WSL2-Linux-Kernel/net/rose/rose_subr.c

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C
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
*
* Copyright (C) Jonathan Naylor G4KLX (g4klx@g4klx.demon.co.uk)
*/
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/timer.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/sockios.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 11:04:11 +03:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <net/ax25.h>
#include <linux/inet.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/tcp_states.h>
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <net/rose.h>
static int rose_create_facilities(unsigned char *buffer, struct rose_sock *rose);
/*
* This routine purges all of the queues of frames.
*/
void rose_clear_queues(struct sock *sk)
{
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
skb_queue_purge(&rose_sk(sk)->ack_queue);
}
/*
* This routine purges the input queue of those frames that have been
* acknowledged. This replaces the boxes labelled "V(a) <- N(r)" on the
* SDL diagram.
*/
void rose_frames_acked(struct sock *sk, unsigned short nr)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk);
/*
* Remove all the ack-ed frames from the ack queue.
*/
if (rose->va != nr) {
while (skb_peek(&rose->ack_queue) != NULL && rose->va != nr) {
skb = skb_dequeue(&rose->ack_queue);
kfree_skb(skb);
rose->va = (rose->va + 1) % ROSE_MODULUS;
}
}
}
void rose_requeue_frames(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb, *skb_prev = NULL;
/*
* Requeue all the un-ack-ed frames on the output queue to be picked
* up by rose_kick. This arrangement handles the possibility of an
* empty output queue.
*/
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&rose_sk(sk)->ack_queue)) != NULL) {
if (skb_prev == NULL)
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
else
skb_append(skb_prev, skb, &sk->sk_write_queue);
skb_prev = skb;
}
}
/*
* Validate that the value of nr is between va and vs. Return true or
* false for testing.
*/
int rose_validate_nr(struct sock *sk, unsigned short nr)
{
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk);
unsigned short vc = rose->va;
while (vc != rose->vs) {
if (nr == vc) return 1;
vc = (vc + 1) % ROSE_MODULUS;
}
return nr == rose->vs;
}
/*
* This routine is called when the packet layer internally generates a
* control frame.
*/
void rose_write_internal(struct sock *sk, int frametype)
{
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned char *dptr;
unsigned char lci1, lci2;
net: rose: fix a possible stack overflow rose_write_internal() uses a temp buffer of 100 bytes, but a manual inspection showed that given arbitrary input, rose_create_facilities() can fill up to 110 bytes. Lets use a tailroom of 256 bytes for peace of mind, and remove the bounce buffer : we can simply allocate a big enough skb and adjust its length as needed. syzbot report : BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116 Write of size 7 at addr ffff88808b1ffbef by task syz-executor.0/24854 CPU: 0 PID: 24854 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #97 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x38/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:131 memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline] rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116 rose_connect+0x7cb/0x1510 net/rose/af_rose.c:826 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1685 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1696 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1693 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1693 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458079 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f47b8d9dc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458079 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f47b8d9e6d4 R13: 00000000004be4a4 R14: 00000000004ceca8 R15: 00000000ffffffff The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00022c7fc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() raw: 01fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff022c0101 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808b1ffa80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808b1ffb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 03 >ffff88808b1ffb80: f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f3 ^ ffff88808b1ffc00: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808b1ffc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f2 01 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-15 20:41:14 +03:00
int maxfaclen = 0;
int len, faclen;
int reserve;
net: rose: fix a possible stack overflow rose_write_internal() uses a temp buffer of 100 bytes, but a manual inspection showed that given arbitrary input, rose_create_facilities() can fill up to 110 bytes. Lets use a tailroom of 256 bytes for peace of mind, and remove the bounce buffer : we can simply allocate a big enough skb and adjust its length as needed. syzbot report : BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116 Write of size 7 at addr ffff88808b1ffbef by task syz-executor.0/24854 CPU: 0 PID: 24854 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #97 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x38/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:131 memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline] rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116 rose_connect+0x7cb/0x1510 net/rose/af_rose.c:826 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1685 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1696 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1693 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1693 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458079 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f47b8d9dc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458079 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f47b8d9e6d4 R13: 00000000004be4a4 R14: 00000000004ceca8 R15: 00000000ffffffff The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00022c7fc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() raw: 01fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff022c0101 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808b1ffa80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808b1ffb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 03 >ffff88808b1ffb80: f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f3 ^ ffff88808b1ffc00: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808b1ffc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f2 01 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-15 20:41:14 +03:00
reserve = AX25_BPQ_HEADER_LEN + AX25_MAX_HEADER_LEN + 1;
len = ROSE_MIN_LEN;
switch (frametype) {
case ROSE_CALL_REQUEST:
len += 1 + ROSE_ADDR_LEN + ROSE_ADDR_LEN;
net: rose: fix a possible stack overflow rose_write_internal() uses a temp buffer of 100 bytes, but a manual inspection showed that given arbitrary input, rose_create_facilities() can fill up to 110 bytes. Lets use a tailroom of 256 bytes for peace of mind, and remove the bounce buffer : we can simply allocate a big enough skb and adjust its length as needed. syzbot report : BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116 Write of size 7 at addr ffff88808b1ffbef by task syz-executor.0/24854 CPU: 0 PID: 24854 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #97 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x38/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:131 memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline] rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116 rose_connect+0x7cb/0x1510 net/rose/af_rose.c:826 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1685 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1696 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1693 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1693 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458079 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f47b8d9dc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458079 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f47b8d9e6d4 R13: 00000000004be4a4 R14: 00000000004ceca8 R15: 00000000ffffffff The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00022c7fc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() raw: 01fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff022c0101 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808b1ffa80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808b1ffb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 03 >ffff88808b1ffb80: f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f3 ^ ffff88808b1ffc00: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808b1ffc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f2 01 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-15 20:41:14 +03:00
maxfaclen = 256;
break;
case ROSE_CALL_ACCEPTED:
case ROSE_CLEAR_REQUEST:
case ROSE_RESET_REQUEST:
len += 2;
break;
}
net: rose: fix a possible stack overflow rose_write_internal() uses a temp buffer of 100 bytes, but a manual inspection showed that given arbitrary input, rose_create_facilities() can fill up to 110 bytes. Lets use a tailroom of 256 bytes for peace of mind, and remove the bounce buffer : we can simply allocate a big enough skb and adjust its length as needed. syzbot report : BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116 Write of size 7 at addr ffff88808b1ffbef by task syz-executor.0/24854 CPU: 0 PID: 24854 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #97 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x38/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:131 memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline] rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116 rose_connect+0x7cb/0x1510 net/rose/af_rose.c:826 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1685 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1696 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1693 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1693 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458079 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f47b8d9dc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458079 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f47b8d9e6d4 R13: 00000000004be4a4 R14: 00000000004ceca8 R15: 00000000ffffffff The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00022c7fc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() raw: 01fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff022c0101 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808b1ffa80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808b1ffb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 03 >ffff88808b1ffb80: f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f3 ^ ffff88808b1ffc00: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808b1ffc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f2 01 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-15 20:41:14 +03:00
skb = alloc_skb(reserve + len + maxfaclen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return;
/*
* Space for AX.25 header and PID.
*/
net: rose: fix a possible stack overflow rose_write_internal() uses a temp buffer of 100 bytes, but a manual inspection showed that given arbitrary input, rose_create_facilities() can fill up to 110 bytes. Lets use a tailroom of 256 bytes for peace of mind, and remove the bounce buffer : we can simply allocate a big enough skb and adjust its length as needed. syzbot report : BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116 Write of size 7 at addr ffff88808b1ffbef by task syz-executor.0/24854 CPU: 0 PID: 24854 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #97 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x38/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:131 memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline] rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116 rose_connect+0x7cb/0x1510 net/rose/af_rose.c:826 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1685 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1696 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1693 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1693 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458079 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f47b8d9dc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458079 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f47b8d9e6d4 R13: 00000000004be4a4 R14: 00000000004ceca8 R15: 00000000ffffffff The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00022c7fc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() raw: 01fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff022c0101 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808b1ffa80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808b1ffb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 03 >ffff88808b1ffb80: f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f3 ^ ffff88808b1ffc00: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808b1ffc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f2 01 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-15 20:41:14 +03:00
skb_reserve(skb, reserve);
net: rose: fix a possible stack overflow rose_write_internal() uses a temp buffer of 100 bytes, but a manual inspection showed that given arbitrary input, rose_create_facilities() can fill up to 110 bytes. Lets use a tailroom of 256 bytes for peace of mind, and remove the bounce buffer : we can simply allocate a big enough skb and adjust its length as needed. syzbot report : BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116 Write of size 7 at addr ffff88808b1ffbef by task syz-executor.0/24854 CPU: 0 PID: 24854 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #97 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x38/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:131 memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline] rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116 rose_connect+0x7cb/0x1510 net/rose/af_rose.c:826 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1685 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1696 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1693 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1693 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458079 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f47b8d9dc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458079 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f47b8d9e6d4 R13: 00000000004be4a4 R14: 00000000004ceca8 R15: 00000000ffffffff The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00022c7fc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() raw: 01fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff022c0101 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808b1ffa80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808b1ffb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 03 >ffff88808b1ffb80: f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f3 ^ ffff88808b1ffc00: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808b1ffc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f2 01 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-15 20:41:14 +03:00
dptr = skb_put(skb, len);
lci1 = (rose->lci >> 8) & 0x0F;
lci2 = (rose->lci >> 0) & 0xFF;
switch (frametype) {
case ROSE_CALL_REQUEST:
*dptr++ = ROSE_GFI | lci1;
*dptr++ = lci2;
*dptr++ = frametype;
*dptr++ = ROSE_CALL_REQ_ADDR_LEN_VAL;
memcpy(dptr, &rose->dest_addr, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
dptr += ROSE_ADDR_LEN;
memcpy(dptr, &rose->source_addr, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
dptr += ROSE_ADDR_LEN;
net: rose: fix a possible stack overflow rose_write_internal() uses a temp buffer of 100 bytes, but a manual inspection showed that given arbitrary input, rose_create_facilities() can fill up to 110 bytes. Lets use a tailroom of 256 bytes for peace of mind, and remove the bounce buffer : we can simply allocate a big enough skb and adjust its length as needed. syzbot report : BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116 Write of size 7 at addr ffff88808b1ffbef by task syz-executor.0/24854 CPU: 0 PID: 24854 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #97 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x38/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:131 memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline] rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116 rose_connect+0x7cb/0x1510 net/rose/af_rose.c:826 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1685 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1696 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1693 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1693 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458079 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f47b8d9dc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458079 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f47b8d9e6d4 R13: 00000000004be4a4 R14: 00000000004ceca8 R15: 00000000ffffffff The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00022c7fc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() raw: 01fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff022c0101 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808b1ffa80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808b1ffb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 03 >ffff88808b1ffb80: f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f3 ^ ffff88808b1ffc00: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808b1ffc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f2 01 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-15 20:41:14 +03:00
faclen = rose_create_facilities(dptr, rose);
skb_put(skb, faclen);
dptr += faclen;
break;
case ROSE_CALL_ACCEPTED:
*dptr++ = ROSE_GFI | lci1;
*dptr++ = lci2;
*dptr++ = frametype;
*dptr++ = 0x00; /* Address length */
*dptr++ = 0; /* Facilities length */
break;
case ROSE_CLEAR_REQUEST:
*dptr++ = ROSE_GFI | lci1;
*dptr++ = lci2;
*dptr++ = frametype;
*dptr++ = rose->cause;
*dptr++ = rose->diagnostic;
break;
case ROSE_RESET_REQUEST:
*dptr++ = ROSE_GFI | lci1;
*dptr++ = lci2;
*dptr++ = frametype;
*dptr++ = ROSE_DTE_ORIGINATED;
*dptr++ = 0;
break;
case ROSE_RR:
case ROSE_RNR:
*dptr++ = ROSE_GFI | lci1;
*dptr++ = lci2;
*dptr = frametype;
*dptr++ |= (rose->vr << 5) & 0xE0;
break;
case ROSE_CLEAR_CONFIRMATION:
case ROSE_RESET_CONFIRMATION:
*dptr++ = ROSE_GFI | lci1;
*dptr++ = lci2;
*dptr++ = frametype;
break;
default:
printk(KERN_ERR "ROSE: rose_write_internal - invalid frametype %02X\n", frametype);
kfree_skb(skb);
return;
}
rose_transmit_link(skb, rose->neighbour);
}
int rose_decode(struct sk_buff *skb, int *ns, int *nr, int *q, int *d, int *m)
{
unsigned char *frame;
frame = skb->data;
*ns = *nr = *q = *d = *m = 0;
switch (frame[2]) {
case ROSE_CALL_REQUEST:
case ROSE_CALL_ACCEPTED:
case ROSE_CLEAR_REQUEST:
case ROSE_CLEAR_CONFIRMATION:
case ROSE_RESET_REQUEST:
case ROSE_RESET_CONFIRMATION:
return frame[2];
default:
break;
}
if ((frame[2] & 0x1F) == ROSE_RR ||
(frame[2] & 0x1F) == ROSE_RNR) {
*nr = (frame[2] >> 5) & 0x07;
return frame[2] & 0x1F;
}
if ((frame[2] & 0x01) == ROSE_DATA) {
*q = (frame[0] & ROSE_Q_BIT) == ROSE_Q_BIT;
*d = (frame[0] & ROSE_D_BIT) == ROSE_D_BIT;
*m = (frame[2] & ROSE_M_BIT) == ROSE_M_BIT;
*nr = (frame[2] >> 5) & 0x07;
*ns = (frame[2] >> 1) & 0x07;
return ROSE_DATA;
}
return ROSE_ILLEGAL;
}
static int rose_parse_national(unsigned char *p, struct rose_facilities_struct *facilities, int len)
{
unsigned char *pt;
unsigned char l, lg, n = 0;
int fac_national_digis_received = 0;
do {
switch (*p & 0xC0) {
case 0x00:
if (len < 2)
return -1;
p += 2;
n += 2;
len -= 2;
break;
case 0x40:
if (len < 3)
return -1;
if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_RAND)
facilities->rand = ((p[1] << 8) & 0xFF00) + ((p[2] << 0) & 0x00FF);
p += 3;
n += 3;
len -= 3;
break;
case 0x80:
if (len < 4)
return -1;
p += 4;
n += 4;
len -= 4;
break;
case 0xC0:
if (len < 2)
return -1;
l = p[1];
if (len < 2 + l)
return -1;
if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DEST_DIGI) {
if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
if (l < AX25_ADDR_LEN)
return -1;
memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
facilities->source_ndigis = 1;
}
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_SRC_DIGI) {
if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
if (l < AX25_ADDR_LEN)
return -1;
memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
facilities->dest_ndigis = 1;
}
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_CALL) {
if (l < AX25_ADDR_LEN)
return -1;
memcpy(&facilities->fail_call, p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_ADD) {
if (l < 1 + ROSE_ADDR_LEN)
return -1;
memcpy(&facilities->fail_addr, p + 3, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS) {
if (l % AX25_ADDR_LEN)
return -1;
fac_national_digis_received = 1;
facilities->source_ndigis = 0;
facilities->dest_ndigis = 0;
for (pt = p + 2, lg = 0 ; lg < l ; pt += AX25_ADDR_LEN, lg += AX25_ADDR_LEN) {
if (pt[6] & AX25_HBIT) {
if (facilities->dest_ndigis >= ROSE_MAX_DIGIS)
return -1;
memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[facilities->dest_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
} else {
if (facilities->source_ndigis >= ROSE_MAX_DIGIS)
return -1;
memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[facilities->source_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
}
}
p += l + 2;
n += l + 2;
len -= l + 2;
break;
}
} while (*p != 0x00 && len > 0);
return n;
}
static int rose_parse_ccitt(unsigned char *p, struct rose_facilities_struct *facilities, int len)
{
unsigned char l, n = 0;
char callsign[11];
do {
switch (*p & 0xC0) {
case 0x00:
if (len < 2)
return -1;
p += 2;
n += 2;
len -= 2;
break;
case 0x40:
if (len < 3)
return -1;
p += 3;
n += 3;
len -= 3;
break;
case 0x80:
if (len < 4)
return -1;
p += 4;
n += 4;
len -= 4;
break;
case 0xC0:
if (len < 2)
return -1;
l = p[1];
/* Prevent overflows*/
if (l < 10 || l > 20)
return -1;
if (*p == FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP) {
memcpy(&facilities->source_addr, p + 7, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
memcpy(callsign, p + 12, l - 10);
callsign[l - 10] = '\0';
asc2ax(&facilities->source_call, callsign);
}
if (*p == FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP) {
memcpy(&facilities->dest_addr, p + 7, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
memcpy(callsign, p + 12, l - 10);
callsign[l - 10] = '\0';
asc2ax(&facilities->dest_call, callsign);
}
p += l + 2;
n += l + 2;
len -= l + 2;
break;
}
} while (*p != 0x00 && len > 0);
return n;
}
int rose_parse_facilities(unsigned char *p, unsigned packet_len,
struct rose_facilities_struct *facilities)
{
int facilities_len, len;
facilities_len = *p++;
if (facilities_len == 0 || (unsigned int)facilities_len > packet_len)
return 0;
while (facilities_len >= 3 && *p == 0x00) {
facilities_len--;
p++;
switch (*p) {
case FAC_NATIONAL: /* National */
len = rose_parse_national(p + 1, facilities, facilities_len - 1);
break;
case FAC_CCITT: /* CCITT */
len = rose_parse_ccitt(p + 1, facilities, facilities_len - 1);
break;
default:
printk(KERN_DEBUG "ROSE: rose_parse_facilities - unknown facilities family %02X\n", *p);
len = 1;
break;
}
if (len < 0)
return 0;
if (WARN_ON(len >= facilities_len))
return 0;
facilities_len -= len + 1;
p += len + 1;
}
return facilities_len == 0;
}
static int rose_create_facilities(unsigned char *buffer, struct rose_sock *rose)
{
unsigned char *p = buffer + 1;
char *callsign;
char buf[11];
int len, nb;
/* National Facilities */
if (rose->rand != 0 || rose->source_ndigis == 1 || rose->dest_ndigis == 1) {
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = FAC_NATIONAL;
if (rose->rand != 0) {
*p++ = FAC_NATIONAL_RAND;
*p++ = (rose->rand >> 8) & 0xFF;
*p++ = (rose->rand >> 0) & 0xFF;
}
/* Sent before older facilities */
if ((rose->source_ndigis > 0) || (rose->dest_ndigis > 0)) {
int maxdigi = 0;
*p++ = FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS;
*p++ = AX25_ADDR_LEN * (rose->source_ndigis + rose->dest_ndigis);
for (nb = 0 ; nb < rose->source_ndigis ; nb++) {
if (++maxdigi >= ROSE_MAX_DIGIS)
break;
memcpy(p, &rose->source_digis[nb], AX25_ADDR_LEN);
p[6] |= AX25_HBIT;
p += AX25_ADDR_LEN;
}
for (nb = 0 ; nb < rose->dest_ndigis ; nb++) {
if (++maxdigi >= ROSE_MAX_DIGIS)
break;
memcpy(p, &rose->dest_digis[nb], AX25_ADDR_LEN);
p[6] &= ~AX25_HBIT;
p += AX25_ADDR_LEN;
}
}
/* For compatibility */
if (rose->source_ndigis > 0) {
*p++ = FAC_NATIONAL_SRC_DIGI;
*p++ = AX25_ADDR_LEN;
memcpy(p, &rose->source_digis[0], AX25_ADDR_LEN);
p += AX25_ADDR_LEN;
}
/* For compatibility */
if (rose->dest_ndigis > 0) {
*p++ = FAC_NATIONAL_DEST_DIGI;
*p++ = AX25_ADDR_LEN;
memcpy(p, &rose->dest_digis[0], AX25_ADDR_LEN);
p += AX25_ADDR_LEN;
}
}
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = FAC_CCITT;
*p++ = FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP;
callsign = ax2asc(buf, &rose->dest_call);
*p++ = strlen(callsign) + 10;
*p++ = (strlen(callsign) + 9) * 2; /* ??? */
*p++ = 0x47; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x11;
*p++ = ROSE_ADDR_LEN * 2;
memcpy(p, &rose->dest_addr, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
p += ROSE_ADDR_LEN;
memcpy(p, callsign, strlen(callsign));
p += strlen(callsign);
*p++ = FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP;
callsign = ax2asc(buf, &rose->source_call);
*p++ = strlen(callsign) + 10;
*p++ = (strlen(callsign) + 9) * 2; /* ??? */
*p++ = 0x47; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x11;
*p++ = ROSE_ADDR_LEN * 2;
memcpy(p, &rose->source_addr, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
p += ROSE_ADDR_LEN;
memcpy(p, callsign, strlen(callsign));
p += strlen(callsign);
len = p - buffer;
buffer[0] = len - 1;
return len;
}
void rose_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int reason, int cause, int diagnostic)
{
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk);
rose_stop_timer(sk);
rose_stop_idletimer(sk);
rose_clear_queues(sk);
rose->lci = 0;
rose->state = ROSE_STATE_0;
if (cause != -1)
rose->cause = cause;
if (diagnostic != -1)
rose->diagnostic = diagnostic;
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
sk->sk_err = reason;
sk->sk_shutdown |= SEND_SHUTDOWN;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD);
}
}