WSL2-Linux-Kernel/mm/kasan/kasan.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 17:07:57 +03:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and out-of-bounds bugs. KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access, therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan instrumentation of globals. This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1]. Basic idea: The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to check the shadow memory on each memory access. Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address. Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address: unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr) { return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET; } where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3. So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory. The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7) means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler. Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error printed. Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov: "We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan), ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing, running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000 scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and lots of others): [2] [3] [4]. The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers. We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer (it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs. Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5]. We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also people from Samsung and Oracle have found some. [...] As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we finish all tuning). I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads. Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are relatively easy to port." Comparison with other debugging features: ======================================== KMEMCHECK: - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of uninitialized memory reads. Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck: $ netperf -l 30 MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET Recv Send Send Socket Socket Message Elapsed Size Size Size Time Throughput bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72 kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54 kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39 kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23 - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation. DEBUG_PAGEALLOC: - KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page granularity level, so it able to find more bugs. SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones): - SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan. - SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads, KASan able to detect both reads and writes. - In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact place of first bad read/write. [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel [2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies Based on work by Andrey Konovalov. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 01:39:17 +03:00
#ifndef __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H
#define __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H
#include <linux/kasan.h>
mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB Implement the stack depot and provide CONFIG_STACKDEPOT. Stack depot will allow KASAN store allocation/deallocation stack traces for memory chunks. The stack traces are stored in a hash table and referenced by handles which reside in the kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta structures in the allocated memory chunks. IRQ stack traces are cut below the IRQ entry point to avoid unnecessary duplication. Right now stackdepot support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Once KASAN features in SLAB are on par with those in SLUB we can switch SLUB to stackdepot as well, thus removing the dependency on SLUB stack bookkeeping, which wastes a lot of memory. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: stack depots" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. Joonsoo has said that he plans to reuse the stackdepot code for the mm/page_owner.c debugging facility. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depot_stack_handle/depot_stack_handle_t] [aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: comment style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-26 00:22:08 +03:00
#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and out-of-bounds bugs. KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access, therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan instrumentation of globals. This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1]. Basic idea: The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to check the shadow memory on each memory access. Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address. Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address: unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr) { return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET; } where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3. So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory. The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7) means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler. Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error printed. Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov: "We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan), ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing, running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000 scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and lots of others): [2] [3] [4]. The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers. We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer (it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs. Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5]. We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also people from Samsung and Oracle have found some. [...] As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we finish all tuning). I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads. Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are relatively easy to port." Comparison with other debugging features: ======================================== KMEMCHECK: - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of uninitialized memory reads. Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck: $ netperf -l 30 MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET Recv Send Send Socket Socket Message Elapsed Size Size Size Time Throughput bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72 kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54 kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39 kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23 - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation. DEBUG_PAGEALLOC: - KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page granularity level, so it able to find more bugs. SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones): - SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan. - SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads, KASan able to detect both reads and writes. - In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact place of first bad read/write. [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel [2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies Based on work by Andrey Konovalov. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 01:39:17 +03:00
#define KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
#define KASAN_SHADOW_MASK (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
#define KASAN_TAG_KERNEL 0xFF /* native kernel pointers tag */
#define KASAN_TAG_INVALID 0xFE /* inaccessible memory tag */
#define KASAN_TAG_MAX 0xFD /* maximum value for random tags */
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
mm: slub: add kernel address sanitizer support for slub allocator With this patch kasan will be able to catch bugs in memory allocated by slub. Initially all objects in newly allocated slab page, marked as redzone. Later, when allocation of slub object happens, requested by caller number of bytes marked as accessible, and the rest of the object (including slub's metadata) marked as redzone (inaccessible). We also mark object as accessible if ksize was called for this object. There is some places in kernel where ksize function is called to inquire size of really allocated area. Such callers could validly access whole allocated memory, so it should be marked as accessible. Code in slub.c and slab_common.c files could validly access to object's metadata, so instrumentation for this files are disabled. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 01:39:42 +03:00
#define KASAN_FREE_PAGE 0xFF /* page was freed */
#define KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE 0xFE /* redzone for kmalloc_large allocations */
#define KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE 0xFC /* redzone inside slub object */
#define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE 0xFB /* object was freed (kmem_cache_free/kfree) */
kasan: record and print the free track Move free track from kasan_alloc_meta to kasan_free_meta in order to make struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta size are both 16 bytes. It is a good size because it is the minimal redzone size and a good number of alignment. For free track, we make some modifications as shown below: 1) Remove the free_track from struct kasan_alloc_meta. 2) Add the free_track into struct kasan_free_meta. 3) Add a macro KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK in order to check whether it can print free stack in KASAN report. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162440.23887-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Co-developed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601051022.1230-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 09:24:39 +03:00
#define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK 0xFA /* object was freed and has free track set */
#else
#define KASAN_FREE_PAGE KASAN_TAG_INVALID
#define KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE KASAN_TAG_INVALID
#define KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE KASAN_TAG_INVALID
#define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE KASAN_TAG_INVALID
kasan: record and print the free track Move free track from kasan_alloc_meta to kasan_free_meta in order to make struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta size are both 16 bytes. It is a good size because it is the minimal redzone size and a good number of alignment. For free track, we make some modifications as shown below: 1) Remove the free_track from struct kasan_alloc_meta. 2) Add the free_track into struct kasan_free_meta. 3) Add a macro KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK in order to check whether it can print free stack in KASAN report. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162440.23887-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Co-developed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601051022.1230-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 09:24:39 +03:00
#define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK KASAN_TAG_INVALID
#endif
kasan: record and print the free track Move free track from kasan_alloc_meta to kasan_free_meta in order to make struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta size are both 16 bytes. It is a good size because it is the minimal redzone size and a good number of alignment. For free track, we make some modifications as shown below: 1) Remove the free_track from struct kasan_alloc_meta. 2) Add the free_track into struct kasan_free_meta. 3) Add a macro KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK in order to check whether it can print free stack in KASAN report. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162440.23887-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Co-developed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601051022.1230-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 09:24:39 +03:00
#define KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE 0xF9 /* redzone for global variable */
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID 0xF8 /* unallocated space in vmapped page */
mm: slub: add kernel address sanitizer support for slub allocator With this patch kasan will be able to catch bugs in memory allocated by slub. Initially all objects in newly allocated slab page, marked as redzone. Later, when allocation of slub object happens, requested by caller number of bytes marked as accessible, and the rest of the object (including slub's metadata) marked as redzone (inaccessible). We also mark object as accessible if ksize was called for this object. There is some places in kernel where ksize function is called to inquire size of really allocated area. Such callers could validly access whole allocated memory, so it should be marked as accessible. Code in slub.c and slab_common.c files could validly access to object's metadata, so instrumentation for this files are disabled. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 01:39:42 +03:00
/*
* Stack redzone shadow values
* (Those are compiler's ABI, don't change them)
*/
#define KASAN_STACK_LEFT 0xF1
#define KASAN_STACK_MID 0xF2
#define KASAN_STACK_RIGHT 0xF3
#define KASAN_STACK_PARTIAL 0xF4
/*
* alloca redzone shadow values
*/
#define KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT 0xCA
#define KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT 0xCB
#define KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE 32
/*
* Stack frame marker (compiler ABI).
*/
#define KASAN_CURRENT_STACK_FRAME_MAGIC 0x41B58AB3
kasan: enable instrumentation of global variables This feature let us to detect accesses out of bounds of global variables. This will work as for globals in kernel image, so for globals in modules. Currently this won't work for symbols in user-specified sections (e.g. __init, __read_mostly, ...) The idea of this is simple. Compiler increases each global variable by redzone size and add constructors invoking __asan_register_globals() function. Information about global variable (address, size, size with redzone ...) passed to __asan_register_globals() so we could poison variable's redzone. This patch also forces module_alloc() to return 8*PAGE_SIZE aligned address making shadow memory handling ( kasan_module_alloc()/kasan_module_free() ) more simple. Such alignment guarantees that each shadow page backing modules address space correspond to only one module_alloc() allocation. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 01:40:17 +03:00
/* Don't break randconfig/all*config builds */
#ifndef KASAN_ABI_VERSION
#define KASAN_ABI_VERSION 1
#endif
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and out-of-bounds bugs. KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access, therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan instrumentation of globals. This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1]. Basic idea: The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to check the shadow memory on each memory access. Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address. Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address: unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr) { return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET; } where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3. So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory. The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7) means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler. Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error printed. Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov: "We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan), ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing, running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000 scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and lots of others): [2] [3] [4]. The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers. We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer (it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs. Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5]. We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also people from Samsung and Oracle have found some. [...] As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we finish all tuning). I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads. Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are relatively easy to port." Comparison with other debugging features: ======================================== KMEMCHECK: - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of uninitialized memory reads. Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck: $ netperf -l 30 MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET Recv Send Send Socket Socket Message Elapsed Size Size Size Time Throughput bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72 kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54 kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39 kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23 - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation. DEBUG_PAGEALLOC: - KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page granularity level, so it able to find more bugs. SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones): - SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan. - SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads, KASan able to detect both reads and writes. - In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact place of first bad read/write. [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel [2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies Based on work by Andrey Konovalov. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 01:39:17 +03:00
struct kasan_access_info {
const void *access_addr;
const void *first_bad_addr;
size_t access_size;
bool is_write;
unsigned long ip;
};
kasan: enable instrumentation of global variables This feature let us to detect accesses out of bounds of global variables. This will work as for globals in kernel image, so for globals in modules. Currently this won't work for symbols in user-specified sections (e.g. __init, __read_mostly, ...) The idea of this is simple. Compiler increases each global variable by redzone size and add constructors invoking __asan_register_globals() function. Information about global variable (address, size, size with redzone ...) passed to __asan_register_globals() so we could poison variable's redzone. This patch also forces module_alloc() to return 8*PAGE_SIZE aligned address making shadow memory handling ( kasan_module_alloc()/kasan_module_free() ) more simple. Such alignment guarantees that each shadow page backing modules address space correspond to only one module_alloc() allocation. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 01:40:17 +03:00
/* The layout of struct dictated by compiler */
struct kasan_source_location {
const char *filename;
int line_no;
int column_no;
};
/* The layout of struct dictated by compiler */
struct kasan_global {
const void *beg; /* Address of the beginning of the global variable. */
size_t size; /* Size of the global variable. */
size_t size_with_redzone; /* Size of the variable + size of the red zone. 32 bytes aligned */
const void *name;
const void *module_name; /* Name of the module where the global variable is declared. */
unsigned long has_dynamic_init; /* This needed for C++ */
#if KASAN_ABI_VERSION >= 4
struct kasan_source_location *location;
#endif
#if KASAN_ABI_VERSION >= 5
char *odr_indicator;
#endif
kasan: enable instrumentation of global variables This feature let us to detect accesses out of bounds of global variables. This will work as for globals in kernel image, so for globals in modules. Currently this won't work for symbols in user-specified sections (e.g. __init, __read_mostly, ...) The idea of this is simple. Compiler increases each global variable by redzone size and add constructors invoking __asan_register_globals() function. Information about global variable (address, size, size with redzone ...) passed to __asan_register_globals() so we could poison variable's redzone. This patch also forces module_alloc() to return 8*PAGE_SIZE aligned address making shadow memory handling ( kasan_module_alloc()/kasan_module_free() ) more simple. Such alignment guarantees that each shadow page backing modules address space correspond to only one module_alloc() allocation. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 01:40:17 +03:00
};
/**
* Structures to keep alloc and free tracks *
*/
mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB Implement the stack depot and provide CONFIG_STACKDEPOT. Stack depot will allow KASAN store allocation/deallocation stack traces for memory chunks. The stack traces are stored in a hash table and referenced by handles which reside in the kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta structures in the allocated memory chunks. IRQ stack traces are cut below the IRQ entry point to avoid unnecessary duplication. Right now stackdepot support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Once KASAN features in SLAB are on par with those in SLUB we can switch SLUB to stackdepot as well, thus removing the dependency on SLUB stack bookkeeping, which wastes a lot of memory. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: stack depots" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. Joonsoo has said that he plans to reuse the stackdepot code for the mm/page_owner.c debugging facility. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depot_stack_handle/depot_stack_handle_t] [aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: comment style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-26 00:22:08 +03:00
#define KASAN_STACK_DEPTH 64
struct kasan_track {
mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB Implement the stack depot and provide CONFIG_STACKDEPOT. Stack depot will allow KASAN store allocation/deallocation stack traces for memory chunks. The stack traces are stored in a hash table and referenced by handles which reside in the kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta structures in the allocated memory chunks. IRQ stack traces are cut below the IRQ entry point to avoid unnecessary duplication. Right now stackdepot support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Once KASAN features in SLAB are on par with those in SLUB we can switch SLUB to stackdepot as well, thus removing the dependency on SLUB stack bookkeeping, which wastes a lot of memory. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: stack depots" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. Joonsoo has said that he plans to reuse the stackdepot code for the mm/page_owner.c debugging facility. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depot_stack_handle/depot_stack_handle_t] [aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: comment style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-26 00:22:08 +03:00
u32 pid;
depot_stack_handle_t stack;
};
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
#define KASAN_NR_FREE_STACKS 5
#else
#define KASAN_NR_FREE_STACKS 1
#endif
struct kasan_alloc_meta {
struct kasan_track alloc_track;
rcu: kasan: record and print call_rcu() call stack Patch series "kasan: memorize and print call_rcu stack", v8. This patchset improves KASAN reports by making them to have call_rcu() call stack information. It is useful for programmers to solve use-after-free or double-free memory issue. The KASAN report was as follows(cleaned up slightly): BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kasan_rcu_reclaim+0x58/0x60 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x24/0x38 kasan_set_free_info+0x18/0x20 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x170 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 kfree+0x98/0x270 kasan_rcu_reclaim+0x1c/0x60 Last call_rcu(): kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbc/0xd0 call_rcu+0x8c/0x580 kasan_rcu_uaf+0xf4/0xf8 Generic KASAN will record the last two call_rcu() call stacks and print up to 2 call_rcu() call stacks in KASAN report. it is only suitable for generic KASAN. This feature considers the size of struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta, we try to optimize the structure layout and size, lets it get better memory consumption. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [2]https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/kasan-dev/better$20stack$20traces$20for$20rcu%7Csort:date/kasan-dev/KQsjT_88hDE/7rNUZprRBgAJ This patch (of 4): This feature will record the last two call_rcu() call stacks and prints up to 2 call_rcu() call stacks in KASAN report. When call_rcu() is called, we store the call_rcu() call stack into slub alloc meta-data, so that the KASAN report can print rcu stack. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [2]https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/kasan-dev/better$20stack$20traces$20for$20rcu%7Csort:date/kasan-dev/KQsjT_88hDE/7rNUZprRBgAJ [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162401.23816-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162123.23713-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601050847.1096-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601050927.1153-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 09:24:35 +03:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
/*
* call_rcu() call stack is stored into struct kasan_alloc_meta.
* The free stack is stored into struct kasan_free_meta.
*/
depot_stack_handle_t aux_stack[2];
kasan: record and print the free track Move free track from kasan_alloc_meta to kasan_free_meta in order to make struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta size are both 16 bytes. It is a good size because it is the minimal redzone size and a good number of alignment. For free track, we make some modifications as shown below: 1) Remove the free_track from struct kasan_alloc_meta. 2) Add the free_track into struct kasan_free_meta. 3) Add a macro KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK in order to check whether it can print free stack in KASAN report. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162440.23887-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Co-developed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601051022.1230-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 09:24:39 +03:00
#else
struct kasan_track free_track[KASAN_NR_FREE_STACKS];
kasan: record and print the free track Move free track from kasan_alloc_meta to kasan_free_meta in order to make struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta size are both 16 bytes. It is a good size because it is the minimal redzone size and a good number of alignment. For free track, we make some modifications as shown below: 1) Remove the free_track from struct kasan_alloc_meta. 2) Add the free_track into struct kasan_free_meta. 3) Add a macro KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK in order to check whether it can print free stack in KASAN report. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162440.23887-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Co-developed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601051022.1230-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 09:24:39 +03:00
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
u8 free_pointer_tag[KASAN_NR_FREE_STACKS];
u8 free_track_idx;
#endif
};
mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free errors. When the object is freed, its state changes from KASAN_STATE_ALLOC to KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE. The object is poisoned and put into quarantine instead of being returned to the allocator, therefore every subsequent access to that object triggers a KASAN error, and the error handler is able to say where the object has been allocated and deallocated. When it's time for the object to leave quarantine, its state becomes KASAN_STATE_FREE and it's returned to the allocator. From now on the allocator may reuse it for another allocation. Before that happens, it's still possible to detect a use-after free on that object (it retains the allocation/deallocation stacks). When the allocator reuses this object, the shadow is unpoisoned and old allocation/deallocation stacks are wiped. Therefore a use of this object, even an incorrect one, won't trigger ASan warning. Without the quarantine, it's not guaranteed that the objects aren't reused immediately, that's why the probability of catching a use-after-free is lower than with quarantine in place. Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free errors. Freed objects are first added to per-cpu quarantine queues. When a cache is destroyed or memory shrinking is requested, the objects are moved into the global quarantine queue. Whenever a kmalloc call allows memory reclaiming, the oldest objects are popped out of the global queue until the total size of objects in quarantine is less than 3/4 of the maximum quarantine size (which is a fraction of installed physical memory). As long as an object remains in the quarantine, KASAN is able to report accesses to it, so the chance of reporting a use-after-free is increased. Once the object leaves quarantine, the allocator may reuse it, in which case the object is unpoisoned and KASAN can't detect incorrect accesses to it. Right now quarantine support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Unification of KASAN features in SLAB and SLUB will be done later. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: quarantine" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. A number of improvements have been suggested by Andrey Ryabinin. [glider@google.com: v9] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462987130-144092-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-21 02:59:11 +03:00
struct qlist_node {
struct qlist_node *next;
};
struct kasan_free_meta {
mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free errors. When the object is freed, its state changes from KASAN_STATE_ALLOC to KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE. The object is poisoned and put into quarantine instead of being returned to the allocator, therefore every subsequent access to that object triggers a KASAN error, and the error handler is able to say where the object has been allocated and deallocated. When it's time for the object to leave quarantine, its state becomes KASAN_STATE_FREE and it's returned to the allocator. From now on the allocator may reuse it for another allocation. Before that happens, it's still possible to detect a use-after free on that object (it retains the allocation/deallocation stacks). When the allocator reuses this object, the shadow is unpoisoned and old allocation/deallocation stacks are wiped. Therefore a use of this object, even an incorrect one, won't trigger ASan warning. Without the quarantine, it's not guaranteed that the objects aren't reused immediately, that's why the probability of catching a use-after-free is lower than with quarantine in place. Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free errors. Freed objects are first added to per-cpu quarantine queues. When a cache is destroyed or memory shrinking is requested, the objects are moved into the global quarantine queue. Whenever a kmalloc call allows memory reclaiming, the oldest objects are popped out of the global queue until the total size of objects in quarantine is less than 3/4 of the maximum quarantine size (which is a fraction of installed physical memory). As long as an object remains in the quarantine, KASAN is able to report accesses to it, so the chance of reporting a use-after-free is increased. Once the object leaves quarantine, the allocator may reuse it, in which case the object is unpoisoned and KASAN can't detect incorrect accesses to it. Right now quarantine support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Unification of KASAN features in SLAB and SLUB will be done later. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: quarantine" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. A number of improvements have been suggested by Andrey Ryabinin. [glider@google.com: v9] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462987130-144092-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-21 02:59:11 +03:00
/* This field is used while the object is in the quarantine.
* Otherwise it might be used for the allocator freelist.
*/
struct qlist_node quarantine_link;
kasan: record and print the free track Move free track from kasan_alloc_meta to kasan_free_meta in order to make struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta size are both 16 bytes. It is a good size because it is the minimal redzone size and a good number of alignment. For free track, we make some modifications as shown below: 1) Remove the free_track from struct kasan_alloc_meta. 2) Add the free_track into struct kasan_free_meta. 3) Add a macro KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK in order to check whether it can print free stack in KASAN report. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162440.23887-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Co-developed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601051022.1230-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 09:24:39 +03:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
struct kasan_track free_track;
#endif
};
struct kasan_alloc_meta *get_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
const void *object);
struct kasan_free_meta *get_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
const void *object);
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and out-of-bounds bugs. KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access, therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan instrumentation of globals. This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1]. Basic idea: The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to check the shadow memory on each memory access. Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address. Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address: unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr) { return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET; } where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3. So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory. The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7) means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler. Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error printed. Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov: "We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan), ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing, running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000 scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and lots of others): [2] [3] [4]. The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers. We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer (it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs. Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5]. We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also people from Samsung and Oracle have found some. [...] As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we finish all tuning). I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads. Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are relatively easy to port." Comparison with other debugging features: ======================================== KMEMCHECK: - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of uninitialized memory reads. Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck: $ netperf -l 30 MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET Recv Send Send Socket Socket Message Elapsed Size Size Size Time Throughput bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72 kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54 kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39 kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23 - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation. DEBUG_PAGEALLOC: - KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page granularity level, so it able to find more bugs. SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones): - SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan. - SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads, KASan able to detect both reads and writes. - In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact place of first bad read/write. [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel [2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies Based on work by Andrey Konovalov. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 01:39:17 +03:00
static inline const void *kasan_shadow_to_mem(const void *shadow_addr)
{
return (void *)(((unsigned long)shadow_addr - KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
<< KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
}
static inline bool addr_has_shadow(const void *addr)
{
return (addr >= kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START));
}
void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
/**
* check_memory_region - Check memory region, and report if invalid access.
* @addr: the accessed address
* @size: the accessed size
* @write: true if access is a write access
* @ret_ip: return address
* @return: true if access was valid, false if invalid
*/
bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
unsigned long ret_ip);
void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info);
kasan: detect negative size in memory operation function Patch series "fix the missing underflow in memory operation function", v4. The patchset helps to produce a KASAN report when size is negative in memory operation functions. It is helpful for programmer to solve an undefined behavior issue. Patch 1 based on Dmitry's review and suggestion, patch 2 is a test in order to verify the patch 1. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341 [2]https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20190927034338.15813-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com/ This patch (of 2): KASAN missed detecting size is a negative number in memset(), memcpy(), and memmove(), it will cause out-of-bounds bug. So needs to be detected by KASAN. If size is a negative number, then it has a reason to be defined as out-of-bounds bug type. Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds. KASAN report is shown below: BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task cat/72 CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0x10c/0x164 print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378 __kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0 kasan_report+0xc/0x18 check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0 memmove+0x34/0x88 kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341 [cai@lca.pw: fix -Wdeclaration-after-statement warn] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1583509030-27939-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw [peterz@infradead.org: fix objtool warning] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305095436.GV2596@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191112065302.7015-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-02 07:09:37 +03:00
bool kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size,
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and out-of-bounds bugs. KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access, therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan instrumentation of globals. This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1]. Basic idea: The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to check the shadow memory on each memory access. Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address. Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address: unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr) { return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET; } where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3. So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory. The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7) means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler. Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error printed. Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov: "We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan), ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing, running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000 scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and lots of others): [2] [3] [4]. The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers. We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer (it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs. Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5]. We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also people from Samsung and Oracle have found some. [...] As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we finish all tuning). I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads. Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are relatively easy to port." Comparison with other debugging features: ======================================== KMEMCHECK: - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of uninitialized memory reads. Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck: $ netperf -l 30 MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET Recv Send Send Socket Socket Message Elapsed Size Size Size Time Throughput bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72 kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54 kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39 kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23 - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation. DEBUG_PAGEALLOC: - KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page granularity level, so it able to find more bugs. SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones): - SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan. - SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads, KASan able to detect both reads and writes. - In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact place of first bad read/write. [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel [2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies Based on work by Andrey Konovalov. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 01:39:17 +03:00
bool is_write, unsigned long ip);
void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *object, unsigned long ip);
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and out-of-bounds bugs. KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access, therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan instrumentation of globals. This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1]. Basic idea: The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to check the shadow memory on each memory access. Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address. Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address: unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr) { return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET; } where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3. So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory. The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7) means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler. Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error printed. Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov: "We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan), ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing, running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000 scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and lots of others): [2] [3] [4]. The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers. We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer (it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs. Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5]. We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also people from Samsung and Oracle have found some. [...] As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we finish all tuning). I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads. Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are relatively easy to port." Comparison with other debugging features: ======================================== KMEMCHECK: - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of uninitialized memory reads. Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck: $ netperf -l 30 MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET Recv Send Send Socket Socket Message Elapsed Size Size Size Time Throughput bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72 kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54 kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39 kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23 - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation. DEBUG_PAGEALLOC: - KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page granularity level, so it able to find more bugs. SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones): - SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan. - SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads, KASan able to detect both reads and writes. - In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact place of first bad read/write. [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel [2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies Based on work by Andrey Konovalov. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 01:39:17 +03:00
struct page *kasan_addr_to_page(const void *addr);
rcu: kasan: record and print call_rcu() call stack Patch series "kasan: memorize and print call_rcu stack", v8. This patchset improves KASAN reports by making them to have call_rcu() call stack information. It is useful for programmers to solve use-after-free or double-free memory issue. The KASAN report was as follows(cleaned up slightly): BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kasan_rcu_reclaim+0x58/0x60 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x24/0x38 kasan_set_free_info+0x18/0x20 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x170 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 kfree+0x98/0x270 kasan_rcu_reclaim+0x1c/0x60 Last call_rcu(): kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbc/0xd0 call_rcu+0x8c/0x580 kasan_rcu_uaf+0xf4/0xf8 Generic KASAN will record the last two call_rcu() call stacks and print up to 2 call_rcu() call stacks in KASAN report. it is only suitable for generic KASAN. This feature considers the size of struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta, we try to optimize the structure layout and size, lets it get better memory consumption. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [2]https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/kasan-dev/better$20stack$20traces$20for$20rcu%7Csort:date/kasan-dev/KQsjT_88hDE/7rNUZprRBgAJ This patch (of 4): This feature will record the last two call_rcu() call stacks and prints up to 2 call_rcu() call stacks in KASAN report. When call_rcu() is called, we store the call_rcu() call stack into slub alloc meta-data, so that the KASAN report can print rcu stack. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [2]https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/kasan-dev/better$20stack$20traces$20for$20rcu%7Csort:date/kasan-dev/KQsjT_88hDE/7rNUZprRBgAJ [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162401.23816-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162123.23713-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601050847.1096-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601050927.1153-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 09:24:35 +03:00
depot_stack_handle_t kasan_save_stack(gfp_t flags);
kasan: record and print the free track Move free track from kasan_alloc_meta to kasan_free_meta in order to make struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta size are both 16 bytes. It is a good size because it is the minimal redzone size and a good number of alignment. For free track, we make some modifications as shown below: 1) Remove the free_track from struct kasan_alloc_meta. 2) Add the free_track into struct kasan_free_meta. 3) Add a macro KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK in order to check whether it can print free stack in KASAN report. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162440.23887-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Co-developed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601051022.1230-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 09:24:39 +03:00
void kasan_set_track(struct kasan_track *track, gfp_t flags);
void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, u8 tag);
struct kasan_track *kasan_get_free_track(struct kmem_cache *cache,
void *object, u8 tag);
rcu: kasan: record and print call_rcu() call stack Patch series "kasan: memorize and print call_rcu stack", v8. This patchset improves KASAN reports by making them to have call_rcu() call stack information. It is useful for programmers to solve use-after-free or double-free memory issue. The KASAN report was as follows(cleaned up slightly): BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kasan_rcu_reclaim+0x58/0x60 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x24/0x38 kasan_set_free_info+0x18/0x20 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x170 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 kfree+0x98/0x270 kasan_rcu_reclaim+0x1c/0x60 Last call_rcu(): kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbc/0xd0 call_rcu+0x8c/0x580 kasan_rcu_uaf+0xf4/0xf8 Generic KASAN will record the last two call_rcu() call stacks and print up to 2 call_rcu() call stacks in KASAN report. it is only suitable for generic KASAN. This feature considers the size of struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta, we try to optimize the structure layout and size, lets it get better memory consumption. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [2]https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/kasan-dev/better$20stack$20traces$20for$20rcu%7Csort:date/kasan-dev/KQsjT_88hDE/7rNUZprRBgAJ This patch (of 4): This feature will record the last two call_rcu() call stacks and prints up to 2 call_rcu() call stacks in KASAN report. When call_rcu() is called, we store the call_rcu() call stack into slub alloc meta-data, so that the KASAN report can print rcu stack. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [2]https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/kasan-dev/better$20stack$20traces$20for$20rcu%7Csort:date/kasan-dev/KQsjT_88hDE/7rNUZprRBgAJ [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162401.23816-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162123.23713-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601050847.1096-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601050927.1153-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 09:24:35 +03:00
kasan: add CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC and CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS This commit splits the current CONFIG_KASAN config option into two: 1. CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC, that enables the generic KASAN mode (the one that exists now); 2. CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS, that enables the software tag-based KASAN mode. The name CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS is chosen as in the future we will have another hardware tag-based KASAN mode, that will rely on hardware memory tagging support in arm64. With CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS enabled, compiler options are changed to instrument kernel files with -fsantize=kernel-hwaddress (except the ones for which KASAN_SANITIZE := n is set). Both CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC and CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS support both CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE instrumentation modes. This commit also adds empty placeholder (for now) implementation of tag-based KASAN specific hooks inserted by the compiler and adjusts common hooks implementation. While this commit adds the CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS config option, this option is not selectable, as it depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS, which we will enable once all the infrastracture code has been added. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2550106eb8a68b10fefbabce820910b115aa853.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 11:29:53 +03:00
#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && \
(defined(CONFIG_SLAB) || defined(CONFIG_SLUB))
mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free errors. When the object is freed, its state changes from KASAN_STATE_ALLOC to KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE. The object is poisoned and put into quarantine instead of being returned to the allocator, therefore every subsequent access to that object triggers a KASAN error, and the error handler is able to say where the object has been allocated and deallocated. When it's time for the object to leave quarantine, its state becomes KASAN_STATE_FREE and it's returned to the allocator. From now on the allocator may reuse it for another allocation. Before that happens, it's still possible to detect a use-after free on that object (it retains the allocation/deallocation stacks). When the allocator reuses this object, the shadow is unpoisoned and old allocation/deallocation stacks are wiped. Therefore a use of this object, even an incorrect one, won't trigger ASan warning. Without the quarantine, it's not guaranteed that the objects aren't reused immediately, that's why the probability of catching a use-after-free is lower than with quarantine in place. Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free errors. Freed objects are first added to per-cpu quarantine queues. When a cache is destroyed or memory shrinking is requested, the objects are moved into the global quarantine queue. Whenever a kmalloc call allows memory reclaiming, the oldest objects are popped out of the global queue until the total size of objects in quarantine is less than 3/4 of the maximum quarantine size (which is a fraction of installed physical memory). As long as an object remains in the quarantine, KASAN is able to report accesses to it, so the chance of reporting a use-after-free is increased. Once the object leaves quarantine, the allocator may reuse it, in which case the object is unpoisoned and KASAN can't detect incorrect accesses to it. Right now quarantine support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Unification of KASAN features in SLAB and SLUB will be done later. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: quarantine" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. A number of improvements have been suggested by Andrey Ryabinin. [glider@google.com: v9] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462987130-144092-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-21 02:59:11 +03:00
void quarantine_put(struct kasan_free_meta *info, struct kmem_cache *cache);
void quarantine_reduce(void);
void quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache);
#else
static inline void quarantine_put(struct kasan_free_meta *info,
struct kmem_cache *cache) { }
static inline void quarantine_reduce(void) { }
static inline void quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache) { }
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS
void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr);
u8 random_tag(void);
#else
static inline void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr) { }
static inline u8 random_tag(void)
{
return 0;
}
#endif
#ifndef arch_kasan_set_tag
static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
{
return addr;
}
#endif
#ifndef arch_kasan_reset_tag
#define arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr) ((void *)(addr))
#endif
#ifndef arch_kasan_get_tag
#define arch_kasan_get_tag(addr) 0
#endif
#define set_tag(addr, tag) ((void *)arch_kasan_set_tag((addr), (tag)))
#define reset_tag(addr) ((void *)arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr))
#define get_tag(addr) arch_kasan_get_tag(addr)
/*
* Exported functions for interfaces called from assembly or from generated
* code. Declarations here to avoid warning about missing declarations.
*/
asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark);
void __asan_register_globals(struct kasan_global *globals, size_t size);
void __asan_unregister_globals(struct kasan_global *globals, size_t size);
void __asan_handle_no_return(void);
void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_t size);
void __asan_allocas_unpoison(const void *stack_top, const void *stack_bottom);
void __asan_load1(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_store1(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_load2(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_store2(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_load4(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_store4(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_load8(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_store8(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_load16(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_store16(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_loadN(unsigned long addr, size_t size);
void __asan_storeN(unsigned long addr, size_t size);
void __asan_load1_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_store1_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_load2_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_store2_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_load4_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_store4_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_load8_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_store8_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_load16_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_store16_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_loadN_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size);
void __asan_storeN_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size);
void __asan_report_load1_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_report_store1_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_report_load2_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_report_store2_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_report_load4_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_report_store4_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_report_load8_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_report_store8_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_report_load16_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_report_store16_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __asan_report_load_n_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size);
void __asan_report_store_n_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size);
void __asan_set_shadow_00(const void *addr, size_t size);
void __asan_set_shadow_f1(const void *addr, size_t size);
void __asan_set_shadow_f2(const void *addr, size_t size);
void __asan_set_shadow_f3(const void *addr, size_t size);
void __asan_set_shadow_f5(const void *addr, size_t size);
void __asan_set_shadow_f8(const void *addr, size_t size);
void __hwasan_load1_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __hwasan_store1_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __hwasan_load2_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __hwasan_store2_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __hwasan_load4_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __hwasan_store4_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __hwasan_load8_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __hwasan_store8_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __hwasan_load16_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __hwasan_store16_noabort(unsigned long addr);
void __hwasan_loadN_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size);
void __hwasan_storeN_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size);
void __hwasan_tag_memory(unsigned long addr, u8 tag, unsigned long size);
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and out-of-bounds bugs. KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access, therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan instrumentation of globals. This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1]. Basic idea: The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to check the shadow memory on each memory access. Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address. Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address: unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr) { return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET; } where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3. So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory. The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7) means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler. Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error printed. Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov: "We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan), ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing, running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000 scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and lots of others): [2] [3] [4]. The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers. We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer (it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs. Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5]. We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also people from Samsung and Oracle have found some. [...] As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we finish all tuning). I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads. Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are relatively easy to port." Comparison with other debugging features: ======================================== KMEMCHECK: - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of uninitialized memory reads. Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck: $ netperf -l 30 MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET Recv Send Send Socket Socket Message Elapsed Size Size Size Time Throughput bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72 kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54 kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39 kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23 - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation. DEBUG_PAGEALLOC: - KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page granularity level, so it able to find more bugs. SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones): - SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan. - SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads, KASan able to detect both reads and writes. - In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact place of first bad read/write. [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel [2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies Based on work by Andrey Konovalov. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 01:39:17 +03:00
#endif