WSL2-Linux-Kernel/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst

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.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
=========
IP Sysctl
=========
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/* Variables
==============================
ip_forward - BOOLEAN
- 0 - disabled (default)
- not 0 - enabled
Forward Packets between interfaces.
This variable is special, its change resets all configuration
parameters to their default state (RFC1122 for hosts, RFC1812
for routers)
ip_default_ttl - INTEGER
Default value of TTL field (Time To Live) for outgoing (but not
forwarded) IP packets. Should be between 1 and 255 inclusive.
Default: 64 (as recommended by RFC1700)
ip_no_pmtu_disc - INTEGER
Disable Path MTU Discovery. If enabled in mode 1 and a
fragmentation-required ICMP is received, the PMTU to this
destination will be set to min_pmtu (see below). You will need
to raise min_pmtu to the smallest interface MTU on your system
manually if you want to avoid locally generated fragments.
In mode 2 incoming Path MTU Discovery messages will be
discarded. Outgoing frames are handled the same as in mode 1,
implicitly setting IP_PMTUDISC_DONT on every created socket.
Mode 3 is a hardened pmtu discover mode. The kernel will only
accept fragmentation-needed errors if the underlying protocol
can verify them besides a plain socket lookup. Current
protocols for which pmtu events will be honored are TCP, SCTP
and DCCP as they verify e.g. the sequence number or the
association. This mode should not be enabled globally but is
only intended to secure e.g. name servers in namespaces where
TCP path mtu must still work but path MTU information of other
protocols should be discarded. If enabled globally this mode
could break other protocols.
Possible values: 0-3
Default: FALSE
min_pmtu - INTEGER
default 552 - minimum discovered Path MTU
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 13:01:15 +04:00
ip_forward_use_pmtu - BOOLEAN
By default we don't trust protocol path MTUs while forwarding
because they could be easily forged and can lead to unwanted
fragmentation by the router.
You only need to enable this if you have user-space software
which tries to discover path mtus by itself and depends on the
kernel honoring this information. This is normally not the
case.
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 13:01:15 +04:00
Default: 0 (disabled)
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 13:01:15 +04:00
Possible values:
- 0 - disabled
- 1 - enabled
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 13:01:15 +04:00
fwmark_reflect - BOOLEAN
Controls the fwmark of kernel-generated IPv4 reply packets that are not
associated with a socket for example, TCP RSTs or ICMP echo replies).
If unset, these packets have a fwmark of zero. If set, they have the
fwmark of the packet they are replying to.
Default: 0
net: ipv4: Consider failed nexthops in multipath routes Multipath route lookups should consider knowledge about next hops and not select a hop that is known to be failed. Example: [h2] [h3] 15.0.0.5 | | 3| 3| [SP1] [SP2]--+ 1 2 1 2 | | /-------------+ | | \ / | | X | | / \ | | / \---------------\ | 1 2 1 2 12.0.0.2 [TOR1] 3-----------------3 [TOR2] 12.0.0.3 4 4 \ / \ / \ / -------| |-----/ 1 2 [TOR3] 3| | [h1] 12.0.0.1 host h1 with IP 12.0.0.1 has 2 paths to host h3 at 15.0.0.5: root@h1:~# ip ro ls ... 12.0.0.0/24 dev swp1 proto kernel scope link src 12.0.0.1 15.0.0.0/16 nexthop via 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 weight 1 nexthop via 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 weight 1 ... If the link between tor3 and tor1 is down and the link between tor1 and tor2 then tor1 is effectively cut-off from h1. Yet the route lookups in h1 are alternating between the 2 routes: ping 15.0.0.5 gets one and ssh 15.0.0.5 gets the other. Connections that attempt to use the 12.0.0.2 nexthop fail since that neighbor is not reachable: root@h1:~# ip neigh show ... 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 lladdr 00:02:00:00:00:1b REACHABLE 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 FAILED ... The failed path can be avoided by considering known neighbor information when selecting next hops. If the neighbor lookup fails we have no knowledge about the nexthop, so give it a shot. If there is an entry then only select the nexthop if the state is sane. This is similar to what fib_detect_death does. To maintain backward compatibility use of the neighbor information is based on a new sysctl, fib_multipath_use_neigh. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-07 17:21:00 +03:00
fib_multipath_use_neigh - BOOLEAN
Use status of existing neighbor entry when determining nexthop for
multipath routes. If disabled, neighbor information is not used and
packets could be directed to a failed nexthop. Only valid for kernels
built with CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH enabled.
net: ipv4: Consider failed nexthops in multipath routes Multipath route lookups should consider knowledge about next hops and not select a hop that is known to be failed. Example: [h2] [h3] 15.0.0.5 | | 3| 3| [SP1] [SP2]--+ 1 2 1 2 | | /-------------+ | | \ / | | X | | / \ | | / \---------------\ | 1 2 1 2 12.0.0.2 [TOR1] 3-----------------3 [TOR2] 12.0.0.3 4 4 \ / \ / \ / -------| |-----/ 1 2 [TOR3] 3| | [h1] 12.0.0.1 host h1 with IP 12.0.0.1 has 2 paths to host h3 at 15.0.0.5: root@h1:~# ip ro ls ... 12.0.0.0/24 dev swp1 proto kernel scope link src 12.0.0.1 15.0.0.0/16 nexthop via 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 weight 1 nexthop via 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 weight 1 ... If the link between tor3 and tor1 is down and the link between tor1 and tor2 then tor1 is effectively cut-off from h1. Yet the route lookups in h1 are alternating between the 2 routes: ping 15.0.0.5 gets one and ssh 15.0.0.5 gets the other. Connections that attempt to use the 12.0.0.2 nexthop fail since that neighbor is not reachable: root@h1:~# ip neigh show ... 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 lladdr 00:02:00:00:00:1b REACHABLE 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 FAILED ... The failed path can be avoided by considering known neighbor information when selecting next hops. If the neighbor lookup fails we have no knowledge about the nexthop, so give it a shot. If there is an entry then only select the nexthop if the state is sane. This is similar to what fib_detect_death does. To maintain backward compatibility use of the neighbor information is based on a new sysctl, fib_multipath_use_neigh. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-07 17:21:00 +03:00
Default: 0 (disabled)
net: ipv4: Consider failed nexthops in multipath routes Multipath route lookups should consider knowledge about next hops and not select a hop that is known to be failed. Example: [h2] [h3] 15.0.0.5 | | 3| 3| [SP1] [SP2]--+ 1 2 1 2 | | /-------------+ | | \ / | | X | | / \ | | / \---------------\ | 1 2 1 2 12.0.0.2 [TOR1] 3-----------------3 [TOR2] 12.0.0.3 4 4 \ / \ / \ / -------| |-----/ 1 2 [TOR3] 3| | [h1] 12.0.0.1 host h1 with IP 12.0.0.1 has 2 paths to host h3 at 15.0.0.5: root@h1:~# ip ro ls ... 12.0.0.0/24 dev swp1 proto kernel scope link src 12.0.0.1 15.0.0.0/16 nexthop via 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 weight 1 nexthop via 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 weight 1 ... If the link between tor3 and tor1 is down and the link between tor1 and tor2 then tor1 is effectively cut-off from h1. Yet the route lookups in h1 are alternating between the 2 routes: ping 15.0.0.5 gets one and ssh 15.0.0.5 gets the other. Connections that attempt to use the 12.0.0.2 nexthop fail since that neighbor is not reachable: root@h1:~# ip neigh show ... 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 lladdr 00:02:00:00:00:1b REACHABLE 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 FAILED ... The failed path can be avoided by considering known neighbor information when selecting next hops. If the neighbor lookup fails we have no knowledge about the nexthop, so give it a shot. If there is an entry then only select the nexthop if the state is sane. This is similar to what fib_detect_death does. To maintain backward compatibility use of the neighbor information is based on a new sysctl, fib_multipath_use_neigh. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-07 17:21:00 +03:00
Possible values:
- 0 - disabled
- 1 - enabled
net: ipv4: Consider failed nexthops in multipath routes Multipath route lookups should consider knowledge about next hops and not select a hop that is known to be failed. Example: [h2] [h3] 15.0.0.5 | | 3| 3| [SP1] [SP2]--+ 1 2 1 2 | | /-------------+ | | \ / | | X | | / \ | | / \---------------\ | 1 2 1 2 12.0.0.2 [TOR1] 3-----------------3 [TOR2] 12.0.0.3 4 4 \ / \ / \ / -------| |-----/ 1 2 [TOR3] 3| | [h1] 12.0.0.1 host h1 with IP 12.0.0.1 has 2 paths to host h3 at 15.0.0.5: root@h1:~# ip ro ls ... 12.0.0.0/24 dev swp1 proto kernel scope link src 12.0.0.1 15.0.0.0/16 nexthop via 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 weight 1 nexthop via 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 weight 1 ... If the link between tor3 and tor1 is down and the link between tor1 and tor2 then tor1 is effectively cut-off from h1. Yet the route lookups in h1 are alternating between the 2 routes: ping 15.0.0.5 gets one and ssh 15.0.0.5 gets the other. Connections that attempt to use the 12.0.0.2 nexthop fail since that neighbor is not reachable: root@h1:~# ip neigh show ... 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 lladdr 00:02:00:00:00:1b REACHABLE 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 FAILED ... The failed path can be avoided by considering known neighbor information when selecting next hops. If the neighbor lookup fails we have no knowledge about the nexthop, so give it a shot. If there is an entry then only select the nexthop if the state is sane. This is similar to what fib_detect_death does. To maintain backward compatibility use of the neighbor information is based on a new sysctl, fib_multipath_use_neigh. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-07 17:21:00 +03:00
fib_multipath_hash_policy - INTEGER
Controls which hash policy to use for multipath routes. Only valid
for kernels built with CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH enabled.
Default: 0 (Layer 3)
Possible values:
- 0 - Layer 3
- 1 - Layer 4
- 2 - Layer 3 or inner Layer 3 if present
ipv4: Allow amount of dirty memory from fib resizing to be controllable fib_trie implementation calls synchronize_rcu when a certain amount of pages are dirty from freed entries. The number of pages was determined experimentally in 2009 (commit c3059477fce2d). At the current setting, synchronize_rcu is called often -- 51 times in a second in one test with an average of an 8 msec delay adding a fib entry. The total impact is a lot of slow down modifying the fib. This is seen in the output of 'time' - the difference between real time and sys+user. For example, using 720,022 single path routes and 'ip -batch'[1]: $ time ./ip -batch ipv4/routes-1-hops real 0m14.214s user 0m2.513s sys 0m6.783s So roughly 35% of the actual time to install the routes is from the ip command getting scheduled out, most notably due to synchronize_rcu (this is observed using 'perf sched timehist'). This patch makes the amount of dirty memory configurable between 64k where the synchronize_rcu is called often (small, low end systems that are memory sensitive) to 64M where synchronize_rcu is called rarely during a large FIB change (for high end systems with lots of memory). The default is 512kB which corresponds to the current setting of 128 pages with a 4kB page size. As an example, at 16MB the worst interval shows 4 calls to synchronize_rcu in a second blocking for up to 30 msec in a single instance, and a total of almost 100 msec across the 4 calls in the second. The trade off is allowing FIB entries to consume more memory in a given time window but but with much better fib insertion rates (~30% increase in prefixes/sec). With this patch and net.ipv4.fib_sync_mem set to 16MB, the same batch file runs in: $ time ./ip -batch ipv4/routes-1-hops real 0m9.692s user 0m2.491s sys 0m6.769s So the dead time is reduced to about 1/2 second or <5% of the real time. [1] 'ip' modified to not request ACK messages which improves route insertion times by about 20% Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-20 19:18:59 +03:00
fib_sync_mem - UNSIGNED INTEGER
Amount of dirty memory from fib entries that can be backlogged before
synchronize_rcu is forced.
Default: 512kB Minimum: 64kB Maximum: 64MB
ipv4: Allow amount of dirty memory from fib resizing to be controllable fib_trie implementation calls synchronize_rcu when a certain amount of pages are dirty from freed entries. The number of pages was determined experimentally in 2009 (commit c3059477fce2d). At the current setting, synchronize_rcu is called often -- 51 times in a second in one test with an average of an 8 msec delay adding a fib entry. The total impact is a lot of slow down modifying the fib. This is seen in the output of 'time' - the difference between real time and sys+user. For example, using 720,022 single path routes and 'ip -batch'[1]: $ time ./ip -batch ipv4/routes-1-hops real 0m14.214s user 0m2.513s sys 0m6.783s So roughly 35% of the actual time to install the routes is from the ip command getting scheduled out, most notably due to synchronize_rcu (this is observed using 'perf sched timehist'). This patch makes the amount of dirty memory configurable between 64k where the synchronize_rcu is called often (small, low end systems that are memory sensitive) to 64M where synchronize_rcu is called rarely during a large FIB change (for high end systems with lots of memory). The default is 512kB which corresponds to the current setting of 128 pages with a 4kB page size. As an example, at 16MB the worst interval shows 4 calls to synchronize_rcu in a second blocking for up to 30 msec in a single instance, and a total of almost 100 msec across the 4 calls in the second. The trade off is allowing FIB entries to consume more memory in a given time window but but with much better fib insertion rates (~30% increase in prefixes/sec). With this patch and net.ipv4.fib_sync_mem set to 16MB, the same batch file runs in: $ time ./ip -batch ipv4/routes-1-hops real 0m9.692s user 0m2.491s sys 0m6.769s So the dead time is reduced to about 1/2 second or <5% of the real time. [1] 'ip' modified to not request ACK messages which improves route insertion times by about 20% Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-20 19:18:59 +03:00
ip_forward_update_priority - INTEGER
Whether to update SKB priority from "TOS" field in IPv4 header after it
is forwarded. The new SKB priority is mapped from TOS field value
according to an rt_tos2priority table (see e.g. man tc-prio).
Default: 1 (Update priority.)
Possible values:
- 0 - Do not update priority.
- 1 - Update priority.
route/max_size - INTEGER
Maximum number of routes allowed in the kernel. Increase
this when using large numbers of interfaces and/or routes.
From linux kernel 3.6 onwards, this is deprecated for ipv4
as route cache is no longer used.
neigh/default/gc_thresh1 - INTEGER
Minimum number of entries to keep. Garbage collector will not
purge entries if there are fewer than this number.
Default: 128
neigh/default/gc_thresh2 - INTEGER
Threshold when garbage collector becomes more aggressive about
purging entries. Entries older than 5 seconds will be cleared
when over this number.
Default: 512
neigh/default/gc_thresh3 - INTEGER
neighbor: Improve garbage collection The existing garbage collection algorithm has a number of problems: 1. The gc algorithm will not evict PERMANENT entries as those entries are managed by userspace, yet the existing algorithm walks the entire hash table which means it always considers PERMANENT entries when looking for entries to evict. In some use cases (e.g., EVPN) there can be tens of thousands of PERMANENT entries leading to wasted CPU cycles when gc kicks in. As an example, with 32k permanent entries, neigh_alloc has been observed taking more than 4 msec per invocation. 2. Currently, when the number of neighbor entries hits gc_thresh2 and the last flush for the table was more than 5 seconds ago gc kicks in walks the entire hash table evicting *all* entries not in PERMANENT or REACHABLE state and not marked as externally learned. There is no discriminator on when the neigh entry was created or if it just moved from REACHABLE to another NUD_VALID state (e.g., NUD_STALE). It is possible for entries to be created or for established neighbor entries to be moved to STALE (e.g., an external node sends an ARP request) right before the 5 second window lapses: -----|---------x|----------|----- t-5 t t+5 If that happens those entries are evicted during gc causing unnecessary thrashing on neighbor entries and userspace caches trying to track them. Further, this contradicts the description of gc_thresh2 which says "Entries older than 5 seconds will be cleared". One workaround is to make gc_thresh2 == gc_thresh3 but that negates the whole point of having separate thresholds. 3. Clearing *all* neigh non-PERMANENT/REACHABLE/externally learned entries when gc_thresh2 is exceeded is over kill and contributes to trashing especially during startup. This patch addresses these problems as follows: 1. Use of a separate list_head to track entries that can be garbage collected along with a separate counter. PERMANENT entries are not added to this list. The gc_thresh parameters are only compared to the new counter, not the total entries in the table. The forced_gc function is updated to only walk this new gc_list looking for entries to evict. 2. Entries are added to the list head at the tail and removed from the front. 3. Entries are only evicted if they were last updated more than 5 seconds ago, adhering to the original intent of gc_thresh2. 4. Forced gc is stopped once the number of gc_entries drops below gc_thresh2. 5. Since gc checks do not apply to PERMANENT entries, gc levels are skipped when allocating a new neighbor for a PERMANENT entry. By extension this means there are no explicit limits on the number of PERMANENT entries that can be created, but this is no different than FIB entries or FDB entries. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-12-07 23:24:57 +03:00
Maximum number of non-PERMANENT neighbor entries allowed. Increase
this when using large numbers of interfaces and when communicating
with large numbers of directly-connected peers.
Default: 1024
neigh: new unresolved queue limits Le mercredi 09 novembre 2011 à 16:21 -0500, David Miller a écrit : > From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> > Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 16:16:44 -0500 (EST) > > > From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> > > Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 12:14:09 +0100 > > > >> unres_qlen is the number of frames we are able to queue per unresolved > >> neighbour. Its default value (3) was never changed and is responsible > >> for strange drops, especially if IP fragments are used, or multiple > >> sessions start in parallel. Even a single tcp flow can hit this limit. > > ... > > > > Ok, I've applied this, let's see what happens :-) > > Early answer, build fails. > > Please test build this patch with DECNET enabled and resubmit. The > decnet neigh layer still refers to the removed ->queue_len member. > > Thanks. Ouch, this was fixed on one machine yesterday, but not the other one I used this morning, sorry. [PATCH V5 net-next] neigh: new unresolved queue limits unres_qlen is the number of frames we are able to queue per unresolved neighbour. Its default value (3) was never changed and is responsible for strange drops, especially if IP fragments are used, or multiple sessions start in parallel. Even a single tcp flow can hit this limit. $ arp -d 192.168.20.108 ; ping -c 2 -s 8000 192.168.20.108 PING 192.168.20.108 (192.168.20.108) 8000(8028) bytes of data. 8008 bytes from 192.168.20.108: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.322 ms Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-11-09 16:07:14 +04:00
neigh/default/unres_qlen_bytes - INTEGER
The maximum number of bytes which may be used by packets
queued for each unresolved address by other network layers.
(added in linux 3.3)
Setting negative value is meaningless and will return error.
Default: SK_WMEM_MAX, (same as net.core.wmem_default).
Exact value depends on architecture and kernel options,
but should be enough to allow queuing 256 packets
of medium size.
neigh: new unresolved queue limits Le mercredi 09 novembre 2011 à 16:21 -0500, David Miller a écrit : > From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> > Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 16:16:44 -0500 (EST) > > > From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> > > Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 12:14:09 +0100 > > > >> unres_qlen is the number of frames we are able to queue per unresolved > >> neighbour. Its default value (3) was never changed and is responsible > >> for strange drops, especially if IP fragments are used, or multiple > >> sessions start in parallel. Even a single tcp flow can hit this limit. > > ... > > > > Ok, I've applied this, let's see what happens :-) > > Early answer, build fails. > > Please test build this patch with DECNET enabled and resubmit. The > decnet neigh layer still refers to the removed ->queue_len member. > > Thanks. Ouch, this was fixed on one machine yesterday, but not the other one I used this morning, sorry. [PATCH V5 net-next] neigh: new unresolved queue limits unres_qlen is the number of frames we are able to queue per unresolved neighbour. Its default value (3) was never changed and is responsible for strange drops, especially if IP fragments are used, or multiple sessions start in parallel. Even a single tcp flow can hit this limit. $ arp -d 192.168.20.108 ; ping -c 2 -s 8000 192.168.20.108 PING 192.168.20.108 (192.168.20.108) 8000(8028) bytes of data. 8008 bytes from 192.168.20.108: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.322 ms Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-11-09 16:07:14 +04:00
neigh/default/unres_qlen - INTEGER
The maximum number of packets which may be queued for each
unresolved address by other network layers.
neigh: new unresolved queue limits Le mercredi 09 novembre 2011 à 16:21 -0500, David Miller a écrit : > From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> > Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 16:16:44 -0500 (EST) > > > From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> > > Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 12:14:09 +0100 > > > >> unres_qlen is the number of frames we are able to queue per unresolved > >> neighbour. Its default value (3) was never changed and is responsible > >> for strange drops, especially if IP fragments are used, or multiple > >> sessions start in parallel. Even a single tcp flow can hit this limit. > > ... > > > > Ok, I've applied this, let's see what happens :-) > > Early answer, build fails. > > Please test build this patch with DECNET enabled and resubmit. The > decnet neigh layer still refers to the removed ->queue_len member. > > Thanks. Ouch, this was fixed on one machine yesterday, but not the other one I used this morning, sorry. [PATCH V5 net-next] neigh: new unresolved queue limits unres_qlen is the number of frames we are able to queue per unresolved neighbour. Its default value (3) was never changed and is responsible for strange drops, especially if IP fragments are used, or multiple sessions start in parallel. Even a single tcp flow can hit this limit. $ arp -d 192.168.20.108 ; ping -c 2 -s 8000 192.168.20.108 PING 192.168.20.108 (192.168.20.108) 8000(8028) bytes of data. 8008 bytes from 192.168.20.108: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.322 ms Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-11-09 16:07:14 +04:00
(deprecated in linux 3.3) : use unres_qlen_bytes instead.
Prior to linux 3.3, the default value is 3 which may cause
unexpected packet loss. The current default value is calculated
according to default value of unres_qlen_bytes and true size of
packet.
Default: 101
neigh: new unresolved queue limits Le mercredi 09 novembre 2011 à 16:21 -0500, David Miller a écrit : > From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> > Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 16:16:44 -0500 (EST) > > > From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> > > Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 12:14:09 +0100 > > > >> unres_qlen is the number of frames we are able to queue per unresolved > >> neighbour. Its default value (3) was never changed and is responsible > >> for strange drops, especially if IP fragments are used, or multiple > >> sessions start in parallel. Even a single tcp flow can hit this limit. > > ... > > > > Ok, I've applied this, let's see what happens :-) > > Early answer, build fails. > > Please test build this patch with DECNET enabled and resubmit. The > decnet neigh layer still refers to the removed ->queue_len member. > > Thanks. Ouch, this was fixed on one machine yesterday, but not the other one I used this morning, sorry. [PATCH V5 net-next] neigh: new unresolved queue limits unres_qlen is the number of frames we are able to queue per unresolved neighbour. Its default value (3) was never changed and is responsible for strange drops, especially if IP fragments are used, or multiple sessions start in parallel. Even a single tcp flow can hit this limit. $ arp -d 192.168.20.108 ; ping -c 2 -s 8000 192.168.20.108 PING 192.168.20.108 (192.168.20.108) 8000(8028) bytes of data. 8008 bytes from 192.168.20.108: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.322 ms Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-11-09 16:07:14 +04:00
mtu_expires - INTEGER
Time, in seconds, that cached PMTU information is kept.
min_adv_mss - INTEGER
The advertised MSS depends on the first hop route MTU, but will
never be lower than this setting.
IP Fragmentation:
ipfrag_high_thresh - LONG INTEGER
inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly units Some applications still rely on IP fragmentation, and to be fair linux reassembly unit is not working under any serious load. It uses static hash tables of 1024 buckets, and up to 128 items per bucket (!!!) A work queue is supposed to garbage collect items when host is under memory pressure, and doing a hash rebuild, changing seed used in hash computations. This work queue blocks softirqs for up to 25 ms when doing a hash rebuild, occurring every 5 seconds if host is under fire. Then there is the problem of sharing this hash table for all netns. It is time to switch to rhashtables, and allocate one of them per netns to speedup netns dismantle, since this is a critical metric these days. Lookup is now using RCU. A followup patch will even remove the refcount hold/release left from prior implementation and save a couple of atomic operations. Before this patch, 16 cpus (16 RX queue NIC) could not handle more than 1 Mpps frags DDOS. After the patch, I reach 9 Mpps without any tuning, and can use up to 2GB of storage for the fragments (exact number depends on frags being evicted after timeout) $ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat FRAG: inuse 1966916 memory 2140004608 A followup patch will change the limits for 64bit arches. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-31 22:58:49 +03:00
Maximum memory used to reassemble IP fragments.
ipfrag_low_thresh - LONG INTEGER
inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly units Some applications still rely on IP fragmentation, and to be fair linux reassembly unit is not working under any serious load. It uses static hash tables of 1024 buckets, and up to 128 items per bucket (!!!) A work queue is supposed to garbage collect items when host is under memory pressure, and doing a hash rebuild, changing seed used in hash computations. This work queue blocks softirqs for up to 25 ms when doing a hash rebuild, occurring every 5 seconds if host is under fire. Then there is the problem of sharing this hash table for all netns. It is time to switch to rhashtables, and allocate one of them per netns to speedup netns dismantle, since this is a critical metric these days. Lookup is now using RCU. A followup patch will even remove the refcount hold/release left from prior implementation and save a couple of atomic operations. Before this patch, 16 cpus (16 RX queue NIC) could not handle more than 1 Mpps frags DDOS. After the patch, I reach 9 Mpps without any tuning, and can use up to 2GB of storage for the fragments (exact number depends on frags being evicted after timeout) $ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat FRAG: inuse 1966916 memory 2140004608 A followup patch will change the limits for 64bit arches. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-31 22:58:49 +03:00
(Obsolete since linux-4.17)
Maximum memory used to reassemble IP fragments before the kernel
begins to remove incomplete fragment queues to free up resources.
The kernel still accepts new fragments for defragmentation.
ipfrag_time - INTEGER
Time in seconds to keep an IP fragment in memory.
ipfrag_max_dist - INTEGER
ipfrag_max_dist is a non-negative integer value which defines the
maximum "disorder" which is allowed among fragments which share a
common IP source address. Note that reordering of packets is
not unusual, but if a large number of fragments arrive from a source
IP address while a particular fragment queue remains incomplete, it
probably indicates that one or more fragments belonging to that queue
have been lost. When ipfrag_max_dist is positive, an additional check
is done on fragments before they are added to a reassembly queue - if
ipfrag_max_dist (or more) fragments have arrived from a particular IP
address between additions to any IP fragment queue using that source
address, it's presumed that one or more fragments in the queue are
lost. The existing fragment queue will be dropped, and a new one
started. An ipfrag_max_dist value of zero disables this check.
Using a very small value, e.g. 1 or 2, for ipfrag_max_dist can
result in unnecessarily dropping fragment queues when normal
reordering of packets occurs, which could lead to poor application
performance. Using a very large value, e.g. 50000, increases the
likelihood of incorrectly reassembling IP fragments that originate
from different IP datagrams, which could result in data corruption.
Default: 64
INET peer storage
=================
inet_peer_threshold - INTEGER
The approximate size of the storage. Starting from this threshold
entries will be thrown aggressively. This threshold also determines
entries' time-to-live and time intervals between garbage collection
passes. More entries, less time-to-live, less GC interval.
inet_peer_minttl - INTEGER
Minimum time-to-live of entries. Should be enough to cover fragment
time-to-live on the reassembling side. This minimum time-to-live is
guaranteed if the pool size is less than inet_peer_threshold.
Measured in seconds.
inet_peer_maxttl - INTEGER
Maximum time-to-live of entries. Unused entries will expire after
this period of time if there is no memory pressure on the pool (i.e.
when the number of entries in the pool is very small).
Measured in seconds.
TCP variables
=============
somaxconn - INTEGER
Limit of socket listen() backlog, known in userspace as SOMAXCONN.
Defaults to 4096. (Was 128 before linux-5.4)
See also tcp_max_syn_backlog for additional tuning for TCP sockets.
tcp_abort_on_overflow - BOOLEAN
If listening service is too slow to accept new connections,
reset them. Default state is FALSE. It means that if overflow
occurred due to a burst, connection will recover. Enable this
option _only_ if you are really sure that listening daemon
cannot be tuned to accept connections faster. Enabling this
option can harm clients of your server.
tcp_adv_win_scale - INTEGER
Count buffering overhead as bytes/2^tcp_adv_win_scale
(if tcp_adv_win_scale > 0) or bytes-bytes/2^(-tcp_adv_win_scale),
if it is <= 0.
Possible values are [-31, 31], inclusive.
tcp: change tcp_adv_win_scale and tcp_rmem[2] tcp_adv_win_scale default value is 2, meaning we expect a good citizen skb to have skb->len / skb->truesize ratio of 75% (3/4) In 2.6 kernels we (mis)accounted for typical MSS=1460 frame : 1536 + 64 + 256 = 1856 'estimated truesize', and 1856 * 3/4 = 1392. So these skbs were considered as not bloated. With recent truesize fixes, a typical MSS=1460 frame truesize is now the more precise : 2048 + 256 = 2304. But 2304 * 3/4 = 1728. So these skb are not good citizen anymore, because 1460 < 1728 (GRO can escape this problem because it build skbs with a too low truesize.) This also means tcp advertises a too optimistic window for a given allocated rcvspace : When receiving frames, sk_rmem_alloc can hit sk_rcvbuf limit and we call tcp_prune_queue()/tcp_collapse() too often, especially when application is slow to drain its receive queue or in case of losses (netperf is fast, scp is slow). This is a major latency source. We should adjust the len/truesize ratio to 50% instead of 75% This patch : 1) changes tcp_adv_win_scale default to 1 instead of 2 2) increase tcp_rmem[2] limit from 4MB to 6MB to take into account better truesize tracking and to allow autotuning tcp receive window to reach same value than before. Note that same amount of kernel memory is consumed compared to 2.6 kernels. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-05-02 06:28:41 +04:00
Default: 1
tcp_allowed_congestion_control - STRING
Show/set the congestion control choices available to non-privileged
processes. The list is a subset of those listed in
tcp_available_congestion_control.
Default is "reno" and the default setting (tcp_congestion_control).
tcp_app_win - INTEGER
Reserve max(window/2^tcp_app_win, mss) of window for application
buffer. Value 0 is special, it means that nothing is reserved.
Default: 31
tcp: auto corking With the introduction of TCP Small Queues, TSO auto sizing, and TCP pacing, we can implement Automatic Corking in the kernel, to help applications doing small write()/sendmsg() to TCP sockets. Idea is to change tcp_push() to check if the current skb payload is under skb optimal size (a multiple of MSS bytes) If under 'size_goal', and at least one packet is still in Qdisc or NIC TX queues, set the TCP Small Queue Throttled bit, so that the push will be delayed up to TX completion time. This delay might allow the application to coalesce more bytes in the skb in following write()/sendmsg()/sendfile() system calls. The exact duration of the delay is depending on the dynamics of the system, and might be zero if no packet for this flow is actually held in Qdisc or NIC TX ring. Using FQ/pacing is a way to increase the probability of autocorking being triggered. Add a new sysctl (/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_autocorking) to control this feature and default it to 1 (enabled) Add a new SNMP counter : nstat -a | grep TcpExtTCPAutoCorking This counter is incremented every time we detected skb was under used and its flush was deferred. Tested: Interesting effects when using line buffered commands under ssh. Excellent performance results in term of cpu usage and total throughput. lpq83:~# echo 1 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_autocorking lpq83:~# perf stat ./super_netperf 4 -t TCP_STREAM -H lpq84 -- -m 128 9410.39 Performance counter stats for './super_netperf 4 -t TCP_STREAM -H lpq84 -- -m 128': 35209.439626 task-clock # 2.901 CPUs utilized 2,294 context-switches # 0.065 K/sec 101 CPU-migrations # 0.003 K/sec 4,079 page-faults # 0.116 K/sec 97,923,241,298 cycles # 2.781 GHz [83.31%] 51,832,908,236 stalled-cycles-frontend # 52.93% frontend cycles idle [83.30%] 25,697,986,603 stalled-cycles-backend # 26.24% backend cycles idle [66.70%] 102,225,978,536 instructions # 1.04 insns per cycle # 0.51 stalled cycles per insn [83.38%] 18,657,696,819 branches # 529.906 M/sec [83.29%] 91,679,646 branch-misses # 0.49% of all branches [83.40%] 12.136204899 seconds time elapsed lpq83:~# echo 0 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_autocorking lpq83:~# perf stat ./super_netperf 4 -t TCP_STREAM -H lpq84 -- -m 128 6624.89 Performance counter stats for './super_netperf 4 -t TCP_STREAM -H lpq84 -- -m 128': 40045.864494 task-clock # 3.301 CPUs utilized 171 context-switches # 0.004 K/sec 53 CPU-migrations # 0.001 K/sec 4,080 page-faults # 0.102 K/sec 111,340,458,645 cycles # 2.780 GHz [83.34%] 61,778,039,277 stalled-cycles-frontend # 55.49% frontend cycles idle [83.31%] 29,295,522,759 stalled-cycles-backend # 26.31% backend cycles idle [66.67%] 108,654,349,355 instructions # 0.98 insns per cycle # 0.57 stalled cycles per insn [83.34%] 19,552,170,748 branches # 488.244 M/sec [83.34%] 157,875,417 branch-misses # 0.81% of all branches [83.34%] 12.130267788 seconds time elapsed Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-12-06 10:36:05 +04:00
tcp_autocorking - BOOLEAN
Enable TCP auto corking :
When applications do consecutive small write()/sendmsg() system calls,
we try to coalesce these small writes as much as possible, to lower
total amount of sent packets. This is done if at least one prior
packet for the flow is waiting in Qdisc queues or device transmit
queue. Applications can still use TCP_CORK for optimal behavior
when they know how/when to uncork their sockets.
tcp: auto corking With the introduction of TCP Small Queues, TSO auto sizing, and TCP pacing, we can implement Automatic Corking in the kernel, to help applications doing small write()/sendmsg() to TCP sockets. Idea is to change tcp_push() to check if the current skb payload is under skb optimal size (a multiple of MSS bytes) If under 'size_goal', and at least one packet is still in Qdisc or NIC TX queues, set the TCP Small Queue Throttled bit, so that the push will be delayed up to TX completion time. This delay might allow the application to coalesce more bytes in the skb in following write()/sendmsg()/sendfile() system calls. The exact duration of the delay is depending on the dynamics of the system, and might be zero if no packet for this flow is actually held in Qdisc or NIC TX ring. Using FQ/pacing is a way to increase the probability of autocorking being triggered. Add a new sysctl (/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_autocorking) to control this feature and default it to 1 (enabled) Add a new SNMP counter : nstat -a | grep TcpExtTCPAutoCorking This counter is incremented every time we detected skb was under used and its flush was deferred. Tested: Interesting effects when using line buffered commands under ssh. Excellent performance results in term of cpu usage and total throughput. lpq83:~# echo 1 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_autocorking lpq83:~# perf stat ./super_netperf 4 -t TCP_STREAM -H lpq84 -- -m 128 9410.39 Performance counter stats for './super_netperf 4 -t TCP_STREAM -H lpq84 -- -m 128': 35209.439626 task-clock # 2.901 CPUs utilized 2,294 context-switches # 0.065 K/sec 101 CPU-migrations # 0.003 K/sec 4,079 page-faults # 0.116 K/sec 97,923,241,298 cycles # 2.781 GHz [83.31%] 51,832,908,236 stalled-cycles-frontend # 52.93% frontend cycles idle [83.30%] 25,697,986,603 stalled-cycles-backend # 26.24% backend cycles idle [66.70%] 102,225,978,536 instructions # 1.04 insns per cycle # 0.51 stalled cycles per insn [83.38%] 18,657,696,819 branches # 529.906 M/sec [83.29%] 91,679,646 branch-misses # 0.49% of all branches [83.40%] 12.136204899 seconds time elapsed lpq83:~# echo 0 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_autocorking lpq83:~# perf stat ./super_netperf 4 -t TCP_STREAM -H lpq84 -- -m 128 6624.89 Performance counter stats for './super_netperf 4 -t TCP_STREAM -H lpq84 -- -m 128': 40045.864494 task-clock # 3.301 CPUs utilized 171 context-switches # 0.004 K/sec 53 CPU-migrations # 0.001 K/sec 4,080 page-faults # 0.102 K/sec 111,340,458,645 cycles # 2.780 GHz [83.34%] 61,778,039,277 stalled-cycles-frontend # 55.49% frontend cycles idle [83.31%] 29,295,522,759 stalled-cycles-backend # 26.31% backend cycles idle [66.67%] 108,654,349,355 instructions # 0.98 insns per cycle # 0.57 stalled cycles per insn [83.34%] 19,552,170,748 branches # 488.244 M/sec [83.34%] 157,875,417 branch-misses # 0.81% of all branches [83.34%] 12.130267788 seconds time elapsed Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-12-06 10:36:05 +04:00
Default : 1
tcp_available_congestion_control - STRING
Shows the available congestion control choices that are registered.
More congestion control algorithms may be available as modules,
but not loaded.
tcp_base_mss - INTEGER
The initial value of search_low to be used by the packetization layer
Path MTU discovery (MTU probing). If MTU probing is enabled,
this is the initial MSS used by the connection.
tcp_mtu_probe_floor - INTEGER
If MTU probing is enabled this caps the minimum MSS used for search_low
for the connection.
Default : 48
tcp_min_snd_mss - INTEGER
TCP SYN and SYNACK messages usually advertise an ADVMSS option,
as described in RFC 1122 and RFC 6691.
If this ADVMSS option is smaller than tcp_min_snd_mss,
it is silently capped to tcp_min_snd_mss.
Default : 48 (at least 8 bytes of payload per segment)
tcp_congestion_control - STRING
Set the congestion control algorithm to be used for new
connections. The algorithm "reno" is always available, but
additional choices may be available based on kernel configuration.
Default is set as part of kernel configuration.
For passive connections, the listener congestion control choice
is inherited.
[see setsockopt(listenfd, SOL_TCP, TCP_CONGESTION, "name" ...) ]
tcp_dsack - BOOLEAN
Allows TCP to send "duplicate" SACKs.
tcp: early retransmit This patch implements RFC 5827 early retransmit (ER) for TCP. It reduces DUPACK threshold (dupthresh) if outstanding packets are less than 4 to recover losses by fast recovery instead of timeout. While the algorithm is simple, small but frequent network reordering makes this feature dangerous: the connection repeatedly enter false recovery and degrade performance. Therefore we implement a mitigation suggested in the appendix of the RFC that delays entering fast recovery by a small interval, i.e., RTT/4. Currently ER is conservative and is disabled for the rest of the connection after the first reordering event. A large scale web server experiment on the performance impact of ER is summarized in section 6 of the paper "Proportional Rate Reduction for TCP”, IMC 2011. http://conferences.sigcomm.org/imc/2011/docs/p155.pdf Note that Linux has a similar feature called THIN_DUPACK. The differences are THIN_DUPACK do not mitigate reorderings and is only used after slow start. Currently ER is disabled if THIN_DUPACK is enabled. I would be happy to merge THIN_DUPACK feature with ER if people think it's a good idea. ER is enabled by sysctl_tcp_early_retrans: 0: Disables ER 1: Reduce dupthresh to packets_out - 1 when outstanding packets < 4. 2: (Default) reduce dupthresh like mode 1. In addition, delay entering fast recovery by RTT/4. Note: mode 2 is implemented in the third part of this patch series. Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-05-02 17:30:03 +04:00
tcp_early_retrans - INTEGER
Tail loss probe (TLP) converts RTOs occurring due to tail
losses into fast recovery (draft-ietf-tcpm-rack). Note that
TLP requires RACK to function properly (see tcp_recovery below)
tcp: early retransmit This patch implements RFC 5827 early retransmit (ER) for TCP. It reduces DUPACK threshold (dupthresh) if outstanding packets are less than 4 to recover losses by fast recovery instead of timeout. While the algorithm is simple, small but frequent network reordering makes this feature dangerous: the connection repeatedly enter false recovery and degrade performance. Therefore we implement a mitigation suggested in the appendix of the RFC that delays entering fast recovery by a small interval, i.e., RTT/4. Currently ER is conservative and is disabled for the rest of the connection after the first reordering event. A large scale web server experiment on the performance impact of ER is summarized in section 6 of the paper "Proportional Rate Reduction for TCP”, IMC 2011. http://conferences.sigcomm.org/imc/2011/docs/p155.pdf Note that Linux has a similar feature called THIN_DUPACK. The differences are THIN_DUPACK do not mitigate reorderings and is only used after slow start. Currently ER is disabled if THIN_DUPACK is enabled. I would be happy to merge THIN_DUPACK feature with ER if people think it's a good idea. ER is enabled by sysctl_tcp_early_retrans: 0: Disables ER 1: Reduce dupthresh to packets_out - 1 when outstanding packets < 4. 2: (Default) reduce dupthresh like mode 1. In addition, delay entering fast recovery by RTT/4. Note: mode 2 is implemented in the third part of this patch series. Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-05-02 17:30:03 +04:00
Possible values:
- 0 disables TLP
- 3 or 4 enables TLP
tcp: Tail loss probe (TLP) This patch series implement the Tail loss probe (TLP) algorithm described in http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-dukkipati-tcpm-tcp-loss-probe-01. The first patch implements the basic algorithm. TLP's goal is to reduce tail latency of short transactions. It achieves this by converting retransmission timeouts (RTOs) occuring due to tail losses (losses at end of transactions) into fast recovery. TLP transmits one packet in two round-trips when a connection is in Open state and isn't receiving any ACKs. The transmitted packet, aka loss probe, can be either new or a retransmission. When there is tail loss, the ACK from a loss probe triggers FACK/early-retransmit based fast recovery, thus avoiding a costly RTO. In the absence of loss, there is no change in the connection state. PTO stands for probe timeout. It is a timer event indicating that an ACK is overdue and triggers a loss probe packet. The PTO value is set to max(2*SRTT, 10ms) and is adjusted to account for delayed ACK timer when there is only one oustanding packet. TLP Algorithm On transmission of new data in Open state: -> packets_out > 1: schedule PTO in max(2*SRTT, 10ms). -> packets_out == 1: schedule PTO in max(2*RTT, 1.5*RTT + 200ms) -> PTO = min(PTO, RTO) Conditions for scheduling PTO: -> Connection is in Open state. -> Connection is either cwnd limited or no new data to send. -> Number of probes per tail loss episode is limited to one. -> Connection is SACK enabled. When PTO fires: new_segment_exists: -> transmit new segment. -> packets_out++. cwnd remains same. no_new_packet: -> retransmit the last segment. Its ACK triggers FACK or early retransmit based recovery. ACK path: -> rearm RTO at start of ACK processing. -> reschedule PTO if need be. In addition, the patch includes a small variation to the Early Retransmit (ER) algorithm, such that ER and TLP together can in principle recover any N-degree of tail loss through fast recovery. TLP is controlled by the same sysctl as ER, tcp_early_retrans sysctl. tcp_early_retrans==0; disables TLP and ER. ==1; enables RFC5827 ER. ==2; delayed ER. ==3; TLP and delayed ER. [DEFAULT] ==4; TLP only. The TLP patch series have been extensively tested on Google Web servers. It is most effective for short Web trasactions, where it reduced RTOs by 15% and improved HTTP response time (average by 6%, 99th percentile by 10%). The transmitted probes account for <0.5% of the overall transmissions. Signed-off-by: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-03-11 14:00:43 +04:00
Default: 3
tcp: early retransmit This patch implements RFC 5827 early retransmit (ER) for TCP. It reduces DUPACK threshold (dupthresh) if outstanding packets are less than 4 to recover losses by fast recovery instead of timeout. While the algorithm is simple, small but frequent network reordering makes this feature dangerous: the connection repeatedly enter false recovery and degrade performance. Therefore we implement a mitigation suggested in the appendix of the RFC that delays entering fast recovery by a small interval, i.e., RTT/4. Currently ER is conservative and is disabled for the rest of the connection after the first reordering event. A large scale web server experiment on the performance impact of ER is summarized in section 6 of the paper "Proportional Rate Reduction for TCP”, IMC 2011. http://conferences.sigcomm.org/imc/2011/docs/p155.pdf Note that Linux has a similar feature called THIN_DUPACK. The differences are THIN_DUPACK do not mitigate reorderings and is only used after slow start. Currently ER is disabled if THIN_DUPACK is enabled. I would be happy to merge THIN_DUPACK feature with ER if people think it's a good idea. ER is enabled by sysctl_tcp_early_retrans: 0: Disables ER 1: Reduce dupthresh to packets_out - 1 when outstanding packets < 4. 2: (Default) reduce dupthresh like mode 1. In addition, delay entering fast recovery by RTT/4. Note: mode 2 is implemented in the third part of this patch series. Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-05-02 17:30:03 +04:00
tcp_ecn - INTEGER
Control use of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) by TCP.
ECN is used only when both ends of the TCP connection indicate
support for it. This feature is useful in avoiding losses due
to congestion by allowing supporting routers to signal
congestion before having to drop packets.
Possible values are:
= =====================================================
0 Disable ECN. Neither initiate nor accept ECN.
1 Enable ECN when requested by incoming connections and
also request ECN on outgoing connection attempts.
2 Enable ECN when requested by incoming connections
but do not request ECN on outgoing connections.
= =====================================================
Default: 2
tcp: add rfc3168, section 6.1.1.1. fallback This work as a follow-up of commit f7b3bec6f516 ("net: allow setting ecn via routing table") and adds RFC3168 section 6.1.1.1. fallback for outgoing ECN connections. In other words, this work adds a retry with a non-ECN setup SYN packet, as suggested from the RFC on the first timeout: [...] A host that receives no reply to an ECN-setup SYN within the normal SYN retransmission timeout interval MAY resend the SYN and any subsequent SYN retransmissions with CWR and ECE cleared. [...] Schematic client-side view when assuming the server is in tcp_ecn=2 mode, that is, Linux default since 2009 via commit 255cac91c3c9 ("tcp: extend ECN sysctl to allow server-side only ECN"): 1) Normal ECN-capable path: SYN ECE CWR -----> <----- SYN ACK ECE ACK -----> 2) Path with broken middlebox, when client has fallback: SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN -----> <----- SYN ACK ACK -----> In case we would not have the fallback implemented, the middlebox drop point would basically end up as: SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) In any case, it's rather a smaller percentage of sites where there would occur such additional setup latency: it was found in end of 2014 that ~56% of IPv4 and 65% of IPv6 servers of Alexa 1 million list would negotiate ECN (aka tcp_ecn=2 default), 0.42% of these webservers will fail to connect when trying to negotiate with ECN (tcp_ecn=1) due to timeouts, which the fallback would mitigate with a slight latency trade-off. Recent related paper on this topic: Brian Trammell, Mirja Kühlewind, Damiano Boppart, Iain Learmonth, Gorry Fairhurst, and Richard Scheffenegger: "Enabling Internet-Wide Deployment of Explicit Congestion Notification." Proc. PAM 2015, New York. http://ecn.ethz.ch/ecn-pam15.pdf Thus, when net.ipv4.tcp_ecn=1 is being set, the patch will perform RFC3168, section 6.1.1.1. fallback on timeout. For users explicitly not wanting this which can be in DC use case, we add a net.ipv4.tcp_ecn_fallback knob that allows for disabling the fallback. tp->ecn_flags are not being cleared in tcp_ecn_clear_syn() on output, but rather we let tcp_ecn_rcv_synack() take that over on input path in case a SYN ACK ECE was delayed. Thus a spurious SYN retransmission will not prevent ECN being negotiated eventually in that case. Reference: https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-iccrg-1.pdf Reference: https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/89/slides/slides-89-tsvarea-1.pdf Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Brian Trammell <trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Dave That <dave.taht@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-19 22:04:22 +03:00
tcp_ecn_fallback - BOOLEAN
If the kernel detects that ECN connection misbehaves, enable fall
back to non-ECN. Currently, this knob implements the fallback
from RFC3168, section 6.1.1.1., but we reserve that in future,
additional detection mechanisms could be implemented under this
knob. The value is not used, if tcp_ecn or per route (or congestion
control) ECN settings are disabled.
tcp: add rfc3168, section 6.1.1.1. fallback This work as a follow-up of commit f7b3bec6f516 ("net: allow setting ecn via routing table") and adds RFC3168 section 6.1.1.1. fallback for outgoing ECN connections. In other words, this work adds a retry with a non-ECN setup SYN packet, as suggested from the RFC on the first timeout: [...] A host that receives no reply to an ECN-setup SYN within the normal SYN retransmission timeout interval MAY resend the SYN and any subsequent SYN retransmissions with CWR and ECE cleared. [...] Schematic client-side view when assuming the server is in tcp_ecn=2 mode, that is, Linux default since 2009 via commit 255cac91c3c9 ("tcp: extend ECN sysctl to allow server-side only ECN"): 1) Normal ECN-capable path: SYN ECE CWR -----> <----- SYN ACK ECE ACK -----> 2) Path with broken middlebox, when client has fallback: SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN -----> <----- SYN ACK ACK -----> In case we would not have the fallback implemented, the middlebox drop point would basically end up as: SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) In any case, it's rather a smaller percentage of sites where there would occur such additional setup latency: it was found in end of 2014 that ~56% of IPv4 and 65% of IPv6 servers of Alexa 1 million list would negotiate ECN (aka tcp_ecn=2 default), 0.42% of these webservers will fail to connect when trying to negotiate with ECN (tcp_ecn=1) due to timeouts, which the fallback would mitigate with a slight latency trade-off. Recent related paper on this topic: Brian Trammell, Mirja Kühlewind, Damiano Boppart, Iain Learmonth, Gorry Fairhurst, and Richard Scheffenegger: "Enabling Internet-Wide Deployment of Explicit Congestion Notification." Proc. PAM 2015, New York. http://ecn.ethz.ch/ecn-pam15.pdf Thus, when net.ipv4.tcp_ecn=1 is being set, the patch will perform RFC3168, section 6.1.1.1. fallback on timeout. For users explicitly not wanting this which can be in DC use case, we add a net.ipv4.tcp_ecn_fallback knob that allows for disabling the fallback. tp->ecn_flags are not being cleared in tcp_ecn_clear_syn() on output, but rather we let tcp_ecn_rcv_synack() take that over on input path in case a SYN ACK ECE was delayed. Thus a spurious SYN retransmission will not prevent ECN being negotiated eventually in that case. Reference: https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-iccrg-1.pdf Reference: https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/89/slides/slides-89-tsvarea-1.pdf Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Brian Trammell <trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Dave That <dave.taht@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-19 22:04:22 +03:00
Default: 1 (fallback enabled)
tcp_fack - BOOLEAN
This is a legacy option, it has no effect anymore.
tcp_fin_timeout - INTEGER
The length of time an orphaned (no longer referenced by any
application) connection will remain in the FIN_WAIT_2 state
before it is aborted at the local end. While a perfectly
valid "receive only" state for an un-orphaned connection, an
orphaned connection in FIN_WAIT_2 state could otherwise wait
forever for the remote to close its end of the connection.
Cf. tcp_max_orphans
Default: 60 seconds
tcp_frto - INTEGER
tcp: implement RFC5682 F-RTO This patch implements F-RTO (foward RTO recovery): When the first retransmission after timeout is acknowledged, F-RTO sends new data instead of old data. If the next ACK acknowledges some never-retransmitted data, then the timeout was spurious and the congestion state is reverted. Otherwise if the next ACK selectively acknowledges the new data, then the timeout was genuine and the loss recovery continues. This idea applies to recurring timeouts as well. While F-RTO sends different data during timeout recovery, it does not (and should not) change the congestion control. The implementaion follows the three steps of SACK enhanced algorithm (section 3) in RFC5682. Step 1 is in tcp_enter_loss(). Step 2 and 3 are in tcp_process_loss(). The basic version is not supported because SACK enhanced version also works for non-SACK connections. The new implementation is functionally in parity with the old F-RTO implementation except the one case where it increases undo events: In addition to the RFC algorithm, a spurious timeout may be detected without sending data in step 2, as long as the SACK confirms not all the original data are dropped. When this happens, the sender will undo the cwnd and perhaps enter fast recovery instead. This additional check increases the F-RTO undo events by 5x compared to the prior implementation on Google Web servers, since the sender often does not have new data to send for HTTP. Note F-RTO may detect spurious timeout before Eifel with timestamps does so. Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-03-20 17:33:00 +04:00
Enables Forward RTO-Recovery (F-RTO) defined in RFC5682.
F-RTO is an enhanced recovery algorithm for TCP retransmission
tcp: implement RFC5682 F-RTO This patch implements F-RTO (foward RTO recovery): When the first retransmission after timeout is acknowledged, F-RTO sends new data instead of old data. If the next ACK acknowledges some never-retransmitted data, then the timeout was spurious and the congestion state is reverted. Otherwise if the next ACK selectively acknowledges the new data, then the timeout was genuine and the loss recovery continues. This idea applies to recurring timeouts as well. While F-RTO sends different data during timeout recovery, it does not (and should not) change the congestion control. The implementaion follows the three steps of SACK enhanced algorithm (section 3) in RFC5682. Step 1 is in tcp_enter_loss(). Step 2 and 3 are in tcp_process_loss(). The basic version is not supported because SACK enhanced version also works for non-SACK connections. The new implementation is functionally in parity with the old F-RTO implementation except the one case where it increases undo events: In addition to the RFC algorithm, a spurious timeout may be detected without sending data in step 2, as long as the SACK confirms not all the original data are dropped. When this happens, the sender will undo the cwnd and perhaps enter fast recovery instead. This additional check increases the F-RTO undo events by 5x compared to the prior implementation on Google Web servers, since the sender often does not have new data to send for HTTP. Note F-RTO may detect spurious timeout before Eifel with timestamps does so. Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-03-20 17:33:00 +04:00
timeouts. It is particularly beneficial in networks where the
RTT fluctuates (e.g., wireless). F-RTO is sender-side only
modification. It does not require any support from the peer.
By default it's enabled with a non-zero value. 0 disables F-RTO.
tcp_fwmark_accept - BOOLEAN
If set, incoming connections to listening sockets that do not have a
socket mark will set the mark of the accepting socket to the fwmark of
the incoming SYN packet. This will cause all packets on that connection
(starting from the first SYNACK) to be sent with that fwmark. The
listening socket's mark is unchanged. Listening sockets that already
have a fwmark set via setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_MARK, ...) are
unaffected.
Default: 0
tcp: helpers to mitigate ACK loops by rate-limiting out-of-window dupacks Helpers for mitigating ACK loops by rate-limiting dupacks sent in response to incoming out-of-window packets. This patch includes: - rate-limiting logic - sysctl to control how often we allow dupacks to out-of-window packets - SNMP counter for cases where we rate-limited our dupack sending The rate-limiting logic in this patch decides to not send dupacks in response to out-of-window segments if (a) they are SYNs or pure ACKs and (b) the remote endpoint is sending them faster than the configured rate limit. We rate-limit our responses rather than blocking them entirely or resetting the connection, because legitimate connections can rely on dupacks in response to some out-of-window segments. For example, zero window probes are typically sent with a sequence number that is below the current window, and ZWPs thus expect to thus elicit a dupack in response. We allow dupacks in response to TCP segments with data, because these may be spurious retransmissions for which the remote endpoint wants to receive DSACKs. This is safe because segments with data can't realistically be part of ACK loops, which by their nature consist of each side sending pure/data-less ACKs to each other. The dupack interval is controlled by a new sysctl knob, tcp_invalid_ratelimit, given in milliseconds, in case an administrator needs to dial this upward in the face of a high-rate DoS attack. The name and units are chosen to be analogous to the existing analogous knob for ICMP, icmp_ratelimit. The default value for tcp_invalid_ratelimit is 500ms, which allows at most one such dupack per 500ms. This is chosen to be 2x faster than the 1-second minimum RTO interval allowed by RFC 6298 (section 2, rule 2.4). We allow the extra 2x factor because network delay variations can cause packets sent at 1 second intervals to be compressed and arrive much closer. Reported-by: Avery Fay <avery@mixpanel.com> Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-02-07 00:04:38 +03:00
tcp_invalid_ratelimit - INTEGER
Limit the maximal rate for sending duplicate acknowledgments
in response to incoming TCP packets that are for an existing
connection but that are invalid due to any of these reasons:
(a) out-of-window sequence number,
(b) out-of-window acknowledgment number, or
(c) PAWS (Protection Against Wrapped Sequence numbers) check failure
This can help mitigate simple "ack loop" DoS attacks, wherein
a buggy or malicious middlebox or man-in-the-middle can
rewrite TCP header fields in manner that causes each endpoint
to think that the other is sending invalid TCP segments, thus
causing each side to send an unterminating stream of duplicate
acknowledgments for invalid segments.
Using 0 disables rate-limiting of dupacks in response to
invalid segments; otherwise this value specifies the minimal
space between sending such dupacks, in milliseconds.
Default: 500 (milliseconds).
tcp_keepalive_time - INTEGER
How often TCP sends out keepalive messages when keepalive is enabled.
Default: 2hours.
tcp_keepalive_probes - INTEGER
How many keepalive probes TCP sends out, until it decides that the
connection is broken. Default value: 9.
tcp_keepalive_intvl - INTEGER
How frequently the probes are send out. Multiplied by
tcp_keepalive_probes it is time to kill not responding connection,
after probes started. Default value: 75sec i.e. connection
will be aborted after ~11 minutes of retries.
tcp_l3mdev_accept - BOOLEAN
Enables child sockets to inherit the L3 master device index.
Enabling this option allows a "global" listen socket to work
across L3 master domains (e.g., VRFs) with connected sockets
derived from the listen socket to be bound to the L3 domain in
which the packets originated. Only valid when the kernel was
compiled with CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV.
Default: 0 (disabled)
tcp_low_latency - BOOLEAN
This is a legacy option, it has no effect anymore.
tcp_max_orphans - INTEGER
Maximal number of TCP sockets not attached to any user file handle,
held by system. If this number is exceeded orphaned connections are
reset immediately and warning is printed. This limit exists
only to prevent simple DoS attacks, you _must_ not rely on this
or lower the limit artificially, but rather increase it
(probably, after increasing installed memory),
if network conditions require more than default value,
and tune network services to linger and kill such states
more aggressively. Let me to remind again: each orphan eats
up to ~64K of unswappable memory.
tcp_max_syn_backlog - INTEGER
Maximal number of remembered connection requests (SYN_RECV),
which have not received an acknowledgment from connecting client.
This is a per-listener limit.
The minimal value is 128 for low memory machines, and it will
increase in proportion to the memory of machine.
If server suffers from overload, try increasing this number.
Remember to also check /proc/sys/net/core/somaxconn
A SYN_RECV request socket consumes about 304 bytes of memory.
tcp_max_tw_buckets - INTEGER
Maximal number of timewait sockets held by system simultaneously.
If this number is exceeded time-wait socket is immediately destroyed
and warning is printed. This limit exists only to prevent
simple DoS attacks, you _must_ not lower the limit artificially,
but rather increase it (probably, after increasing installed memory),
if network conditions require more than default value.
tcp_mem - vector of 3 INTEGERs: min, pressure, max
min: below this number of pages TCP is not bothered about its
memory appetite.
pressure: when amount of memory allocated by TCP exceeds this number
of pages, TCP moderates its memory consumption and enters memory
pressure mode, which is exited when memory consumption falls
under "min".
max: number of pages allowed for queueing by all TCP sockets.
Defaults are calculated at boot time from amount of available
memory.
tcp: track min RTT using windowed min-filter Kathleen Nichols' algorithm for tracking the minimum RTT of a data stream over some measurement window. It uses constant space and constant time per update. Yet it almost always delivers the same minimum as an implementation that has to keep all the data in the window. The measurement window is tunable via sysctl.net.ipv4.tcp_min_rtt_wlen with a default value of 5 minutes. The algorithm keeps track of the best, 2nd best & 3rd best min values, maintaining an invariant that the measurement time of the n'th best >= n-1'th best. It also makes sure that the three values are widely separated in the time window since that bounds the worse case error when that data is monotonically increasing over the window. Upon getting a new min, we can forget everything earlier because it has no value - the new min is less than everything else in the window by definition and it's the most recent. So we restart fresh on every new min and overwrites the 2nd & 3rd choices. The same property holds for the 2nd & 3rd best. Therefore we have to maintain two invariants to maximize the information in the samples, one on values (1st.v <= 2nd.v <= 3rd.v) and the other on times (now-win <=1st.t <= 2nd.t <= 3rd.t <= now). These invariants determine the structure of the code The RTT input to the windowed filter is the minimum RTT measured from ACK or SACK, or as the last resort from TCP timestamps. The accessor tcp_min_rtt() returns the minimum RTT seen in the window. ~0U indicates it is not available. The minimum is 1usec even if the true RTT is below that. Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-17 07:57:42 +03:00
tcp_min_rtt_wlen - INTEGER
The window length of the windowed min filter to track the minimum RTT.
A shorter window lets a flow more quickly pick up new (higher)
minimum RTT when it is moved to a longer path (e.g., due to traffic
engineering). A longer window makes the filter more resistant to RTT
inflations such as transient congestion. The unit is seconds.
Possible values: 0 - 86400 (1 day)
tcp: track min RTT using windowed min-filter Kathleen Nichols' algorithm for tracking the minimum RTT of a data stream over some measurement window. It uses constant space and constant time per update. Yet it almost always delivers the same minimum as an implementation that has to keep all the data in the window. The measurement window is tunable via sysctl.net.ipv4.tcp_min_rtt_wlen with a default value of 5 minutes. The algorithm keeps track of the best, 2nd best & 3rd best min values, maintaining an invariant that the measurement time of the n'th best >= n-1'th best. It also makes sure that the three values are widely separated in the time window since that bounds the worse case error when that data is monotonically increasing over the window. Upon getting a new min, we can forget everything earlier because it has no value - the new min is less than everything else in the window by definition and it's the most recent. So we restart fresh on every new min and overwrites the 2nd & 3rd choices. The same property holds for the 2nd & 3rd best. Therefore we have to maintain two invariants to maximize the information in the samples, one on values (1st.v <= 2nd.v <= 3rd.v) and the other on times (now-win <=1st.t <= 2nd.t <= 3rd.t <= now). These invariants determine the structure of the code The RTT input to the windowed filter is the minimum RTT measured from ACK or SACK, or as the last resort from TCP timestamps. The accessor tcp_min_rtt() returns the minimum RTT seen in the window. ~0U indicates it is not available. The minimum is 1usec even if the true RTT is below that. Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-17 07:57:42 +03:00
Default: 300
tcp_moderate_rcvbuf - BOOLEAN
If set, TCP performs receive buffer auto-tuning, attempting to
automatically size the buffer (no greater than tcp_rmem[2]) to
match the size required by the path for full throughput. Enabled by
default.
tcp_mtu_probing - INTEGER
Controls TCP Packetization-Layer Path MTU Discovery. Takes three
values:
- 0 - Disabled
- 1 - Disabled by default, enabled when an ICMP black hole detected
- 2 - Always enabled, use initial MSS of tcp_base_mss.
tcp_probe_interval - UNSIGNED INTEGER
Controls how often to start TCP Packetization-Layer Path MTU
Discovery reprobe. The default is reprobing every 10 minutes as
per RFC4821.
tcp_probe_threshold - INTEGER
Controls when TCP Packetization-Layer Path MTU Discovery probing
will stop in respect to the width of search range in bytes. Default
is 8 bytes.
tcp_no_metrics_save - BOOLEAN
By default, TCP saves various connection metrics in the route cache
when the connection closes, so that connections established in the
near future can use these to set initial conditions. Usually, this
increases overall performance, but may sometimes cause performance
degradation. If set, TCP will not cache metrics on closing
connections.
tcp_no_ssthresh_metrics_save - BOOLEAN
Controls whether TCP saves ssthresh metrics in the route cache.
Default is 1, which disables ssthresh metrics.
tcp_orphan_retries - INTEGER
This value influences the timeout of a locally closed TCP connection,
when RTO retransmissions remain unacknowledged.
See tcp_retries2 for more details.
The default value is 8.
If your machine is a loaded WEB server,
you should think about lowering this value, such sockets
may consume significant resources. Cf. tcp_max_orphans.
tcp_recovery - INTEGER
This value is a bitmap to enable various experimental loss recovery
features.
========= =============================================================
RACK: 0x1 enables the RACK loss detection for fast detection of lost
retransmissions and tail drops. It also subsumes and disables
RFC6675 recovery for SACK connections.
RACK: 0x2 makes RACK's reordering window static (min_rtt/4).
RACK: 0x4 disables RACK's DUPACK threshold heuristic
========= =============================================================
Default: 0x1
tcp_reordering - INTEGER
Initial reordering level of packets in a TCP stream.
TCP stack can then dynamically adjust flow reordering level
between this initial value and tcp_max_reordering
Default: 3
tcp_max_reordering - INTEGER
Maximal reordering level of packets in a TCP stream.
300 is a fairly conservative value, but you might increase it
if paths are using per packet load balancing (like bonding rr mode)
Default: 300
tcp_retrans_collapse - BOOLEAN
Bug-to-bug compatibility with some broken printers.
On retransmit try to send bigger packets to work around bugs in
certain TCP stacks.
tcp_retries1 - INTEGER
This value influences the time, after which TCP decides, that
something is wrong due to unacknowledged RTO retransmissions,
and reports this suspicion to the network layer.
See tcp_retries2 for more details.
RFC 1122 recommends at least 3 retransmissions, which is the
default.
tcp_retries2 - INTEGER
This value influences the timeout of an alive TCP connection,
when RTO retransmissions remain unacknowledged.
Given a value of N, a hypothetical TCP connection following
exponential backoff with an initial RTO of TCP_RTO_MIN would
retransmit N times before killing the connection at the (N+1)th RTO.
The default value of 15 yields a hypothetical timeout of 924.6
seconds and is a lower bound for the effective timeout.
TCP will effectively time out at the first RTO which exceeds the
hypothetical timeout.
RFC 1122 recommends at least 100 seconds for the timeout,
which corresponds to a value of at least 8.
tcp_rfc1337 - BOOLEAN
If set, the TCP stack behaves conforming to RFC1337. If unset,
we are not conforming to RFC, but prevent TCP TIME_WAIT
assassination.
Default: 0
tcp_rmem - vector of 3 INTEGERs: min, default, max
min: Minimal size of receive buffer used by TCP sockets.
It is guaranteed to each TCP socket, even under moderate memory
pressure.
Default: 4K
default: initial size of receive buffer used by TCP sockets.
This value overrides net.core.rmem_default used by other protocols.
Default: 87380 bytes. This value results in window of 65535 with
default setting of tcp_adv_win_scale and tcp_app_win:0 and a bit
less for default tcp_app_win. See below about these variables.
max: maximal size of receive buffer allowed for automatically
selected receiver buffers for TCP socket. This value does not override
net.core.rmem_max. Calling setsockopt() with SO_RCVBUF disables
automatic tuning of that socket's receive buffer size, in which
case this value is ignored.
tcp: change tcp_adv_win_scale and tcp_rmem[2] tcp_adv_win_scale default value is 2, meaning we expect a good citizen skb to have skb->len / skb->truesize ratio of 75% (3/4) In 2.6 kernels we (mis)accounted for typical MSS=1460 frame : 1536 + 64 + 256 = 1856 'estimated truesize', and 1856 * 3/4 = 1392. So these skbs were considered as not bloated. With recent truesize fixes, a typical MSS=1460 frame truesize is now the more precise : 2048 + 256 = 2304. But 2304 * 3/4 = 1728. So these skb are not good citizen anymore, because 1460 < 1728 (GRO can escape this problem because it build skbs with a too low truesize.) This also means tcp advertises a too optimistic window for a given allocated rcvspace : When receiving frames, sk_rmem_alloc can hit sk_rcvbuf limit and we call tcp_prune_queue()/tcp_collapse() too often, especially when application is slow to drain its receive queue or in case of losses (netperf is fast, scp is slow). This is a major latency source. We should adjust the len/truesize ratio to 50% instead of 75% This patch : 1) changes tcp_adv_win_scale default to 1 instead of 2 2) increase tcp_rmem[2] limit from 4MB to 6MB to take into account better truesize tracking and to allow autotuning tcp receive window to reach same value than before. Note that same amount of kernel memory is consumed compared to 2.6 kernels. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-05-02 06:28:41 +04:00
Default: between 87380B and 6MB, depending on RAM size.
tcp_sack - BOOLEAN
Enable select acknowledgments (SACKS).
tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns - LONG INTEGER
TCP tries to reduce number of SACK sent, using a timer
based on 5% of SRTT, capped by this sysctl, in nano seconds.
The default is 1ms, based on TSO autosizing period.
Default : 1,000,000 ns (1 ms)
tcp_comp_sack_slack_ns - LONG INTEGER
This sysctl control the slack used when arming the
timer used by SACK compression. This gives extra time
for small RTT flows, and reduces system overhead by allowing
opportunistic reduction of timer interrupts.
Default : 100,000 ns (100 us)
tcp_comp_sack_nr - INTEGER
Max number of SACK that can be compressed.
Using 0 disables SACK compression.
Default : 44
tcp_slow_start_after_idle - BOOLEAN
If set, provide RFC2861 behavior and time out the congestion
window after an idle period. An idle period is defined at
the current RTO. If unset, the congestion window will not
be timed out after an idle period.
Default: 1
tcp_stdurg - BOOLEAN
Use the Host requirements interpretation of the TCP urgent pointer field.
Most hosts use the older BSD interpretation, so if you turn this on
Linux might not communicate correctly with them.
Default: FALSE
tcp_synack_retries - INTEGER
Number of times SYNACKs for a passive TCP connection attempt will
be retransmitted. Should not be higher than 255. Default value
is 5, which corresponds to 31seconds till the last retransmission
with the current initial RTO of 1second. With this the final timeout
for a passive TCP connection will happen after 63seconds.
tcp_syncookies - INTEGER
Only valid when the kernel was compiled with CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
Send out syncookies when the syn backlog queue of a socket
overflows. This is to prevent against the common 'SYN flood attack'
Default: 1
Note, that syncookies is fallback facility.
It MUST NOT be used to help highly loaded servers to stand
against legal connection rate. If you see SYN flood warnings
in your logs, but investigation shows that they occur
because of overload with legal connections, you should tune
another parameters until this warning disappear.
See: tcp_max_syn_backlog, tcp_synack_retries, tcp_abort_on_overflow.
syncookies seriously violate TCP protocol, do not allow
to use TCP extensions, can result in serious degradation
of some services (f.e. SMTP relaying), visible not by you,
but your clients and relays, contacting you. While you see
SYN flood warnings in logs not being really flooded, your server
is seriously misconfigured.
If you want to test which effects syncookies have to your
network connections you can set this knob to 2 to enable
unconditionally generation of syncookies.
tcp_fastopen - INTEGER
Enable TCP Fast Open (RFC7413) to send and accept data in the opening
SYN packet.
The client support is enabled by flag 0x1 (on by default). The client
then must use sendmsg() or sendto() with the MSG_FASTOPEN flag,
rather than connect() to send data in SYN.
The server support is enabled by flag 0x2 (off by default). Then
either enable for all listeners with another flag (0x400) or
enable individual listeners via TCP_FASTOPEN socket option with
the option value being the length of the syn-data backlog.
The values (bitmap) are
===== ======== ======================================================
0x1 (client) enables sending data in the opening SYN on the client.
0x2 (server) enables the server support, i.e., allowing data in
a SYN packet to be accepted and passed to the
application before 3-way handshake finishes.
0x4 (client) send data in the opening SYN regardless of cookie
availability and without a cookie option.
0x200 (server) accept data-in-SYN w/o any cookie option present.
0x400 (server) enable all listeners to support Fast Open by
default without explicit TCP_FASTOPEN socket option.
===== ======== ======================================================
Default: 0x1
Note that that additional client or server features are only
effective if the basic support (0x1 and 0x2) are enabled respectively.
net/tcp_fastopen: Disable active side TFO in certain scenarios Middlebox firewall issues can potentially cause server's data being blackholed after a successful 3WHS using TFO. Following are the related reports from Apple: https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/Paasch_Network_Support.pdf Slide 31 identifies an issue where the client ACK to the server's data sent during a TFO'd handshake is dropped. C ---> syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C (accept & write) C <---- data ------- S C ----- ACK -> X S [retry and timeout] https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf Slide 5 shows a similar situation that the server's data gets dropped after 3WHS. C ---- syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C ---- ack --------> S S (accept & write) C? X <- data ------ S [retry and timeout] This is the worst failure b/c the client can not detect such behavior to mitigate the situation (such as disabling TFO). Failing to proceed, the application (e.g., SSL library) may simply timeout and retry with TFO again, and the process repeats indefinitely. The proposed solution is to disable active TFO globally under the following circumstances: 1. client side TFO socket detects out of order FIN 2. client side TFO socket receives out of order RST We disable active side TFO globally for 1hr at first. Then if it happens again, we disable it for 2h, then 4h, 8h, ... And we reset the timeout to 1hr if a client side TFO sockets not opened on loopback has successfully received data segs from server. And we examine this condition during close(). The rational behind it is that when such firewall issue happens, application running on the client should eventually close the socket as it is not able to get the data it is expecting. Or application running on the server should close the socket as it is not able to receive any response from client. In both cases, out of order FIN or RST will get received on the client given that the firewall will not block them as no data are in those frames. And we want to disable active TFO globally as it helps if the middle box is very close to the client and most of the connections are likely to fail. Also, add a debug sysctl: tcp_fastopen_blackhole_detect_timeout_sec: the initial timeout to use when firewall blackhole issue happens. This can be set and read. When setting it to 0, it means to disable the active disable logic. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-21 00:45:46 +03:00
tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout_sec - INTEGER
Initial time period in second to disable Fastopen on active TCP sockets
when a TFO firewall blackhole issue happens.
This time period will grow exponentially when more blackhole issues
get detected right after Fastopen is re-enabled and will reset to
initial value when the blackhole issue goes away.
0 to disable the blackhole detection.
net/tcp_fastopen: Disable active side TFO in certain scenarios Middlebox firewall issues can potentially cause server's data being blackholed after a successful 3WHS using TFO. Following are the related reports from Apple: https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/Paasch_Network_Support.pdf Slide 31 identifies an issue where the client ACK to the server's data sent during a TFO'd handshake is dropped. C ---> syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C (accept & write) C <---- data ------- S C ----- ACK -> X S [retry and timeout] https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf Slide 5 shows a similar situation that the server's data gets dropped after 3WHS. C ---- syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C ---- ack --------> S S (accept & write) C? X <- data ------ S [retry and timeout] This is the worst failure b/c the client can not detect such behavior to mitigate the situation (such as disabling TFO). Failing to proceed, the application (e.g., SSL library) may simply timeout and retry with TFO again, and the process repeats indefinitely. The proposed solution is to disable active TFO globally under the following circumstances: 1. client side TFO socket detects out of order FIN 2. client side TFO socket receives out of order RST We disable active side TFO globally for 1hr at first. Then if it happens again, we disable it for 2h, then 4h, 8h, ... And we reset the timeout to 1hr if a client side TFO sockets not opened on loopback has successfully received data segs from server. And we examine this condition during close(). The rational behind it is that when such firewall issue happens, application running on the client should eventually close the socket as it is not able to get the data it is expecting. Or application running on the server should close the socket as it is not able to receive any response from client. In both cases, out of order FIN or RST will get received on the client given that the firewall will not block them as no data are in those frames. And we want to disable active TFO globally as it helps if the middle box is very close to the client and most of the connections are likely to fail. Also, add a debug sysctl: tcp_fastopen_blackhole_detect_timeout_sec: the initial timeout to use when firewall blackhole issue happens. This can be set and read. When setting it to 0, it means to disable the active disable logic. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-21 00:45:46 +03:00
By default, it is set to 1hr.
tcp_fastopen_key - list of comma separated 32-digit hexadecimal INTEGERs
The list consists of a primary key and an optional backup key. The
primary key is used for both creating and validating cookies, while the
optional backup key is only used for validating cookies. The purpose of
the backup key is to maximize TFO validation when keys are rotated.
A randomly chosen primary key may be configured by the kernel if
the tcp_fastopen sysctl is set to 0x400 (see above), or if the
TCP_FASTOPEN setsockopt() optname is set and a key has not been
previously configured via sysctl. If keys are configured via
setsockopt() by using the TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY optname, then those
per-socket keys will be used instead of any keys that are specified via
sysctl.
A key is specified as 4 8-digit hexadecimal integers which are separated
by a '-' as: xxxxxxxx-xxxxxxxx-xxxxxxxx-xxxxxxxx. Leading zeros may be
omitted. A primary and a backup key may be specified by separating them
by a comma. If only one key is specified, it becomes the primary key and
any previously configured backup keys are removed.
tcp_syn_retries - INTEGER
Number of times initial SYNs for an active TCP connection attempt
will be retransmitted. Should not be higher than 127. Default value
is 6, which corresponds to 63seconds till the last retransmission
with the current initial RTO of 1second. With this the final timeout
for an active TCP connection attempt will happen after 127seconds.
tcp_timestamps - INTEGER
Enable timestamps as defined in RFC1323.
- 0: Disabled.
- 1: Enable timestamps as defined in RFC1323 and use random offset for
each connection rather than only using the current time.
- 2: Like 1, but without random offsets.
Default: 1
tcp: TSO packets automatic sizing After hearing many people over past years complaining against TSO being bursty or even buggy, we are proud to present automatic sizing of TSO packets. One part of the problem is that tcp_tso_should_defer() uses an heuristic relying on upcoming ACKS instead of a timer, but more generally, having big TSO packets makes little sense for low rates, as it tends to create micro bursts on the network, and general consensus is to reduce the buffering amount. This patch introduces a per socket sk_pacing_rate, that approximates the current sending rate, and allows us to size the TSO packets so that we try to send one packet every ms. This field could be set by other transports. Patch has no impact for high speed flows, where having large TSO packets makes sense to reach line rate. For other flows, this helps better packet scheduling and ACK clocking. This patch increases performance of TCP flows in lossy environments. A new sysctl (tcp_min_tso_segs) is added, to specify the minimal size of a TSO packet (default being 2). A follow-up patch will provide a new packet scheduler (FQ), using sk_pacing_rate as an input to perform optional per flow pacing. This explains why we chose to set sk_pacing_rate to twice the current rate, allowing 'slow start' ramp up. sk_pacing_rate = 2 * cwnd * mss / srtt v2: Neal Cardwell reported a suspect deferring of last two segments on initial write of 10 MSS, I had to change tcp_tso_should_defer() to take into account tp->xmit_size_goal_segs Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Van Jacobson <vanj@google.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-27 16:46:32 +04:00
tcp_min_tso_segs - INTEGER
Minimal number of segments per TSO frame.
tcp: TSO packets automatic sizing After hearing many people over past years complaining against TSO being bursty or even buggy, we are proud to present automatic sizing of TSO packets. One part of the problem is that tcp_tso_should_defer() uses an heuristic relying on upcoming ACKS instead of a timer, but more generally, having big TSO packets makes little sense for low rates, as it tends to create micro bursts on the network, and general consensus is to reduce the buffering amount. This patch introduces a per socket sk_pacing_rate, that approximates the current sending rate, and allows us to size the TSO packets so that we try to send one packet every ms. This field could be set by other transports. Patch has no impact for high speed flows, where having large TSO packets makes sense to reach line rate. For other flows, this helps better packet scheduling and ACK clocking. This patch increases performance of TCP flows in lossy environments. A new sysctl (tcp_min_tso_segs) is added, to specify the minimal size of a TSO packet (default being 2). A follow-up patch will provide a new packet scheduler (FQ), using sk_pacing_rate as an input to perform optional per flow pacing. This explains why we chose to set sk_pacing_rate to twice the current rate, allowing 'slow start' ramp up. sk_pacing_rate = 2 * cwnd * mss / srtt v2: Neal Cardwell reported a suspect deferring of last two segments on initial write of 10 MSS, I had to change tcp_tso_should_defer() to take into account tp->xmit_size_goal_segs Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Van Jacobson <vanj@google.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-27 16:46:32 +04:00
Since linux-3.12, TCP does an automatic sizing of TSO frames,
depending on flow rate, instead of filling 64Kbytes packets.
For specific usages, it's possible to force TCP to build big
TSO frames. Note that TCP stack might split too big TSO packets
if available window is too small.
tcp: TSO packets automatic sizing After hearing many people over past years complaining against TSO being bursty or even buggy, we are proud to present automatic sizing of TSO packets. One part of the problem is that tcp_tso_should_defer() uses an heuristic relying on upcoming ACKS instead of a timer, but more generally, having big TSO packets makes little sense for low rates, as it tends to create micro bursts on the network, and general consensus is to reduce the buffering amount. This patch introduces a per socket sk_pacing_rate, that approximates the current sending rate, and allows us to size the TSO packets so that we try to send one packet every ms. This field could be set by other transports. Patch has no impact for high speed flows, where having large TSO packets makes sense to reach line rate. For other flows, this helps better packet scheduling and ACK clocking. This patch increases performance of TCP flows in lossy environments. A new sysctl (tcp_min_tso_segs) is added, to specify the minimal size of a TSO packet (default being 2). A follow-up patch will provide a new packet scheduler (FQ), using sk_pacing_rate as an input to perform optional per flow pacing. This explains why we chose to set sk_pacing_rate to twice the current rate, allowing 'slow start' ramp up. sk_pacing_rate = 2 * cwnd * mss / srtt v2: Neal Cardwell reported a suspect deferring of last two segments on initial write of 10 MSS, I had to change tcp_tso_should_defer() to take into account tp->xmit_size_goal_segs Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Van Jacobson <vanj@google.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-08-27 16:46:32 +04:00
Default: 2
tcp_pacing_ss_ratio - INTEGER
sk->sk_pacing_rate is set by TCP stack using a ratio applied
to current rate. (current_rate = cwnd * mss / srtt)
If TCP is in slow start, tcp_pacing_ss_ratio is applied
to let TCP probe for bigger speeds, assuming cwnd can be
doubled every other RTT.
Default: 200
tcp_pacing_ca_ratio - INTEGER
sk->sk_pacing_rate is set by TCP stack using a ratio applied
to current rate. (current_rate = cwnd * mss / srtt)
If TCP is in congestion avoidance phase, tcp_pacing_ca_ratio
is applied to conservatively probe for bigger throughput.
Default: 120
tcp_tso_win_divisor - INTEGER
This allows control over what percentage of the congestion window
can be consumed by a single TSO frame.
The setting of this parameter is a choice between burstiness and
building larger TSO frames.
Default: 3
net-tcp: extend tcp_tw_reuse sysctl to enable loopback only optimization This changes the /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_tw_reuse from a boolean to an integer. It now takes the values 0, 1 and 2, where 0 and 1 behave as before, while 2 enables timewait socket reuse only for sockets that we can prove are loopback connections: ie. bound to 'lo' interface or where one of source or destination IPs is 127.0.0.0/8, ::ffff:127.0.0.0/104 or ::1. This enables quicker reuse of ephemeral ports for loopback connections - where tcp_tw_reuse is 100% safe from a protocol perspective (this assumes no artificially induced packet loss on 'lo'). This also makes estblishing many loopback connections *much* faster (allocating ports out of the first half of the ephemeral port range is significantly faster, then allocating from the second half) Without this change in a 32K ephemeral port space my sample program (it just establishes and closes [::1]:ephemeral -> [::1]:server_port connections in a tight loop) fails after 32765 connections in 24 seconds. With it enabled 50000 connections only take 4.7 seconds. This is particularly problematic for IPv6 where we only have one local address and cannot play tricks with varying source IP from 127.0.0.0/8 pool. Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Change-Id: I0377961749979d0301b7b62871a32a4b34b654e1 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-06-03 20:41:17 +03:00
tcp_tw_reuse - INTEGER
Enable reuse of TIME-WAIT sockets for new connections when it is
safe from protocol viewpoint.
- 0 - disable
- 1 - global enable
- 2 - enable for loopback traffic only
It should not be changed without advice/request of technical
experts.
net-tcp: extend tcp_tw_reuse sysctl to enable loopback only optimization This changes the /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_tw_reuse from a boolean to an integer. It now takes the values 0, 1 and 2, where 0 and 1 behave as before, while 2 enables timewait socket reuse only for sockets that we can prove are loopback connections: ie. bound to 'lo' interface or where one of source or destination IPs is 127.0.0.0/8, ::ffff:127.0.0.0/104 or ::1. This enables quicker reuse of ephemeral ports for loopback connections - where tcp_tw_reuse is 100% safe from a protocol perspective (this assumes no artificially induced packet loss on 'lo'). This also makes estblishing many loopback connections *much* faster (allocating ports out of the first half of the ephemeral port range is significantly faster, then allocating from the second half) Without this change in a 32K ephemeral port space my sample program (it just establishes and closes [::1]:ephemeral -> [::1]:server_port connections in a tight loop) fails after 32765 connections in 24 seconds. With it enabled 50000 connections only take 4.7 seconds. This is particularly problematic for IPv6 where we only have one local address and cannot play tricks with varying source IP from 127.0.0.0/8 pool. Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Change-Id: I0377961749979d0301b7b62871a32a4b34b654e1 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-06-03 20:41:17 +03:00
Default: 2
tcp_window_scaling - BOOLEAN
Enable window scaling as defined in RFC1323.
tcp_wmem - vector of 3 INTEGERs: min, default, max
min: Amount of memory reserved for send buffers for TCP sockets.
Each TCP socket has rights to use it due to fact of its birth.
Default: 4K
default: initial size of send buffer used by TCP sockets. This
value overrides net.core.wmem_default used by other protocols.
It is usually lower than net.core.wmem_default.
Default: 16K
max: Maximal amount of memory allowed for automatically tuned
send buffers for TCP sockets. This value does not override
net.core.wmem_max. Calling setsockopt() with SO_SNDBUF disables
automatic tuning of that socket's send buffer size, in which case
this value is ignored.
Default: between 64K and 4MB, depending on RAM size.
tcp: TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT socket option Idea of this patch is to add optional limitation of number of unsent bytes in TCP sockets, to reduce usage of kernel memory. TCP receiver might announce a big window, and TCP sender autotuning might allow a large amount of bytes in write queue, but this has little performance impact if a large part of this buffering is wasted : Write queue needs to be large only to deal with large BDP, not necessarily to cope with scheduling delays (incoming ACKS make room for the application to queue more bytes) For most workloads, using a value of 128 KB or less is OK to give applications enough time to react to POLLOUT events in time (or being awaken in a blocking sendmsg()) This patch adds two ways to set the limit : 1) Per socket option TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT 2) A sysctl (/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_notsent_lowat) for sockets not using TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT socket option (or setting a zero value) Default value being UINT_MAX (0xFFFFFFFF), meaning this has no effect. This changes poll()/select()/epoll() to report POLLOUT only if number of unsent bytes is below tp->nosent_lowat Note this might increase number of sendmsg()/sendfile() calls when using non blocking sockets, and increase number of context switches for blocking sockets. Note this is not related to SO_SNDLOWAT (as SO_SNDLOWAT is defined as : Specify the minimum number of bytes in the buffer until the socket layer will pass the data to the protocol) Tested: netperf sessions, and watching /proc/net/protocols "memory" column for TCP With 200 concurrent netperf -t TCP_STREAM sessions, amount of kernel memory used by TCP buffers shrinks by ~55 % (20567 pages instead of 45458) lpq83:~# echo -1 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_notsent_lowat lpq83:~# (super_netperf 200 -t TCP_STREAM -H remote -l 90 &); sleep 60 ; grep TCP /proc/net/protocols TCPv6 1880 2 45458 no 208 yes ipv6 y y y y y y y y y y y y y n y y y y y TCP 1696 508 45458 no 208 yes kernel y y y y y y y y y y y y y n y y y y y lpq83:~# echo 131072 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_notsent_lowat lpq83:~# (super_netperf 200 -t TCP_STREAM -H remote -l 90 &); sleep 60 ; grep TCP /proc/net/protocols TCPv6 1880 2 20567 no 208 yes ipv6 y y y y y y y y y y y y y n y y y y y TCP 1696 508 20567 no 208 yes kernel y y y y y y y y y y y y y n y y y y y Using 128KB has no bad effect on the throughput or cpu usage of a single flow, although there is an increase of context switches. A bonus is that we hold socket lock for a shorter amount of time and should improve latencies of ACK processing. lpq83:~# echo -1 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_notsent_lowat lpq83:~# perf stat -e context-switches ./netperf -H 7.7.7.84 -t omni -l 20 -c -i10,3 OMNI Send TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to 7.7.7.84 () port 0 AF_INET : +/-2.500% @ 99% conf. Local Remote Local Elapsed Throughput Throughput Local Local Remote Remote Local Remote Service Send Socket Recv Socket Send Time Units CPU CPU CPU CPU Service Service Demand Size Size Size (sec) Util Util Util Util Demand Demand Units Final Final % Method % Method 1651584 6291456 16384 20.00 17447.90 10^6bits/s 3.13 S -1.00 U 0.353 -1.000 usec/KB Performance counter stats for './netperf -H 7.7.7.84 -t omni -l 20 -c -i10,3': 412,514 context-switches 200.034645535 seconds time elapsed lpq83:~# echo 131072 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_notsent_lowat lpq83:~# perf stat -e context-switches ./netperf -H 7.7.7.84 -t omni -l 20 -c -i10,3 OMNI Send TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to 7.7.7.84 () port 0 AF_INET : +/-2.500% @ 99% conf. Local Remote Local Elapsed Throughput Throughput Local Local Remote Remote Local Remote Service Send Socket Recv Socket Send Time Units CPU CPU CPU CPU Service Service Demand Size Size Size (sec) Util Util Util Util Demand Demand Units Final Final % Method % Method 1593240 6291456 16384 20.00 17321.16 10^6bits/s 3.35 S -1.00 U 0.381 -1.000 usec/KB Performance counter stats for './netperf -H 7.7.7.84 -t omni -l 20 -c -i10,3': 2,675,818 context-switches 200.029651391 seconds time elapsed Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-By: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-07-23 07:27:07 +04:00
tcp_notsent_lowat - UNSIGNED INTEGER
A TCP socket can control the amount of unsent bytes in its write queue,
thanks to TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT socket option. poll()/select()/epoll()
reports POLLOUT events if the amount of unsent bytes is below a per
socket value, and if the write queue is not full. sendmsg() will
also not add new buffers if the limit is hit.
This global variable controls the amount of unsent data for
sockets not using TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT. For these sockets, a change
to the global variable has immediate effect.
Default: UINT_MAX (0xFFFFFFFF)
tcp_workaround_signed_windows - BOOLEAN
If set, assume no receipt of a window scaling option means the
remote TCP is broken and treats the window as a signed quantity.
If unset, assume the remote TCP is not broken even if we do
not receive a window scaling option from them.
Default: 0
tcp_thin_linear_timeouts - BOOLEAN
Enable dynamic triggering of linear timeouts for thin streams.
If set, a check is performed upon retransmission by timeout to
determine if the stream is thin (less than 4 packets in flight).
As long as the stream is found to be thin, up to 6 linear
timeouts may be performed before exponential backoff mode is
initiated. This improves retransmission latency for
non-aggressive thin streams, often found to be time-dependent.
For more information on thin streams, see
Documentation/networking/tcp-thin.rst
Default: 0
tcp: TCP Small Queues This introduce TSQ (TCP Small Queues) TSQ goal is to reduce number of TCP packets in xmit queues (qdisc & device queues), to reduce RTT and cwnd bias, part of the bufferbloat problem. sk->sk_wmem_alloc not allowed to grow above a given limit, allowing no more than ~128KB [1] per tcp socket in qdisc/dev layers at a given time. TSO packets are sized/capped to half the limit, so that we have two TSO packets in flight, allowing better bandwidth use. As a side effect, setting the limit to 40000 automatically reduces the standard gso max limit (65536) to 40000/2 : It can help to reduce latencies of high prio packets, having smaller TSO packets. This means we divert sock_wfree() to a tcp_wfree() handler, to queue/send following frames when skb_orphan() [2] is called for the already queued skbs. Results on my dev machines (tg3/ixgbe nics) are really impressive, using standard pfifo_fast, and with or without TSO/GSO. Without reduction of nominal bandwidth, we have reduction of buffering per bulk sender : < 1ms on Gbit (instead of 50ms with TSO) < 8ms on 100Mbit (instead of 132 ms) I no longer have 4 MBytes backlogged in qdisc by a single netperf session, and both side socket autotuning no longer use 4 Mbytes. As skb destructor cannot restart xmit itself ( as qdisc lock might be taken at this point ), we delegate the work to a tasklet. We use one tasklest per cpu for performance reasons. If tasklet finds a socket owned by the user, it sets TSQ_OWNED flag. This flag is tested in a new protocol method called from release_sock(), to eventually send new segments. [1] New /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_limit_output_bytes tunable [2] skb_orphan() is usually called at TX completion time, but some drivers call it in their start_xmit() handler. These drivers should at least use BQL, or else a single TCP session can still fill the whole NIC TX ring, since TSQ will have no effect. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Dave Taht <dave.taht@bufferbloat.net> Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Cc: Matt Mathis <mattmathis@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-07-11 09:50:31 +04:00
tcp_limit_output_bytes - INTEGER
Controls TCP Small Queue limit per tcp socket.
TCP bulk sender tends to increase packets in flight until it
gets losses notifications. With SNDBUF autotuning, this can
result in a large amount of packets queued on the local machine
(e.g.: qdiscs, CPU backlog, or device) hurting latency of other
flows, for typical pfifo_fast qdiscs. tcp_limit_output_bytes
limits the number of bytes on qdisc or device to reduce artificial
RTT/cwnd and reduce bufferbloat.
Default: 1048576 (16 * 65536)
tcp: TCP Small Queues This introduce TSQ (TCP Small Queues) TSQ goal is to reduce number of TCP packets in xmit queues (qdisc & device queues), to reduce RTT and cwnd bias, part of the bufferbloat problem. sk->sk_wmem_alloc not allowed to grow above a given limit, allowing no more than ~128KB [1] per tcp socket in qdisc/dev layers at a given time. TSO packets are sized/capped to half the limit, so that we have two TSO packets in flight, allowing better bandwidth use. As a side effect, setting the limit to 40000 automatically reduces the standard gso max limit (65536) to 40000/2 : It can help to reduce latencies of high prio packets, having smaller TSO packets. This means we divert sock_wfree() to a tcp_wfree() handler, to queue/send following frames when skb_orphan() [2] is called for the already queued skbs. Results on my dev machines (tg3/ixgbe nics) are really impressive, using standard pfifo_fast, and with or without TSO/GSO. Without reduction of nominal bandwidth, we have reduction of buffering per bulk sender : < 1ms on Gbit (instead of 50ms with TSO) < 8ms on 100Mbit (instead of 132 ms) I no longer have 4 MBytes backlogged in qdisc by a single netperf session, and both side socket autotuning no longer use 4 Mbytes. As skb destructor cannot restart xmit itself ( as qdisc lock might be taken at this point ), we delegate the work to a tasklet. We use one tasklest per cpu for performance reasons. If tasklet finds a socket owned by the user, it sets TSQ_OWNED flag. This flag is tested in a new protocol method called from release_sock(), to eventually send new segments. [1] New /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_limit_output_bytes tunable [2] skb_orphan() is usually called at TX completion time, but some drivers call it in their start_xmit() handler. These drivers should at least use BQL, or else a single TCP session can still fill the whole NIC TX ring, since TSQ will have no effect. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Dave Taht <dave.taht@bufferbloat.net> Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Cc: Matt Mathis <mattmathis@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-07-11 09:50:31 +04:00
tcp_challenge_ack_limit - INTEGER
Limits number of Challenge ACK sent per second, as recommended
in RFC 5961 (Improving TCP's Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks)
Default: 1000
tcp_rx_skb_cache - BOOLEAN
Controls a per TCP socket cache of one skb, that might help
performance of some workloads. This might be dangerous
on systems with a lot of TCP sockets, since it increases
memory usage.
Default: 0 (disabled)
UDP variables
=============
udp_l3mdev_accept - BOOLEAN
Enabling this option allows a "global" bound socket to work
across L3 master domains (e.g., VRFs) with packets capable of
being received regardless of the L3 domain in which they
originated. Only valid when the kernel was compiled with
CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV.
Default: 0 (disabled)
udp_mem - vector of 3 INTEGERs: min, pressure, max
Number of pages allowed for queueing by all UDP sockets.
min: Below this number of pages UDP is not bothered about its
memory appetite. When amount of memory allocated by UDP exceeds
this number, UDP starts to moderate memory usage.
pressure: This value was introduced to follow format of tcp_mem.
max: Number of pages allowed for queueing by all UDP sockets.
Default is calculated at boot time from amount of available memory.
udp_rmem_min - INTEGER
Minimal size of receive buffer used by UDP sockets in moderation.
Each UDP socket is able to use the size for receiving data, even if
total pages of UDP sockets exceed udp_mem pressure. The unit is byte.
Default: 4K
udp_wmem_min - INTEGER
Minimal size of send buffer used by UDP sockets in moderation.
Each UDP socket is able to use the size for sending data, even if
total pages of UDP sockets exceed udp_mem pressure. The unit is byte.
Default: 4K
RAW variables
=============
raw_l3mdev_accept - BOOLEAN
Enabling this option allows a "global" bound socket to work
across L3 master domains (e.g., VRFs) with packets capable of
being received regardless of the L3 domain in which they
originated. Only valid when the kernel was compiled with
CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV.
Default: 1 (enabled)
CIPSOv4 Variables
=================
cipso_cache_enable - BOOLEAN
If set, enable additions to and lookups from the CIPSO label mapping
cache. If unset, additions are ignored and lookups always result in a
miss. However, regardless of the setting the cache is still
invalidated when required when means you can safely toggle this on and
off and the cache will always be "safe".
Default: 1
cipso_cache_bucket_size - INTEGER
The CIPSO label cache consists of a fixed size hash table with each
hash bucket containing a number of cache entries. This variable limits
the number of entries in each hash bucket; the larger the value the
more CIPSO label mappings that can be cached. When the number of
entries in a given hash bucket reaches this limit adding new entries
causes the oldest entry in the bucket to be removed to make room.
Default: 10
cipso_rbm_optfmt - BOOLEAN
Enable the "Optimized Tag 1 Format" as defined in section 3.4.2.6 of
the CIPSO draft specification (see Documentation/netlabel for details).
This means that when set the CIPSO tag will be padded with empty
categories in order to make the packet data 32-bit aligned.
Default: 0
cipso_rbm_structvalid - BOOLEAN
If set, do a very strict check of the CIPSO option when
ip_options_compile() is called. If unset, relax the checks done during
ip_options_compile(). Either way is "safe" as errors are caught else
where in the CIPSO processing code but setting this to 0 (False) should
result in less work (i.e. it should be faster) but could cause problems
with other implementations that require strict checking.
Default: 0
IP Variables
============
ip_local_port_range - 2 INTEGERS
Defines the local port range that is used by TCP and UDP to
choose the local port. The first number is the first, the
second the last local port number.
If possible, it is better these numbers have different parity
(one even and one odd value).
Must be greater than or equal to ip_unprivileged_port_start.
The default values are 32768 and 60999 respectively.
ip_local_reserved_ports - list of comma separated ranges
Specify the ports which are reserved for known third-party
applications. These ports will not be used by automatic port
assignments (e.g. when calling connect() or bind() with port
number 0). Explicit port allocation behavior is unchanged.
The format used for both input and output is a comma separated
list of ranges (e.g. "1,2-4,10-10" for ports 1, 2, 3, 4 and
10). Writing to the file will clear all previously reserved
ports and update the current list with the one given in the
input.
Note that ip_local_port_range and ip_local_reserved_ports
settings are independent and both are considered by the kernel
when determining which ports are available for automatic port
assignments.
You can reserve ports which are not in the current
ip_local_port_range, e.g.::
$ cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range
32000 60999
$ cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_reserved_ports
8080,9148
although this is redundant. However such a setting is useful
if later the port range is changed to a value that will
include the reserved ports.
Default: Empty
ip_unprivileged_port_start - INTEGER
This is a per-namespace sysctl. It defines the first
unprivileged port in the network namespace. Privileged ports
require root or CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE in order to bind to them.
To disable all privileged ports, set this to 0. They must not
overlap with the ip_local_port_range.
Default: 1024
ip_nonlocal_bind - BOOLEAN
If set, allows processes to bind() to non-local IP addresses,
which can be quite useful - but may break some applications.
Default: 0
tcp: bind(0) remove the SO_REUSEADDR restriction when ephemeral ports are exhausted. Commit aacd9289af8b82f5fb01bcdd53d0e3406d1333c7 ("tcp: bind() use stronger condition for bind_conflict") introduced a restriction to forbid to bind SO_REUSEADDR enabled sockets to the same (addr, port) tuple in order to assign ports dispersedly so that we can connect to the same remote host. The change results in accelerating port depletion so that we fail to bind sockets to the same local port even if we want to connect to the different remote hosts. You can reproduce this issue by following instructions below. 1. # sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range="32768 32768" 2. set SO_REUSEADDR to two sockets. 3. bind two sockets to (localhost, 0) and the latter fails. Therefore, when ephemeral ports are exhausted, bind(0) should fallback to the legacy behaviour to enable the SO_REUSEADDR option and make it possible to connect to different remote (addr, port) tuples. This patch allows us to bind SO_REUSEADDR enabled sockets to the same (addr, port) only when net.ipv4.ip_autobind_reuse is set 1 and all ephemeral ports are exhausted. This also allows connect() and listen() to share ports in the following way and may break some applications. So the ip_autobind_reuse is 0 by default and disables the feature. 1. setsockopt(sk1, SO_REUSEADDR) 2. setsockopt(sk2, SO_REUSEADDR) 3. bind(sk1, saddr, 0) 4. bind(sk2, saddr, 0) 5. connect(sk1, daddr) 6. listen(sk2) If it is set 1, we can fully utilize the 4-tuples, but we should use IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT for bind()+connect() as possible. The notable thing is that if all sockets bound to the same port have both SO_REUSEADDR and SO_REUSEPORT enabled, we can bind sockets to an ephemeral port and also do listen(). Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.co.jp> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-03-10 11:05:25 +03:00
ip_autobind_reuse - BOOLEAN
By default, bind() does not select the ports automatically even if
the new socket and all sockets bound to the port have SO_REUSEADDR.
ip_autobind_reuse allows bind() to reuse the port and this is useful
when you use bind()+connect(), but may break some applications.
The preferred solution is to use IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT and this
option should only be set by experts.
Default: 0
ip_dynaddr - BOOLEAN
If set non-zero, enables support for dynamic addresses.
If set to a non-zero value larger than 1, a kernel log
message will be printed when dynamic address rewriting
occurs.
Default: 0
ip_early_demux - BOOLEAN
Optimize input packet processing down to one demux for
certain kinds of local sockets. Currently we only do this
for established TCP and connected UDP sockets.
It may add an additional cost for pure routing workloads that
reduces overall throughput, in such case you should disable it.
Default: 1
ping_group_range - 2 INTEGERS
Restrict ICMP_PROTO datagram sockets to users in the group range.
The default is "1 0", meaning, that nobody (not even root) may
create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions
to the single group. "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100
4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons.
tcp_early_demux - BOOLEAN
Enable early demux for established TCP sockets.
Default: 1
udp_early_demux - BOOLEAN
Enable early demux for connected UDP sockets. Disable this if
your system could experience more unconnected load.
Default: 1
icmp_echo_ignore_all - BOOLEAN
If set non-zero, then the kernel will ignore all ICMP ECHO
requests sent to it.
Default: 0
icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts - BOOLEAN
If set non-zero, then the kernel will ignore all ICMP ECHO and
TIMESTAMP requests sent to it via broadcast/multicast.
Default: 1
icmp_ratelimit - INTEGER
Limit the maximal rates for sending ICMP packets whose type matches
icmp_ratemask (see below) to specific targets.
0 to disable any limiting,
otherwise the minimal space between responses in milliseconds.
Note that another sysctl, icmp_msgs_per_sec limits the number
of ICMP packets sent on all targets.
Default: 1000
icmp_msgs_per_sec - INTEGER
Limit maximal number of ICMP packets sent per second from this host.
Only messages whose type matches icmp_ratemask (see below) are
controlled by this limit.
Default: 1000
icmp_msgs_burst - INTEGER
icmp_msgs_per_sec controls number of ICMP packets sent per second,
while icmp_msgs_burst controls the burst size of these packets.
Default: 50
icmp_ratemask - INTEGER
Mask made of ICMP types for which rates are being limited.
Significant bits: IHGFEDCBA9876543210
Default mask: 0000001100000011000 (6168)
Bit definitions (see include/linux/icmp.h):
= =========================
0 Echo Reply
3 Destination Unreachable [1]_
4 Source Quench [1]_
5 Redirect
8 Echo Request
B Time Exceeded [1]_
C Parameter Problem [1]_
D Timestamp Request
E Timestamp Reply
F Info Request
G Info Reply
H Address Mask Request
I Address Mask Reply
= =========================
.. [1] These are rate limited by default (see default mask above)
icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses - BOOLEAN
Some routers violate RFC1122 by sending bogus responses to broadcast
frames. Such violations are normally logged via a kernel warning.
If this is set to TRUE, the kernel will not give such warnings, which
will avoid log file clutter.
Default: 1
icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr - BOOLEAN
If zero, icmp error messages are sent with the primary address of
the exiting interface.
If non-zero, the message will be sent with the primary address of
the interface that received the packet that caused the icmp error.
This is the behaviour network many administrators will expect from
a router. And it can make debugging complicated network layouts
much easier.
Note that if no primary address exists for the interface selected,
then the primary address of the first non-loopback interface that
has one will be used regardless of this setting.
Default: 0
igmp_max_memberships - INTEGER
Change the maximum number of multicast groups we can subscribe to.
Default: 20
Theoretical maximum value is bounded by having to send a membership
report in a single datagram (i.e. the report can't span multiple
datagrams, or risk confusing the switch and leaving groups you don't
intend to).
The number of supported groups 'M' is bounded by the number of group
report entries you can fit into a single datagram of 65535 bytes.
M = 65536-sizeof (ip header)/(sizeof(Group record))
Group records are variable length, with a minimum of 12 bytes.
So net.ipv4.igmp_max_memberships should not be set higher than:
(65536-24) / 12 = 5459
The value 5459 assumes no IP header options, so in practice
this number may be lower.
igmp_max_msf - INTEGER
Maximum number of addresses allowed in the source filter list for a
multicast group.
Default: 10
igmp_qrv - INTEGER
Controls the IGMP query robustness variable (see RFC2236 8.1).
Default: 2 (as specified by RFC2236 8.1)
Minimum: 1 (as specified by RFC6636 4.5)
force_igmp_version - INTEGER
- 0 - (default) No enforcement of a IGMP version, IGMPv1/v2 fallback
allowed. Will back to IGMPv3 mode again if all IGMPv1/v2 Querier
Present timer expires.
- 1 - Enforce to use IGMP version 1. Will also reply IGMPv1 report if
receive IGMPv2/v3 query.
- 2 - Enforce to use IGMP version 2. Will fallback to IGMPv1 if receive
IGMPv1 query message. Will reply report if receive IGMPv3 query.
- 3 - Enforce to use IGMP version 3. The same react with default 0.
.. note::
this is not the same with force_mld_version because IGMPv3 RFC3376
Security Considerations does not have clear description that we could
ignore other version messages completely as MLDv2 RFC3810. So make
this value as default 0 is recommended.
``conf/interface/*``
changes special settings per interface (where
interface" is the name of your network interface)
``conf/all/*``
is special, changes the settings for all interfaces
log_martians - BOOLEAN
Log packets with impossible addresses to kernel log.
log_martians for the interface will be enabled if at least one of
conf/{all,interface}/log_martians is set to TRUE,
it will be disabled otherwise
accept_redirects - BOOLEAN
Accept ICMP redirect messages.
accept_redirects for the interface will be enabled if:
- both conf/{all,interface}/accept_redirects are TRUE in the case
forwarding for the interface is enabled
or
- at least one of conf/{all,interface}/accept_redirects is TRUE in the
case forwarding for the interface is disabled
accept_redirects for the interface will be disabled otherwise
default:
- TRUE (host)
- FALSE (router)
forwarding - BOOLEAN
Enable IP forwarding on this interface. This controls whether packets
received _on_ this interface can be forwarded.
mc_forwarding - BOOLEAN
Do multicast routing. The kernel needs to be compiled with CONFIG_MROUTE
and a multicast routing daemon is required.
conf/all/mc_forwarding must also be set to TRUE to enable multicast
routing for the interface
medium_id - INTEGER
Integer value used to differentiate the devices by the medium they
are attached to. Two devices can have different id values when
the broadcast packets are received only on one of them.
The default value 0 means that the device is the only interface
to its medium, value of -1 means that medium is not known.
Currently, it is used to change the proxy_arp behavior:
the proxy_arp feature is enabled for packets forwarded between
two devices attached to different media.
proxy_arp - BOOLEAN
Do proxy arp.
proxy_arp for the interface will be enabled if at least one of
conf/{all,interface}/proxy_arp is set to TRUE,
it will be disabled otherwise
proxy_arp_pvlan - BOOLEAN
Private VLAN proxy arp.
Basically allow proxy arp replies back to the same interface
(from which the ARP request/solicitation was received).
This is done to support (ethernet) switch features, like RFC
3069, where the individual ports are NOT allowed to
communicate with each other, but they are allowed to talk to
the upstream router. As described in RFC 3069, it is possible
to allow these hosts to communicate through the upstream
router by proxy_arp'ing. Don't need to be used together with
proxy_arp.
This technology is known by different names:
In RFC 3069 it is called VLAN Aggregation.
Cisco and Allied Telesyn call it Private VLAN.
Hewlett-Packard call it Source-Port filtering or port-isolation.
Ericsson call it MAC-Forced Forwarding (RFC Draft).
shared_media - BOOLEAN
Send(router) or accept(host) RFC1620 shared media redirects.
Overrides secure_redirects.
shared_media for the interface will be enabled if at least one of
conf/{all,interface}/shared_media is set to TRUE,
it will be disabled otherwise
default TRUE
secure_redirects - BOOLEAN
Accept ICMP redirect messages only to gateways listed in the
interface's current gateway list. Even if disabled, RFC1122 redirect
rules still apply.
Overridden by shared_media.
secure_redirects for the interface will be enabled if at least one of
conf/{all,interface}/secure_redirects is set to TRUE,
it will be disabled otherwise
default TRUE
send_redirects - BOOLEAN
Send redirects, if router.
send_redirects for the interface will be enabled if at least one of
conf/{all,interface}/send_redirects is set to TRUE,
it will be disabled otherwise
Default: TRUE
bootp_relay - BOOLEAN
Accept packets with source address 0.b.c.d destined
not to this host as local ones. It is supposed, that
BOOTP relay daemon will catch and forward such packets.
conf/all/bootp_relay must also be set to TRUE to enable BOOTP relay
for the interface
default FALSE
Not Implemented Yet.
accept_source_route - BOOLEAN
Accept packets with SRR option.
conf/all/accept_source_route must also be set to TRUE to accept packets
with SRR option on the interface
default
- TRUE (router)
- FALSE (host)
accept_local - BOOLEAN
Accept packets with local source addresses. In combination with
suitable routing, this can be used to direct packets between two
local interfaces over the wire and have them accepted properly.
default FALSE
route_localnet - BOOLEAN
Do not consider loopback addresses as martian source or destination
while routing. This enables the use of 127/8 for local routing purposes.
default FALSE
rp_filter - INTEGER
- 0 - No source validation.
- 1 - Strict mode as defined in RFC3704 Strict Reverse Path
Each incoming packet is tested against the FIB and if the interface
is not the best reverse path the packet check will fail.
By default failed packets are discarded.
- 2 - Loose mode as defined in RFC3704 Loose Reverse Path
Each incoming packet's source address is also tested against the FIB
and if the source address is not reachable via any interface
the packet check will fail.
Current recommended practice in RFC3704 is to enable strict mode
to prevent IP spoofing from DDos attacks. If using asymmetric routing
or other complicated routing, then loose mode is recommended.
The max value from conf/{all,interface}/rp_filter is used
when doing source validation on the {interface}.
Default value is 0. Note that some distributions enable it
in startup scripts.
arp_filter - BOOLEAN
- 1 - Allows you to have multiple network interfaces on the same
subnet, and have the ARPs for each interface be answered
based on whether or not the kernel would route a packet from
the ARP'd IP out that interface (therefore you must use source
based routing for this to work). In other words it allows control
of which cards (usually 1) will respond to an arp request.
- 0 - (default) The kernel can respond to arp requests with addresses
from other interfaces. This may seem wrong but it usually makes
sense, because it increases the chance of successful communication.
IP addresses are owned by the complete host on Linux, not by
particular interfaces. Only for more complex setups like load-
balancing, does this behaviour cause problems.
arp_filter for the interface will be enabled if at least one of
conf/{all,interface}/arp_filter is set to TRUE,
it will be disabled otherwise
arp_announce - INTEGER
Define different restriction levels for announcing the local
source IP address from IP packets in ARP requests sent on
interface:
- 0 - (default) Use any local address, configured on any interface
- 1 - Try to avoid local addresses that are not in the target's
subnet for this interface. This mode is useful when target
hosts reachable via this interface require the source IP
address in ARP requests to be part of their logical network
configured on the receiving interface. When we generate the
request we will check all our subnets that include the
target IP and will preserve the source address if it is from
such subnet. If there is no such subnet we select source
address according to the rules for level 2.
- 2 - Always use the best local address for this target.
In this mode we ignore the source address in the IP packet
and try to select local address that we prefer for talks with
the target host. Such local address is selected by looking
for primary IP addresses on all our subnets on the outgoing
interface that include the target IP address. If no suitable
local address is found we select the first local address
we have on the outgoing interface or on all other interfaces,
with the hope we will receive reply for our request and
even sometimes no matter the source IP address we announce.
The max value from conf/{all,interface}/arp_announce is used.
Increasing the restriction level gives more chance for
receiving answer from the resolved target while decreasing
the level announces more valid sender's information.
arp_ignore - INTEGER
Define different modes for sending replies in response to
received ARP requests that resolve local target IP addresses:
- 0 - (default): reply for any local target IP address, configured
on any interface
- 1 - reply only if the target IP address is local address
configured on the incoming interface
- 2 - reply only if the target IP address is local address
configured on the incoming interface and both with the
sender's IP address are part from same subnet on this interface
- 3 - do not reply for local addresses configured with scope host,
only resolutions for global and link addresses are replied
- 4-7 - reserved
- 8 - do not reply for all local addresses
The max value from conf/{all,interface}/arp_ignore is used
when ARP request is received on the {interface}
arp_notify - BOOLEAN
Define mode for notification of address and device changes.
== ==========================================================
0 (default): do nothing
1 Generate gratuitous arp requests when device is brought up
or hardware address changes.
== ==========================================================
arp_accept - BOOLEAN
Define behavior for gratuitous ARP frames who's IP is not
already present in the ARP table:
- 0 - don't create new entries in the ARP table
- 1 - create new entries in the ARP table
Both replies and requests type gratuitous arp will trigger the
ARP table to be updated, if this setting is on.
If the ARP table already contains the IP address of the
gratuitous arp frame, the arp table will be updated regardless
if this setting is on or off.
mcast_solicit - INTEGER
The maximum number of multicast probes in INCOMPLETE state,
when the associated hardware address is unknown. Defaults
to 3.
ucast_solicit - INTEGER
The maximum number of unicast probes in PROBE state, when
the hardware address is being reconfirmed. Defaults to 3.
app_solicit - INTEGER
The maximum number of probes to send to the user space ARP daemon
via netlink before dropping back to multicast probes (see
mcast_resolicit). Defaults to 0.
mcast_resolicit - INTEGER
The maximum number of multicast probes after unicast and
app probes in PROBE state. Defaults to 0.
disable_policy - BOOLEAN
Disable IPSEC policy (SPD) for this interface
disable_xfrm - BOOLEAN
Disable IPSEC encryption on this interface, whatever the policy
igmpv2_unsolicited_report_interval - INTEGER
The interval in milliseconds in which the next unsolicited
IGMPv1 or IGMPv2 report retransmit will take place.
Default: 10000 (10 seconds)
igmpv3_unsolicited_report_interval - INTEGER
The interval in milliseconds in which the next unsolicited
IGMPv3 report retransmit will take place.
Default: 1000 (1 seconds)
promote_secondaries - BOOLEAN
When a primary IP address is removed from this interface
promote a corresponding secondary IP address instead of
removing all the corresponding secondary IP addresses.
drop_unicast_in_l2_multicast - BOOLEAN
Drop any unicast IP packets that are received in link-layer
multicast (or broadcast) frames.
This behavior (for multicast) is actually a SHOULD in RFC
1122, but is disabled by default for compatibility reasons.
Default: off (0)
drop_gratuitous_arp - BOOLEAN
Drop all gratuitous ARP frames, for example if there's a known
good ARP proxy on the network and such frames need not be used
(or in the case of 802.11, must not be used to prevent attacks.)
Default: off (0)
tag - INTEGER
Allows you to write a number, which can be used as required.
Default value is 0.
xfrm4_gc_thresh - INTEGER
(Obsolete since linux-4.14)
The threshold at which we will start garbage collecting for IPv4
destination cache entries. At twice this value the system will
refuse new allocations.
igmp_link_local_mcast_reports - BOOLEAN
Enable IGMP reports for link local multicast groups in the
224.0.0.X range.
Default TRUE
Alexey Kuznetsov.
kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru
Updated by:
- Andi Kleen
ak@muc.de
- Nicolas Delon
delon.nicolas@wanadoo.fr
/proc/sys/net/ipv6/* Variables
==============================
IPv6 has no global variables such as tcp_*. tcp_* settings under ipv4/ also
apply to IPv6 [XXX?].
bindv6only - BOOLEAN
Default value for IPV6_V6ONLY socket option,
which restricts use of the IPv6 socket to IPv6 communication
only.
- TRUE: disable IPv4-mapped address feature
- FALSE: enable IPv4-mapped address feature
Default: FALSE (as specified in RFC3493)
flowlabel_consistency - BOOLEAN
Protect the consistency (and unicity) of flow label.
You have to disable it to use IPV6_FL_F_REFLECT flag on the
flow label manager.
- TRUE: enabled
- FALSE: disabled
Default: TRUE
auto_flowlabels - INTEGER
Automatically generate flow labels based on a flow hash of the
packet. This allows intermediate devices, such as routers, to
identify packet flows for mechanisms like Equal Cost Multipath
ipv6: Implement automatic flow label generation on transmit Automatically generate flow labels for IPv6 packets on transmit. The flow label is computed based on skb_get_hash. The flow label will only automatically be set when it is zero otherwise (i.e. flow label manager hasn't set one). This supports the transmit side functionality of RFC 6438. Added an IPv6 sysctl auto_flowlabels to enable/disable this behavior system wide, and added IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL socket option to enable this functionality per socket. By default, auto flowlabels are disabled to avoid possible conflicts with flow label manager, however if this feature proves useful we may want to enable it by default. It should also be noted that FreeBSD has already implemented automatic flow labels (including the sysctl and socket option). In FreeBSD, automatic flow labels default to enabled. Performance impact: Running super_netperf with 200 flows for TCP_RR and UDP_RR for IPv6. Note that in UDP case, __skb_get_hash will be called for every packet with explains slight regression. In the TCP case the hash is saved in the socket so there is no regression. Automatic flow labels disabled: TCP_RR: 86.53% CPU utilization 127/195/322 90/95/99% latencies 1.40498e+06 tps UDP_RR: 90.70% CPU utilization 118/168/243 90/95/99% latencies 1.50309e+06 tps Automatic flow labels enabled: TCP_RR: 85.90% CPU utilization 128/199/337 90/95/99% latencies 1.40051e+06 UDP_RR 92.61% CPU utilization 115/164/236 90/95/99% latencies 1.4687e+06 Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-02 08:33:10 +04:00
Routing (see RFC 6438).
= ===========================================================
0 automatic flow labels are completely disabled
1 automatic flow labels are enabled by default, they can be
disabled on a per socket basis using the IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL
socket option
2 automatic flow labels are allowed, they may be enabled on a
per socket basis using the IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL socket option
3 automatic flow labels are enabled and enforced, they cannot
be disabled by the socket option
= ===========================================================
Default: 1
ipv6: Implement automatic flow label generation on transmit Automatically generate flow labels for IPv6 packets on transmit. The flow label is computed based on skb_get_hash. The flow label will only automatically be set when it is zero otherwise (i.e. flow label manager hasn't set one). This supports the transmit side functionality of RFC 6438. Added an IPv6 sysctl auto_flowlabels to enable/disable this behavior system wide, and added IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL socket option to enable this functionality per socket. By default, auto flowlabels are disabled to avoid possible conflicts with flow label manager, however if this feature proves useful we may want to enable it by default. It should also be noted that FreeBSD has already implemented automatic flow labels (including the sysctl and socket option). In FreeBSD, automatic flow labels default to enabled. Performance impact: Running super_netperf with 200 flows for TCP_RR and UDP_RR for IPv6. Note that in UDP case, __skb_get_hash will be called for every packet with explains slight regression. In the TCP case the hash is saved in the socket so there is no regression. Automatic flow labels disabled: TCP_RR: 86.53% CPU utilization 127/195/322 90/95/99% latencies 1.40498e+06 tps UDP_RR: 90.70% CPU utilization 118/168/243 90/95/99% latencies 1.50309e+06 tps Automatic flow labels enabled: TCP_RR: 85.90% CPU utilization 128/199/337 90/95/99% latencies 1.40051e+06 UDP_RR 92.61% CPU utilization 115/164/236 90/95/99% latencies 1.4687e+06 Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-02 08:33:10 +04:00
ipv6: Flow label state ranges This patch divides the IPv6 flow label space into two ranges: 0-7ffff is reserved for flow label manager, 80000-fffff will be used for creating auto flow labels (per RFC6438). This only affects how labels are set on transmit, it does not affect receive. This range split can be disbaled by systcl. Background: IPv6 flow labels have been an unmitigated disappointment thus far in the lifetime of IPv6. Support in HW devices to use them for ECMP is lacking, and OSes don't turn them on by default. If we had these we could get much better hashing in IPv6 networks without resorting to DPI, possibly eliminating some of the motivations to to define new encaps in UDP just for getting ECMP. Unfortunately, the initial specfications of IPv6 did not clarify how they are to be used. There has always been a vague concept that these can be used for ECMP, flow hashing, etc. and we do now have a good standard how to this in RFC6438. The problem is that flow labels can be either stateful or stateless (as in RFC6438), and we are presented with the possibility that a stateless label may collide with a stateful one. Attempts to split the flow label space were rejected in IETF. When we added support in Linux for RFC6438, we could not turn on flow labels by default due to this conflict. This patch splits the flow label space and should give us a path to enabling auto flow labels by default for all IPv6 packets. This is an API change so we need to consider compatibility with existing deployment. The stateful range is chosen to be the lower values in hopes that most uses would have chosen small numbers. Once we resolve the stateless/stateful issue, we can proceed to look at enabling RFC6438 flow labels by default (starting with scaled testing). Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-04-30 01:33:21 +03:00
flowlabel_state_ranges - BOOLEAN
Split the flow label number space into two ranges. 0-0x7FFFF is
reserved for the IPv6 flow manager facility, 0x80000-0xFFFFF
is reserved for stateless flow labels as described in RFC6437.
- TRUE: enabled
- FALSE: disabled
ipv6: Flow label state ranges This patch divides the IPv6 flow label space into two ranges: 0-7ffff is reserved for flow label manager, 80000-fffff will be used for creating auto flow labels (per RFC6438). This only affects how labels are set on transmit, it does not affect receive. This range split can be disbaled by systcl. Background: IPv6 flow labels have been an unmitigated disappointment thus far in the lifetime of IPv6. Support in HW devices to use them for ECMP is lacking, and OSes don't turn them on by default. If we had these we could get much better hashing in IPv6 networks without resorting to DPI, possibly eliminating some of the motivations to to define new encaps in UDP just for getting ECMP. Unfortunately, the initial specfications of IPv6 did not clarify how they are to be used. There has always been a vague concept that these can be used for ECMP, flow hashing, etc. and we do now have a good standard how to this in RFC6438. The problem is that flow labels can be either stateful or stateless (as in RFC6438), and we are presented with the possibility that a stateless label may collide with a stateful one. Attempts to split the flow label space were rejected in IETF. When we added support in Linux for RFC6438, we could not turn on flow labels by default due to this conflict. This patch splits the flow label space and should give us a path to enabling auto flow labels by default for all IPv6 packets. This is an API change so we need to consider compatibility with existing deployment. The stateful range is chosen to be the lower values in hopes that most uses would have chosen small numbers. Once we resolve the stateless/stateful issue, we can proceed to look at enabling RFC6438 flow labels by default (starting with scaled testing). Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-04-30 01:33:21 +03:00
Default: true
flowlabel_reflect - INTEGER
Control flow label reflection. Needed for Path MTU
Discovery to work with Equal Cost Multipath Routing in anycast
environments. See RFC 7690 and:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wang-6man-flow-label-reflection-01
This is a bitmask.
- 1: enabled for established flows
Note that this prevents automatic flowlabel changes, as done
in "tcp: change IPv6 flow-label upon receiving spurious retransmission"
and "tcp: Change txhash on every SYN and RTO retransmit"
- 2: enabled for TCP RESET packets (no active listener)
If set, a RST packet sent in response to a SYN packet on a closed
port will reflect the incoming flow label.
- 4: enabled for ICMPv6 echo reply messages.
Default: 0
fib_multipath_hash_policy - INTEGER
Controls which hash policy to use for multipath routes.
Default: 0 (Layer 3)
Possible values:
- 0 - Layer 3 (source and destination addresses plus flow label)
- 1 - Layer 4 (standard 5-tuple)
- 2 - Layer 3 or inner Layer 3 if present
anycast_src_echo_reply - BOOLEAN
Controls the use of anycast addresses as source addresses for ICMPv6
echo reply
- TRUE: enabled
- FALSE: disabled
Default: FALSE
idgen_delay - INTEGER
Controls the delay in seconds after which time to retry
privacy stable address generation if a DAD conflict is
detected.
Default: 1 (as specified in RFC7217)
idgen_retries - INTEGER
Controls the number of retries to generate a stable privacy
address if a DAD conflict is detected.
Default: 3 (as specified in RFC7217)
mld_qrv - INTEGER
Controls the MLD query robustness variable (see RFC3810 9.1).
Default: 2 (as specified by RFC3810 9.1)
Minimum: 1 (as specified by RFC6636 4.5)
max_dst_opts_number - INTEGER
ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and Destination options RFC 8200 (IPv6) defines Hop-by-Hop options and Destination options extension headers. Both of these carry a list of TLVs which is only limited by the maximum length of the extension header (2048 bytes). By the spec a host must process all the TLVs in these options, however these could be used as a fairly obvious denial of service attack. I think this could in fact be a significant DOS vector on the Internet, one mitigating factor might be that many FWs drop all packets with EH (and obviously this is only IPv6) so an Internet wide attack might not be so effective (yet!). By my calculation, the worse case packet with TLVs in a standard 1500 byte MTU packet that would be processed by the stack contains 1282 invidual TLVs (including pad TLVS) or 724 two byte TLVs. I wrote a quick test program that floods a whole bunch of these packets to a host and sure enough there is substantial time spent in ip6_parse_tlv. These packets contain nothing but unknown TLVS (that are ignored), TLV padding, and bogus UDP header with zero payload length. 25.38% [kernel] [k] __fib6_clean_all 21.63% [kernel] [k] ip6_parse_tlv 4.21% [kernel] [k] __local_bh_enable_ip 2.18% [kernel] [k] ip6_pol_route.isra.39 1.98% [kernel] [k] fib6_walk_continue 1.88% [kernel] [k] _raw_write_lock_bh 1.65% [kernel] [k] dst_release This patch adds configurable limits to Destination and Hop-by-Hop options. There are three limits that may be set: - Limit the number of options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Limit the byte length of a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Disallow unrecognized options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. The limits are set in corresponding sysctls: ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_len ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_len If a max_*_opts_cnt is less than zero then unknown TLVs are disallowed. The number of known TLVs that are allowed is the absolute value of this number. If a limit is exceeded when processing an extension header the packet is dropped. Default values are set to 8 for options counts, and set to INT_MAX for maximum length. Note the choice to limit options to 8 is an arbitrary guess (roughly based on the fact that the stack supports three HBH options and just one destination option). These limits have being proposed in draft-ietf-6man-rfc6434-bis. Tested (by Martin Lau) I tested out 1 thread (i.e. one raw_udp process). I changed the net.ipv6.max_dst_(opts|hbh)_number between 8 to 2048. With sysctls setting to 2048, the softirq% is packed to 100%. With 8, the softirq% is almost unnoticable from mpstat. v2; - Code and documention cleanup. - Change references of RFC2460 to be RFC8200. - Add reference to RFC6434-bis where the limits will be in standard. Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-31 00:16:00 +03:00
Maximum number of non-padding TLVs allowed in a Destination
options extension header. If this value is less than zero
then unknown options are disallowed and the number of known
TLVs allowed is the absolute value of this number.
ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and Destination options RFC 8200 (IPv6) defines Hop-by-Hop options and Destination options extension headers. Both of these carry a list of TLVs which is only limited by the maximum length of the extension header (2048 bytes). By the spec a host must process all the TLVs in these options, however these could be used as a fairly obvious denial of service attack. I think this could in fact be a significant DOS vector on the Internet, one mitigating factor might be that many FWs drop all packets with EH (and obviously this is only IPv6) so an Internet wide attack might not be so effective (yet!). By my calculation, the worse case packet with TLVs in a standard 1500 byte MTU packet that would be processed by the stack contains 1282 invidual TLVs (including pad TLVS) or 724 two byte TLVs. I wrote a quick test program that floods a whole bunch of these packets to a host and sure enough there is substantial time spent in ip6_parse_tlv. These packets contain nothing but unknown TLVS (that are ignored), TLV padding, and bogus UDP header with zero payload length. 25.38% [kernel] [k] __fib6_clean_all 21.63% [kernel] [k] ip6_parse_tlv 4.21% [kernel] [k] __local_bh_enable_ip 2.18% [kernel] [k] ip6_pol_route.isra.39 1.98% [kernel] [k] fib6_walk_continue 1.88% [kernel] [k] _raw_write_lock_bh 1.65% [kernel] [k] dst_release This patch adds configurable limits to Destination and Hop-by-Hop options. There are three limits that may be set: - Limit the number of options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Limit the byte length of a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Disallow unrecognized options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. The limits are set in corresponding sysctls: ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_len ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_len If a max_*_opts_cnt is less than zero then unknown TLVs are disallowed. The number of known TLVs that are allowed is the absolute value of this number. If a limit is exceeded when processing an extension header the packet is dropped. Default values are set to 8 for options counts, and set to INT_MAX for maximum length. Note the choice to limit options to 8 is an arbitrary guess (roughly based on the fact that the stack supports three HBH options and just one destination option). These limits have being proposed in draft-ietf-6man-rfc6434-bis. Tested (by Martin Lau) I tested out 1 thread (i.e. one raw_udp process). I changed the net.ipv6.max_dst_(opts|hbh)_number between 8 to 2048. With sysctls setting to 2048, the softirq% is packed to 100%. With 8, the softirq% is almost unnoticable from mpstat. v2; - Code and documention cleanup. - Change references of RFC2460 to be RFC8200. - Add reference to RFC6434-bis where the limits will be in standard. Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-31 00:16:00 +03:00
Default: 8
max_hbh_opts_number - INTEGER
ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and Destination options RFC 8200 (IPv6) defines Hop-by-Hop options and Destination options extension headers. Both of these carry a list of TLVs which is only limited by the maximum length of the extension header (2048 bytes). By the spec a host must process all the TLVs in these options, however these could be used as a fairly obvious denial of service attack. I think this could in fact be a significant DOS vector on the Internet, one mitigating factor might be that many FWs drop all packets with EH (and obviously this is only IPv6) so an Internet wide attack might not be so effective (yet!). By my calculation, the worse case packet with TLVs in a standard 1500 byte MTU packet that would be processed by the stack contains 1282 invidual TLVs (including pad TLVS) or 724 two byte TLVs. I wrote a quick test program that floods a whole bunch of these packets to a host and sure enough there is substantial time spent in ip6_parse_tlv. These packets contain nothing but unknown TLVS (that are ignored), TLV padding, and bogus UDP header with zero payload length. 25.38% [kernel] [k] __fib6_clean_all 21.63% [kernel] [k] ip6_parse_tlv 4.21% [kernel] [k] __local_bh_enable_ip 2.18% [kernel] [k] ip6_pol_route.isra.39 1.98% [kernel] [k] fib6_walk_continue 1.88% [kernel] [k] _raw_write_lock_bh 1.65% [kernel] [k] dst_release This patch adds configurable limits to Destination and Hop-by-Hop options. There are three limits that may be set: - Limit the number of options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Limit the byte length of a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Disallow unrecognized options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. The limits are set in corresponding sysctls: ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_len ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_len If a max_*_opts_cnt is less than zero then unknown TLVs are disallowed. The number of known TLVs that are allowed is the absolute value of this number. If a limit is exceeded when processing an extension header the packet is dropped. Default values are set to 8 for options counts, and set to INT_MAX for maximum length. Note the choice to limit options to 8 is an arbitrary guess (roughly based on the fact that the stack supports three HBH options and just one destination option). These limits have being proposed in draft-ietf-6man-rfc6434-bis. Tested (by Martin Lau) I tested out 1 thread (i.e. one raw_udp process). I changed the net.ipv6.max_dst_(opts|hbh)_number between 8 to 2048. With sysctls setting to 2048, the softirq% is packed to 100%. With 8, the softirq% is almost unnoticable from mpstat. v2; - Code and documention cleanup. - Change references of RFC2460 to be RFC8200. - Add reference to RFC6434-bis where the limits will be in standard. Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-31 00:16:00 +03:00
Maximum number of non-padding TLVs allowed in a Hop-by-Hop
options extension header. If this value is less than zero
then unknown options are disallowed and the number of known
TLVs allowed is the absolute value of this number.
ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and Destination options RFC 8200 (IPv6) defines Hop-by-Hop options and Destination options extension headers. Both of these carry a list of TLVs which is only limited by the maximum length of the extension header (2048 bytes). By the spec a host must process all the TLVs in these options, however these could be used as a fairly obvious denial of service attack. I think this could in fact be a significant DOS vector on the Internet, one mitigating factor might be that many FWs drop all packets with EH (and obviously this is only IPv6) so an Internet wide attack might not be so effective (yet!). By my calculation, the worse case packet with TLVs in a standard 1500 byte MTU packet that would be processed by the stack contains 1282 invidual TLVs (including pad TLVS) or 724 two byte TLVs. I wrote a quick test program that floods a whole bunch of these packets to a host and sure enough there is substantial time spent in ip6_parse_tlv. These packets contain nothing but unknown TLVS (that are ignored), TLV padding, and bogus UDP header with zero payload length. 25.38% [kernel] [k] __fib6_clean_all 21.63% [kernel] [k] ip6_parse_tlv 4.21% [kernel] [k] __local_bh_enable_ip 2.18% [kernel] [k] ip6_pol_route.isra.39 1.98% [kernel] [k] fib6_walk_continue 1.88% [kernel] [k] _raw_write_lock_bh 1.65% [kernel] [k] dst_release This patch adds configurable limits to Destination and Hop-by-Hop options. There are three limits that may be set: - Limit the number of options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Limit the byte length of a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Disallow unrecognized options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. The limits are set in corresponding sysctls: ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_len ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_len If a max_*_opts_cnt is less than zero then unknown TLVs are disallowed. The number of known TLVs that are allowed is the absolute value of this number. If a limit is exceeded when processing an extension header the packet is dropped. Default values are set to 8 for options counts, and set to INT_MAX for maximum length. Note the choice to limit options to 8 is an arbitrary guess (roughly based on the fact that the stack supports three HBH options and just one destination option). These limits have being proposed in draft-ietf-6man-rfc6434-bis. Tested (by Martin Lau) I tested out 1 thread (i.e. one raw_udp process). I changed the net.ipv6.max_dst_(opts|hbh)_number between 8 to 2048. With sysctls setting to 2048, the softirq% is packed to 100%. With 8, the softirq% is almost unnoticable from mpstat. v2; - Code and documention cleanup. - Change references of RFC2460 to be RFC8200. - Add reference to RFC6434-bis where the limits will be in standard. Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-31 00:16:00 +03:00
Default: 8
max_dst_opts_length - INTEGER
ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and Destination options RFC 8200 (IPv6) defines Hop-by-Hop options and Destination options extension headers. Both of these carry a list of TLVs which is only limited by the maximum length of the extension header (2048 bytes). By the spec a host must process all the TLVs in these options, however these could be used as a fairly obvious denial of service attack. I think this could in fact be a significant DOS vector on the Internet, one mitigating factor might be that many FWs drop all packets with EH (and obviously this is only IPv6) so an Internet wide attack might not be so effective (yet!). By my calculation, the worse case packet with TLVs in a standard 1500 byte MTU packet that would be processed by the stack contains 1282 invidual TLVs (including pad TLVS) or 724 two byte TLVs. I wrote a quick test program that floods a whole bunch of these packets to a host and sure enough there is substantial time spent in ip6_parse_tlv. These packets contain nothing but unknown TLVS (that are ignored), TLV padding, and bogus UDP header with zero payload length. 25.38% [kernel] [k] __fib6_clean_all 21.63% [kernel] [k] ip6_parse_tlv 4.21% [kernel] [k] __local_bh_enable_ip 2.18% [kernel] [k] ip6_pol_route.isra.39 1.98% [kernel] [k] fib6_walk_continue 1.88% [kernel] [k] _raw_write_lock_bh 1.65% [kernel] [k] dst_release This patch adds configurable limits to Destination and Hop-by-Hop options. There are three limits that may be set: - Limit the number of options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Limit the byte length of a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Disallow unrecognized options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. The limits are set in corresponding sysctls: ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_len ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_len If a max_*_opts_cnt is less than zero then unknown TLVs are disallowed. The number of known TLVs that are allowed is the absolute value of this number. If a limit is exceeded when processing an extension header the packet is dropped. Default values are set to 8 for options counts, and set to INT_MAX for maximum length. Note the choice to limit options to 8 is an arbitrary guess (roughly based on the fact that the stack supports three HBH options and just one destination option). These limits have being proposed in draft-ietf-6man-rfc6434-bis. Tested (by Martin Lau) I tested out 1 thread (i.e. one raw_udp process). I changed the net.ipv6.max_dst_(opts|hbh)_number between 8 to 2048. With sysctls setting to 2048, the softirq% is packed to 100%. With 8, the softirq% is almost unnoticable from mpstat. v2; - Code and documention cleanup. - Change references of RFC2460 to be RFC8200. - Add reference to RFC6434-bis where the limits will be in standard. Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-31 00:16:00 +03:00
Maximum length allowed for a Destination options extension
header.
ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and Destination options RFC 8200 (IPv6) defines Hop-by-Hop options and Destination options extension headers. Both of these carry a list of TLVs which is only limited by the maximum length of the extension header (2048 bytes). By the spec a host must process all the TLVs in these options, however these could be used as a fairly obvious denial of service attack. I think this could in fact be a significant DOS vector on the Internet, one mitigating factor might be that many FWs drop all packets with EH (and obviously this is only IPv6) so an Internet wide attack might not be so effective (yet!). By my calculation, the worse case packet with TLVs in a standard 1500 byte MTU packet that would be processed by the stack contains 1282 invidual TLVs (including pad TLVS) or 724 two byte TLVs. I wrote a quick test program that floods a whole bunch of these packets to a host and sure enough there is substantial time spent in ip6_parse_tlv. These packets contain nothing but unknown TLVS (that are ignored), TLV padding, and bogus UDP header with zero payload length. 25.38% [kernel] [k] __fib6_clean_all 21.63% [kernel] [k] ip6_parse_tlv 4.21% [kernel] [k] __local_bh_enable_ip 2.18% [kernel] [k] ip6_pol_route.isra.39 1.98% [kernel] [k] fib6_walk_continue 1.88% [kernel] [k] _raw_write_lock_bh 1.65% [kernel] [k] dst_release This patch adds configurable limits to Destination and Hop-by-Hop options. There are three limits that may be set: - Limit the number of options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Limit the byte length of a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Disallow unrecognized options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. The limits are set in corresponding sysctls: ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_len ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_len If a max_*_opts_cnt is less than zero then unknown TLVs are disallowed. The number of known TLVs that are allowed is the absolute value of this number. If a limit is exceeded when processing an extension header the packet is dropped. Default values are set to 8 for options counts, and set to INT_MAX for maximum length. Note the choice to limit options to 8 is an arbitrary guess (roughly based on the fact that the stack supports three HBH options and just one destination option). These limits have being proposed in draft-ietf-6man-rfc6434-bis. Tested (by Martin Lau) I tested out 1 thread (i.e. one raw_udp process). I changed the net.ipv6.max_dst_(opts|hbh)_number between 8 to 2048. With sysctls setting to 2048, the softirq% is packed to 100%. With 8, the softirq% is almost unnoticable from mpstat. v2; - Code and documention cleanup. - Change references of RFC2460 to be RFC8200. - Add reference to RFC6434-bis where the limits will be in standard. Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-31 00:16:00 +03:00
Default: INT_MAX (unlimited)
max_hbh_length - INTEGER
ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and Destination options RFC 8200 (IPv6) defines Hop-by-Hop options and Destination options extension headers. Both of these carry a list of TLVs which is only limited by the maximum length of the extension header (2048 bytes). By the spec a host must process all the TLVs in these options, however these could be used as a fairly obvious denial of service attack. I think this could in fact be a significant DOS vector on the Internet, one mitigating factor might be that many FWs drop all packets with EH (and obviously this is only IPv6) so an Internet wide attack might not be so effective (yet!). By my calculation, the worse case packet with TLVs in a standard 1500 byte MTU packet that would be processed by the stack contains 1282 invidual TLVs (including pad TLVS) or 724 two byte TLVs. I wrote a quick test program that floods a whole bunch of these packets to a host and sure enough there is substantial time spent in ip6_parse_tlv. These packets contain nothing but unknown TLVS (that are ignored), TLV padding, and bogus UDP header with zero payload length. 25.38% [kernel] [k] __fib6_clean_all 21.63% [kernel] [k] ip6_parse_tlv 4.21% [kernel] [k] __local_bh_enable_ip 2.18% [kernel] [k] ip6_pol_route.isra.39 1.98% [kernel] [k] fib6_walk_continue 1.88% [kernel] [k] _raw_write_lock_bh 1.65% [kernel] [k] dst_release This patch adds configurable limits to Destination and Hop-by-Hop options. There are three limits that may be set: - Limit the number of options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Limit the byte length of a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Disallow unrecognized options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. The limits are set in corresponding sysctls: ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_len ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_len If a max_*_opts_cnt is less than zero then unknown TLVs are disallowed. The number of known TLVs that are allowed is the absolute value of this number. If a limit is exceeded when processing an extension header the packet is dropped. Default values are set to 8 for options counts, and set to INT_MAX for maximum length. Note the choice to limit options to 8 is an arbitrary guess (roughly based on the fact that the stack supports three HBH options and just one destination option). These limits have being proposed in draft-ietf-6man-rfc6434-bis. Tested (by Martin Lau) I tested out 1 thread (i.e. one raw_udp process). I changed the net.ipv6.max_dst_(opts|hbh)_number between 8 to 2048. With sysctls setting to 2048, the softirq% is packed to 100%. With 8, the softirq% is almost unnoticable from mpstat. v2; - Code and documention cleanup. - Change references of RFC2460 to be RFC8200. - Add reference to RFC6434-bis where the limits will be in standard. Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-31 00:16:00 +03:00
Maximum length allowed for a Hop-by-Hop options extension
header.
ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and Destination options RFC 8200 (IPv6) defines Hop-by-Hop options and Destination options extension headers. Both of these carry a list of TLVs which is only limited by the maximum length of the extension header (2048 bytes). By the spec a host must process all the TLVs in these options, however these could be used as a fairly obvious denial of service attack. I think this could in fact be a significant DOS vector on the Internet, one mitigating factor might be that many FWs drop all packets with EH (and obviously this is only IPv6) so an Internet wide attack might not be so effective (yet!). By my calculation, the worse case packet with TLVs in a standard 1500 byte MTU packet that would be processed by the stack contains 1282 invidual TLVs (including pad TLVS) or 724 two byte TLVs. I wrote a quick test program that floods a whole bunch of these packets to a host and sure enough there is substantial time spent in ip6_parse_tlv. These packets contain nothing but unknown TLVS (that are ignored), TLV padding, and bogus UDP header with zero payload length. 25.38% [kernel] [k] __fib6_clean_all 21.63% [kernel] [k] ip6_parse_tlv 4.21% [kernel] [k] __local_bh_enable_ip 2.18% [kernel] [k] ip6_pol_route.isra.39 1.98% [kernel] [k] fib6_walk_continue 1.88% [kernel] [k] _raw_write_lock_bh 1.65% [kernel] [k] dst_release This patch adds configurable limits to Destination and Hop-by-Hop options. There are three limits that may be set: - Limit the number of options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Limit the byte length of a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Disallow unrecognized options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. The limits are set in corresponding sysctls: ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_len ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_len If a max_*_opts_cnt is less than zero then unknown TLVs are disallowed. The number of known TLVs that are allowed is the absolute value of this number. If a limit is exceeded when processing an extension header the packet is dropped. Default values are set to 8 for options counts, and set to INT_MAX for maximum length. Note the choice to limit options to 8 is an arbitrary guess (roughly based on the fact that the stack supports three HBH options and just one destination option). These limits have being proposed in draft-ietf-6man-rfc6434-bis. Tested (by Martin Lau) I tested out 1 thread (i.e. one raw_udp process). I changed the net.ipv6.max_dst_(opts|hbh)_number between 8 to 2048. With sysctls setting to 2048, the softirq% is packed to 100%. With 8, the softirq% is almost unnoticable from mpstat. v2; - Code and documention cleanup. - Change references of RFC2460 to be RFC8200. - Add reference to RFC6434-bis where the limits will be in standard. Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-31 00:16:00 +03:00
Default: INT_MAX (unlimited)
skip_notify_on_dev_down - BOOLEAN
Controls whether an RTM_DELROUTE message is generated for routes
removed when a device is taken down or deleted. IPv4 does not
generate this message; IPv6 does by default. Setting this sysctl
to true skips the message, making IPv4 and IPv6 on par in relying
on userspace caches to track link events and evict routes.
Default: false (generate message)
nexthop_compat_mode - BOOLEAN
New nexthop API provides a means for managing nexthops independent of
prefixes. Backwards compatibilty with old route format is enabled by
default which means route dumps and notifications contain the new
nexthop attribute but also the full, expanded nexthop definition.
Further, updates or deletes of a nexthop configuration generate route
notifications for each fib entry using the nexthop. Once a system
understands the new API, this sysctl can be disabled to achieve full
performance benefits of the new API by disabling the nexthop expansion
and extraneous notifications.
Default: true (backward compat mode)
IPv6 Fragmentation:
ip6frag_high_thresh - INTEGER
Maximum memory used to reassemble IPv6 fragments. When
ip6frag_high_thresh bytes of memory is allocated for this purpose,
the fragment handler will toss packets until ip6frag_low_thresh
is reached.
ip6frag_low_thresh - INTEGER
See ip6frag_high_thresh
ip6frag_time - INTEGER
Time in seconds to keep an IPv6 fragment in memory.
IPv6 Segment Routing:
seg6_flowlabel - INTEGER
Controls the behaviour of computing the flowlabel of outer
IPv6 header in case of SR T.encaps
== =======================================================
-1 set flowlabel to zero.
0 copy flowlabel from Inner packet in case of Inner IPv6
(Set flowlabel to 0 in case IPv4/L2)
1 Compute the flowlabel using seg6_make_flowlabel()
== =======================================================
Default is 0.
``conf/default/*``:
Change the interface-specific default settings.
``conf/all/*``:
Change all the interface-specific settings.
[XXX: Other special features than forwarding?]
conf/all/forwarding - BOOLEAN
Enable global IPv6 forwarding between all interfaces.
IPv4 and IPv6 work differently here; e.g. netfilter must be used
to control which interfaces may forward packets and which not.
This also sets all interfaces' Host/Router setting
'forwarding' to the specified value. See below for details.
This referred to as global forwarding.
proxy_ndp - BOOLEAN
Do proxy ndp.
fwmark_reflect - BOOLEAN
Controls the fwmark of kernel-generated IPv6 reply packets that are not
associated with a socket for example, TCP RSTs or ICMPv6 echo replies).
If unset, these packets have a fwmark of zero. If set, they have the
fwmark of the packet they are replying to.
Default: 0
``conf/interface/*``:
Change special settings per interface.
The functional behaviour for certain settings is different
depending on whether local forwarding is enabled or not.
accept_ra - INTEGER
Accept Router Advertisements; autoconfigure using them.
ipv6: Send ICMPv6 RSes only when RAs are accepted This patch improves the logic determining when to send ICMPv6 Router Solicitations, so that they are 1) always sent when the kernel is accepting Router Advertisements, and 2) never sent when the kernel is not accepting RAs. In other words, the operational setting of the "accept_ra" sysctl is used. The change also makes the special "Hybrid Router" forwarding mode ("forwarding" sysctl set to 2) operate exactly the same as the standard Router mode (forwarding=1). The only difference between the two was that RSes was being sent in the Hybrid Router mode only. The sysctl documentation describing the special Hybrid Router mode has therefore been removed. Rationale for the change: Currently, the value of forwarding sysctl is the only thing determining whether or not to send RSes. If it has the value 0 or 2, they are sent, otherwise they are not. This leads to inconsistent behaviour in the following cases: * accept_ra=0, forwarding=0 * accept_ra=0, forwarding=2 * accept_ra=1, forwarding=2 * accept_ra=2, forwarding=1 In the first three cases, the kernel will send RSes, even though it will not accept any RAs received in reply. In the last case, it will not send any RSes, even though it will accept and process any RAs received. (Most routers will send unsolicited RAs periodically, so suppressing RSes in the last case will merely delay auto-configuration, not prevent it.) Also, it is my opinion that having the forwarding sysctl control RS sending behaviour (completely independent of whether RAs are being accepted or not) is simply not what most users would intuitively expect to be the case. Signed-off-by: Tore Anderson <tore@fud.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-29 03:47:33 +04:00
It also determines whether or not to transmit Router
Solicitations. If and only if the functional setting is to
accept Router Advertisements, Router Solicitations will be
transmitted.
Possible values are:
== ===========================================================
0 Do not accept Router Advertisements.
1 Accept Router Advertisements if forwarding is disabled.
2 Overrule forwarding behaviour. Accept Router Advertisements
even if forwarding is enabled.
== ===========================================================
Functional default:
- enabled if local forwarding is disabled.
- disabled if local forwarding is enabled.
accept_ra_defrtr - BOOLEAN
Learn default router in Router Advertisement.
Functional default:
- enabled if accept_ra is enabled.
- disabled if accept_ra is disabled.
accept_ra_from_local - BOOLEAN
Accept RA with source-address that is found on local machine
if the RA is otherwise proper and able to be accepted.
Default is to NOT accept these as it may be an un-intended
network loop.
Functional default:
- enabled if accept_ra_from_local is enabled
on a specific interface.
- disabled if accept_ra_from_local is disabled
on a specific interface.
accept_ra_min_hop_limit - INTEGER
Minimum hop limit Information in Router Advertisement.
Hop limit Information in Router Advertisement less than this
variable shall be ignored.
Default: 1
accept_ra_pinfo - BOOLEAN
Learn Prefix Information in Router Advertisement.
Functional default:
- enabled if accept_ra is enabled.
- disabled if accept_ra is disabled.
accept_ra_rt_info_min_plen - INTEGER
Minimum prefix length of Route Information in RA.
Route Information w/ prefix smaller than this variable shall
be ignored.
Functional default:
* 0 if accept_ra_rtr_pref is enabled.
* -1 if accept_ra_rtr_pref is disabled.
accept_ra_rt_info_max_plen - INTEGER
Maximum prefix length of Route Information in RA.
Route Information w/ prefix larger than this variable shall
be ignored.
Functional default:
* 0 if accept_ra_rtr_pref is enabled.
* -1 if accept_ra_rtr_pref is disabled.
accept_ra_rtr_pref - BOOLEAN
Accept Router Preference in RA.
Functional default:
- enabled if accept_ra is enabled.
- disabled if accept_ra is disabled.
accept_ra_mtu - BOOLEAN
Apply the MTU value specified in RA option 5 (RFC4861). If
disabled, the MTU specified in the RA will be ignored.
Functional default:
- enabled if accept_ra is enabled.
- disabled if accept_ra is disabled.
accept_redirects - BOOLEAN
Accept Redirects.
Functional default:
- enabled if local forwarding is disabled.
- disabled if local forwarding is enabled.
accept_source_route - INTEGER
Accept source routing (routing extension header).
- >= 0: Accept only routing header type 2.
- < 0: Do not accept routing header.
Default: 0
autoconf - BOOLEAN
Autoconfigure addresses using Prefix Information in Router
Advertisements.
Functional default:
- enabled if accept_ra_pinfo is enabled.
- disabled if accept_ra_pinfo is disabled.
dad_transmits - INTEGER
The amount of Duplicate Address Detection probes to send.
Default: 1
forwarding - INTEGER
Configure interface-specific Host/Router behaviour.
.. note::
It is recommended to have the same setting on all
interfaces; mixed router/host scenarios are rather uncommon.
Possible values are:
- 0 Forwarding disabled
- 1 Forwarding enabled
**FALSE (0)**:
By default, Host behaviour is assumed. This means:
1. IsRouter flag is not set in Neighbour Advertisements.
ipv6: Send ICMPv6 RSes only when RAs are accepted This patch improves the logic determining when to send ICMPv6 Router Solicitations, so that they are 1) always sent when the kernel is accepting Router Advertisements, and 2) never sent when the kernel is not accepting RAs. In other words, the operational setting of the "accept_ra" sysctl is used. The change also makes the special "Hybrid Router" forwarding mode ("forwarding" sysctl set to 2) operate exactly the same as the standard Router mode (forwarding=1). The only difference between the two was that RSes was being sent in the Hybrid Router mode only. The sysctl documentation describing the special Hybrid Router mode has therefore been removed. Rationale for the change: Currently, the value of forwarding sysctl is the only thing determining whether or not to send RSes. If it has the value 0 or 2, they are sent, otherwise they are not. This leads to inconsistent behaviour in the following cases: * accept_ra=0, forwarding=0 * accept_ra=0, forwarding=2 * accept_ra=1, forwarding=2 * accept_ra=2, forwarding=1 In the first three cases, the kernel will send RSes, even though it will not accept any RAs received in reply. In the last case, it will not send any RSes, even though it will accept and process any RAs received. (Most routers will send unsolicited RAs periodically, so suppressing RSes in the last case will merely delay auto-configuration, not prevent it.) Also, it is my opinion that having the forwarding sysctl control RS sending behaviour (completely independent of whether RAs are being accepted or not) is simply not what most users would intuitively expect to be the case. Signed-off-by: Tore Anderson <tore@fud.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-29 03:47:33 +04:00
2. If accept_ra is TRUE (default), transmit Router
Solicitations.
3. If accept_ra is TRUE (default), accept Router
Advertisements (and do autoconfiguration).
4. If accept_redirects is TRUE (default), accept Redirects.
**TRUE (1)**:
If local forwarding is enabled, Router behaviour is assumed.
This means exactly the reverse from the above:
1. IsRouter flag is set in Neighbour Advertisements.
ipv6: Send ICMPv6 RSes only when RAs are accepted This patch improves the logic determining when to send ICMPv6 Router Solicitations, so that they are 1) always sent when the kernel is accepting Router Advertisements, and 2) never sent when the kernel is not accepting RAs. In other words, the operational setting of the "accept_ra" sysctl is used. The change also makes the special "Hybrid Router" forwarding mode ("forwarding" sysctl set to 2) operate exactly the same as the standard Router mode (forwarding=1). The only difference between the two was that RSes was being sent in the Hybrid Router mode only. The sysctl documentation describing the special Hybrid Router mode has therefore been removed. Rationale for the change: Currently, the value of forwarding sysctl is the only thing determining whether or not to send RSes. If it has the value 0 or 2, they are sent, otherwise they are not. This leads to inconsistent behaviour in the following cases: * accept_ra=0, forwarding=0 * accept_ra=0, forwarding=2 * accept_ra=1, forwarding=2 * accept_ra=2, forwarding=1 In the first three cases, the kernel will send RSes, even though it will not accept any RAs received in reply. In the last case, it will not send any RSes, even though it will accept and process any RAs received. (Most routers will send unsolicited RAs periodically, so suppressing RSes in the last case will merely delay auto-configuration, not prevent it.) Also, it is my opinion that having the forwarding sysctl control RS sending behaviour (completely independent of whether RAs are being accepted or not) is simply not what most users would intuitively expect to be the case. Signed-off-by: Tore Anderson <tore@fud.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-29 03:47:33 +04:00
2. Router Solicitations are not sent unless accept_ra is 2.
3. Router Advertisements are ignored unless accept_ra is 2.
4. Redirects are ignored.
Default: 0 (disabled) if global forwarding is disabled (default),
otherwise 1 (enabled).
hop_limit - INTEGER
Default Hop Limit to set.
Default: 64
mtu - INTEGER
Default Maximum Transfer Unit
Default: 1280 (IPv6 required minimum)
ip_nonlocal_bind - BOOLEAN
If set, allows processes to bind() to non-local IPv6 addresses,
which can be quite useful - but may break some applications.
Default: 0
router_probe_interval - INTEGER
Minimum interval (in seconds) between Router Probing described
in RFC4191.
Default: 60
router_solicitation_delay - INTEGER
Number of seconds to wait after interface is brought up
before sending Router Solicitations.
Default: 1
router_solicitation_interval - INTEGER
Number of seconds to wait between Router Solicitations.
Default: 4
router_solicitations - INTEGER
Number of Router Solicitations to send until assuming no
routers are present.
Default: 3
use_oif_addrs_only - BOOLEAN
When enabled, the candidate source addresses for destinations
routed via this interface are restricted to the set of addresses
configured on this interface (vis. RFC 6724, section 4).
Default: false
use_tempaddr - INTEGER
Preference for Privacy Extensions (RFC3041).
* <= 0 : disable Privacy Extensions
* == 1 : enable Privacy Extensions, but prefer public
addresses over temporary addresses.
* > 1 : enable Privacy Extensions and prefer temporary
addresses over public addresses.
Default:
* 0 (for most devices)
* -1 (for point-to-point devices and loopback devices)
temp_valid_lft - INTEGER
valid lifetime (in seconds) for temporary addresses.
Default: 604800 (7 days)
temp_prefered_lft - INTEGER
Preferred lifetime (in seconds) for temporary addresses.
Default: 86400 (1 day)
net: ipv6: Make address flushing on ifdown optional Currently, all ipv6 addresses are flushed when the interface is configured down, including global, static addresses: $ ip -6 addr show dev eth1 3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 state UP qlen 1000 inet6 2100:1::2/120 scope global valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever inet6 fe80::e0:f9ff:fe79:34bd/64 scope link valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever $ ip link set dev eth1 down $ ip -6 addr show dev eth1 << nothing; all addresses have been flushed>> Add a new sysctl to make this behavior optional. The new setting defaults to flush all addresses to maintain backwards compatibility. When the set global addresses with no expire times are not flushed on an admin down. The sysctl is per-interface or system-wide for all interfaces $ sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.eth1.keep_addr_on_down=1 or $ sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.keep_addr_on_down=1 Will keep addresses on eth1 on an admin down. $ ip -6 addr show dev eth1 3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 state UP qlen 1000 inet6 2100:1::2/120 scope global valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever inet6 fe80::e0:f9ff:fe79:34bd/64 scope link valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever $ ip link set dev eth1 down $ ip -6 addr show dev eth1 3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 state DOWN qlen 1000 inet6 2100:1::2/120 scope global tentative valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever inet6 fe80::e0:f9ff:fe79:34bd/64 scope link tentative valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-02-24 20:25:37 +03:00
keep_addr_on_down - INTEGER
Keep all IPv6 addresses on an interface down event. If set static
global addresses with no expiration time are not flushed.
* >0 : enabled
* 0 : system default
* <0 : disabled
net: ipv6: Make address flushing on ifdown optional Currently, all ipv6 addresses are flushed when the interface is configured down, including global, static addresses: $ ip -6 addr show dev eth1 3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 state UP qlen 1000 inet6 2100:1::2/120 scope global valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever inet6 fe80::e0:f9ff:fe79:34bd/64 scope link valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever $ ip link set dev eth1 down $ ip -6 addr show dev eth1 << nothing; all addresses have been flushed>> Add a new sysctl to make this behavior optional. The new setting defaults to flush all addresses to maintain backwards compatibility. When the set global addresses with no expire times are not flushed on an admin down. The sysctl is per-interface or system-wide for all interfaces $ sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.eth1.keep_addr_on_down=1 or $ sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.keep_addr_on_down=1 Will keep addresses on eth1 on an admin down. $ ip -6 addr show dev eth1 3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 state UP qlen 1000 inet6 2100:1::2/120 scope global valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever inet6 fe80::e0:f9ff:fe79:34bd/64 scope link valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever $ ip link set dev eth1 down $ ip -6 addr show dev eth1 3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 state DOWN qlen 1000 inet6 2100:1::2/120 scope global tentative valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever inet6 fe80::e0:f9ff:fe79:34bd/64 scope link tentative valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-02-24 20:25:37 +03:00
Default: 0 (addresses are removed)
max_desync_factor - INTEGER
Maximum value for DESYNC_FACTOR, which is a random value
that ensures that clients don't synchronize with each
other and generate new addresses at exactly the same time.
value is in seconds.
Default: 600
regen_max_retry - INTEGER
Number of attempts before give up attempting to generate
valid temporary addresses.
Default: 5
max_addresses - INTEGER
Maximum number of autoconfigured addresses per interface. Setting
to zero disables the limitation. It is not recommended to set this
value too large (or to zero) because it would be an easy way to
crash the kernel by allowing too many addresses to be created.
Default: 16
disable_ipv6 - BOOLEAN
Disable IPv6 operation. If accept_dad is set to 2, this value
will be dynamically set to TRUE if DAD fails for the link-local
address.
Default: FALSE (enable IPv6 operation)
When this value is changed from 1 to 0 (IPv6 is being enabled),
it will dynamically create a link-local address on the given
interface and start Duplicate Address Detection, if necessary.
When this value is changed from 0 to 1 (IPv6 is being disabled),
it will dynamically delete all addresses and routes on the given
interface. From now on it will not possible to add addresses/routes
to the selected interface.
accept_dad - INTEGER
Whether to accept DAD (Duplicate Address Detection).
== ==============================================================
0 Disable DAD
1 Enable DAD (default)
2 Enable DAD, and disable IPv6 operation if MAC-based duplicate
link-local address has been found.
== ==============================================================
DAD operation and mode on a given interface will be selected according
to the maximum value of conf/{all,interface}/accept_dad.
force_tllao - BOOLEAN
Enable sending the target link-layer address option even when
responding to a unicast neighbor solicitation.
Default: FALSE
Quoting from RFC 2461, section 4.4, Target link-layer address:
"The option MUST be included for multicast solicitations in order to
avoid infinite Neighbor Solicitation "recursion" when the peer node
does not have a cache entry to return a Neighbor Advertisements
message. When responding to unicast solicitations, the option can be
omitted since the sender of the solicitation has the correct link-
layer address; otherwise it would not have be able to send the unicast
solicitation in the first place. However, including the link-layer
address in this case adds little overhead and eliminates a potential
race condition where the sender deletes the cached link-layer address
prior to receiving a response to a previous solicitation."
ndisc_notify - BOOLEAN
Define mode for notification of address and device changes.
* 0 - (default): do nothing
* 1 - Generate unsolicited neighbour advertisements when device is brought
up or hardware address changes.
net: ipv6: sysctl to specify IPv6 ND traffic class Add a per-device sysctl to specify the default traffic class to use for kernel originated IPv6 Neighbour Discovery packets. Currently this includes: - Router Solicitation (ICMPv6 type 133) ndisc_send_rs() -> ndisc_send_skb() -> ip6_nd_hdr() - Neighbour Solicitation (ICMPv6 type 135) ndisc_send_ns() -> ndisc_send_skb() -> ip6_nd_hdr() - Neighbour Advertisement (ICMPv6 type 136) ndisc_send_na() -> ndisc_send_skb() -> ip6_nd_hdr() - Redirect (ICMPv6 type 137) ndisc_send_redirect() -> ndisc_send_skb() -> ip6_nd_hdr() and if the kernel ever gets around to generating RA's, it would presumably also include: - Router Advertisement (ICMPv6 type 134) (radvd daemon could pick up on the kernel setting and use it) Interface drivers may examine the Traffic Class value and translate the DiffServ Code Point into a link-layer appropriate traffic prioritization scheme. An example of mapping IETF DSCP values to IEEE 802.11 User Priority values can be found here: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tsvwg-ieee-802-11 The expected primary use case is to properly prioritize ND over wifi. Testing: jzem22:~# cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass 0 jzem22:~# echo -1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument jzem22:~# echo 256 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument jzem22:~# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass jzem22:~# echo 255 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass jzem22:~# cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass 255 jzem22:~# echo 34 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass jzem22:~# cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass 34 jzem22:~# echo $[0xDC] > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass jzem22:~# tcpdump -v -i eth0 icmp6 and src host jzem22.pgc and dst host fe80::1 tcpdump: listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes IP6 (class 0xdc, hlim 255, next-header ICMPv6 (58) payload length: 24) jzem22.pgc > fe80::1: [icmp6 sum ok] ICMP6, neighbor advertisement, length 24, tgt is jzem22.pgc, Flags [solicited] (based on original change written by Erik Kline, with minor changes) v2: fix 'suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage' by explicitly grabbing the rcu_read_lock. Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: Erik Kline <ek@google.com> Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-11-08 08:52:09 +03:00
ndisc_tclass - INTEGER
The IPv6 Traffic Class to use by default when sending IPv6 Neighbor
Discovery (Router Solicitation, Router Advertisement, Neighbor
Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Redirect) messages.
These 8 bits can be interpreted as 6 high order bits holding the DSCP
value and 2 low order bits representing ECN (which you probably want
to leave cleared).
* 0 - (default)
net: ipv6: sysctl to specify IPv6 ND traffic class Add a per-device sysctl to specify the default traffic class to use for kernel originated IPv6 Neighbour Discovery packets. Currently this includes: - Router Solicitation (ICMPv6 type 133) ndisc_send_rs() -> ndisc_send_skb() -> ip6_nd_hdr() - Neighbour Solicitation (ICMPv6 type 135) ndisc_send_ns() -> ndisc_send_skb() -> ip6_nd_hdr() - Neighbour Advertisement (ICMPv6 type 136) ndisc_send_na() -> ndisc_send_skb() -> ip6_nd_hdr() - Redirect (ICMPv6 type 137) ndisc_send_redirect() -> ndisc_send_skb() -> ip6_nd_hdr() and if the kernel ever gets around to generating RA's, it would presumably also include: - Router Advertisement (ICMPv6 type 134) (radvd daemon could pick up on the kernel setting and use it) Interface drivers may examine the Traffic Class value and translate the DiffServ Code Point into a link-layer appropriate traffic prioritization scheme. An example of mapping IETF DSCP values to IEEE 802.11 User Priority values can be found here: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tsvwg-ieee-802-11 The expected primary use case is to properly prioritize ND over wifi. Testing: jzem22:~# cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass 0 jzem22:~# echo -1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument jzem22:~# echo 256 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument jzem22:~# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass jzem22:~# echo 255 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass jzem22:~# cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass 255 jzem22:~# echo 34 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass jzem22:~# cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass 34 jzem22:~# echo $[0xDC] > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass jzem22:~# tcpdump -v -i eth0 icmp6 and src host jzem22.pgc and dst host fe80::1 tcpdump: listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes IP6 (class 0xdc, hlim 255, next-header ICMPv6 (58) payload length: 24) jzem22.pgc > fe80::1: [icmp6 sum ok] ICMP6, neighbor advertisement, length 24, tgt is jzem22.pgc, Flags [solicited] (based on original change written by Erik Kline, with minor changes) v2: fix 'suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage' by explicitly grabbing the rcu_read_lock. Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: Erik Kline <ek@google.com> Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-11-08 08:52:09 +03:00
mldv1_unsolicited_report_interval - INTEGER
The interval in milliseconds in which the next unsolicited
MLDv1 report retransmit will take place.
Default: 10000 (10 seconds)
mldv2_unsolicited_report_interval - INTEGER
The interval in milliseconds in which the next unsolicited
MLDv2 report retransmit will take place.
Default: 1000 (1 second)
force_mld_version - INTEGER
* 0 - (default) No enforcement of a MLD version, MLDv1 fallback allowed
* 1 - Enforce to use MLD version 1
* 2 - Enforce to use MLD version 2
suppress_frag_ndisc - INTEGER
Control RFC 6980 (Security Implications of IPv6 Fragmentation
with IPv6 Neighbor Discovery) behavior:
* 1 - (default) discard fragmented neighbor discovery packets
* 0 - allow fragmented neighbor discovery packets
net: ipv6: Add a sysctl to make optimistic addresses useful candidates Add a sysctl that causes an interface's optimistic addresses to be considered equivalent to other non-deprecated addresses for source address selection purposes. Preferred addresses will still take precedence over optimistic addresses, subject to other ranking in the source address selection algorithm. This is useful where different interfaces are connected to different networks from different ISPs (e.g., a cell network and a home wifi network). The current behaviour complies with RFC 3484/6724, and it makes sense if the host has only one interface, or has multiple interfaces on the same network (same or cooperating administrative domain(s), but not in the multiple distinct networks case. For example, if a mobile device has an IPv6 address on an LTE network and then connects to IPv6-enabled wifi, while the wifi IPv6 address is undergoing DAD, IPv6 connections will try use the wifi default route with the LTE IPv6 address, and will get stuck until they time out. Also, because optimistic nodes can receive frames, issue an RTM_NEWADDR as soon as DAD starts (with the IFA_F_OPTIMSTIC flag appropriately set). A second RTM_NEWADDR is sent if DAD completes (the address flags have changed), otherwise an RTM_DELADDR is sent. Also: add an entry in ip-sysctl.txt for optimistic_dad. Signed-off-by: Erik Kline <ek@google.com> Acked-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 12:11:14 +03:00
optimistic_dad - BOOLEAN
Whether to perform Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection (RFC 4429).
* 0: disabled (default)
* 1: enabled
Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection for the interface will be enabled
if at least one of conf/{all,interface}/optimistic_dad is set to 1,
it will be disabled otherwise.
net: ipv6: Add a sysctl to make optimistic addresses useful candidates Add a sysctl that causes an interface's optimistic addresses to be considered equivalent to other non-deprecated addresses for source address selection purposes. Preferred addresses will still take precedence over optimistic addresses, subject to other ranking in the source address selection algorithm. This is useful where different interfaces are connected to different networks from different ISPs (e.g., a cell network and a home wifi network). The current behaviour complies with RFC 3484/6724, and it makes sense if the host has only one interface, or has multiple interfaces on the same network (same or cooperating administrative domain(s), but not in the multiple distinct networks case. For example, if a mobile device has an IPv6 address on an LTE network and then connects to IPv6-enabled wifi, while the wifi IPv6 address is undergoing DAD, IPv6 connections will try use the wifi default route with the LTE IPv6 address, and will get stuck until they time out. Also, because optimistic nodes can receive frames, issue an RTM_NEWADDR as soon as DAD starts (with the IFA_F_OPTIMSTIC flag appropriately set). A second RTM_NEWADDR is sent if DAD completes (the address flags have changed), otherwise an RTM_DELADDR is sent. Also: add an entry in ip-sysctl.txt for optimistic_dad. Signed-off-by: Erik Kline <ek@google.com> Acked-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 12:11:14 +03:00
use_optimistic - BOOLEAN
If enabled, do not classify optimistic addresses as deprecated during
source address selection. Preferred addresses will still be chosen
before optimistic addresses, subject to other ranking in the source
address selection algorithm.
* 0: disabled (default)
* 1: enabled
This will be enabled if at least one of
conf/{all,interface}/use_optimistic is set to 1, disabled otherwise.
net: ipv6: Add a sysctl to make optimistic addresses useful candidates Add a sysctl that causes an interface's optimistic addresses to be considered equivalent to other non-deprecated addresses for source address selection purposes. Preferred addresses will still take precedence over optimistic addresses, subject to other ranking in the source address selection algorithm. This is useful where different interfaces are connected to different networks from different ISPs (e.g., a cell network and a home wifi network). The current behaviour complies with RFC 3484/6724, and it makes sense if the host has only one interface, or has multiple interfaces on the same network (same or cooperating administrative domain(s), but not in the multiple distinct networks case. For example, if a mobile device has an IPv6 address on an LTE network and then connects to IPv6-enabled wifi, while the wifi IPv6 address is undergoing DAD, IPv6 connections will try use the wifi default route with the LTE IPv6 address, and will get stuck until they time out. Also, because optimistic nodes can receive frames, issue an RTM_NEWADDR as soon as DAD starts (with the IFA_F_OPTIMSTIC flag appropriately set). A second RTM_NEWADDR is sent if DAD completes (the address flags have changed), otherwise an RTM_DELADDR is sent. Also: add an entry in ip-sysctl.txt for optimistic_dad. Signed-off-by: Erik Kline <ek@google.com> Acked-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 12:11:14 +03:00
stable_secret - IPv6 address
This IPv6 address will be used as a secret to generate IPv6
addresses for link-local addresses and autoconfigured
ones. All addresses generated after setting this secret will
be stable privacy ones by default. This can be changed via the
addrgenmode ip-link. conf/default/stable_secret is used as the
secret for the namespace, the interface specific ones can
overwrite that. Writes to conf/all/stable_secret are refused.
It is recommended to generate this secret during installation
of a system and keep it stable after that.
By default the stable secret is unset.
addr_gen_mode - INTEGER
Defines how link-local and autoconf addresses are generated.
= =================================================================
0 generate address based on EUI64 (default)
1 do no generate a link-local address, use EUI64 for addresses
generated from autoconf
2 generate stable privacy addresses, using the secret from
stable_secret (RFC7217)
3 generate stable privacy addresses, using a random secret if unset
= =================================================================
drop_unicast_in_l2_multicast - BOOLEAN
Drop any unicast IPv6 packets that are received in link-layer
multicast (or broadcast) frames.
By default this is turned off.
drop_unsolicited_na - BOOLEAN
Drop all unsolicited neighbor advertisements, for example if there's
a known good NA proxy on the network and such frames need not be used
(or in the case of 802.11, must not be used to prevent attacks.)
By default this is turned off.
enhanced_dad - BOOLEAN
Include a nonce option in the IPv6 neighbor solicitation messages used for
duplicate address detection per RFC7527. A received DAD NS will only signal
a duplicate address if the nonce is different. This avoids any false
detection of duplicates due to loopback of the NS messages that we send.
The nonce option will be sent on an interface unless both of
conf/{all,interface}/enhanced_dad are set to FALSE.
Default: TRUE
``icmp/*``:
===========
ratelimit - INTEGER
Limit the maximal rates for sending ICMPv6 messages.
0 to disable any limiting,
otherwise the minimal space between responses in milliseconds.
Default: 1000
ratemask - list of comma separated ranges
For ICMPv6 message types matching the ranges in the ratemask, limit
the sending of the message according to ratelimit parameter.
The format used for both input and output is a comma separated
list of ranges (e.g. "0-127,129" for ICMPv6 message type 0 to 127 and
129). Writing to the file will clear all previous ranges of ICMPv6
message types and update the current list with the input.
Refer to: https://www.iana.org/assignments/icmpv6-parameters/icmpv6-parameters.xhtml
for numerical values of ICMPv6 message types, e.g. echo request is 128
and echo reply is 129.
Default: 0-1,3-127 (rate limit ICMPv6 errors except Packet Too Big)
echo_ignore_all - BOOLEAN
If set non-zero, then the kernel will ignore all ICMP ECHO
requests sent to it over the IPv6 protocol.
Default: 0
echo_ignore_multicast - BOOLEAN
If set non-zero, then the kernel will ignore all ICMP ECHO
requests sent to it over the IPv6 protocol via multicast.
Default: 0
echo_ignore_anycast - BOOLEAN
If set non-zero, then the kernel will ignore all ICMP ECHO
requests sent to it over the IPv6 protocol destined to anycast address.
Default: 0
xfrm6_gc_thresh - INTEGER
(Obsolete since linux-4.14)
The threshold at which we will start garbage collecting for IPv6
destination cache entries. At twice this value the system will
refuse new allocations.
IPv6 Update by:
Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
YOSHIFUJI Hideaki / USAGI Project <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
/proc/sys/net/bridge/* Variables:
=================================
bridge-nf-call-arptables - BOOLEAN
- 1 : pass bridged ARP traffic to arptables' FORWARD chain.
- 0 : disable this.
Default: 1
bridge-nf-call-iptables - BOOLEAN
- 1 : pass bridged IPv4 traffic to iptables' chains.
- 0 : disable this.
Default: 1
bridge-nf-call-ip6tables - BOOLEAN
- 1 : pass bridged IPv6 traffic to ip6tables' chains.
- 0 : disable this.
Default: 1
bridge-nf-filter-vlan-tagged - BOOLEAN
- 1 : pass bridged vlan-tagged ARP/IP/IPv6 traffic to {arp,ip,ip6}tables.
- 0 : disable this.
Default: 0
bridge-nf-filter-pppoe-tagged - BOOLEAN
- 1 : pass bridged pppoe-tagged IP/IPv6 traffic to {ip,ip6}tables.
- 0 : disable this.
Default: 0
bridge-nf-pass-vlan-input-dev - BOOLEAN
- 1: if bridge-nf-filter-vlan-tagged is enabled, try to find a vlan
interface on the bridge and set the netfilter input device to the
vlan. This allows use of e.g. "iptables -i br0.1" and makes the
REDIRECT target work with vlan-on-top-of-bridge interfaces. When no
matching vlan interface is found, or this switch is off, the input
device is set to the bridge interface.
- 0: disable bridge netfilter vlan interface lookup.
Default: 0
``proc/sys/net/sctp/*`` Variables:
==================================
addip_enable - BOOLEAN
Enable or disable extension of Dynamic Address Reconfiguration
(ADD-IP) functionality specified in RFC5061. This extension provides
the ability to dynamically add and remove new addresses for the SCTP
associations.
1: Enable extension.
0: Disable extension.
Default: 0
pf_enable - INTEGER
Enable or disable pf (pf is short for potentially failed) state. A value
of pf_retrans > path_max_retrans also disables pf state. That is, one of
both pf_enable and pf_retrans > path_max_retrans can disable pf state.
Since pf_retrans and path_max_retrans can be changed by userspace
application, sometimes user expects to disable pf state by the value of
pf_retrans > path_max_retrans, but occasionally the value of pf_retrans
or path_max_retrans is changed by the user application, this pf state is
enabled. As such, it is necessary to add this to dynamically enable
and disable pf state. See:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-sctp-failover for
details.
1: Enable pf.
0: Disable pf.
Default: 1
sctp: add pf_expose per netns and sock and asoc As said in rfc7829, section 3, point 12: The SCTP stack SHOULD expose the PF state of its destination addresses to the ULP as well as provide the means to notify the ULP of state transitions of its destination addresses from active to PF, and vice versa. However, it is recommended that an SCTP stack implementing SCTP-PF also allows for the ULP to be kept ignorant of the PF state of its destinations and the associated state transitions, thus allowing for retention of the simpler state transition model of [RFC4960] in the ULP. Not only does it allow to expose the PF state to ULP, but also allow to ignore sctp-pf to ULP. So this patch is to add pf_expose per netns, sock and asoc. And in sctp_assoc_control_transport(), ulp_notify will be set to false if asoc->expose is not 'enabled' in next patch. It also allows a user to change pf_expose per netns by sysctl, and pf_expose per sock and asoc will be initialized with it. Note that pf_expose also works for SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDR_INFO sockopt, to not allow a user to query the state of a sctp-pf peer address when pf_expose is 'disabled', as said in section 7.3. v1->v2: - Fix a build warning noticed by Nathan Chancellor. v2->v3: - set pf_expose to UNUSED by default to keep compatible with old applications. v3->v4: - add a new entry for pf_expose on ip-sysctl.txt, as Marcelo suggested. - change this patch to 1/5, and move sctp_assoc_control_transport change into 2/5, as Marcelo suggested. - use SCTP_PF_EXPOSE_UNSET instead of SCTP_PF_EXPOSE_UNUSED, and set SCTP_PF_EXPOSE_UNSET to 0 in enum, as Marcelo suggested. Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-11-08 08:20:32 +03:00
pf_expose - INTEGER
Unset or enable/disable pf (pf is short for potentially failed) state
exposure. Applications can control the exposure of the PF path state
in the SCTP_PEER_ADDR_CHANGE event and the SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDR_INFO
sockopt. When it's unset, no SCTP_PEER_ADDR_CHANGE event with
SCTP_ADDR_PF state will be sent and a SCTP_PF-state transport info
can be got via SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDR_INFO sockopt; When it's enabled,
a SCTP_PEER_ADDR_CHANGE event will be sent for a transport becoming
SCTP_PF state and a SCTP_PF-state transport info can be got via
SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDR_INFO sockopt; When it's diabled, no
SCTP_PEER_ADDR_CHANGE event will be sent and it returns -EACCES when
trying to get a SCTP_PF-state transport info via SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDR_INFO
sockopt.
0: Unset pf state exposure, Compatible with old applications.
1: Disable pf state exposure.
2: Enable pf state exposure.
Default: 0
addip_noauth_enable - BOOLEAN
Dynamic Address Reconfiguration (ADD-IP) requires the use of
authentication to protect the operations of adding or removing new
addresses. This requirement is mandated so that unauthorized hosts
would not be able to hijack associations. However, older
implementations may not have implemented this requirement while
allowing the ADD-IP extension. For reasons of interoperability,
we provide this variable to control the enforcement of the
authentication requirement.
== ===============================================================
1 Allow ADD-IP extension to be used without authentication. This
should only be set in a closed environment for interoperability
with older implementations.
0 Enforce the authentication requirement
== ===============================================================
Default: 0
auth_enable - BOOLEAN
Enable or disable Authenticated Chunks extension. This extension
provides the ability to send and receive authenticated chunks and is
required for secure operation of Dynamic Address Reconfiguration
(ADD-IP) extension.
- 1: Enable this extension.
- 0: Disable this extension.
Default: 0
prsctp_enable - BOOLEAN
Enable or disable the Partial Reliability extension (RFC3758) which
is used to notify peers that a given DATA should no longer be expected.
- 1: Enable extension
- 0: Disable
Default: 1
max_burst - INTEGER
The limit of the number of new packets that can be initially sent. It
controls how bursty the generated traffic can be.
Default: 4
association_max_retrans - INTEGER
Set the maximum number for retransmissions that an association can
attempt deciding that the remote end is unreachable. If this value
is exceeded, the association is terminated.
Default: 10
max_init_retransmits - INTEGER
The maximum number of retransmissions of INIT and COOKIE-ECHO chunks
that an association will attempt before declaring the destination
unreachable and terminating.
Default: 8
path_max_retrans - INTEGER
The maximum number of retransmissions that will be attempted on a given
path. Once this threshold is exceeded, the path is considered
unreachable, and new traffic will use a different path when the
association is multihomed.
Default: 5
pf_retrans - INTEGER
The number of retransmissions that will be attempted on a given path
before traffic is redirected to an alternate transport (should one
exist). Note this is distinct from path_max_retrans, as a path that
passes the pf_retrans threshold can still be used. Its only
deprioritized when a transmission path is selected by the stack. This
setting is primarily used to enable fast failover mechanisms without
having to reduce path_max_retrans to a very low value. See:
http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-nishida-tsvwg-sctp-failover-05.txt
for details. Note also that a value of pf_retrans > path_max_retrans
disables this feature. Since both pf_retrans and path_max_retrans can
be changed by userspace application, a variable pf_enable is used to
disable pf state.
Default: 0
ps_retrans - INTEGER
Primary.Switchover.Max.Retrans (PSMR), it's a tunable parameter coming
from section-5 "Primary Path Switchover" in rfc7829. The primary path
will be changed to another active path when the path error counter on
the old primary path exceeds PSMR, so that "the SCTP sender is allowed
to continue data transmission on a new working path even when the old
primary destination address becomes active again". Note this feature
is disabled by initializing 'ps_retrans' per netns as 0xffff by default,
and its value can't be less than 'pf_retrans' when changing by sysctl.
Default: 0xffff
rto_initial - INTEGER
The initial round trip timeout value in milliseconds that will be used
in calculating round trip times. This is the initial time interval
for retransmissions.
Default: 3000
rto_max - INTEGER
The maximum value (in milliseconds) of the round trip timeout. This
is the largest time interval that can elapse between retransmissions.
Default: 60000
rto_min - INTEGER
The minimum value (in milliseconds) of the round trip timeout. This
is the smallest time interval the can elapse between retransmissions.
Default: 1000
hb_interval - INTEGER
The interval (in milliseconds) between HEARTBEAT chunks. These chunks
are sent at the specified interval on idle paths to probe the state of
a given path between 2 associations.
Default: 30000
sack_timeout - INTEGER
The amount of time (in milliseconds) that the implementation will wait
to send a SACK.
Default: 200
valid_cookie_life - INTEGER
The default lifetime of the SCTP cookie (in milliseconds). The cookie
is used during association establishment.
Default: 60000
cookie_preserve_enable - BOOLEAN
Enable or disable the ability to extend the lifetime of the SCTP cookie
that is used during the establishment phase of SCTP association
- 1: Enable cookie lifetime extension.
- 0: Disable
Default: 1
cookie_hmac_alg - STRING
Select the hmac algorithm used when generating the cookie value sent by
a listening sctp socket to a connecting client in the INIT-ACK chunk.
Valid values are:
* md5
* sha1
* none
Ability to assign md5 or sha1 as the selected alg is predicated on the
configuration of those algorithms at build time (CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD5 and
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1).
Default: Dependent on configuration. MD5 if available, else SHA1 if
available, else none.
rcvbuf_policy - INTEGER
Determines if the receive buffer is attributed to the socket or to
association. SCTP supports the capability to create multiple
associations on a single socket. When using this capability, it is
possible that a single stalled association that's buffering a lot
of data may block other associations from delivering their data by
consuming all of the receive buffer space. To work around this,
the rcvbuf_policy could be set to attribute the receiver buffer space
to each association instead of the socket. This prevents the described
blocking.
- 1: rcvbuf space is per association
- 0: rcvbuf space is per socket
Default: 0
sndbuf_policy - INTEGER
Similar to rcvbuf_policy above, this applies to send buffer space.
- 1: Send buffer is tracked per association
- 0: Send buffer is tracked per socket.
Default: 0
sctp_mem - vector of 3 INTEGERs: min, pressure, max
Number of pages allowed for queueing by all SCTP sockets.
min: Below this number of pages SCTP is not bothered about its
memory appetite. When amount of memory allocated by SCTP exceeds
this number, SCTP starts to moderate memory usage.
pressure: This value was introduced to follow format of tcp_mem.
max: Number of pages allowed for queueing by all SCTP sockets.
Default is calculated at boot time from amount of available memory.
sctp_rmem - vector of 3 INTEGERs: min, default, max
Only the first value ("min") is used, "default" and "max" are
ignored.
min: Minimal size of receive buffer used by SCTP socket.
It is guaranteed to each SCTP socket (but not association) even
under moderate memory pressure.
Default: 4K
sctp_wmem - vector of 3 INTEGERs: min, default, max
Currently this tunable has no effect.
addr_scope_policy - INTEGER
Control IPv4 address scoping - draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00
- 0 - Disable IPv4 address scoping
- 1 - Enable IPv4 address scoping
- 2 - Follow draft but allow IPv4 private addresses
- 3 - Follow draft but allow IPv4 link local addresses
Default: 1
``/proc/sys/net/core/*``
========================
Please see: Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst for descriptions of these entries.
``/proc/sys/net/unix/*``
========================
max_dgram_qlen - INTEGER
The maximum length of dgram socket receive queue
Default: 10