WSL2-Linux-Kernel/arch/x86/realmode/init.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 17:07:57 +03:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
mm: reorder includes after introduction of linux/pgtable.h The replacement of <asm/pgrable.h> with <linux/pgtable.h> made the include of the latter in the middle of asm includes. Fix this up with the aid of the below script and manual adjustments here and there. import sys import re if len(sys.argv) is not 3: print "USAGE: %s <file> <header>" % (sys.argv[0]) sys.exit(1) hdr_to_move="#include <linux/%s>" % sys.argv[2] moved = False in_hdrs = False with open(sys.argv[1], "r") as f: lines = f.readlines() for _line in lines: line = _line.rstrip(' ') if line == hdr_to_move: continue if line.startswith("#include <linux/"): in_hdrs = True elif not moved and in_hdrs: moved = True print hdr_to_move print line Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <ley.foon.tan@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200514170327.31389-4-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-09 07:32:42 +03:00
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/realmode.h>
2016-08-10 12:29:14 +03:00
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
x86/kdump: Always reserve the low 1M when the crashkernel option is specified On x86, purgatory() copies the first 640K of memory to a backup region because the kernel needs those first 640K for the real mode trampoline during boot, among others. However, when SME is enabled, the kernel cannot properly copy the old memory to the backup area but reads only its encrypted contents. The result is that the crash tool gets invalid pointers when parsing vmcore: crash> kmem -s|grep -i invalid kmem: dma-kmalloc-512: slab:ffffd77680001c00 invalid freepointer:a6086ac099f0c5a4 kmem: dma-kmalloc-512: slab:ffffd77680001c00 invalid freepointer:a6086ac099f0c5a4 crash> So reserve the remaining low 1M memory when the crashkernel option is specified (after reserving real mode memory) so that allocated memory does not fall into the low 1M area and thus the copying of the contents of the first 640k to a backup region in purgatory() can be avoided altogether. This way, it does not need to be included in crash dumps or used for anything except the trampolines that must live in the low 1M. [ bp: Heavily rewrite commit message, flip check logic in crash_reserve_low_1M().] Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: bhe@redhat.com Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: d.hatayama@fujitsu.com Cc: dhowells@redhat.com Cc: ebiederm@xmission.com Cc: horms@verge.net.au Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jürgen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191108090027.11082-2-lijiang@redhat.com Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204793
2019-11-08 12:00:25 +03:00
#include <asm/crash.h>
#include <asm/sev.h>
struct real_mode_header *real_mode_header;
u32 *trampoline_cr4_features;
x86/mm: Separate variable for trampoline PGD Use a separate global variable to define the trampoline PGD used to start other processors. This change will allow KALSR memory randomization to change the trampoline PGD to be correctly aligned with physical memory. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-22 03:47:01 +03:00
/* Hold the pgd entry used on booting additional CPUs */
pgd_t trampoline_pgd_entry;
void load_trampoline_pgtable(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
load_cr3(initial_page_table);
#else
/*
* This function is called before exiting to real-mode and that will
* fail with CR4.PCIDE still set.
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCIDE);
write_cr3(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd);
#endif
/*
* The CR3 write above will not flush global TLB entries.
* Stale, global entries from previous page tables may still be
* present. Flush those stale entries.
*
* This ensures that memory accessed while running with
* trampoline_pgd is *actually* mapped into trampoline_pgd.
*/
__flush_tlb_all();
}
void __init reserve_real_mode(void)
{
phys_addr_t mem;
size_t size = real_mode_size_needed();
if (!size)
return;
WARN_ON(slab_is_available());
/* Has to be under 1M so we can execute real-mode AP code. */
mem = memblock_phys_alloc_range(size, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 1<<20);
x86/setup: Always reserve the first 1M of RAM There are BIOSes that are known to corrupt the memory under 1M, or more precisely under 640K because the memory above 640K is anyway reserved for the EGA/VGA frame buffer and BIOS. To prevent usage of the memory that will be potentially clobbered by the kernel, the beginning of the memory is always reserved. The exact size of the reserved area is determined by CONFIG_X86_RESERVE_LOW build time and the "reservelow=" command line option. The reserved range may be from 4K to 640K with the default of 64K. There are also configurations that reserve the entire 1M range, like machines with SandyBridge graphic devices or systems that enable crash kernel. In addition to the potentially clobbered memory, EBDA of unknown size may be as low as 128K and the memory above that EBDA start is also reserved early. It would have been possible to reserve the entire range under 1M unless for the real mode trampoline that must reside in that area. To accommodate placement of the real mode trampoline and keep the memory safe from being clobbered by BIOS, reserve the first 64K of RAM before memory allocations are possible and then, after the real mode trampoline is allocated, reserve the entire range from 0 to 1M. Update trim_snb_memory() and reserve_real_mode() to avoid redundant reservations of the same memory range. Also make sure the memory under 1M is not getting freed by efi_free_boot_services(). [ bp: Massage commit message and comments. ] Fixes: a799c2bd29d1 ("x86/setup: Consolidate early memory reservations") Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=213177 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210601075354.5149-2-rppt@kernel.org
2021-06-01 10:53:52 +03:00
if (!mem)
pr_info("No sub-1M memory is available for the trampoline\n");
x86/setup: Always reserve the first 1M of RAM There are BIOSes that are known to corrupt the memory under 1M, or more precisely under 640K because the memory above 640K is anyway reserved for the EGA/VGA frame buffer and BIOS. To prevent usage of the memory that will be potentially clobbered by the kernel, the beginning of the memory is always reserved. The exact size of the reserved area is determined by CONFIG_X86_RESERVE_LOW build time and the "reservelow=" command line option. The reserved range may be from 4K to 640K with the default of 64K. There are also configurations that reserve the entire 1M range, like machines with SandyBridge graphic devices or systems that enable crash kernel. In addition to the potentially clobbered memory, EBDA of unknown size may be as low as 128K and the memory above that EBDA start is also reserved early. It would have been possible to reserve the entire range under 1M unless for the real mode trampoline that must reside in that area. To accommodate placement of the real mode trampoline and keep the memory safe from being clobbered by BIOS, reserve the first 64K of RAM before memory allocations are possible and then, after the real mode trampoline is allocated, reserve the entire range from 0 to 1M. Update trim_snb_memory() and reserve_real_mode() to avoid redundant reservations of the same memory range. Also make sure the memory under 1M is not getting freed by efi_free_boot_services(). [ bp: Massage commit message and comments. ] Fixes: a799c2bd29d1 ("x86/setup: Consolidate early memory reservations") Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=213177 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210601075354.5149-2-rppt@kernel.org
2021-06-01 10:53:52 +03:00
else
set_real_mode_mem(mem);
x86/setup: Always reserve the first 1M of RAM There are BIOSes that are known to corrupt the memory under 1M, or more precisely under 640K because the memory above 640K is anyway reserved for the EGA/VGA frame buffer and BIOS. To prevent usage of the memory that will be potentially clobbered by the kernel, the beginning of the memory is always reserved. The exact size of the reserved area is determined by CONFIG_X86_RESERVE_LOW build time and the "reservelow=" command line option. The reserved range may be from 4K to 640K with the default of 64K. There are also configurations that reserve the entire 1M range, like machines with SandyBridge graphic devices or systems that enable crash kernel. In addition to the potentially clobbered memory, EBDA of unknown size may be as low as 128K and the memory above that EBDA start is also reserved early. It would have been possible to reserve the entire range under 1M unless for the real mode trampoline that must reside in that area. To accommodate placement of the real mode trampoline and keep the memory safe from being clobbered by BIOS, reserve the first 64K of RAM before memory allocations are possible and then, after the real mode trampoline is allocated, reserve the entire range from 0 to 1M. Update trim_snb_memory() and reserve_real_mode() to avoid redundant reservations of the same memory range. Also make sure the memory under 1M is not getting freed by efi_free_boot_services(). [ bp: Massage commit message and comments. ] Fixes: a799c2bd29d1 ("x86/setup: Consolidate early memory reservations") Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=213177 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210601075354.5149-2-rppt@kernel.org
2021-06-01 10:53:52 +03:00
/*
* Unconditionally reserve the entire fisrt 1M, see comment in
* setup_arch().
*/
memblock_reserve(0, SZ_1M);
}
static void __init sme_sev_setup_real_mode(struct trampoline_header *th)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
th->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE;
if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) {
/*
* Skip the call to verify_cpu() in secondary_startup_64 as it
* will cause #VC exceptions when the AP can't handle them yet.
*/
th->start = (u64) secondary_startup_64_no_verify;
if (sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(real_mode_header))
panic("Failed to get/update SEV-ES AP Jump Table");
}
#endif
}
static void __init setup_real_mode(void)
{
u16 real_mode_seg;
const u32 *rel;
u32 count;
unsigned char *base;
unsigned long phys_base;
struct trampoline_header *trampoline_header;
size_t size = PAGE_ALIGN(real_mode_blob_end - real_mode_blob);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
u64 *trampoline_pgd;
u64 efer;
x86/64/mm: Map all kernel memory into trampoline_pgd The trampoline_pgd only maps the 0xfffffff000000000-0xffffffffffffffff range of kernel memory (with 4-level paging). This range contains the kernel's text+data+bss mappings and the module mapping space but not the direct mapping and the vmalloc area. This is enough to get the application processors out of real-mode, but for code that switches back to real-mode the trampoline_pgd is missing important parts of the address space. For example, consider this code from arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c, function machine_real_restart() for a 64-bit kernel: #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 load_cr3(initial_page_table); #else write_cr3(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd); /* Exiting long mode will fail if CR4.PCIDE is set. */ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID)) cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCIDE); #endif /* Jump to the identity-mapped low memory code */ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 asm volatile("jmpl *%0" : : "rm" (real_mode_header->machine_real_restart_asm), "a" (type)); #else asm volatile("ljmpl *%0" : : "m" (real_mode_header->machine_real_restart_asm), "D" (type)); #endif The code switches to the trampoline_pgd, which unmaps the direct mapping and also the kernel stack. The call to cr4_clear_bits() will find no stack and crash the machine. The real_mode_header pointer below points into the direct mapping, and dereferencing it also causes a crash. The reason this does not crash always is only that kernel mappings are global and the CR3 switch does not flush those mappings. But if theses mappings are not in the TLB already, the above code will crash before it can jump to the real-mode stub. Extend the trampoline_pgd to contain all kernel mappings to prevent these crashes and to make code which runs on this page-table more robust. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211202153226.22946-5-joro@8bytes.org
2021-12-02 18:32:26 +03:00
int i;
#endif
base = (unsigned char *)real_mode_header;
x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active When Secure Memory Encryption is enabled, the trampoline area must not be encrypted. A CPU running in real mode will not be able to decrypt memory that has been encrypted because it will not be able to use addresses with the memory encryption mask. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c70ffd2614fa77e80df31c9169ca98a9b16ff97c.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 00:10:20 +03:00
/*
* If SME is active, the trampoline area will need to be in
* decrypted memory in order to bring up other processors
* successfully. This is not needed for SEV.
x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active When Secure Memory Encryption is enabled, the trampoline area must not be encrypted. A CPU running in real mode will not be able to decrypt memory that has been encrypted because it will not be able to use addresses with the memory encryption mask. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c70ffd2614fa77e80df31c9169ca98a9b16ff97c.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 00:10:20 +03:00
*/
if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)base, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active When Secure Memory Encryption is enabled, the trampoline area must not be encrypted. A CPU running in real mode will not be able to decrypt memory that has been encrypted because it will not be able to use addresses with the memory encryption mask. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c70ffd2614fa77e80df31c9169ca98a9b16ff97c.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 00:10:20 +03:00
memcpy(base, real_mode_blob, size);
phys_base = __pa(base);
real_mode_seg = phys_base >> 4;
rel = (u32 *) real_mode_relocs;
/* 16-bit segment relocations. */
count = *rel++;
while (count--) {
u16 *seg = (u16 *) (base + *rel++);
*seg = real_mode_seg;
}
/* 32-bit linear relocations. */
count = *rel++;
while (count--) {
u32 *ptr = (u32 *) (base + *rel++);
*ptr += phys_base;
}
/* Must be performed *after* relocation. */
trampoline_header = (struct trampoline_header *)
__va(real_mode_header->trampoline_header);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
trampoline_header->start = __pa_symbol(startup_32_smp);
trampoline_header->gdt_limit = __BOOT_DS + 7;
trampoline_header->gdt_base = __pa_symbol(boot_gdt);
#else
/*
* Some AMD processors will #GP(0) if EFER.LMA is set in WRMSR
* so we need to mask it out.
*/
rdmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer);
trampoline_header->efer = efer & ~EFER_LMA;
trampoline_header->start = (u64) secondary_startup_64;
trampoline_cr4_features = &trampoline_header->cr4;
2016-08-10 12:29:14 +03:00
*trampoline_cr4_features = mmu_cr4_features;
x86/boot/realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Add support to check if memory encryption is active in the kernel and that it has been enabled on the AP. If memory encryption is active in the kernel but has not been enabled on the AP, then set the memory encryption bit (bit 23) of MSR_K8_SYSCFG to enable memory encryption on that AP and allow the AP to continue start up. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/37e29b99c395910f56ca9f8ecf7b0439b28827c8.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 00:10:25 +03:00
trampoline_header->flags = 0;
trampoline_pgd = (u64 *) __va(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd);
x86/64/mm: Map all kernel memory into trampoline_pgd The trampoline_pgd only maps the 0xfffffff000000000-0xffffffffffffffff range of kernel memory (with 4-level paging). This range contains the kernel's text+data+bss mappings and the module mapping space but not the direct mapping and the vmalloc area. This is enough to get the application processors out of real-mode, but for code that switches back to real-mode the trampoline_pgd is missing important parts of the address space. For example, consider this code from arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c, function machine_real_restart() for a 64-bit kernel: #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 load_cr3(initial_page_table); #else write_cr3(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd); /* Exiting long mode will fail if CR4.PCIDE is set. */ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID)) cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCIDE); #endif /* Jump to the identity-mapped low memory code */ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 asm volatile("jmpl *%0" : : "rm" (real_mode_header->machine_real_restart_asm), "a" (type)); #else asm volatile("ljmpl *%0" : : "m" (real_mode_header->machine_real_restart_asm), "D" (type)); #endif The code switches to the trampoline_pgd, which unmaps the direct mapping and also the kernel stack. The call to cr4_clear_bits() will find no stack and crash the machine. The real_mode_header pointer below points into the direct mapping, and dereferencing it also causes a crash. The reason this does not crash always is only that kernel mappings are global and the CR3 switch does not flush those mappings. But if theses mappings are not in the TLB already, the above code will crash before it can jump to the real-mode stub. Extend the trampoline_pgd to contain all kernel mappings to prevent these crashes and to make code which runs on this page-table more robust. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211202153226.22946-5-joro@8bytes.org
2021-12-02 18:32:26 +03:00
/* Map the real mode stub as virtual == physical */
x86/mm: Separate variable for trampoline PGD Use a separate global variable to define the trampoline PGD used to start other processors. This change will allow KALSR memory randomization to change the trampoline PGD to be correctly aligned with physical memory. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-22 03:47:01 +03:00
trampoline_pgd[0] = trampoline_pgd_entry.pgd;
x86/64/mm: Map all kernel memory into trampoline_pgd The trampoline_pgd only maps the 0xfffffff000000000-0xffffffffffffffff range of kernel memory (with 4-level paging). This range contains the kernel's text+data+bss mappings and the module mapping space but not the direct mapping and the vmalloc area. This is enough to get the application processors out of real-mode, but for code that switches back to real-mode the trampoline_pgd is missing important parts of the address space. For example, consider this code from arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c, function machine_real_restart() for a 64-bit kernel: #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 load_cr3(initial_page_table); #else write_cr3(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd); /* Exiting long mode will fail if CR4.PCIDE is set. */ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID)) cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCIDE); #endif /* Jump to the identity-mapped low memory code */ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 asm volatile("jmpl *%0" : : "rm" (real_mode_header->machine_real_restart_asm), "a" (type)); #else asm volatile("ljmpl *%0" : : "m" (real_mode_header->machine_real_restart_asm), "D" (type)); #endif The code switches to the trampoline_pgd, which unmaps the direct mapping and also the kernel stack. The call to cr4_clear_bits() will find no stack and crash the machine. The real_mode_header pointer below points into the direct mapping, and dereferencing it also causes a crash. The reason this does not crash always is only that kernel mappings are global and the CR3 switch does not flush those mappings. But if theses mappings are not in the TLB already, the above code will crash before it can jump to the real-mode stub. Extend the trampoline_pgd to contain all kernel mappings to prevent these crashes and to make code which runs on this page-table more robust. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211202153226.22946-5-joro@8bytes.org
2021-12-02 18:32:26 +03:00
/*
* Include the entirety of the kernel mapping into the trampoline
* PGD. This way, all mappings present in the normal kernel page
* tables are usable while running on trampoline_pgd.
*/
for (i = pgd_index(__PAGE_OFFSET); i < PTRS_PER_PGD; i++)
trampoline_pgd[i] = init_top_pgt[i].pgd;
#endif
sme_sev_setup_real_mode(trampoline_header);
}
/*
* reserve_real_mode() gets called very early, to guarantee the
* availability of low memory. This is before the proper kernel page
* tables are set up, so we cannot set page permissions in that
* function. Also trampoline code will be executed by APs so we
* need to mark it executable at do_pre_smp_initcalls() at least,
* thus run it as a early_initcall().
*/
static void __init set_real_mode_permissions(void)
{
unsigned char *base = (unsigned char *) real_mode_header;
size_t size = PAGE_ALIGN(real_mode_blob_end - real_mode_blob);
size_t ro_size =
PAGE_ALIGN(real_mode_header->ro_end) -
__pa(base);
size_t text_size =
PAGE_ALIGN(real_mode_header->ro_end) -
real_mode_header->text_start;
unsigned long text_start =
(unsigned long) __va(real_mode_header->text_start);
set_memory_nx((unsigned long) base, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
set_memory_ro((unsigned long) base, ro_size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
set_memory_x((unsigned long) text_start, text_size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
}
static int __init init_real_mode(void)
{
if (!real_mode_header)
panic("Real mode trampoline was not allocated");
setup_real_mode();
set_real_mode_permissions();
return 0;
}
early_initcall(init_real_mode);