2019-06-04 11:11:33 +03:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 19:37:40 +03:00
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/*
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* Scalar fixed time AES core transform
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2017 Linaro Ltd <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
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*/
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#include <crypto/aes.h>
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <asm/unaligned.h>
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/*
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* Emit the sbox as volatile const to prevent the compiler from doing
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* constant folding on sbox references involving fixed indexes.
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*/
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static volatile const u8 __cacheline_aligned __aesti_sbox[] = {
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0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5,
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0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76,
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0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0,
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0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0,
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0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc,
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0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15,
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0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a,
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0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75,
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0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0,
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0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84,
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0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b,
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0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf,
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0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
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0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8,
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0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5,
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0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2,
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0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17,
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0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73,
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0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88,
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0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb,
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0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c,
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0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79,
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0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9,
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0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08,
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0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6,
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0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
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0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e,
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0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e,
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0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94,
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0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf,
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0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68,
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0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16,
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};
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static volatile const u8 __cacheline_aligned __aesti_inv_sbox[] = {
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0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38,
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0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb,
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0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87,
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0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb,
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0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d,
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0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e,
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0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2,
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0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25,
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0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16,
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0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92,
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0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda,
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0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84,
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0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a,
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0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06,
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0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02,
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0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b,
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0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea,
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0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73,
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0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85,
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0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e,
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0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89,
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0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b,
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0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20,
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0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4,
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0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31,
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0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f,
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0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d,
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0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef,
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0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0,
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0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61,
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0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26,
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0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d,
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};
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static u32 mul_by_x(u32 w)
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{
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u32 x = w & 0x7f7f7f7f;
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u32 y = w & 0x80808080;
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/* multiply by polynomial 'x' (0b10) in GF(2^8) */
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return (x << 1) ^ (y >> 7) * 0x1b;
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}
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static u32 mul_by_x2(u32 w)
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{
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u32 x = w & 0x3f3f3f3f;
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u32 y = w & 0x80808080;
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u32 z = w & 0x40404040;
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/* multiply by polynomial 'x^2' (0b100) in GF(2^8) */
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return (x << 2) ^ (y >> 7) * 0x36 ^ (z >> 6) * 0x1b;
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}
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static u32 mix_columns(u32 x)
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{
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/*
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* Perform the following matrix multiplication in GF(2^8)
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*
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* | 0x2 0x3 0x1 0x1 | | x[0] |
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* | 0x1 0x2 0x3 0x1 | | x[1] |
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* | 0x1 0x1 0x2 0x3 | x | x[2] |
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2017-05-10 03:20:27 +03:00
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* | 0x3 0x1 0x1 0x2 | | x[3] |
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crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 19:37:40 +03:00
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*/
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u32 y = mul_by_x(x) ^ ror32(x, 16);
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return y ^ ror32(x ^ y, 8);
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}
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static u32 inv_mix_columns(u32 x)
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{
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/*
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* Perform the following matrix multiplication in GF(2^8)
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*
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* | 0xe 0xb 0xd 0x9 | | x[0] |
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* | 0x9 0xe 0xb 0xd | | x[1] |
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* | 0xd 0x9 0xe 0xb | x | x[2] |
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* | 0xb 0xd 0x9 0xe | | x[3] |
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*
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* which can conveniently be reduced to
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*
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* | 0x2 0x3 0x1 0x1 | | 0x5 0x0 0x4 0x0 | | x[0] |
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* | 0x1 0x2 0x3 0x1 | | 0x0 0x5 0x0 0x4 | | x[1] |
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* | 0x1 0x1 0x2 0x3 | x | 0x4 0x0 0x5 0x0 | x | x[2] |
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* | 0x3 0x1 0x1 0x2 | | 0x0 0x4 0x0 0x5 | | x[3] |
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*/
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u32 y = mul_by_x2(x);
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return mix_columns(x ^ y ^ ror32(y, 16));
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}
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static __always_inline u32 subshift(u32 in[], int pos)
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{
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return (__aesti_sbox[in[pos] & 0xff]) ^
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(__aesti_sbox[(in[(pos + 1) % 4] >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
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(__aesti_sbox[(in[(pos + 2) % 4] >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
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(__aesti_sbox[(in[(pos + 3) % 4] >> 24) & 0xff] << 24);
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}
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static __always_inline u32 inv_subshift(u32 in[], int pos)
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{
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return (__aesti_inv_sbox[in[pos] & 0xff]) ^
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(__aesti_inv_sbox[(in[(pos + 3) % 4] >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
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(__aesti_inv_sbox[(in[(pos + 2) % 4] >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
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(__aesti_inv_sbox[(in[(pos + 1) % 4] >> 24) & 0xff] << 24);
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}
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static u32 subw(u32 in)
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{
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return (__aesti_sbox[in & 0xff]) ^
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(__aesti_sbox[(in >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
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(__aesti_sbox[(in >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
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(__aesti_sbox[(in >> 24) & 0xff] << 24);
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}
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static int aesti_expand_key(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key,
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unsigned int key_len)
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{
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u32 kwords = key_len / sizeof(u32);
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u32 rc, i, j;
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if (key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
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key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
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key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256)
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return -EINVAL;
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ctx->key_length = key_len;
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for (i = 0; i < kwords; i++)
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ctx->key_enc[i] = get_unaligned_le32(in_key + i * sizeof(u32));
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for (i = 0, rc = 1; i < 10; i++, rc = mul_by_x(rc)) {
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u32 *rki = ctx->key_enc + (i * kwords);
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u32 *rko = rki + kwords;
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rko[0] = ror32(subw(rki[kwords - 1]), 8) ^ rc ^ rki[0];
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rko[1] = rko[0] ^ rki[1];
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rko[2] = rko[1] ^ rki[2];
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rko[3] = rko[2] ^ rki[3];
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if (key_len == 24) {
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if (i >= 7)
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break;
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rko[4] = rko[3] ^ rki[4];
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rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5];
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} else if (key_len == 32) {
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if (i >= 6)
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break;
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rko[4] = subw(rko[3]) ^ rki[4];
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rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5];
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rko[6] = rko[5] ^ rki[6];
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rko[7] = rko[6] ^ rki[7];
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}
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}
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/*
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* Generate the decryption keys for the Equivalent Inverse Cipher.
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* This involves reversing the order of the round keys, and applying
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* the Inverse Mix Columns transformation to all but the first and
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* the last one.
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*/
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ctx->key_dec[0] = ctx->key_enc[key_len + 24];
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ctx->key_dec[1] = ctx->key_enc[key_len + 25];
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ctx->key_dec[2] = ctx->key_enc[key_len + 26];
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ctx->key_dec[3] = ctx->key_enc[key_len + 27];
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for (i = 4, j = key_len + 20; j > 0; i += 4, j -= 4) {
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_dec[i] = inv_mix_columns(ctx->key_enc[j]);
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_dec[i + 1] = inv_mix_columns(ctx->key_enc[j + 1]);
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_dec[i + 2] = inv_mix_columns(ctx->key_enc[j + 2]);
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_dec[i + 3] = inv_mix_columns(ctx->key_enc[j + 3]);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_dec[i] = ctx->key_enc[0];
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_dec[i + 1] = ctx->key_enc[1];
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_dec[i + 2] = ctx->key_enc[2];
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_dec[i + 3] = ctx->key_enc[3];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int aesti_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int key_len)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = aesti_expand_key(ctx, in_key, key_len);
|
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* In order to force the compiler to emit data independent Sbox lookups
|
|
|
|
|
* at the start of each block, xor the first round key with values at
|
|
|
|
|
* fixed indexes in the Sbox. This will need to be repeated each time
|
|
|
|
|
* the key is used, which will pull the entire Sbox into the D-cache
|
|
|
|
|
* before any data dependent Sbox lookups are performed.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_enc[0] ^= __aesti_sbox[ 0] ^ __aesti_sbox[128];
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_enc[1] ^= __aesti_sbox[32] ^ __aesti_sbox[160];
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_enc[2] ^= __aesti_sbox[64] ^ __aesti_sbox[192];
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_enc[3] ^= __aesti_sbox[96] ^ __aesti_sbox[224];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_dec[0] ^= __aesti_inv_sbox[ 0] ^ __aesti_inv_sbox[128];
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_dec[1] ^= __aesti_inv_sbox[32] ^ __aesti_inv_sbox[160];
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_dec[2] ^= __aesti_inv_sbox[64] ^ __aesti_inv_sbox[192];
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->key_dec[3] ^= __aesti_inv_sbox[96] ^ __aesti_inv_sbox[224];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void aesti_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
const u32 *rkp = ctx->key_enc + 4;
|
|
|
|
|
int rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 st0[4], st1[4];
|
2018-10-18 07:37:58 +03:00
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 19:37:40 +03:00
|
|
|
int round;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
st0[0] = ctx->key_enc[0] ^ get_unaligned_le32(in);
|
|
|
|
|
st0[1] = ctx->key_enc[1] ^ get_unaligned_le32(in + 4);
|
|
|
|
|
st0[2] = ctx->key_enc[2] ^ get_unaligned_le32(in + 8);
|
|
|
|
|
st0[3] = ctx->key_enc[3] ^ get_unaligned_le32(in + 12);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-18 07:37:58 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Temporarily disable interrupts to avoid races where cachelines are
|
|
|
|
|
* evicted when the CPU is interrupted to do something else.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
local_irq_save(flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 19:37:40 +03:00
|
|
|
st0[0] ^= __aesti_sbox[ 0] ^ __aesti_sbox[128];
|
|
|
|
|
st0[1] ^= __aesti_sbox[32] ^ __aesti_sbox[160];
|
|
|
|
|
st0[2] ^= __aesti_sbox[64] ^ __aesti_sbox[192];
|
|
|
|
|
st0[3] ^= __aesti_sbox[96] ^ __aesti_sbox[224];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (round = 0;; round += 2, rkp += 8) {
|
|
|
|
|
st1[0] = mix_columns(subshift(st0, 0)) ^ rkp[0];
|
|
|
|
|
st1[1] = mix_columns(subshift(st0, 1)) ^ rkp[1];
|
|
|
|
|
st1[2] = mix_columns(subshift(st0, 2)) ^ rkp[2];
|
|
|
|
|
st1[3] = mix_columns(subshift(st0, 3)) ^ rkp[3];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (round == rounds - 2)
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
st0[0] = mix_columns(subshift(st1, 0)) ^ rkp[4];
|
|
|
|
|
st0[1] = mix_columns(subshift(st1, 1)) ^ rkp[5];
|
|
|
|
|
st0[2] = mix_columns(subshift(st1, 2)) ^ rkp[6];
|
|
|
|
|
st0[3] = mix_columns(subshift(st1, 3)) ^ rkp[7];
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
put_unaligned_le32(subshift(st1, 0) ^ rkp[4], out);
|
|
|
|
|
put_unaligned_le32(subshift(st1, 1) ^ rkp[5], out + 4);
|
|
|
|
|
put_unaligned_le32(subshift(st1, 2) ^ rkp[6], out + 8);
|
|
|
|
|
put_unaligned_le32(subshift(st1, 3) ^ rkp[7], out + 12);
|
2018-10-18 07:37:58 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
local_irq_restore(flags);
|
crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 19:37:40 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void aesti_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
const u32 *rkp = ctx->key_dec + 4;
|
|
|
|
|
int rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 st0[4], st1[4];
|
2018-10-18 07:37:58 +03:00
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 19:37:40 +03:00
|
|
|
int round;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
st0[0] = ctx->key_dec[0] ^ get_unaligned_le32(in);
|
|
|
|
|
st0[1] = ctx->key_dec[1] ^ get_unaligned_le32(in + 4);
|
|
|
|
|
st0[2] = ctx->key_dec[2] ^ get_unaligned_le32(in + 8);
|
|
|
|
|
st0[3] = ctx->key_dec[3] ^ get_unaligned_le32(in + 12);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-18 07:37:58 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Temporarily disable interrupts to avoid races where cachelines are
|
|
|
|
|
* evicted when the CPU is interrupted to do something else.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
local_irq_save(flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 19:37:40 +03:00
|
|
|
st0[0] ^= __aesti_inv_sbox[ 0] ^ __aesti_inv_sbox[128];
|
|
|
|
|
st0[1] ^= __aesti_inv_sbox[32] ^ __aesti_inv_sbox[160];
|
|
|
|
|
st0[2] ^= __aesti_inv_sbox[64] ^ __aesti_inv_sbox[192];
|
|
|
|
|
st0[3] ^= __aesti_inv_sbox[96] ^ __aesti_inv_sbox[224];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (round = 0;; round += 2, rkp += 8) {
|
|
|
|
|
st1[0] = inv_mix_columns(inv_subshift(st0, 0)) ^ rkp[0];
|
|
|
|
|
st1[1] = inv_mix_columns(inv_subshift(st0, 1)) ^ rkp[1];
|
|
|
|
|
st1[2] = inv_mix_columns(inv_subshift(st0, 2)) ^ rkp[2];
|
|
|
|
|
st1[3] = inv_mix_columns(inv_subshift(st0, 3)) ^ rkp[3];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (round == rounds - 2)
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
st0[0] = inv_mix_columns(inv_subshift(st1, 0)) ^ rkp[4];
|
|
|
|
|
st0[1] = inv_mix_columns(inv_subshift(st1, 1)) ^ rkp[5];
|
|
|
|
|
st0[2] = inv_mix_columns(inv_subshift(st1, 2)) ^ rkp[6];
|
|
|
|
|
st0[3] = inv_mix_columns(inv_subshift(st1, 3)) ^ rkp[7];
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
put_unaligned_le32(inv_subshift(st1, 0) ^ rkp[4], out);
|
|
|
|
|
put_unaligned_le32(inv_subshift(st1, 1) ^ rkp[5], out + 4);
|
|
|
|
|
put_unaligned_le32(inv_subshift(st1, 2) ^ rkp[6], out + 8);
|
|
|
|
|
put_unaligned_le32(inv_subshift(st1, 3) ^ rkp[7], out + 12);
|
2018-10-18 07:37:58 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
local_irq_restore(flags);
|
crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 19:37:40 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct crypto_alg aes_alg = {
|
|
|
|
|
.cra_name = "aes",
|
|
|
|
|
.cra_driver_name = "aes-fixed-time",
|
|
|
|
|
.cra_priority = 100 + 1,
|
|
|
|
|
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
|
|
|
|
|
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx),
|
|
|
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
|
.cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
|
.cra_cipher.cia_setkey = aesti_set_key,
|
|
|
|
|
.cra_cipher.cia_encrypt = aesti_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
|
.cra_cipher.cia_decrypt = aesti_decrypt
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init aes_init(void)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return crypto_register_alg(&aes_alg);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void __exit aes_fini(void)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
crypto_unregister_alg(&aes_alg);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
module_init(aes_init);
|
|
|
|
|
module_exit(aes_fini);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Generic fixed time AES");
|
|
|
|
|
MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>");
|
|
|
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
|
