WSL2-Linux-Kernel/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c

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/*
* linux/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
*/
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/shm.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <asm/cachetype.h>
#define COLOUR_ALIGN(addr,pgoff) \
((((addr)+SHMLBA-1)&~(SHMLBA-1)) + \
(((pgoff)<<PAGE_SHIFT) & (SHMLBA-1)))
/* gap between mmap and stack */
#define MIN_GAP (128*1024*1024UL)
#define MAX_GAP ((TASK_SIZE)/6*5)
static int mmap_is_legacy(void)
{
if (current->personality & ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT)
return 1;
if (rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK) == RLIM_INFINITY)
return 1;
return sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
}
static unsigned long mmap_base(unsigned long rnd)
{
unsigned long gap = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);
if (gap < MIN_GAP)
gap = MIN_GAP;
else if (gap > MAX_GAP)
gap = MAX_GAP;
return PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE - gap - rnd);
}
/*
* We need to ensure that shared mappings are correctly aligned to
* avoid aliasing issues with VIPT caches. We need to ensure that
* a specific page of an object is always mapped at a multiple of
* SHMLBA bytes.
*
* We unconditionally provide this function for all cases, however
* in the VIVT case, we optimise out the alignment rules.
*/
unsigned long
arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int do_align = 0;
int aliasing = cache_is_vipt_aliasing();
struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
/*
* We only need to do colour alignment if either the I or D
* caches alias.
*/
if (aliasing)
do_align = filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED);
/*
* We enforce the MAP_FIXED case.
*/
if (flags & MAP_FIXED) {
if (aliasing && flags & MAP_SHARED &&
(addr - (pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT)) & (SHMLBA - 1))
return -EINVAL;
return addr;
}
if (len > TASK_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
if (addr) {
if (do_align)
addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
else
addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (TASK_SIZE - len >= addr &&
(!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start))
return addr;
}
info.flags = 0;
info.length = len;
info.low_limit = mm->mmap_base;
info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE;
info.align_mask = do_align ? (PAGE_MASK & (SHMLBA - 1)) : 0;
info.align_offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
return vm_unmapped_area(&info);
}
unsigned long
arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
const unsigned long len, const unsigned long pgoff,
const unsigned long flags)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
unsigned long addr = addr0;
int do_align = 0;
int aliasing = cache_is_vipt_aliasing();
struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
/*
* We only need to do colour alignment if either the I or D
* caches alias.
*/
if (aliasing)
do_align = filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED);
/* requested length too big for entire address space */
if (len > TASK_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
if (flags & MAP_FIXED) {
if (aliasing && flags & MAP_SHARED &&
(addr - (pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT)) & (SHMLBA - 1))
return -EINVAL;
return addr;
}
/* requesting a specific address */
if (addr) {
if (do_align)
addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
else
addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (TASK_SIZE - len >= addr &&
(!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start))
return addr;
}
info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN;
info.length = len;
info.low_limit = FIRST_USER_ADDRESS;
info.high_limit = mm->mmap_base;
info.align_mask = do_align ? (PAGE_MASK & (SHMLBA - 1)) : 0;
info.align_offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
/*
* A failed mmap() very likely causes application failure,
* so fall back to the bottom-up function here. This scenario
* can happen with large stack limits and large mmap()
* allocations.
*/
if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK) {
VM_BUG_ON(addr != -ENOMEM);
info.flags = 0;
info.low_limit = mm->mmap_base;
info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE;
addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
}
return addr;
}
mm: expose arch_mmap_rnd when available When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location, a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base. In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE for describing this feature on architectures that support it (which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390 already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 01:48:00 +03:00
unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
arm: factor out mmap ASLR into mmap_rnd To address the "offset2lib" ASLR weakness[1], this separates ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR, as already done on s390. The architectures that are already randomizing mmap (arm, arm64, mips, powerpc, s390, and x86), have their various forms of arch_mmap_rnd() made available via the new CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE. For these architectures, arch_randomize_brk() is collapsed as well. This is an alternative to the solutions in: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/2/23/442 I've been able to test x86 and arm, and the buildbot (so far) seems happy with building the rest. [1] http://cybersecurity.upv.es/attacks/offset2lib/offset2lib.html This patch (of 10): In preparation for splitting out ET_DYN ASLR, this moves the ASLR calculations for mmap on ARM into a separate routine, similar to x86. This also removes the redundant check of personality (PF_RANDOMIZE is already set before calling arch_pick_mmap_layout). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 01:47:41 +03:00
{
unsigned long rnd;
/* 8 bits of randomness in 20 address space bits */
rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1 << 8);
return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
unsigned long random_factor = 0UL;
arm: factor out mmap ASLR into mmap_rnd To address the "offset2lib" ASLR weakness[1], this separates ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR, as already done on s390. The architectures that are already randomizing mmap (arm, arm64, mips, powerpc, s390, and x86), have their various forms of arch_mmap_rnd() made available via the new CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE. For these architectures, arch_randomize_brk() is collapsed as well. This is an alternative to the solutions in: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/2/23/442 I've been able to test x86 and arm, and the buildbot (so far) seems happy with building the rest. [1] http://cybersecurity.upv.es/attacks/offset2lib/offset2lib.html This patch (of 10): In preparation for splitting out ET_DYN ASLR, this moves the ASLR calculations for mmap on ARM into a separate routine, similar to x86. This also removes the redundant check of personality (PF_RANDOMIZE is already set before calling arch_pick_mmap_layout). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 01:47:41 +03:00
if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
mm: expose arch_mmap_rnd when available When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location, a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base. In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE for describing this feature on architectures that support it (which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390 already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 01:48:00 +03:00
random_factor = arch_mmap_rnd();
if (mmap_is_legacy()) {
mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + random_factor;
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
} else {
mm->mmap_base = mmap_base(random_factor);
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
}
}
/*
* You really shouldn't be using read() or write() on /dev/mem. This
* might go away in the future.
*/
int valid_phys_addr_range(phys_addr_t addr, size_t size)
{
if (addr < PHYS_OFFSET)
return 0;
if (addr + size > __pa(high_memory - 1) + 1)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Do not allow /dev/mem mappings beyond the supported physical range.
*/
int valid_mmap_phys_addr_range(unsigned long pfn, size_t size)
{
return (pfn + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT)) <= (1 + (PHYS_MASK >> PAGE_SHIFT));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM
#include <linux/ioport.h>
/*
* devmem_is_allowed() checks to see if /dev/mem access to a certain
* address is valid. The argument is a physical page number.
* We mimic x86 here by disallowing access to system RAM as well as
* device-exclusive MMIO regions. This effectively disable read()/write()
* on /dev/mem.
*/
int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long pfn)
{
if (iomem_is_exclusive(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT))
return 0;
if (!page_is_ram(pfn))
return 1;
return 0;
}
#endif