idmapping 0:10000000:65536 which is the same used for the two idmapped mounts. Now the user tries to retrieve the POSIX ACLs using the getfacl command getfacl -n /vol/contpool/lowermap/home/ubuntu/.bashrc and to their surprise they see: # file: vol/contpool/merge/home/ubuntu/.bashrc # owner: 1000 # group: 1000 user::rw- user:4294967295:rwx group::r-- mask::rwx other::r-- indicating the the uid wasn't correctly translated according to the idmapped mount. The problem is how we currently translate POSIX ACLs. Let's inspect the callchain in this example: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */ sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | -> ovl_xattr_get() | -> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() { 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); 4 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 4); /* FAILURE */ -1 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 4); } If the user chooses to use option (2) and mounts overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts inside the container things don't look that much better: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536 sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | -> ovl_xattr_get() | -> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() { 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); 4 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns, 4); /* FAILURE */ -1 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 4); } As is easily seen the problem arises because the idmapping of the lower mount isn't taken into account as all of this happens in do_gexattr(). But do_getxattr() is always called on an overlayfs mount and inode and thus cannot possible take the idmapping of the lower layers into account. This problem is similar for fscaps but there the translation happens as part of vfs_getxattr() already. Let's walk through an fscaps overlayfs callchain: setcap 'cap_net_raw+ep' /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc The expected outcome here is that we'll receive the cap_net_raw capability as we are able to map the uid associated with the fscap to 0 within our container. IOW, we want to see 0 as the result of the idmapping translations. If the user chooses option (1) we get the following callchain for fscaps: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */ sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() -> vfs_getxattr() -> xattr_getsecurity() -> security_inode_getsecurity() ________________________________ -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | | { V | 10000000 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:0:4k /* no idmapped mount */, 10000000); | /* Expected result is 0 and thus that we own the fscap. */ | 0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000000); | } | -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() | -> handler->get == ovl_other_xattr_get() | -> vfs_getxattr() | -> xattr_getsecurity() | -> security_inode_getsecurity() | -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | { | 0 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* lower s_user_ns */, 0); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* idmapped mount */, 0); | 10000000 = from_kuid(0:0:4k /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); | |____________________________________________________________________| } -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() -> handler->get == /* lower filesystem callback */ And if the user chooses option (2) we get: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536 sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() -> vfs_getxattr() -> xattr_getsecurity() -> security_inode_getsecurity() _______________________________ -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | | { V | 10000000 = make_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* overlayfs idmapping */, 0); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:0:4k /* no idmapped mount */, 10000000); | /* Expected result is 0 and thus that we own the fscap. */ | 0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000000); | } | -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() | -> handler->get == ovl_other_xattr_get() | |-> vfs_getxattr() | -> xattr_getsecurity() | -> security_inode_getsecurity() | -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | { | 0 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* lower s_user_ns */, 0); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* idmapped mount */, 0); | 0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); | |____________________________________________________________________| } -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() -> handler->get == /* lower filesystem callback */ We can see how the translation happens correctly in those cases as the conversion happens within the vfs_getxattr() helper. For POSIX ACLs we need to do something similar. However, in contrast to fscaps we cannot apply the fix directly to the kernel internal posix acl data structure as this would alter the cached values and would also require a rework of how we currently deal with POSIX ACLs in general which almost never take the filesystem idmapping into account (the noteable exception being FUSE but even there the implementation is special) and instead retrieve the raw values based on the initial idmapping. The correct values are then generated right before returning to userspace. The fix for this is to move taking the mount's idmapping into account directly in vfs_getxattr() instead of having it be part of posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(). To this end we split out two small and unexported helpers posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() and posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt(). The former to be called in vfs_getxattr() and the latter to be called in vfs_setxattr(). Let's go back to the original example. Assume the user chose option (1) and mounted overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts on the host: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */ sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | | -> ovl_xattr_get() | | -> vfs_getxattr() | | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { | | 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); | | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* lower idmapped mount */, 4); | | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | | |_______________________ | | } | | | | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { | | V | 10000004 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 10000004); | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | } |_________________________________________________ | | | | |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() | { V 10000004 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* init_user_ns */, 10000004); /* SUCCESS */ 4 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000004); } And similarly if the user chooses option (1) and mounted overayfs on top of idmapped mounts inside the container: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536 sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | | -> ovl_xattr_get() | | -> vfs_getxattr() | | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { | | 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); | | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* lower idmapped mount */, 4); | | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | | |_______________________ | | } | | | | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { V | 10000004 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 10000004); | 10000004 = from_kuid(0(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | |_________________________________________________ | } | | | |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() | { V 10000004 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* init_user_ns */, 10000004); /* SUCCESS */ 4 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmappings */, 10000004); } The last remaining problem we need to fix here is ovl_get_acl(). During ovl_permission() overlayfs will call: ovl_permission() -> generic_permission() -> acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() -> inode->i_op->get_acl() == ovl_get_acl() > get_acl() /* on the underlying filesystem) ->inode->i_op->get_acl() == /*lower filesystem callback */ -> posix_acl_permission() passing through the get_acl request to the underlying filesystem. This will retrieve the acls stored in the lower filesystem without taking the idmapping of the underlying mount into account as this would mean altering the cached values for the lower filesystem. So we block using ACLs for now until we decided on a nice way to fix this. Note this limitation both in the documentation and in the code. The most straightforward solution would be to have ovl_get_acl() simply duplicate the ACLs, update the values according to the idmapped mount and return it to acl_permission_check() so it can be used in posix_acl_permission() forgetting them afterwards. This is a bit heavy handed but fairly straightforward otherwise. Link: https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped/issues/9 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220708090134.385160-2-brauner@kernel.org Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-07-06 19:30:59 +03:00
count = posix_acl_xattr_count(size);
if (count < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (count == 0)
return 0;
acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr() This cycle we added support for mounting overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts. Recently I've started looking into potential corner cases when trying to add additional tests and I noticed that reporting for POSIX ACLs is currently wrong when using idmapped layers with overlayfs mounted on top of it. I'm going to give a rather detailed explanation to both the origin of the problem and the solution. Let's assume the user creates the following directory layout and they have a rootfs /var/lib/lxc/c1/rootfs. The files in this rootfs are owned as you would expect files on your host system to be owned. For example, ~/.bashrc for your regular user would be owned by 1000:1000 and /root/.bashrc would be owned by 0:0. IOW, this is just regular boring filesystem tree on an ext4 or xfs filesystem. The user chooses to set POSIX ACLs using the setfacl binary granting the user with uid 4 read, write, and execute permissions for their .bashrc file: setfacl -m u:4:rwx /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc Now they to expose the whole rootfs to a container using an idmapped mount. So they first create: mkdir -pv /vol/contpool/{ctrover,merge,lowermap,overmap} mkdir -pv /vol/contpool/ctrover/{over,work} chown 10000000:10000000 /vol/contpool/ctrover/{over,work} The user now creates an idmapped mount for the rootfs: mount-idmapped/mount-idmapped --map-mount=b:0:10000000:65536 \ /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs \ /vol/contpool/lowermap This for example makes it so that /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc which is owned by uid and gid 1000 as being owned by uid and gid 10001000 at /vol/contpool/lowermap/home/ubuntu/.bashrc. Assume the user wants to expose these idmapped mounts through an overlayfs mount to a container. mount -t overlay overlay \ -o lowerdir=/vol/contpool/lowermap, \ upperdir=/vol/contpool/overmap/over, \ workdir=/vol/contpool/overmap/work \ /vol/contpool/merge The user can do this in two ways: (1) Mount overlayfs in the initial user namespace and expose it to the container. (2) Mount overlayfs on top of the idmapped mounts inside of the container's user namespace. Let's assume the user chooses the (1) option and mounts overlayfs on the host and then changes into a container which uses the idmapping 0:10000000:65536 which is the same used for the two idmapped mounts. Now the user tries to retrieve the POSIX ACLs using the getfacl command getfacl -n /vol/contpool/lowermap/home/ubuntu/.bashrc and to their surprise they see: # file: vol/contpool/merge/home/ubuntu/.bashrc # owner: 1000 # group: 1000 user::rw- user:4294967295:rwx group::r-- mask::rwx other::r-- indicating the the uid wasn't correctly translated according to the idmapped mount. The problem is how we currently translate POSIX ACLs. Let's inspect the callchain in this example: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */ sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | -> ovl_xattr_get() | -> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() { 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); 4 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 4); /* FAILURE */ -1 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 4); } If the user chooses to use option (2) and mounts overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts inside the container things don't look that much better: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536 sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | -> ovl_xattr_get() | -> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() { 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); 4 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns, 4); /* FAILURE */ -1 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 4); } As is easily seen the problem arises because the idmapping of the lower mount isn't taken into account as all of this happens in do_gexattr(). But do_getxattr() is always called on an overlayfs mount and inode and thus cannot possible take the idmapping of the lower layers into account. This problem is similar for fscaps but there the translation happens as part of vfs_getxattr() already. Let's walk through an fscaps overlayfs callchain: setcap 'cap_net_raw+ep' /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc The expected outcome here is that we'll receive the cap_net_raw capability as we are able to map the uid associated with the fscap to 0 within our container. IOW, we want to see 0 as the result of the idmapping translations. If the user chooses option (1) we get the following callchain for fscaps: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */ sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() -> vfs_getxattr() -> xattr_getsecurity() -> security_inode_getsecurity() ________________________________ -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | | { V | 10000000 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:0:4k /* no idmapped mount */, 10000000); | /* Expected result is 0 and thus that we own the fscap. */ | 0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000000); | } | -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() | -> handler->get == ovl_other_xattr_get() | -> vfs_getxattr() | -> xattr_getsecurity() | -> security_inode_getsecurity() | -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | { | 0 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* lower s_user_ns */, 0); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* idmapped mount */, 0); | 10000000 = from_kuid(0:0:4k /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); | |____________________________________________________________________| } -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() -> handler->get == /* lower filesystem callback */ And if the user chooses option (2) we get: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536 sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() -> vfs_getxattr() -> xattr_getsecurity() -> security_inode_getsecurity() _______________________________ -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | | { V | 10000000 = make_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* overlayfs idmapping */, 0); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:0:4k /* no idmapped mount */, 10000000); | /* Expected result is 0 and thus that we own the fscap. */ | 0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000000); | } | -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() | -> handler->get == ovl_other_xattr_get() | |-> vfs_getxattr() | -> xattr_getsecurity() | -> security_inode_getsecurity() | -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | { | 0 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* lower s_user_ns */, 0); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* idmapped mount */, 0); | 0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); | |____________________________________________________________________| } -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() -> handler->get == /* lower filesystem callback */ We can see how the translation happens correctly in those cases as the conversion happens within the vfs_getxattr() helper. For POSIX ACLs we need to do something similar. However, in contrast to fscaps we cannot apply the fix directly to the kernel internal posix acl data structure as this would alter the cached values and would also require a rework of how we currently deal with POSIX ACLs in general which almost never take the filesystem idmapping into account (the noteable exception being FUSE but even there the implementation is special) and instead retrieve the raw values based on the initial idmapping. The correct values are then generated right before returning to userspace. The fix for this is to move taking the mount's idmapping into account directly in vfs_getxattr() instead of having it be part of posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(). To this end we split out two small and unexported helpers posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() and posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt(). The former to be called in vfs_getxattr() and the latter to be called in vfs_setxattr(). Let's go back to the original example. Assume the user chose option (1) and mounted overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts on the host: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */ sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | | -> ovl_xattr_get() | | -> vfs_getxattr() | | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { | | 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); | | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* lower idmapped mount */, 4); | | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | | |_______________________ | | } | | | | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { | | V | 10000004 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 10000004); | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | } |_________________________________________________ | | | | |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() | { V 10000004 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* init_user_ns */, 10000004); /* SUCCESS */ 4 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000004); } And similarly if the user chooses option (1) and mounted overayfs on top of idmapped mounts inside the container: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536 sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | | -> ovl_xattr_get() | | -> vfs_getxattr() | | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { | | 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); | | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* lower idmapped mount */, 4); | | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | | |_______________________ | | } | | | | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { V | 10000004 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 10000004); | 10000004 = from_kuid(0(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | |_________________________________________________ | } | | | |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() | { V 10000004 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* init_user_ns */, 10000004); /* SUCCESS */ 4 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmappings */, 10000004); } The last remaining problem we need to fix here is ovl_get_acl(). During ovl_permission() overlayfs will call: ovl_permission() -> generic_permission() -> acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() -> inode->i_op->get_acl() == ovl_get_acl() > get_acl() /* on the underlying filesystem) ->inode->i_op->get_acl() == /*lower filesystem callback */ -> posix_acl_permission() passing through the get_acl request to the underlying filesystem. This will retrieve the acls stored in the lower filesystem without taking the idmapping of the underlying mount into account as this would mean altering the cached values for the lower filesystem. So we block using ACLs for now until we decided on a nice way to fix this. Note this limitation both in the documentation and in the code. The most straightforward solution would be to have ovl_get_acl() simply duplicate the ACLs, update the values according to the idmapped mount and return it to acl_permission_check() so it can be used in posix_acl_permission() forgetting them afterwards. This is a bit heavy handed but fairly straightforward otherwise. Link: https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped/issues/9 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220708090134.385160-2-brauner@kernel.org Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-07-06 19:30:59 +03:00
return count;
}
acl: add vfs_set_acl_prepare() Various filesystems store POSIX ACLs on the backing store in their uapi format. Such filesystems need to translate from the uapi POSIX ACL format into the VFS format during i_op->get_acl(). The VFS provides the posix_acl_from_xattr() helper for this task. But the usage of posix_acl_from_xattr() is currently ambiguous. It is intended to transform from a uapi POSIX ACL to the VFS represenation. For example, when retrieving POSIX ACLs for permission checking during lookup or when calling getxattr() to retrieve system.posix_acl_{access,default}. Calling posix_acl_from_xattr() during i_op->get_acl() will map the raw {g,u}id values stored as ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in the uapi POSIX ACL format into k{g,u}id_t in the filesystem's idmapping and return a struct posix_acl ready to be returned to the VFS for caching and to perform permission checks on. However, posix_acl_from_xattr() is also called during setxattr() for all filesystems that rely on VFS provides posix_acl_{access,default}_xattr_handler. The posix_acl_xattr_set() handler which is used for the ->set() method of posix_acl_{access,default}_xattr_handler uses posix_acl_from_xattr() to translate from the uapi POSIX ACL format to the VFS format so that it can be passed to the i_op->set_acl() handler of the filesystem or for direct caching in case no i_op->set_acl() handler is defined. During setxattr() the {g,u}id values stored as ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in the uapi POSIX ACL format aren't raw {g,u}id values that need to be mapped according to the filesystem's idmapping. Instead they are {g,u}id values in the caller's idmapping which have been generated during posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(). In other words, they are k{g,u}id_t which are passed as raw {g,u}id values abusing the uapi POSIX ACL format (Please note that this type safety violation has existed since the introduction of k{g,u}id_t. Please see [1] for more details.). So when posix_acl_from_xattr() is called in posix_acl_xattr_set() the filesystem idmapping is completely irrelevant. Instead, we abuse the initial idmapping to recover the k{g,u}id_t base on the value stored in raw {g,u}id as ACL_{GROUP,USER} in the uapi POSIX ACL format. We need to clearly distinguish betweeen these two operations as it is really easy to confuse for filesystems as can be seen in ntfs3. In order to do this we factor out make_posix_acl() which takes callbacks allowing callers to pass dedicated methods to generate the correct k{g,u}id_t. This is just an internal static helper which is not exposed to any filesystems but it neatly encapsulates the basic logic of walking through a uapi POSIX ACL and returning an allocated VFS POSIX ACL with the correct k{g,u}id_t values. The posix_acl_from_xattr() helper can then be implemented as a simple call to make_posix_acl() with callbacks that generate the correct k{g,u}id_t from the raw {g,u}id values in ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in the uapi POSIX ACL format as read from the backing store. For setxattr() we add a new helper vfs_set_acl_prepare() which has callbacks to map the POSIX ACLs from the uapi format with the k{g,u}id_t values stored in raw {g,u}id format in ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries into the correct k{g,u}id_t values in the filesystem idmapping. In contrast to posix_acl_from_xattr() the vfs_set_acl_prepare() helper needs to take the mount idmapping into account. The differences are explained in more detail in the kernel doc for the new functions. In follow up patches we will remove all abuses of posix_acl_from_xattr() for setxattr() operations and replace it with calls to vfs_set_acl_prepare(). The new vfs_set_acl_prepare() helper allows us to deal with the ambiguity in how the POSI ACL uapi struct stores {g,u}id values depending on whether this is a getxattr() or setxattr() operation. This also allows us to remove the posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() helper reducing the abuse of the POSIX ACL uapi format to pass values that should be distinct types in {g,u}id values stored as ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries. The removal of posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() in turn allows us to re-constify the value parameter of vfs_setxattr() which in turn allows us to avoid the nasty cast from a const void pointer to a non-const void pointer on ovl_do_setxattr(). Ultimately, the plan is to get rid of the type violations completely and never pass the values from k{g,u}id_t as raw {g,u}id in ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in uapi POSIX ACL format. But that's a longer way to go and this is a preparatory step. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Co-Developed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-08-29 15:38:42 +03:00
/**
* posix_acl_from_xattr - convert POSIX ACLs from backing store to VFS format
* @userns: the filesystem's idmapping
acl: add vfs_set_acl_prepare() Various filesystems store POSIX ACLs on the backing store in their uapi format. Such filesystems need to translate from the uapi POSIX ACL format into the VFS format during i_op->get_acl(). The VFS provides the posix_acl_from_xattr() helper for this task. But the usage of posix_acl_from_xattr() is currently ambiguous. It is intended to transform from a uapi POSIX ACL to the VFS represenation. For example, when retrieving POSIX ACLs for permission checking during lookup or when calling getxattr() to retrieve system.posix_acl_{access,default}. Calling posix_acl_from_xattr() during i_op->get_acl() will map the raw {g,u}id values stored as ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in the uapi POSIX ACL format into k{g,u}id_t in the filesystem's idmapping and return a struct posix_acl ready to be returned to the VFS for caching and to perform permission checks on. However, posix_acl_from_xattr() is also called during setxattr() for all filesystems that rely on VFS provides posix_acl_{access,default}_xattr_handler. The posix_acl_xattr_set() handler which is used for the ->set() method of posix_acl_{access,default}_xattr_handler uses posix_acl_from_xattr() to translate from the uapi POSIX ACL format to the VFS format so that it can be passed to the i_op->set_acl() handler of the filesystem or for direct caching in case no i_op->set_acl() handler is defined. During setxattr() the {g,u}id values stored as ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in the uapi POSIX ACL format aren't raw {g,u}id values that need to be mapped according to the filesystem's idmapping. Instead they are {g,u}id values in the caller's idmapping which have been generated during posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(). In other words, they are k{g,u}id_t which are passed as raw {g,u}id values abusing the uapi POSIX ACL format (Please note that this type safety violation has existed since the introduction of k{g,u}id_t. Please see [1] for more details.). So when posix_acl_from_xattr() is called in posix_acl_xattr_set() the filesystem idmapping is completely irrelevant. Instead, we abuse the initial idmapping to recover the k{g,u}id_t base on the value stored in raw {g,u}id as ACL_{GROUP,USER} in the uapi POSIX ACL format. We need to clearly distinguish betweeen these two operations as it is really easy to confuse for filesystems as can be seen in ntfs3. In order to do this we factor out make_posix_acl() which takes callbacks allowing callers to pass dedicated methods to generate the correct k{g,u}id_t. This is just an internal static helper which is not exposed to any filesystems but it neatly encapsulates the basic logic of walking through a uapi POSIX ACL and returning an allocated VFS POSIX ACL with the correct k{g,u}id_t values. The posix_acl_from_xattr() helper can then be implemented as a simple call to make_posix_acl() with callbacks that generate the correct k{g,u}id_t from the raw {g,u}id values in ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in the uapi POSIX ACL format as read from the backing store. For setxattr() we add a new helper vfs_set_acl_prepare() which has callbacks to map the POSIX ACLs from the uapi format with the k{g,u}id_t values stored in raw {g,u}id format in ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries into the correct k{g,u}id_t values in the filesystem idmapping. In contrast to posix_acl_from_xattr() the vfs_set_acl_prepare() helper needs to take the mount idmapping into account. The differences are explained in more detail in the kernel doc for the new functions. In follow up patches we will remove all abuses of posix_acl_from_xattr() for setxattr() operations and replace it with calls to vfs_set_acl_prepare(). The new vfs_set_acl_prepare() helper allows us to deal with the ambiguity in how the POSI ACL uapi struct stores {g,u}id values depending on whether this is a getxattr() or setxattr() operation. This also allows us to remove the posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() helper reducing the abuse of the POSIX ACL uapi format to pass values that should be distinct types in {g,u}id values stored as ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries. The removal of posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() in turn allows us to re-constify the value parameter of vfs_setxattr() which in turn allows us to avoid the nasty cast from a const void pointer to a non-const void pointer on ovl_do_setxattr(). Ultimately, the plan is to get rid of the type violations completely and never pass the values from k{g,u}id_t as raw {g,u}id in ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in uapi POSIX ACL format. But that's a longer way to go and this is a preparatory step. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Co-Developed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-08-29 15:38:42 +03:00
* @value: the uapi representation of POSIX ACLs
* @size: the size of @void
*
* Filesystems that store POSIX ACLs in the unaltered uapi format should use
* posix_acl_from_xattr() when reading them from the backing store and
* converting them into the struct posix_acl VFS format. The helper is
* specifically intended to be called from the acl inode operation.
*
* The posix_acl_from_xattr() function will map the raw {g,u}id values stored
* in ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries into idmapping in @userns.
*
* Note that posix_acl_from_xattr() does not take idmapped mounts into account.
* If it did it calling it from the get acl inode operation would return POSIX
* ACLs mapped according to an idmapped mount which would mean that the value
* couldn't be cached for the filesystem. Idmapped mounts are taken into
* account on the fly during permission checking or right at the VFS -
* userspace boundary before reporting them to the user.
acl: add vfs_set_acl_prepare() Various filesystems store POSIX ACLs on the backing store in their uapi format. Such filesystems need to translate from the uapi POSIX ACL format into the VFS format during i_op->get_acl(). The VFS provides the posix_acl_from_xattr() helper for this task. But the usage of posix_acl_from_xattr() is currently ambiguous. It is intended to transform from a uapi POSIX ACL to the VFS represenation. For example, when retrieving POSIX ACLs for permission checking during lookup or when calling getxattr() to retrieve system.posix_acl_{access,default}. Calling posix_acl_from_xattr() during i_op->get_acl() will map the raw {g,u}id values stored as ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in the uapi POSIX ACL format into k{g,u}id_t in the filesystem's idmapping and return a struct posix_acl ready to be returned to the VFS for caching and to perform permission checks on. However, posix_acl_from_xattr() is also called during setxattr() for all filesystems that rely on VFS provides posix_acl_{access,default}_xattr_handler. The posix_acl_xattr_set() handler which is used for the ->set() method of posix_acl_{access,default}_xattr_handler uses posix_acl_from_xattr() to translate from the uapi POSIX ACL format to the VFS format so that it can be passed to the i_op->set_acl() handler of the filesystem or for direct caching in case no i_op->set_acl() handler is defined. During setxattr() the {g,u}id values stored as ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in the uapi POSIX ACL format aren't raw {g,u}id values that need to be mapped according to the filesystem's idmapping. Instead they are {g,u}id values in the caller's idmapping which have been generated during posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(). In other words, they are k{g,u}id_t which are passed as raw {g,u}id values abusing the uapi POSIX ACL format (Please note that this type safety violation has existed since the introduction of k{g,u}id_t. Please see [1] for more details.). So when posix_acl_from_xattr() is called in posix_acl_xattr_set() the filesystem idmapping is completely irrelevant. Instead, we abuse the initial idmapping to recover the k{g,u}id_t base on the value stored in raw {g,u}id as ACL_{GROUP,USER} in the uapi POSIX ACL format. We need to clearly distinguish betweeen these two operations as it is really easy to confuse for filesystems as can be seen in ntfs3. In order to do this we factor out make_posix_acl() which takes callbacks allowing callers to pass dedicated methods to generate the correct k{g,u}id_t. This is just an internal static helper which is not exposed to any filesystems but it neatly encapsulates the basic logic of walking through a uapi POSIX ACL and returning an allocated VFS POSIX ACL with the correct k{g,u}id_t values. The posix_acl_from_xattr() helper can then be implemented as a simple call to make_posix_acl() with callbacks that generate the correct k{g,u}id_t from the raw {g,u}id values in ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in the uapi POSIX ACL format as read from the backing store. For setxattr() we add a new helper vfs_set_acl_prepare() which has callbacks to map the POSIX ACLs from the uapi format with the k{g,u}id_t values stored in raw {g,u}id format in ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries into the correct k{g,u}id_t values in the filesystem idmapping. In contrast to posix_acl_from_xattr() the vfs_set_acl_prepare() helper needs to take the mount idmapping into account. The differences are explained in more detail in the kernel doc for the new functions. In follow up patches we will remove all abuses of posix_acl_from_xattr() for setxattr() operations and replace it with calls to vfs_set_acl_prepare(). The new vfs_set_acl_prepare() helper allows us to deal with the ambiguity in how the POSI ACL uapi struct stores {g,u}id values depending on whether this is a getxattr() or setxattr() operation. This also allows us to remove the posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() helper reducing the abuse of the POSIX ACL uapi format to pass values that should be distinct types in {g,u}id values stored as ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries. The removal of posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() in turn allows us to re-constify the value parameter of vfs_setxattr() which in turn allows us to avoid the nasty cast from a const void pointer to a non-const void pointer on ovl_do_setxattr(). Ultimately, the plan is to get rid of the type violations completely and never pass the values from k{g,u}id_t as raw {g,u}id in ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in uapi POSIX ACL format. But that's a longer way to go and this is a preparatory step. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Co-Developed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-08-29 15:38:42 +03:00
*
* Return: Allocated struct posix_acl on success, NULL for a valid header but
* without actual POSIX ACL entries, or ERR_PTR() encoded error code.
*/
struct posix_acl *posix_acl_from_xattr(struct user_namespace *userns,
const void *value, size_t size)
{
const struct posix_acl_xattr_header *header = value;
const struct posix_acl_xattr_entry *entry = (const void *)(header + 1), *end;
int count;
struct posix_acl *acl;
struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e;
count = posix_acl_fix_xattr_common(value, size);
if (count < 0)
return ERR_PTR(count);
if (count == 0)
return NULL;
acl = posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_NOFS);
if (!acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
acl_e = acl->a_entries;
for (end = entry + count; entry != end; acl_e++, entry++) {
acl_e->e_tag = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_tag);
acl_e->e_perm = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_perm);
switch(acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
break;
case ACL_USER:
acl_e->e_uid = make_kuid(userns,
le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
if (!uid_valid(acl_e->e_uid))
goto fail;
break;
case ACL_GROUP:
acl_e->e_gid = make_kgid(userns,
le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
if (!gid_valid(acl_e->e_gid))
goto fail;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
return acl;
fail:
posix_acl_release(acl);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL (posix_acl_from_xattr);
/*
* Convert from in-memory to extended attribute representation.
*/
int
posix_acl_to_xattr(struct user_namespace *user_ns, const struct posix_acl *acl,
void *buffer, size_t size)
{
struct posix_acl_xattr_header *ext_acl = buffer;
struct posix_acl_xattr_entry *ext_entry;
int real_size, n;
real_size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
if (!buffer)
return real_size;
if (real_size > size)
return -ERANGE;
ext_entry = (void *)(ext_acl + 1);
ext_acl->a_version = cpu_to_le32(POSIX_ACL_XATTR_VERSION);
for (n=0; n < acl->a_count; n++, ext_entry++) {
const struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e = &acl->a_entries[n];
ext_entry->e_tag = cpu_to_le16(acl_e->e_tag);
ext_entry->e_perm = cpu_to_le16(acl_e->e_perm);
switch(acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
ext_entry->e_id =
cpu_to_le32(from_kuid(user_ns, acl_e->e_uid));
break;
case ACL_GROUP:
ext_entry->e_id =
cpu_to_le32(from_kgid(user_ns, acl_e->e_gid));
break;
default:
ext_entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(ACL_UNDEFINED_ID);
break;
}
}
return real_size;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL (posix_acl_to_xattr);
/**
* vfs_posix_acl_to_xattr - convert from kernel to userspace representation
* @idmap: idmap of the mount
* @inode: inode the posix acls are set on
* @acl: the posix acls as represented by the vfs
* @buffer: the buffer into which to convert @acl
* @size: size of @buffer
*
* This converts @acl from the VFS representation in the filesystem idmapping
* to the uapi form reportable to userspace. And mount and caller idmappings
* are handled appropriately.
*
* Return: On success, the size of the stored uapi posix acls, on error a
* negative errno.
*/
static ssize_t vfs_posix_acl_to_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *inode,
const struct posix_acl *acl, void *buffer,
size_t size)
{
struct posix_acl_xattr_header *ext_acl = buffer;
struct posix_acl_xattr_entry *ext_entry;
struct user_namespace *fs_userns, *caller_userns;
struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
ssize_t real_size, n;
vfsuid_t vfsuid;
vfsgid_t vfsgid;
real_size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
if (!buffer)
return real_size;
if (real_size > size)
return -ERANGE;
ext_entry = (void *)(ext_acl + 1);
ext_acl->a_version = cpu_to_le32(POSIX_ACL_XATTR_VERSION);
fs_userns = i_user_ns(inode);
caller_userns = current_user_ns();
mnt_userns = mnt_idmap_owner(idmap);
for (n=0; n < acl->a_count; n++, ext_entry++) {
const struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e = &acl->a_entries[n];
ext_entry->e_tag = cpu_to_le16(acl_e->e_tag);
ext_entry->e_perm = cpu_to_le16(acl_e->e_perm);
switch(acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
vfsuid = make_vfsuid(mnt_userns, fs_userns, acl_e->e_uid);
ext_entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(from_kuid(
caller_userns, vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid)));
break;
case ACL_GROUP:
vfsgid = make_vfsgid(mnt_userns, fs_userns, acl_e->e_gid);
ext_entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(from_kgid(
caller_userns, vfsgid_into_kgid(vfsgid)));
break;
default:
ext_entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(ACL_UNDEFINED_ID);
break;
}
}
return real_size;
}
int
fs: pass dentry to set acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. Since some filesystem rely on the dentry being available to them when setting posix acls (e.g., 9p and cifs) they cannot rely on set acl inode operation. But since ->set_acl() is required in order to use the generic posix acl xattr handlers filesystems that do not implement this inode operation cannot use the handler and need to implement their own dedicated posix acl handlers. Update the ->set_acl() inode method to take a dentry argument. This allows all filesystems to rely on ->set_acl(). As far as I can tell all codepaths can be switched to rely on the dentry instead of just the inode. Note that the original motivation for passing the dentry separate from the inode instead of just the dentry in the xattr handlers was because of security modules that call security_d_instantiate(). This hook is called during d_instantiate_new(), d_add(), __d_instantiate_anon(), and d_splice_alias() to initialize the inode's security context and possibly to set security.* xattrs. Since this only affects security.* xattrs this is completely irrelevant for posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-23 11:29:39 +03:00
set_posix_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
acl: handle idmapped mounts The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped mounts. The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which direction we're translating. Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace. In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode() helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass the mount's user namespace down. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 16:19:27 +03:00
int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
{
fs: pass dentry to set acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. Since some filesystem rely on the dentry being available to them when setting posix acls (e.g., 9p and cifs) they cannot rely on set acl inode operation. But since ->set_acl() is required in order to use the generic posix acl xattr handlers filesystems that do not implement this inode operation cannot use the handler and need to implement their own dedicated posix acl handlers. Update the ->set_acl() inode method to take a dentry argument. This allows all filesystems to rely on ->set_acl(). As far as I can tell all codepaths can be switched to rely on the dentry instead of just the inode. Note that the original motivation for passing the dentry separate from the inode instead of just the dentry in the xattr handlers was because of security modules that call security_d_instantiate(). This hook is called during d_instantiate_new(), d_add(), __d_instantiate_anon(), and d_splice_alias() to initialize the inode's security context and possibly to set security.* xattrs. Since this only affects security.* xattrs this is completely irrelevant for posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-23 11:29:39 +03:00
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!inode->i_op->set_acl)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
acl: handle idmapped mounts The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped mounts. The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which direction we're translating. Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace. In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode() helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass the mount's user namespace down. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 16:19:27 +03:00
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
return -EPERM;
if (acl) {
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull userns vfs updates from Eric Biederman: "This tree contains some very long awaited work on generalizing the user namespace support for mounting filesystems to include filesystems with a backing store. The real world target is fuse but the goal is to update the vfs to allow any filesystem to be supported. This patchset is based on a lot of code review and testing to approach that goal. While looking at what is needed to support the fuse filesystem it became clear that there were things like xattrs for security modules that needed special treatment. That the resolution of those concerns would not be fuse specific. That sorting out these general issues made most sense at the generic level, where the right people could be drawn into the conversation, and the issues could be solved for everyone. At a high level what this patchset does a couple of simple things: - Add a user namespace owner (s_user_ns) to struct super_block. - Teach the vfs to handle filesystem uids and gids not mapping into to kuids and kgids and being reported as INVALID_UID and INVALID_GID in vfs data structures. By assigning a user namespace owner filesystems that are mounted with only user namespace privilege can be detected. This allows security modules and the like to know which mounts may not be trusted. This also allows the set of uids and gids that are communicated to the filesystem to be capped at the set of kuids and kgids that are in the owning user namespace of the filesystem. One of the crazier corner casees this handles is the case of inodes whose i_uid or i_gid are not mapped into the vfs. Most of the code simply doesn't care but it is easy to confuse the inode writeback path so no operation that could cause an inode write-back is permitted for such inodes (aka only reads are allowed). This set of changes starts out by cleaning up the code paths involved in user namespace permirted mounts. Then when things are clean enough adds code that cleanly sets s_user_ns. Then additional restrictions are added that are possible now that the filesystem superblock contains owner information. These changes should not affect anyone in practice, but there are some parts of these restrictions that are changes in behavior. - Andy's restriction on suid executables that does not honor the suid bit when the path is from another mount namespace (think /proc/[pid]/fd/) or when the filesystem was mounted by a less privileged user. - The replacement of the user namespace implicit setting of MNT_NODEV with implicitly setting SB_I_NODEV on the filesystem superblock instead. Using SB_I_NODEV is a stronger form that happens to make this state user invisible. The user visibility can be managed but it caused problems when it was introduced from applications reasonably expecting mount flags to be what they were set to. There is a little bit of work remaining before it is safe to support mounting filesystems with backing store in user namespaces, beyond what is in this set of changes. - Verifying the mounter has permission to read/write the block device during mount. - Teaching the integrity modules IMA and EVM to handle filesystems mounted with only user namespace root and to reduce trust in their security xattrs accordingly. - Capturing the mounters credentials and using that for permission checks in d_automount and the like. (Given that overlayfs already does this, and we need the work in d_automount it make sense to generalize this case). Furthermore there are a few changes that are on the wishlist: - Get all filesystems supporting posix acls using the generic posix acls so that posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user may be removed. [Maintainability] - Reducing the permission checks in places such as remount to allow the superblock owner to perform them. - Allowing the superblock owner to chown files with unmapped uids and gids to something that is mapped so the files may be treated normally. I am not considering even obvious relaxations of permission checks until it is clear there are no more corner cases that need to be locked down and handled generically. Many thanks to Seth Forshee who kept this code alive, and putting up with me rewriting substantial portions of what he did to handle more corner cases, and for his diligent testing and reviewing of my changes" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (30 commits) fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems creds fs: Update i_[ug]id_(read|write) to translate relative to s_user_ns evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC dquot: For now explicitly don't support filesystems outside of init_user_ns quota: Handle quota data stored in s_user_ns in quota_setxquota quota: Ensure qids map to the filesystem vfs: Don't create inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs vfs: Don't modify inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() vfs: Verify acls are valid within superblock's s_user_ns. userns: Handle -1 in k[ug]id_has_mapping when !CONFIG_USER_NS fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super block userns: Remove the now unnecessary FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT flag userns: Remove implicit MNT_NODEV fragility. ...
2016-07-30 01:54:19 +03:00
int ret = posix_acl_valid(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, acl);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
fs: pass dentry to set acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. Since some filesystem rely on the dentry being available to them when setting posix acls (e.g., 9p and cifs) they cannot rely on set acl inode operation. But since ->set_acl() is required in order to use the generic posix acl xattr handlers filesystems that do not implement this inode operation cannot use the handler and need to implement their own dedicated posix acl handlers. Update the ->set_acl() inode method to take a dentry argument. This allows all filesystems to rely on ->set_acl(). As far as I can tell all codepaths can be switched to rely on the dentry instead of just the inode. Note that the original motivation for passing the dentry separate from the inode instead of just the dentry in the xattr handlers was because of security modules that call security_d_instantiate(). This hook is called during d_instantiate_new(), d_add(), __d_instantiate_anon(), and d_splice_alias() to initialize the inode's security context and possibly to set security.* xattrs. Since this only affects security.* xattrs this is completely irrelevant for posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-23 11:29:39 +03:00
return inode->i_op->set_acl(mnt_userns, dentry, acl, type);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_posix_acl);
static bool
posix_acl_xattr_list(struct dentry *dentry)
{
return IS_POSIXACL(d_backing_inode(dentry));
}
const struct xattr_handler posix_acl_access_xattr_handler = {
.name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS,
.flags = ACL_TYPE_ACCESS,
.list = posix_acl_xattr_list,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(posix_acl_access_xattr_handler);
const struct xattr_handler posix_acl_default_xattr_handler = {
.name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT,
.flags = ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT,
.list = posix_acl_xattr_list,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(posix_acl_default_xattr_handler);
fs: pass dentry to set acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. Since some filesystem rely on the dentry being available to them when setting posix acls (e.g., 9p and cifs) they cannot rely on set acl inode operation. But since ->set_acl() is required in order to use the generic posix acl xattr handlers filesystems that do not implement this inode operation cannot use the handler and need to implement their own dedicated posix acl handlers. Update the ->set_acl() inode method to take a dentry argument. This allows all filesystems to rely on ->set_acl(). As far as I can tell all codepaths can be switched to rely on the dentry instead of just the inode. Note that the original motivation for passing the dentry separate from the inode instead of just the dentry in the xattr handlers was because of security modules that call security_d_instantiate(). This hook is called during d_instantiate_new(), d_add(), __d_instantiate_anon(), and d_splice_alias() to initialize the inode's security context and possibly to set security.* xattrs. Since this only affects security.* xattrs this is completely irrelevant for posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-23 11:29:39 +03:00
int simple_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int error;
fs: pass dentry to set acl method The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. Since some filesystem rely on the dentry being available to them when setting posix acls (e.g., 9p and cifs) they cannot rely on set acl inode operation. But since ->set_acl() is required in order to use the generic posix acl xattr handlers filesystems that do not implement this inode operation cannot use the handler and need to implement their own dedicated posix acl handlers. Update the ->set_acl() inode method to take a dentry argument. This allows all filesystems to rely on ->set_acl(). As far as I can tell all codepaths can be switched to rely on the dentry instead of just the inode. Note that the original motivation for passing the dentry separate from the inode instead of just the dentry in the xattr handlers was because of security modules that call security_d_instantiate(). This hook is called during d_instantiate_new(), d_add(), __d_instantiate_anon(), and d_splice_alias() to initialize the inode's security context and possibly to set security.* xattrs. Since this only affects security.* xattrs this is completely irrelevant for posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-23 11:29:39 +03:00
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
error = posix_acl_update_mode(mnt_userns, inode,
&inode->i_mode, &acl);
if (error)
return error;
}
inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
if (IS_I_VERSION(inode))
inode_inc_iversion(inode);
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return 0;
}
int simple_acl_create(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
{
struct posix_acl *default_acl, *acl;
int error;
error = posix_acl_create(dir, &inode->i_mode, &default_acl, &acl);
if (error)
return error;
set_cached_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, default_acl);
set_cached_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, acl);
if (default_acl)
posix_acl_release(default_acl);
if (acl)
posix_acl_release(acl);
return 0;
}
static int vfs_set_acl_idmapped_mnt(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct user_namespace *fs_userns,
struct posix_acl *acl)
{
for (int n = 0; n < acl->a_count; n++) {
struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e = &acl->a_entries[n];
switch (acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
acl_e->e_uid = from_vfsuid(mnt_userns, fs_userns,
VFSUIDT_INIT(acl_e->e_uid));
break;
case ACL_GROUP:
acl_e->e_gid = from_vfsgid(mnt_userns, fs_userns,
VFSGIDT_INIT(acl_e->e_gid));
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
/**
* vfs_set_acl - set posix acls
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount
* @dentry: the dentry based on which to set the posix acls
* @acl_name: the name of the posix acl
* @kacl: the posix acls in the appropriate VFS format
*
* This function sets @kacl. The caller must all posix_acl_release() on @kacl
* afterwards.
*
* Return: On success 0, on error negative errno.
*/
int vfs_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
{
int acl_type;
int error;
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL;
acl_type = posix_acl_type(acl_name);
if (acl_type < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (kacl) {
/*
* If we're on an idmapped mount translate from mount specific
* vfs{g,u}id_t into global filesystem k{g,u}id_t.
* Afterwards we can cache the POSIX ACLs filesystem wide and -
* if this is a filesystem with a backing store - ultimately
* translate them to backing store values.
*/
error = vfs_set_acl_idmapped_mnt(mnt_userns, i_user_ns(inode), kacl);
if (error)
return error;
}
retry_deleg:
inode_lock(inode);
/*
* We only care about restrictions the inode struct itself places upon
* us otherwise POSIX ACLs aren't subject to any VFS restrictions.
*/
error = may_write_xattr(mnt_userns, inode);
if (error)
goto out_inode_unlock;
error = security_inode_set_acl(mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
if (error)
goto out_inode_unlock;
error = try_break_deleg(inode, &delegated_inode);
if (error)
goto out_inode_unlock;
if (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)
error = set_posix_acl(mnt_userns, dentry, acl_type, kacl);
else if (unlikely(is_bad_inode(inode)))
error = -EIO;
else
error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!error) {
fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
}
out_inode_unlock:
inode_unlock(inode);
if (delegated_inode) {
error = break_deleg_wait(&delegated_inode);
if (!error)
goto retry_deleg;
}
return error;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_set_acl);
/**
* vfs_get_acl - get posix acls
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount
* @dentry: the dentry based on which to retrieve the posix acls
* @acl_name: the name of the posix acl
*
* This function retrieves @kacl from the filesystem. The caller must all
* posix_acl_release() on @kacl.
*
* Return: On success POSIX ACLs in VFS format, on error negative errno.
*/
struct posix_acl *vfs_get_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
struct posix_acl *acl;
int acl_type, error;
acl_type = posix_acl_type(acl_name);
if (acl_type < 0)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* The VFS has no restrictions on reading POSIX ACLs so calling
* something like xattr_permission() isn't needed. Only LSMs get a say.
*/
error = security_inode_get_acl(mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name);
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode))
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
acl = __get_acl(mnt_userns, dentry, inode, acl_type);
if (IS_ERR(acl))
return acl;
if (!acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENODATA);
return acl;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_get_acl);
/**
* vfs_remove_acl - remove posix acls
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount
* @dentry: the dentry based on which to retrieve the posix acls
* @acl_name: the name of the posix acl
*
* This function removes posix acls.
*
* Return: On success 0, on error negative errno.
*/
int vfs_remove_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *acl_name)
{
int acl_type;
int error;
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL;
acl_type = posix_acl_type(acl_name);
if (acl_type < 0)
return -EINVAL;
retry_deleg:
inode_lock(inode);
/*
* We only care about restrictions the inode struct itself places upon
* us otherwise POSIX ACLs aren't subject to any VFS restrictions.
*/
error = may_write_xattr(mnt_userns, inode);
if (error)
goto out_inode_unlock;
error = security_inode_remove_acl(mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name);
if (error)
goto out_inode_unlock;
error = try_break_deleg(inode, &delegated_inode);
if (error)
goto out_inode_unlock;
if (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)
error = set_posix_acl(mnt_userns, dentry, acl_type, NULL);
else if (unlikely(is_bad_inode(inode)))
error = -EIO;
else
error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!error) {
fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name);
}
out_inode_unlock:
inode_unlock(inode);
if (delegated_inode) {
error = break_deleg_wait(&delegated_inode);
if (!error)
goto retry_deleg;
}
return error;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_remove_acl);
int do_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *acl_name, const void *kvalue, size_t size)
{
int error;
struct posix_acl *acl = NULL;
if (size) {
/*
* Note that posix_acl_from_xattr() uses GFP_NOFS when it
* probably doesn't need to here.
*/
acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(current_user_ns(), kvalue, size);
if (IS_ERR(acl))
return PTR_ERR(acl);
}
error = vfs_set_acl(mnt_idmap_owner(idmap), dentry, acl_name, acl);
posix_acl_release(acl);
return error;
}
ssize_t do_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *acl_name, void *kvalue, size_t size)
{
ssize_t error;
struct posix_acl *acl;
acl = vfs_get_acl(mnt_idmap_owner(idmap), dentry, acl_name);
if (IS_ERR(acl))
return PTR_ERR(acl);
error = vfs_posix_acl_to_xattr(idmap, d_inode(dentry),
acl, kvalue, size);
posix_acl_release(acl);
return error;
}