WSL2-Linux-Kernel/block/genhd.c

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35 KiB
C
Исходник Обычный вид История

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* gendisk handling
*
* Portions Copyright (C) 2020 Christoph Hellwig
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/genhd.h>
#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/kmod.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/idr.h>
implement in-kernel gendisk events handling Currently, media presence polling for removeable block devices is done from userland. There are several issues with this. * Polling is done by periodically opening the device. For SCSI devices, the command sequence generated by such action involves a few different commands including TEST_UNIT_READY. This behavior, while perfectly legal, is different from Windows which only issues single command, GET_EVENT_STATUS_NOTIFICATION. Unfortunately, some ATAPI devices lock up after being periodically queried such command sequences. * There is no reliable and unintrusive way for a userland program to tell whether the target device is safe for media presence polling. For example, polling for media presence during an on-going burning session can make it fail. The polling program can avoid this by opening the device with O_EXCL but then it risks making a valid exclusive user of the device fail w/ -EBUSY. * Userland polling is unnecessarily heavy and in-kernel implementation is lighter and better coordinated (workqueue, timer slack). This patch implements framework for in-kernel disk event handling, which includes media presence polling. * bdops->check_events() is added, which supercedes ->media_changed(). It should check whether there's any pending event and return if so. Currently, two events are defined - DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE and DISK_EVENT_EJECT_REQUEST. ->check_events() is guaranteed not to be called parallelly. * gendisk->events and ->async_events are added. These should be initialized by block driver before passing the device to add_disk(). The former contains the mask of all supported events and the latter the mask of all events which the device can report without polling. /sys/block/*/events[_async] export these to userland. * Kernel parameter block.events_dfl_poll_msecs controls the system polling interval (default is 0 which means disable) and /sys/block/*/events_poll_msecs control polling intervals for individual devices (default is -1 meaning use system setting). Note that if a device can report all supported events asynchronously and its polling interval isn't explicitly set, the device won't be polled regardless of the system polling interval. * If a device is opened exclusively with write access, event checking is automatically disabled until all write exclusive accesses are released. * There are event 'clearing' events. For example, both of currently defined events are cleared after the device has been successfully opened. This information is passed to ->check_events() callback using @clearing argument as a hint. * Event checking is always performed from system_nrt_wq and timer slack is set to 25% for polling. * Nothing changes for drivers which implement ->media_changed() but not ->check_events(). Going forward, all drivers will be converted to ->check_events() and ->media_change() will be dropped. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com>
2010-12-08 22:57:37 +03:00
#include <linux/log2.h>
#include <linux/pm_runtime.h>
#include <linux/badblocks.h>
#include "blk.h"
static struct kobject *block_depr;
block: add disk sequence number Associating uevents with block devices in userspace is difficult and racy: the uevent netlink socket is lossy, and on slow and overloaded systems has a very high latency. Block devices do not have exclusive owners in userspace, any process can set one up (e.g. loop devices). Moreover, device names can be reused (e.g. loop0 can be reused again and again). A userspace process setting up a block device and watching for its events cannot thus reliably tell whether an event relates to the device it just set up or another earlier instance with the same name. Being able to set a UUID on a loop device would solve the race conditions. But it does not allow to derive orderings from uevents: if you see a uevent with a UUID that does not match the device you are waiting for, you cannot tell whether it's because the right uevent has not arrived yet, or it was already sent and you missed it. So you cannot tell whether you should wait for it or not. Associating a unique, monotonically increasing sequential number to the lifetime of each block device, which can be retrieved with an ioctl immediately upon setting it up, allows to solve the race conditions with uevents, and also allows userspace processes to know whether they should wait for the uevent they need or if it was dropped and thus they should move on. Additionally, increment the disk sequence number when the media change, i.e. on DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE event. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712230530.29323-2-mcroce@linux.microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-07-13 02:05:25 +03:00
/*
* Unique, monotonically increasing sequential number associated with block
* devices instances (i.e. incremented each time a device is attached).
* Associating uevents with block devices in userspace is difficult and racy:
* the uevent netlink socket is lossy, and on slow and overloaded systems has
* a very high latency.
* Block devices do not have exclusive owners in userspace, any process can set
* one up (e.g. loop devices). Moreover, device names can be reused (e.g. loop0
* can be reused again and again).
* A userspace process setting up a block device and watching for its events
* cannot thus reliably tell whether an event relates to the device it just set
* up or another earlier instance with the same name.
* This sequential number allows userspace processes to solve this problem, and
* uniquely associate an uevent to the lifetime to a device.
*/
static atomic64_t diskseq;
/* for extended dynamic devt allocation, currently only one major is used */
#define NR_EXT_DEVT (1 << MINORBITS)
static DEFINE_IDA(ext_devt_ida);
void set_capacity(struct gendisk *disk, sector_t sectors)
{
struct block_device *bdev = disk->part0;
spin_lock(&bdev->bd_size_lock);
i_size_write(bdev->bd_inode, (loff_t)sectors << SECTOR_SHIFT);
spin_unlock(&bdev->bd_size_lock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_capacity);
/*
* Set disk capacity and notify if the size is not currently zero and will not
* be set to zero. Returns true if a uevent was sent, otherwise false.
*/
bool set_capacity_and_notify(struct gendisk *disk, sector_t size)
{
sector_t capacity = get_capacity(disk);
char *envp[] = { "RESIZE=1", NULL };
set_capacity(disk, size);
/*
* Only print a message and send a uevent if the gendisk is user visible
* and alive. This avoids spamming the log and udev when setting the
* initial capacity during probing.
*/
if (size == capacity ||
!disk_live(disk) ||
(disk->flags & GENHD_FL_HIDDEN))
return false;
pr_info("%s: detected capacity change from %lld to %lld\n",
disk->disk_name, capacity, size);
/*
* Historically we did not send a uevent for changes to/from an empty
* device.
*/
if (!capacity || !size)
return false;
kobject_uevent_env(&disk_to_dev(disk)->kobj, KOBJ_CHANGE, envp);
return true;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_capacity_and_notify);
/*
* Format the device name of the indicated block device into the supplied buffer
* and return a pointer to that same buffer for convenience.
*
* Note: do not use this in new code, use the %pg specifier to sprintf and
* printk insted.
*/
const char *bdevname(struct block_device *bdev, char *buf)
{
struct gendisk *hd = bdev->bd_disk;
int partno = bdev->bd_partno;
if (!partno)
snprintf(buf, BDEVNAME_SIZE, "%s", hd->disk_name);
else if (isdigit(hd->disk_name[strlen(hd->disk_name)-1]))
snprintf(buf, BDEVNAME_SIZE, "%sp%d", hd->disk_name, partno);
else
snprintf(buf, BDEVNAME_SIZE, "%s%d", hd->disk_name, partno);
return buf;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bdevname);
static void part_stat_read_all(struct block_device *part,
struct disk_stats *stat)
{
int cpu;
memset(stat, 0, sizeof(struct disk_stats));
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct disk_stats *ptr = per_cpu_ptr(part->bd_stats, cpu);
int group;
for (group = 0; group < NR_STAT_GROUPS; group++) {
stat->nsecs[group] += ptr->nsecs[group];
stat->sectors[group] += ptr->sectors[group];
stat->ios[group] += ptr->ios[group];
stat->merges[group] += ptr->merges[group];
}
stat->io_ticks += ptr->io_ticks;
}
}
static unsigned int part_in_flight(struct block_device *part)
{
unsigned int inflight = 0;
int cpu;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
inflight += part_stat_local_read_cpu(part, in_flight[0], cpu) +
part_stat_local_read_cpu(part, in_flight[1], cpu);
}
if ((int)inflight < 0)
inflight = 0;
return inflight;
}
static void part_in_flight_rw(struct block_device *part,
unsigned int inflight[2])
{
int cpu;
inflight[0] = 0;
inflight[1] = 0;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
inflight[0] += part_stat_local_read_cpu(part, in_flight[0], cpu);
inflight[1] += part_stat_local_read_cpu(part, in_flight[1], cpu);
}
if ((int)inflight[0] < 0)
inflight[0] = 0;
if ((int)inflight[1] < 0)
inflight[1] = 0;
}
/*
* Can be deleted altogether. Later.
*
*/
#define BLKDEV_MAJOR_HASH_SIZE 255
static struct blk_major_name {
struct blk_major_name *next;
int major;
char name[16];
void (*probe)(dev_t devt);
} *major_names[BLKDEV_MAJOR_HASH_SIZE];
static DEFINE_MUTEX(major_names_lock);
block: genhd: don't call blkdev_show() with major_names_lock held If CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP && CONFIG_MTD (at least; there might be other combinations), lockdep complains circular locking dependency at __loop_clr_fd(), for major_names_lock serves as a locking dependency aggregating hub across multiple block modules. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0+ #757 Tainted: G E ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-udevd/7568 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88800f334d48 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 but task is already holding lock: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x17/0x20 lo_open+0x23/0x50 [loop] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x199/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #5 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 bd_register_pending_holders+0x20/0x100 device_add_disk+0x1ae/0x390 loop_add+0x29c/0x2d0 [loop] blk_request_module+0x5a/0xb0 blkdev_get_no_open+0x27/0xa0 blkdev_get_by_dev+0x5f/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #4 (major_names_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 blkdev_show+0x19/0x80 devinfo_show+0x52/0x60 seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x3e0 proc_reg_read_iter+0x41/0x80 vfs_read+0x2ac/0x330 ksys_read+0x6b/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 seq_read_iter+0x37/0x3e0 generic_file_splice_read+0xf3/0x170 splice_direct_to_actor+0x14e/0x350 do_splice_direct+0x84/0xd0 do_sendfile+0x263/0x430 __se_sys_sendfile64+0x96/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 lo_write_bvec+0x96/0x280 [loop] loop_process_work+0xa68/0xc10 [loop] process_one_work+0x293/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x280/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by systemd-udevd/7568: #0: ffff888012554128 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_put+0x4c/0x1d0 #1: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 7568 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G E 5.14.0+ #757 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 02/27/2020 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x79/0xbf print_circular_bug+0x5d6/0x5e0 ? stack_trace_save+0x42/0x60 ? save_trace+0x3d/0x2d0 check_noncircular+0x10b/0x120 validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0x1a0 ? drain_workqueue+0x41/0x140 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 ? blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0xac/0xd0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x230 blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f0fd4c661f7 Code: 00 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 13 fc ff ff RSP: 002b:00007ffd1c9e9fd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f0fd46be6c8 RCX: 00007f0fd4c661f7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000055fff1eaf400 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f0fd46be6c8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000002f08 R15: 00007ffd1c9ea050 Commit 1c500ad706383f1a ("loop: reduce the loop_ctl_mutex scope") is for breaking "loop_ctl_mutex => &lo->lo_mutex" dependency chain. But enabling a different block module results in forming circular locking dependency due to shared major_names_lock mutex. The simplest fix is to call probe function without holding major_names_lock [1], but Christoph Hellwig does not like such idea. Therefore, instead of holding major_names_lock in blkdev_show(), introduce a different lock for blkdev_show() in order to break "sb_writers#$N => &p->lock => major_names_lock" dependency chain. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2af8a5b-3c1b-204e-7f56-bea0b15848d6@i-love.sakura.ne.jp [1] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/18a02da2-0bf3-550e-b071-2b4ab13c49f0@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-09-07 14:52:13 +03:00
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(major_names_spinlock);
/* index in the above - for now: assume no multimajor ranges */
static inline int major_to_index(unsigned major)
{
return major % BLKDEV_MAJOR_HASH_SIZE;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
void blkdev_show(struct seq_file *seqf, off_t offset)
{
struct blk_major_name *dp;
block: genhd: don't call blkdev_show() with major_names_lock held If CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP && CONFIG_MTD (at least; there might be other combinations), lockdep complains circular locking dependency at __loop_clr_fd(), for major_names_lock serves as a locking dependency aggregating hub across multiple block modules. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0+ #757 Tainted: G E ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-udevd/7568 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88800f334d48 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 but task is already holding lock: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x17/0x20 lo_open+0x23/0x50 [loop] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x199/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #5 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 bd_register_pending_holders+0x20/0x100 device_add_disk+0x1ae/0x390 loop_add+0x29c/0x2d0 [loop] blk_request_module+0x5a/0xb0 blkdev_get_no_open+0x27/0xa0 blkdev_get_by_dev+0x5f/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #4 (major_names_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 blkdev_show+0x19/0x80 devinfo_show+0x52/0x60 seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x3e0 proc_reg_read_iter+0x41/0x80 vfs_read+0x2ac/0x330 ksys_read+0x6b/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 seq_read_iter+0x37/0x3e0 generic_file_splice_read+0xf3/0x170 splice_direct_to_actor+0x14e/0x350 do_splice_direct+0x84/0xd0 do_sendfile+0x263/0x430 __se_sys_sendfile64+0x96/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 lo_write_bvec+0x96/0x280 [loop] loop_process_work+0xa68/0xc10 [loop] process_one_work+0x293/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x280/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by systemd-udevd/7568: #0: ffff888012554128 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_put+0x4c/0x1d0 #1: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 7568 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G E 5.14.0+ #757 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 02/27/2020 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x79/0xbf print_circular_bug+0x5d6/0x5e0 ? stack_trace_save+0x42/0x60 ? save_trace+0x3d/0x2d0 check_noncircular+0x10b/0x120 validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0x1a0 ? drain_workqueue+0x41/0x140 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 ? blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0xac/0xd0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x230 blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f0fd4c661f7 Code: 00 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 13 fc ff ff RSP: 002b:00007ffd1c9e9fd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f0fd46be6c8 RCX: 00007f0fd4c661f7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000055fff1eaf400 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f0fd46be6c8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000002f08 R15: 00007ffd1c9ea050 Commit 1c500ad706383f1a ("loop: reduce the loop_ctl_mutex scope") is for breaking "loop_ctl_mutex => &lo->lo_mutex" dependency chain. But enabling a different block module results in forming circular locking dependency due to shared major_names_lock mutex. The simplest fix is to call probe function without holding major_names_lock [1], but Christoph Hellwig does not like such idea. Therefore, instead of holding major_names_lock in blkdev_show(), introduce a different lock for blkdev_show() in order to break "sb_writers#$N => &p->lock => major_names_lock" dependency chain. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2af8a5b-3c1b-204e-7f56-bea0b15848d6@i-love.sakura.ne.jp [1] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/18a02da2-0bf3-550e-b071-2b4ab13c49f0@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-09-07 14:52:13 +03:00
spin_lock(&major_names_spinlock);
for (dp = major_names[major_to_index(offset)]; dp; dp = dp->next)
if (dp->major == offset)
seq_printf(seqf, "%3d %s\n", dp->major, dp->name);
block: genhd: don't call blkdev_show() with major_names_lock held If CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP && CONFIG_MTD (at least; there might be other combinations), lockdep complains circular locking dependency at __loop_clr_fd(), for major_names_lock serves as a locking dependency aggregating hub across multiple block modules. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0+ #757 Tainted: G E ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-udevd/7568 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88800f334d48 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 but task is already holding lock: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x17/0x20 lo_open+0x23/0x50 [loop] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x199/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #5 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 bd_register_pending_holders+0x20/0x100 device_add_disk+0x1ae/0x390 loop_add+0x29c/0x2d0 [loop] blk_request_module+0x5a/0xb0 blkdev_get_no_open+0x27/0xa0 blkdev_get_by_dev+0x5f/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #4 (major_names_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 blkdev_show+0x19/0x80 devinfo_show+0x52/0x60 seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x3e0 proc_reg_read_iter+0x41/0x80 vfs_read+0x2ac/0x330 ksys_read+0x6b/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 seq_read_iter+0x37/0x3e0 generic_file_splice_read+0xf3/0x170 splice_direct_to_actor+0x14e/0x350 do_splice_direct+0x84/0xd0 do_sendfile+0x263/0x430 __se_sys_sendfile64+0x96/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 lo_write_bvec+0x96/0x280 [loop] loop_process_work+0xa68/0xc10 [loop] process_one_work+0x293/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x280/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by systemd-udevd/7568: #0: ffff888012554128 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_put+0x4c/0x1d0 #1: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 7568 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G E 5.14.0+ #757 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 02/27/2020 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x79/0xbf print_circular_bug+0x5d6/0x5e0 ? stack_trace_save+0x42/0x60 ? save_trace+0x3d/0x2d0 check_noncircular+0x10b/0x120 validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0x1a0 ? drain_workqueue+0x41/0x140 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 ? blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0xac/0xd0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x230 blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f0fd4c661f7 Code: 00 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 13 fc ff ff RSP: 002b:00007ffd1c9e9fd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f0fd46be6c8 RCX: 00007f0fd4c661f7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000055fff1eaf400 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f0fd46be6c8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000002f08 R15: 00007ffd1c9ea050 Commit 1c500ad706383f1a ("loop: reduce the loop_ctl_mutex scope") is for breaking "loop_ctl_mutex => &lo->lo_mutex" dependency chain. But enabling a different block module results in forming circular locking dependency due to shared major_names_lock mutex. The simplest fix is to call probe function without holding major_names_lock [1], but Christoph Hellwig does not like such idea. Therefore, instead of holding major_names_lock in blkdev_show(), introduce a different lock for blkdev_show() in order to break "sb_writers#$N => &p->lock => major_names_lock" dependency chain. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2af8a5b-3c1b-204e-7f56-bea0b15848d6@i-love.sakura.ne.jp [1] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/18a02da2-0bf3-550e-b071-2b4ab13c49f0@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-09-07 14:52:13 +03:00
spin_unlock(&major_names_spinlock);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
/**
* __register_blkdev - register a new block device
*
* @major: the requested major device number [1..BLKDEV_MAJOR_MAX-1]. If
* @major = 0, try to allocate any unused major number.
* @name: the name of the new block device as a zero terminated string
* @probe: allback that is called on access to any minor number of @major
*
* The @name must be unique within the system.
*
* The return value depends on the @major input parameter:
*
* - if a major device number was requested in range [1..BLKDEV_MAJOR_MAX-1]
* then the function returns zero on success, or a negative error code
* - if any unused major number was requested with @major = 0 parameter
* then the return value is the allocated major number in range
* [1..BLKDEV_MAJOR_MAX-1] or a negative error code otherwise
*
* See Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt for the list of allocated
* major numbers.
*
* Use register_blkdev instead for any new code.
*/
int __register_blkdev(unsigned int major, const char *name,
void (*probe)(dev_t devt))
{
struct blk_major_name **n, *p;
int index, ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&major_names_lock);
/* temporary */
if (major == 0) {
for (index = ARRAY_SIZE(major_names)-1; index > 0; index--) {
if (major_names[index] == NULL)
break;
}
if (index == 0) {
printk("%s: failed to get major for %s\n",
__func__, name);
ret = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
major = index;
ret = major;
}
if (major >= BLKDEV_MAJOR_MAX) {
pr_err("%s: major requested (%u) is greater than the maximum (%u) for %s\n",
__func__, major, BLKDEV_MAJOR_MAX-1, name);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct blk_major_name), GFP_KERNEL);
if (p == NULL) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
p->major = major;
p->probe = probe;
strlcpy(p->name, name, sizeof(p->name));
p->next = NULL;
index = major_to_index(major);
block: genhd: don't call blkdev_show() with major_names_lock held If CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP && CONFIG_MTD (at least; there might be other combinations), lockdep complains circular locking dependency at __loop_clr_fd(), for major_names_lock serves as a locking dependency aggregating hub across multiple block modules. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0+ #757 Tainted: G E ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-udevd/7568 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88800f334d48 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 but task is already holding lock: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x17/0x20 lo_open+0x23/0x50 [loop] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x199/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #5 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 bd_register_pending_holders+0x20/0x100 device_add_disk+0x1ae/0x390 loop_add+0x29c/0x2d0 [loop] blk_request_module+0x5a/0xb0 blkdev_get_no_open+0x27/0xa0 blkdev_get_by_dev+0x5f/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #4 (major_names_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 blkdev_show+0x19/0x80 devinfo_show+0x52/0x60 seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x3e0 proc_reg_read_iter+0x41/0x80 vfs_read+0x2ac/0x330 ksys_read+0x6b/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 seq_read_iter+0x37/0x3e0 generic_file_splice_read+0xf3/0x170 splice_direct_to_actor+0x14e/0x350 do_splice_direct+0x84/0xd0 do_sendfile+0x263/0x430 __se_sys_sendfile64+0x96/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 lo_write_bvec+0x96/0x280 [loop] loop_process_work+0xa68/0xc10 [loop] process_one_work+0x293/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x280/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by systemd-udevd/7568: #0: ffff888012554128 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_put+0x4c/0x1d0 #1: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 7568 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G E 5.14.0+ #757 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 02/27/2020 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x79/0xbf print_circular_bug+0x5d6/0x5e0 ? stack_trace_save+0x42/0x60 ? save_trace+0x3d/0x2d0 check_noncircular+0x10b/0x120 validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0x1a0 ? drain_workqueue+0x41/0x140 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 ? blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0xac/0xd0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x230 blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f0fd4c661f7 Code: 00 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 13 fc ff ff RSP: 002b:00007ffd1c9e9fd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f0fd46be6c8 RCX: 00007f0fd4c661f7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000055fff1eaf400 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f0fd46be6c8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000002f08 R15: 00007ffd1c9ea050 Commit 1c500ad706383f1a ("loop: reduce the loop_ctl_mutex scope") is for breaking "loop_ctl_mutex => &lo->lo_mutex" dependency chain. But enabling a different block module results in forming circular locking dependency due to shared major_names_lock mutex. The simplest fix is to call probe function without holding major_names_lock [1], but Christoph Hellwig does not like such idea. Therefore, instead of holding major_names_lock in blkdev_show(), introduce a different lock for blkdev_show() in order to break "sb_writers#$N => &p->lock => major_names_lock" dependency chain. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2af8a5b-3c1b-204e-7f56-bea0b15848d6@i-love.sakura.ne.jp [1] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/18a02da2-0bf3-550e-b071-2b4ab13c49f0@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-09-07 14:52:13 +03:00
spin_lock(&major_names_spinlock);
for (n = &major_names[index]; *n; n = &(*n)->next) {
if ((*n)->major == major)
break;
}
if (!*n)
*n = p;
else
ret = -EBUSY;
block: genhd: don't call blkdev_show() with major_names_lock held If CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP && CONFIG_MTD (at least; there might be other combinations), lockdep complains circular locking dependency at __loop_clr_fd(), for major_names_lock serves as a locking dependency aggregating hub across multiple block modules. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0+ #757 Tainted: G E ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-udevd/7568 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88800f334d48 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 but task is already holding lock: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x17/0x20 lo_open+0x23/0x50 [loop] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x199/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #5 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 bd_register_pending_holders+0x20/0x100 device_add_disk+0x1ae/0x390 loop_add+0x29c/0x2d0 [loop] blk_request_module+0x5a/0xb0 blkdev_get_no_open+0x27/0xa0 blkdev_get_by_dev+0x5f/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #4 (major_names_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 blkdev_show+0x19/0x80 devinfo_show+0x52/0x60 seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x3e0 proc_reg_read_iter+0x41/0x80 vfs_read+0x2ac/0x330 ksys_read+0x6b/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 seq_read_iter+0x37/0x3e0 generic_file_splice_read+0xf3/0x170 splice_direct_to_actor+0x14e/0x350 do_splice_direct+0x84/0xd0 do_sendfile+0x263/0x430 __se_sys_sendfile64+0x96/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 lo_write_bvec+0x96/0x280 [loop] loop_process_work+0xa68/0xc10 [loop] process_one_work+0x293/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x280/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by systemd-udevd/7568: #0: ffff888012554128 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_put+0x4c/0x1d0 #1: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 7568 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G E 5.14.0+ #757 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 02/27/2020 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x79/0xbf print_circular_bug+0x5d6/0x5e0 ? stack_trace_save+0x42/0x60 ? save_trace+0x3d/0x2d0 check_noncircular+0x10b/0x120 validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0x1a0 ? drain_workqueue+0x41/0x140 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 ? blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0xac/0xd0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x230 blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f0fd4c661f7 Code: 00 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 13 fc ff ff RSP: 002b:00007ffd1c9e9fd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f0fd46be6c8 RCX: 00007f0fd4c661f7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000055fff1eaf400 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f0fd46be6c8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000002f08 R15: 00007ffd1c9ea050 Commit 1c500ad706383f1a ("loop: reduce the loop_ctl_mutex scope") is for breaking "loop_ctl_mutex => &lo->lo_mutex" dependency chain. But enabling a different block module results in forming circular locking dependency due to shared major_names_lock mutex. The simplest fix is to call probe function without holding major_names_lock [1], but Christoph Hellwig does not like such idea. Therefore, instead of holding major_names_lock in blkdev_show(), introduce a different lock for blkdev_show() in order to break "sb_writers#$N => &p->lock => major_names_lock" dependency chain. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2af8a5b-3c1b-204e-7f56-bea0b15848d6@i-love.sakura.ne.jp [1] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/18a02da2-0bf3-550e-b071-2b4ab13c49f0@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-09-07 14:52:13 +03:00
spin_unlock(&major_names_spinlock);
if (ret < 0) {
printk("register_blkdev: cannot get major %u for %s\n",
major, name);
kfree(p);
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&major_names_lock);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__register_blkdev);
void unregister_blkdev(unsigned int major, const char *name)
{
struct blk_major_name **n;
struct blk_major_name *p = NULL;
int index = major_to_index(major);
mutex_lock(&major_names_lock);
block: genhd: don't call blkdev_show() with major_names_lock held If CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP && CONFIG_MTD (at least; there might be other combinations), lockdep complains circular locking dependency at __loop_clr_fd(), for major_names_lock serves as a locking dependency aggregating hub across multiple block modules. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0+ #757 Tainted: G E ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-udevd/7568 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88800f334d48 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 but task is already holding lock: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x17/0x20 lo_open+0x23/0x50 [loop] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x199/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #5 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 bd_register_pending_holders+0x20/0x100 device_add_disk+0x1ae/0x390 loop_add+0x29c/0x2d0 [loop] blk_request_module+0x5a/0xb0 blkdev_get_no_open+0x27/0xa0 blkdev_get_by_dev+0x5f/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #4 (major_names_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 blkdev_show+0x19/0x80 devinfo_show+0x52/0x60 seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x3e0 proc_reg_read_iter+0x41/0x80 vfs_read+0x2ac/0x330 ksys_read+0x6b/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 seq_read_iter+0x37/0x3e0 generic_file_splice_read+0xf3/0x170 splice_direct_to_actor+0x14e/0x350 do_splice_direct+0x84/0xd0 do_sendfile+0x263/0x430 __se_sys_sendfile64+0x96/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 lo_write_bvec+0x96/0x280 [loop] loop_process_work+0xa68/0xc10 [loop] process_one_work+0x293/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x280/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by systemd-udevd/7568: #0: ffff888012554128 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_put+0x4c/0x1d0 #1: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 7568 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G E 5.14.0+ #757 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 02/27/2020 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x79/0xbf print_circular_bug+0x5d6/0x5e0 ? stack_trace_save+0x42/0x60 ? save_trace+0x3d/0x2d0 check_noncircular+0x10b/0x120 validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0x1a0 ? drain_workqueue+0x41/0x140 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 ? blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0xac/0xd0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x230 blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f0fd4c661f7 Code: 00 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 13 fc ff ff RSP: 002b:00007ffd1c9e9fd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f0fd46be6c8 RCX: 00007f0fd4c661f7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000055fff1eaf400 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f0fd46be6c8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000002f08 R15: 00007ffd1c9ea050 Commit 1c500ad706383f1a ("loop: reduce the loop_ctl_mutex scope") is for breaking "loop_ctl_mutex => &lo->lo_mutex" dependency chain. But enabling a different block module results in forming circular locking dependency due to shared major_names_lock mutex. The simplest fix is to call probe function without holding major_names_lock [1], but Christoph Hellwig does not like such idea. Therefore, instead of holding major_names_lock in blkdev_show(), introduce a different lock for blkdev_show() in order to break "sb_writers#$N => &p->lock => major_names_lock" dependency chain. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2af8a5b-3c1b-204e-7f56-bea0b15848d6@i-love.sakura.ne.jp [1] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/18a02da2-0bf3-550e-b071-2b4ab13c49f0@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-09-07 14:52:13 +03:00
spin_lock(&major_names_spinlock);
for (n = &major_names[index]; *n; n = &(*n)->next)
if ((*n)->major == major)
break;
if (!*n || strcmp((*n)->name, name)) {
WARN_ON(1);
} else {
p = *n;
*n = p->next;
}
block: genhd: don't call blkdev_show() with major_names_lock held If CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP && CONFIG_MTD (at least; there might be other combinations), lockdep complains circular locking dependency at __loop_clr_fd(), for major_names_lock serves as a locking dependency aggregating hub across multiple block modules. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0+ #757 Tainted: G E ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-udevd/7568 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88800f334d48 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 but task is already holding lock: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x17/0x20 lo_open+0x23/0x50 [loop] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x199/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #5 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 bd_register_pending_holders+0x20/0x100 device_add_disk+0x1ae/0x390 loop_add+0x29c/0x2d0 [loop] blk_request_module+0x5a/0xb0 blkdev_get_no_open+0x27/0xa0 blkdev_get_by_dev+0x5f/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #4 (major_names_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 blkdev_show+0x19/0x80 devinfo_show+0x52/0x60 seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x3e0 proc_reg_read_iter+0x41/0x80 vfs_read+0x2ac/0x330 ksys_read+0x6b/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 seq_read_iter+0x37/0x3e0 generic_file_splice_read+0xf3/0x170 splice_direct_to_actor+0x14e/0x350 do_splice_direct+0x84/0xd0 do_sendfile+0x263/0x430 __se_sys_sendfile64+0x96/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 lo_write_bvec+0x96/0x280 [loop] loop_process_work+0xa68/0xc10 [loop] process_one_work+0x293/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x280/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by systemd-udevd/7568: #0: ffff888012554128 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_put+0x4c/0x1d0 #1: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 7568 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G E 5.14.0+ #757 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 02/27/2020 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x79/0xbf print_circular_bug+0x5d6/0x5e0 ? stack_trace_save+0x42/0x60 ? save_trace+0x3d/0x2d0 check_noncircular+0x10b/0x120 validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0x1a0 ? drain_workqueue+0x41/0x140 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 ? blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0xac/0xd0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x230 blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f0fd4c661f7 Code: 00 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 13 fc ff ff RSP: 002b:00007ffd1c9e9fd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f0fd46be6c8 RCX: 00007f0fd4c661f7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000055fff1eaf400 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f0fd46be6c8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000002f08 R15: 00007ffd1c9ea050 Commit 1c500ad706383f1a ("loop: reduce the loop_ctl_mutex scope") is for breaking "loop_ctl_mutex => &lo->lo_mutex" dependency chain. But enabling a different block module results in forming circular locking dependency due to shared major_names_lock mutex. The simplest fix is to call probe function without holding major_names_lock [1], but Christoph Hellwig does not like such idea. Therefore, instead of holding major_names_lock in blkdev_show(), introduce a different lock for blkdev_show() in order to break "sb_writers#$N => &p->lock => major_names_lock" dependency chain. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2af8a5b-3c1b-204e-7f56-bea0b15848d6@i-love.sakura.ne.jp [1] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/18a02da2-0bf3-550e-b071-2b4ab13c49f0@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-09-07 14:52:13 +03:00
spin_unlock(&major_names_spinlock);
mutex_unlock(&major_names_lock);
kfree(p);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blkdev);
int blk_alloc_ext_minor(void)
{
int idx;
idx = ida_alloc_range(&ext_devt_ida, 0, NR_EXT_DEVT, GFP_KERNEL);
if (idx == -ENOSPC)
return -EBUSY;
return idx;
}
void blk_free_ext_minor(unsigned int minor)
{
ida_free(&ext_devt_ida, minor);
block: fix use-after-free on gendisk commit 2da78092dda "block: Fix dev_t minor allocation lifetime" specifically moved blk_free_devt(dev->devt) call to part_release() to avoid reallocating device number before the device is fully shutdown. However, it can cause use-after-free on gendisk in get_gendisk(). We use md device as example to show the race scenes: Process1 Worker Process2 md_free blkdev_open del_gendisk add delete_partition_work_fn() to wq __blkdev_get get_gendisk put_disk disk_release kfree(disk) find part from ext_devt_idr get_disk_and_module(disk) cause use after free delete_partition_work_fn put_device(part) part_release remove part from ext_devt_idr Before <devt, hd_struct pointer> is removed from ext_devt_idr by delete_partition_work_fn(), we can find the devt and then access gendisk by hd_struct pointer. But, if we access the gendisk after it have been freed, it can cause in use-after-freeon gendisk in get_gendisk(). We fix this by adding a new helper blk_invalidate_devt() in delete_partition() and del_gendisk(). It replaces hd_struct pointer in idr with value 'NULL', and deletes the entry from idr in part_release() as we do now. Thanks to Jan Kara for providing the solution and more clear comments for the code. Fixes: 2da78092dda1 ("block: Fix dev_t minor allocation lifetime") Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Yufen Yu <yuyufen@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2019-04-02 15:06:34 +03:00
}
static char *bdevt_str(dev_t devt, char *buf)
{
if (MAJOR(devt) <= 0xff && MINOR(devt) <= 0xff) {
char tbuf[BDEVT_SIZE];
snprintf(tbuf, BDEVT_SIZE, "%02x%02x", MAJOR(devt), MINOR(devt));
snprintf(buf, BDEVT_SIZE, "%-9s", tbuf);
} else
snprintf(buf, BDEVT_SIZE, "%03x:%05x", MAJOR(devt), MINOR(devt));
return buf;
}
void disk_uevent(struct gendisk *disk, enum kobject_action action)
{
struct block_device *part;
unsigned long idx;
rcu_read_lock();
xa_for_each(&disk->part_tbl, idx, part) {
if (bdev_is_partition(part) && !bdev_nr_sectors(part))
continue;
if (!kobject_get_unless_zero(&part->bd_device.kobj))
continue;
rcu_read_unlock();
kobject_uevent(bdev_kobj(part), action);
put_device(&part->bd_device);
rcu_read_lock();
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(disk_uevent);
static void disk_scan_partitions(struct gendisk *disk)
{
struct block_device *bdev;
if (!get_capacity(disk) || !disk_part_scan_enabled(disk))
return;
set_bit(GD_NEED_PART_SCAN, &disk->state);
bdev = blkdev_get_by_dev(disk_devt(disk), FMODE_READ, NULL);
if (!IS_ERR(bdev))
blkdev_put(bdev, FMODE_READ);
}
/**
* device_add_disk - add disk information to kernel list
* @parent: parent device for the disk
* @disk: per-device partitioning information
* @groups: Additional per-device sysfs groups
*
* This function registers the partitioning information in @disk
* with the kernel.
*/
int device_add_disk(struct device *parent, struct gendisk *disk,
const struct attribute_group **groups)
{
struct device *ddev = disk_to_dev(disk);
int ret;
block: Delay default elevator initialization When elevator_init_mq() is called from blk_mq_init_allocated_queue(), the only information known about the device is the number of hardware queues as the block device scan by the device driver is not completed yet for most drivers. The device type and elevator required features are not set yet, preventing to correctly select the default elevator most suitable for the device. This currently affects all multi-queue zoned block devices which default to the "none" elevator instead of the required "mq-deadline" elevator. These drives currently include host-managed SMR disks connected to a smartpqi HBA and null_blk block devices with zoned mode enabled. Upcoming NVMe Zoned Namespace devices will also be affected. Fix this by adding the boolean elevator_init argument to blk_mq_init_allocated_queue() to control the execution of elevator_init_mq(). Two cases exist: 1) elevator_init = false is used for calls to blk_mq_init_allocated_queue() within blk_mq_init_queue(). In this case, a call to elevator_init_mq() is added to __device_add_disk(), resulting in the delayed initialization of the queue elevator after the device driver finished probing the device information. This effectively allows elevator_init_mq() access to more information about the device. 2) elevator_init = true preserves the current behavior of initializing the elevator directly from blk_mq_init_allocated_queue(). This case is used for the special request based DM devices where the device gendisk is created before the queue initialization and device information (e.g. queue limits) is already known when the queue initialization is executed. Additionally, to make sure that the elevator initialization is never done while requests are in-flight (there should be none when the device driver calls device_add_disk()), freeze and quiesce the device request queue before calling blk_mq_init_sched() in elevator_init_mq(). Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2019-09-05 12:51:33 +03:00
/*
* The disk queue should now be all set with enough information about
* the device for the elevator code to pick an adequate default
* elevator if one is needed, that is, for devices requesting queue
* registration.
*/
elevator_init_mq(disk->queue);
block: Delay default elevator initialization When elevator_init_mq() is called from blk_mq_init_allocated_queue(), the only information known about the device is the number of hardware queues as the block device scan by the device driver is not completed yet for most drivers. The device type and elevator required features are not set yet, preventing to correctly select the default elevator most suitable for the device. This currently affects all multi-queue zoned block devices which default to the "none" elevator instead of the required "mq-deadline" elevator. These drives currently include host-managed SMR disks connected to a smartpqi HBA and null_blk block devices with zoned mode enabled. Upcoming NVMe Zoned Namespace devices will also be affected. Fix this by adding the boolean elevator_init argument to blk_mq_init_allocated_queue() to control the execution of elevator_init_mq(). Two cases exist: 1) elevator_init = false is used for calls to blk_mq_init_allocated_queue() within blk_mq_init_queue(). In this case, a call to elevator_init_mq() is added to __device_add_disk(), resulting in the delayed initialization of the queue elevator after the device driver finished probing the device information. This effectively allows elevator_init_mq() access to more information about the device. 2) elevator_init = true preserves the current behavior of initializing the elevator directly from blk_mq_init_allocated_queue(). This case is used for the special request based DM devices where the device gendisk is created before the queue initialization and device information (e.g. queue limits) is already known when the queue initialization is executed. Additionally, to make sure that the elevator initialization is never done while requests are in-flight (there should be none when the device driver calls device_add_disk()), freeze and quiesce the device request queue before calling blk_mq_init_sched() in elevator_init_mq(). Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2019-09-05 12:51:33 +03:00
/*
* If the driver provides an explicit major number it also must provide
* the number of minors numbers supported, and those will be used to
* setup the gendisk.
* Otherwise just allocate the device numbers for both the whole device
* and all partitions from the extended dev_t space.
*/
if (disk->major) {
if (WARN_ON(!disk->minors))
return -EINVAL;
if (disk->minors > DISK_MAX_PARTS) {
pr_err("block: can't allocate more than %d partitions\n",
DISK_MAX_PARTS);
disk->minors = DISK_MAX_PARTS;
}
} else {
if (WARN_ON(disk->minors))
return -EINVAL;
ret = blk_alloc_ext_minor();
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
disk->major = BLOCK_EXT_MAJOR;
disk->first_minor = ret;
disk->flags |= GENHD_FL_EXT_DEVT;
}
ret = disk_alloc_events(disk);
if (ret)
goto out_free_ext_minor;
block: fix __blkdev_get and add_disk race condition The following situation might occur: __blkdev_get: add_disk: register_disk() get_gendisk() disk_block_events() disk->ev == NULL disk_add_events() __disk_unblock_events() disk->ev != NULL --ev->block Then we unblock events, when they are suppose to be blocked. This can trigger events related block/genhd.c warnings, but also can crash in sd_check_events() or other places. I'm able to reproduce crashes with the following scripts (with connected usb dongle as sdb disk). <snip> DEV=/dev/sdb ENABLE=/sys/bus/usb/devices/1-2/bConfigurationValue function stop_me() { for i in `jobs -p` ; do kill $i 2> /dev/null ; done exit } trap stop_me SIGHUP SIGINT SIGTERM for ((i = 0; i < 10; i++)) ; do while true; do fdisk -l $DEV 2>&1 > /dev/null ; done & done while true ; do echo 1 > $ENABLE sleep 1 echo 0 > $ENABLE done </snip> I use the script to verify patch fixing oops in sd_revalidate_disk http://marc.info/?l=linux-scsi&m=132935572512352&w=2 Without Jun'ichi Nomura patch titled "Fix NULL pointer dereference in sd_revalidate_disk" or this one, script easily crash kernel within a few seconds. With both patches applied I do not observe crash. Unfortunately after some time (dozen of minutes), script will hung in: [ 1563.906432] [<c08354f5>] schedule_timeout_uninterruptible+0x15/0x20 [ 1563.906437] [<c04532d5>] msleep+0x15/0x20 [ 1563.906443] [<c05d60b2>] blk_drain_queue+0x32/0xd0 [ 1563.906447] [<c05d6e00>] blk_cleanup_queue+0xd0/0x170 [ 1563.906454] [<c06d278f>] scsi_free_queue+0x3f/0x60 [ 1563.906459] [<c06d7e6e>] __scsi_remove_device+0x6e/0xb0 [ 1563.906463] [<c06d4aff>] scsi_forget_host+0x4f/0x60 [ 1563.906468] [<c06cd84a>] scsi_remove_host+0x5a/0xf0 [ 1563.906482] [<f7f030fb>] quiesce_and_remove_host+0x5b/0xa0 [usb_storage] [ 1563.906490] [<f7f03203>] usb_stor_disconnect+0x13/0x20 [usb_storage] Anyway I think this patch is some step forward. As drawback, I do not teardown on sysfs file create error, because I do not know how to nullify disk->ev (since it can be used). However add_disk error handling practically does not exist too, and things will work without this sysfs file, except events will not be exported to user space. Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2012-03-02 13:43:28 +04:00
/* delay uevents, until we scanned partition table */
dev_set_uevent_suppress(ddev, 1);
ddev->parent = parent;
ddev->groups = groups;
dev_set_name(ddev, "%s", disk->disk_name);
if (!(disk->flags & GENHD_FL_HIDDEN))
ddev->devt = MKDEV(disk->major, disk->first_minor);
ret = device_add(ddev);
if (ret)
goto out_disk_release_events;
if (!sysfs_deprecated) {
ret = sysfs_create_link(block_depr, &ddev->kobj,
kobject_name(&ddev->kobj));
if (ret)
goto out_device_del;
}
/*
* avoid probable deadlock caused by allocating memory with
* GFP_KERNEL in runtime_resume callback of its all ancestor
* devices
*/
pm_runtime_set_memalloc_noio(ddev, true);
ret = blk_integrity_add(disk);
if (ret)
goto out_del_block_link;
disk->part0->bd_holder_dir =
kobject_create_and_add("holders", &ddev->kobj);
if (!disk->part0->bd_holder_dir)
goto out_del_integrity;
disk->slave_dir = kobject_create_and_add("slaves", &ddev->kobj);
if (!disk->slave_dir)
goto out_put_holder_dir;
ret = bd_register_pending_holders(disk);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_put_slave_dir;
ret = blk_register_queue(disk);
if (ret)
goto out_put_slave_dir;
if (disk->flags & GENHD_FL_HIDDEN) {
/*
* Don't let hidden disks show up in /proc/partitions,
* and don't bother scanning for partitions either.
*/
disk->flags |= GENHD_FL_SUPPRESS_PARTITION_INFO;
disk->flags |= GENHD_FL_NO_PART_SCAN;
} else {
ret = bdi_register(disk->bdi, "%u:%u",
disk->major, disk->first_minor);
if (ret)
goto out_unregister_queue;
bdi_set_owner(disk->bdi, ddev);
ret = sysfs_create_link(&ddev->kobj,
&disk->bdi->dev->kobj, "bdi");
if (ret)
goto out_unregister_bdi;
bdev_add(disk->part0, ddev->devt);
disk_scan_partitions(disk);
/*
* Announce the disk and partitions after all partitions are
* created. (for hidden disks uevents remain suppressed forever)
*/
dev_set_uevent_suppress(ddev, 0);
disk_uevent(disk, KOBJ_ADD);
}
disk_update_readahead(disk);
implement in-kernel gendisk events handling Currently, media presence polling for removeable block devices is done from userland. There are several issues with this. * Polling is done by periodically opening the device. For SCSI devices, the command sequence generated by such action involves a few different commands including TEST_UNIT_READY. This behavior, while perfectly legal, is different from Windows which only issues single command, GET_EVENT_STATUS_NOTIFICATION. Unfortunately, some ATAPI devices lock up after being periodically queried such command sequences. * There is no reliable and unintrusive way for a userland program to tell whether the target device is safe for media presence polling. For example, polling for media presence during an on-going burning session can make it fail. The polling program can avoid this by opening the device with O_EXCL but then it risks making a valid exclusive user of the device fail w/ -EBUSY. * Userland polling is unnecessarily heavy and in-kernel implementation is lighter and better coordinated (workqueue, timer slack). This patch implements framework for in-kernel disk event handling, which includes media presence polling. * bdops->check_events() is added, which supercedes ->media_changed(). It should check whether there's any pending event and return if so. Currently, two events are defined - DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE and DISK_EVENT_EJECT_REQUEST. ->check_events() is guaranteed not to be called parallelly. * gendisk->events and ->async_events are added. These should be initialized by block driver before passing the device to add_disk(). The former contains the mask of all supported events and the latter the mask of all events which the device can report without polling. /sys/block/*/events[_async] export these to userland. * Kernel parameter block.events_dfl_poll_msecs controls the system polling interval (default is 0 which means disable) and /sys/block/*/events_poll_msecs control polling intervals for individual devices (default is -1 meaning use system setting). Note that if a device can report all supported events asynchronously and its polling interval isn't explicitly set, the device won't be polled regardless of the system polling interval. * If a device is opened exclusively with write access, event checking is automatically disabled until all write exclusive accesses are released. * There are event 'clearing' events. For example, both of currently defined events are cleared after the device has been successfully opened. This information is passed to ->check_events() callback using @clearing argument as a hint. * Event checking is always performed from system_nrt_wq and timer slack is set to 25% for polling. * Nothing changes for drivers which implement ->media_changed() but not ->check_events(). Going forward, all drivers will be converted to ->check_events() and ->media_change() will be dropped. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com>
2010-12-08 22:57:37 +03:00
disk_add_events(disk);
return 0;
out_unregister_bdi:
if (!(disk->flags & GENHD_FL_HIDDEN))
bdi_unregister(disk->bdi);
out_unregister_queue:
blk_unregister_queue(disk);
out_put_slave_dir:
kobject_put(disk->slave_dir);
out_put_holder_dir:
kobject_put(disk->part0->bd_holder_dir);
out_del_integrity:
blk_integrity_del(disk);
out_del_block_link:
if (!sysfs_deprecated)
sysfs_remove_link(block_depr, dev_name(ddev));
out_device_del:
device_del(ddev);
out_disk_release_events:
disk_release_events(disk);
out_free_ext_minor:
if (disk->major == BLOCK_EXT_MAJOR)
blk_free_ext_minor(disk->first_minor);
return WARN_ON_ONCE(ret); /* keep until all callers handle errors */
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(device_add_disk);
/**
* del_gendisk - remove the gendisk
* @disk: the struct gendisk to remove
*
* Removes the gendisk and all its associated resources. This deletes the
* partitions associated with the gendisk, and unregisters the associated
* request_queue.
*
* This is the counter to the respective __device_add_disk() call.
*
* The final removal of the struct gendisk happens when its refcount reaches 0
* with put_disk(), which should be called after del_gendisk(), if
* __device_add_disk() was used.
block: revert back to synchronous request_queue removal Commit dc9edc44de6c ("block: Fix a blk_exit_rl() regression") merged on v4.12 moved the work behind blk_release_queue() into a workqueue after a splat floated around which indicated some work on blk_release_queue() could sleep in blk_exit_rl(). This splat would be possible when a driver called blk_put_queue() or blk_cleanup_queue() (which calls blk_put_queue() as its final call) from an atomic context. blk_put_queue() decrements the refcount for the request_queue kobject, and upon reaching 0 blk_release_queue() is called. Although blk_exit_rl() is now removed through commit db6d99523560 ("block: remove request_list code") on v5.0, we reserve the right to be able to sleep within blk_release_queue() context. The last reference for the request_queue must not be called from atomic context. *When* the last reference to the request_queue reaches 0 varies, and so let's take the opportunity to document when that is expected to happen and also document the context of the related calls as best as possible so we can avoid future issues, and with the hopes that the synchronous request_queue removal sticks. We revert back to synchronous request_queue removal because asynchronous removal creates a regression with expected userspace interaction with several drivers. An example is when removing the loopback driver, one uses ioctls from userspace to do so, but upon return and if successful, one expects the device to be removed. Likewise if one races to add another device the new one may not be added as it is still being removed. This was expected behavior before and it now fails as the device is still present and busy still. Moving to asynchronous request_queue removal could have broken many scripts which relied on the removal to have been completed if there was no error. Document this expectation as well so that this doesn't regress userspace again. Using asynchronous request_queue removal however has helped us find other bugs. In the future we can test what could break with this arrangement by enabling CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE. While at it, update the docs with the context expectations for the request_queue / gendisk refcount decrement, and make these expectations explicit by using might_sleep(). Fixes: dc9edc44de6c ("block: Fix a blk_exit_rl() regression") Suggested-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: yu kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-06-19 23:47:25 +03:00
*
* Drivers exist which depend on the release of the gendisk to be synchronous,
* it should not be deferred.
*
* Context: can sleep
*/
void del_gendisk(struct gendisk *disk)
{
block: revert back to synchronous request_queue removal Commit dc9edc44de6c ("block: Fix a blk_exit_rl() regression") merged on v4.12 moved the work behind blk_release_queue() into a workqueue after a splat floated around which indicated some work on blk_release_queue() could sleep in blk_exit_rl(). This splat would be possible when a driver called blk_put_queue() or blk_cleanup_queue() (which calls blk_put_queue() as its final call) from an atomic context. blk_put_queue() decrements the refcount for the request_queue kobject, and upon reaching 0 blk_release_queue() is called. Although blk_exit_rl() is now removed through commit db6d99523560 ("block: remove request_list code") on v5.0, we reserve the right to be able to sleep within blk_release_queue() context. The last reference for the request_queue must not be called from atomic context. *When* the last reference to the request_queue reaches 0 varies, and so let's take the opportunity to document when that is expected to happen and also document the context of the related calls as best as possible so we can avoid future issues, and with the hopes that the synchronous request_queue removal sticks. We revert back to synchronous request_queue removal because asynchronous removal creates a regression with expected userspace interaction with several drivers. An example is when removing the loopback driver, one uses ioctls from userspace to do so, but upon return and if successful, one expects the device to be removed. Likewise if one races to add another device the new one may not be added as it is still being removed. This was expected behavior before and it now fails as the device is still present and busy still. Moving to asynchronous request_queue removal could have broken many scripts which relied on the removal to have been completed if there was no error. Document this expectation as well so that this doesn't regress userspace again. Using asynchronous request_queue removal however has helped us find other bugs. In the future we can test what could break with this arrangement by enabling CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE. While at it, update the docs with the context expectations for the request_queue / gendisk refcount decrement, and make these expectations explicit by using might_sleep(). Fixes: dc9edc44de6c ("block: Fix a blk_exit_rl() regression") Suggested-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: yu kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-06-19 23:47:25 +03:00
might_sleep();
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!disk_live(disk) && !(disk->flags & GENHD_FL_HIDDEN)))
return;
blk_integrity_del(disk);
implement in-kernel gendisk events handling Currently, media presence polling for removeable block devices is done from userland. There are several issues with this. * Polling is done by periodically opening the device. For SCSI devices, the command sequence generated by such action involves a few different commands including TEST_UNIT_READY. This behavior, while perfectly legal, is different from Windows which only issues single command, GET_EVENT_STATUS_NOTIFICATION. Unfortunately, some ATAPI devices lock up after being periodically queried such command sequences. * There is no reliable and unintrusive way for a userland program to tell whether the target device is safe for media presence polling. For example, polling for media presence during an on-going burning session can make it fail. The polling program can avoid this by opening the device with O_EXCL but then it risks making a valid exclusive user of the device fail w/ -EBUSY. * Userland polling is unnecessarily heavy and in-kernel implementation is lighter and better coordinated (workqueue, timer slack). This patch implements framework for in-kernel disk event handling, which includes media presence polling. * bdops->check_events() is added, which supercedes ->media_changed(). It should check whether there's any pending event and return if so. Currently, two events are defined - DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE and DISK_EVENT_EJECT_REQUEST. ->check_events() is guaranteed not to be called parallelly. * gendisk->events and ->async_events are added. These should be initialized by block driver before passing the device to add_disk(). The former contains the mask of all supported events and the latter the mask of all events which the device can report without polling. /sys/block/*/events[_async] export these to userland. * Kernel parameter block.events_dfl_poll_msecs controls the system polling interval (default is 0 which means disable) and /sys/block/*/events_poll_msecs control polling intervals for individual devices (default is -1 meaning use system setting). Note that if a device can report all supported events asynchronously and its polling interval isn't explicitly set, the device won't be polled regardless of the system polling interval. * If a device is opened exclusively with write access, event checking is automatically disabled until all write exclusive accesses are released. * There are event 'clearing' events. For example, both of currently defined events are cleared after the device has been successfully opened. This information is passed to ->check_events() callback using @clearing argument as a hint. * Event checking is always performed from system_nrt_wq and timer slack is set to 25% for polling. * Nothing changes for drivers which implement ->media_changed() but not ->check_events(). Going forward, all drivers will be converted to ->check_events() and ->media_change() will be dropped. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com>
2010-12-08 22:57:37 +03:00
disk_del_events(disk);
mutex_lock(&disk->open_mutex);
remove_inode_hash(disk->part0->bd_inode);
blk_drop_partitions(disk);
mutex_unlock(&disk->open_mutex);
fsync_bdev(disk->part0);
__invalidate_device(disk->part0, true);
set_capacity(disk, 0);
if (!(disk->flags & GENHD_FL_HIDDEN)) {
sysfs_remove_link(&disk_to_dev(disk)->kobj, "bdi");
/*
* Unregister bdi before releasing device numbers (as they can
* get reused and we'd get clashes in sysfs).
*/
bdi_unregister(disk->bdi);
}
blk_unregister_queue(disk);
kobject_put(disk->part0->bd_holder_dir);
kobject_put(disk->slave_dir);
part_stat_set_all(disk->part0, 0);
disk->part0->bd_stamp = 0;
if (!sysfs_deprecated)
sysfs_remove_link(block_depr, dev_name(disk_to_dev(disk)));
pm_runtime_set_memalloc_noio(disk_to_dev(disk), false);
device_del(disk_to_dev(disk));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_gendisk);
/* sysfs access to bad-blocks list. */
static ssize_t disk_badblocks_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *page)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
if (!disk->bb)
return sprintf(page, "\n");
return badblocks_show(disk->bb, page, 0);
}
static ssize_t disk_badblocks_store(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *page, size_t len)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
if (!disk->bb)
return -ENXIO;
return badblocks_store(disk->bb, page, len, 0);
}
void blk_request_module(dev_t devt)
{
unsigned int major = MAJOR(devt);
struct blk_major_name **n;
mutex_lock(&major_names_lock);
for (n = &major_names[major_to_index(major)]; *n; n = &(*n)->next) {
if ((*n)->major == major && (*n)->probe) {
(*n)->probe(devt);
mutex_unlock(&major_names_lock);
return;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&major_names_lock);
if (request_module("block-major-%d-%d", MAJOR(devt), MINOR(devt)) > 0)
/* Make old-style 2.4 aliases work */
request_module("block-major-%d", MAJOR(devt));
}
/*
* print a full list of all partitions - intended for places where the root
* filesystem can't be mounted and thus to give the victim some idea of what
* went wrong
*/
void __init printk_all_partitions(void)
{
struct class_dev_iter iter;
struct device *dev;
class_dev_iter_init(&iter, &block_class, NULL, &disk_type);
while ((dev = class_dev_iter_next(&iter))) {
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
struct block_device *part;
char devt_buf[BDEVT_SIZE];
unsigned long idx;
/*
* Don't show empty devices or things that have been
* suppressed
*/
if (get_capacity(disk) == 0 ||
(disk->flags & GENHD_FL_SUPPRESS_PARTITION_INFO))
continue;
/*
* Note, unlike /proc/partitions, I am showing the numbers in
* hex - the same format as the root= option takes.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
xa_for_each(&disk->part_tbl, idx, part) {
if (!bdev_nr_sectors(part))
continue;
printk("%s%s %10llu %pg %s",
bdev_is_partition(part) ? " " : "",
bdevt_str(part->bd_dev, devt_buf),
bdev_nr_sectors(part) >> 1, part,
part->bd_meta_info ?
part->bd_meta_info->uuid : "");
if (bdev_is_partition(part))
printk("\n");
else if (dev->parent && dev->parent->driver)
printk(" driver: %s\n",
dev->parent->driver->name);
else
printk(" (driver?)\n");
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
class_dev_iter_exit(&iter);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
/* iterator */
static void *disk_seqf_start(struct seq_file *seqf, loff_t *pos)
{
loff_t skip = *pos;
struct class_dev_iter *iter;
struct device *dev;
iter = kmalloc(sizeof(*iter), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iter)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
seqf->private = iter;
class_dev_iter_init(iter, &block_class, NULL, &disk_type);
do {
dev = class_dev_iter_next(iter);
if (!dev)
return NULL;
} while (skip--);
return dev_to_disk(dev);
}
static void *disk_seqf_next(struct seq_file *seqf, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
struct device *dev;
(*pos)++;
dev = class_dev_iter_next(seqf->private);
if (dev)
return dev_to_disk(dev);
return NULL;
}
static void disk_seqf_stop(struct seq_file *seqf, void *v)
{
struct class_dev_iter *iter = seqf->private;
/* stop is called even after start failed :-( */
if (iter) {
class_dev_iter_exit(iter);
kfree(iter);
block: fix use-after-free in seq file I got a KASAN report of use-after-free: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508 Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315 ============================================================================= BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315 ___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520 __slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0 disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 traverse+0x176/0x860 seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0 proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180 do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210 do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660 vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0 do_preadv+0x126/0x170 SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315 __slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0 kfree+0x20a/0x220 disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 traverse+0x3b5/0x860 seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0 proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180 do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210 do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660 vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0 do_preadv+0x126/0x170 SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480 ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480 ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84 [<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0 [<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 [<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520 [<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 [<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 [<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10 [<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50 [<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0 [<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180 [<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210 [<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660 [<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0 [<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170 [<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10 This problem can occur in the following situation: open() - pread() - .seq_start() - iter = kmalloc() // succeeds - seqf->private = iter - .seq_stop() - kfree(seqf->private) - pread() - .seq_start() - iter = kmalloc() // fails - .seq_stop() - class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq iteration stops. An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
2016-07-29 11:40:31 +03:00
seqf->private = NULL;
}
}
static void *show_partition_start(struct seq_file *seqf, loff_t *pos)
{
void *p;
p = disk_seqf_start(seqf, pos);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(p) && !*pos)
seq_puts(seqf, "major minor #blocks name\n\n");
return p;
}
static int show_partition(struct seq_file *seqf, void *v)
{
struct gendisk *sgp = v;
struct block_device *part;
unsigned long idx;
/* Don't show non-partitionable removeable devices or empty devices */
if (!get_capacity(sgp) || (!disk_max_parts(sgp) &&
(sgp->flags & GENHD_FL_REMOVABLE)))
return 0;
if (sgp->flags & GENHD_FL_SUPPRESS_PARTITION_INFO)
return 0;
rcu_read_lock();
xa_for_each(&sgp->part_tbl, idx, part) {
if (!bdev_nr_sectors(part))
continue;
seq_printf(seqf, "%4d %7d %10llu %pg\n",
MAJOR(part->bd_dev), MINOR(part->bd_dev),
bdev_nr_sectors(part) >> 1, part);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
static const struct seq_operations partitions_op = {
.start = show_partition_start,
.next = disk_seqf_next,
.stop = disk_seqf_stop,
.show = show_partition
};
#endif
static int __init genhd_device_init(void)
{
int error;
block_class.dev_kobj = sysfs_dev_block_kobj;
error = class_register(&block_class);
if (unlikely(error))
return error;
blk_dev_init();
block: fix boot failure with CONFIG_DEBUG_BLOCK_EXT_DEVT=y and nash We run into system boot failure with kernel 2.6.28-rc. We found it on a couple of machines, including T61 notebook, nehalem machine, and another HPC NX6325 notebook. All the machines use FedoraCore 8 or FedoraCore 9. With kernel prior to 2.6.28-rc, system boot doesn't fail. I debug it and locate the root cause. Pls. see http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11899 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=471517 As a matter of fact, there are 2 bugs. 1)root=/dev/sda1, system boot randomly fails. Mostly, boot for 5 times and fails once. nash has a bug. Some of its functions misuse return value 0. Sometimes, 0 means timeout and no uevent available. Sometimes, 0 means nash gets an uevent, but the uevent isn't block-related (for exmaple, usb). If by coincidence, kernel tells nash that uevents are available, but kernel also set timeout, nash might stops collecting other uevents in queue if current uevent isn't block-related. I work out a patch for nash to fix it. http://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=18858 2) root=LABEL=/, system always can't boot. initrd init reports switchroot fails. Here is an executation branch of nash when booting: (1) nash read /sys/block/sda/dev; Assume major is 8 (on my desktop) (2) nash query /proc/devices with the major number; It found line "8 sd"; (3) nash use 'sd' to search its own probe table to find device (DISK) type for the device and add it to its own list; (4) Later on, it probes all devices in its list to get filesystem labels; scsi register "8 sd" always. When major is 259, nash fails to find the device(DISK) type. I enables CONFIG_DEBUG_BLOCK_EXT_DEVT=y when compiling kernel, so 259 is picked up for device /dev/sda1, which causes nash to fail to find device (DISK) type. To fixing issue 2), I create a patch for nash and another patch for kernel. http://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=18859 http://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=18837 Below is the patch for kernel 2.6.28-rc4. It registers blkext, a new block device in proc/devices. With 2 patches on nash and 1 patch on kernel, I boot my machines for dozens of times without failure. Signed-off-by Zhang Yanmin <yanmin.zhang@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
2008-11-14 10:26:30 +03:00
register_blkdev(BLOCK_EXT_MAJOR, "blkext");
/* create top-level block dir */
if (!sysfs_deprecated)
block_depr = kobject_create_and_add("block", NULL);
return 0;
}
subsys_initcall(genhd_device_init);
static ssize_t disk_range_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", disk->minors);
}
static ssize_t disk_ext_range_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", disk_max_parts(disk));
}
static ssize_t disk_removable_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n",
(disk->flags & GENHD_FL_REMOVABLE ? 1 : 0));
}
static ssize_t disk_hidden_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n",
(disk->flags & GENHD_FL_HIDDEN ? 1 : 0));
}
static ssize_t disk_ro_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", get_disk_ro(disk) ? 1 : 0);
}
ssize_t part_size_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "%llu\n", bdev_nr_sectors(dev_to_bdev(dev)));
}
ssize_t part_stat_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct block_device *bdev = dev_to_bdev(dev);
struct request_queue *q = bdev->bd_disk->queue;
struct disk_stats stat;
unsigned int inflight;
part_stat_read_all(bdev, &stat);
if (queue_is_mq(q))
inflight = blk_mq_in_flight(q, bdev);
else
inflight = part_in_flight(bdev);
return sprintf(buf,
"%8lu %8lu %8llu %8u "
"%8lu %8lu %8llu %8u "
"%8u %8u %8u "
"%8lu %8lu %8llu %8u "
"%8lu %8u"
"\n",
stat.ios[STAT_READ],
stat.merges[STAT_READ],
(unsigned long long)stat.sectors[STAT_READ],
(unsigned int)div_u64(stat.nsecs[STAT_READ], NSEC_PER_MSEC),
stat.ios[STAT_WRITE],
stat.merges[STAT_WRITE],
(unsigned long long)stat.sectors[STAT_WRITE],
(unsigned int)div_u64(stat.nsecs[STAT_WRITE], NSEC_PER_MSEC),
inflight,
jiffies_to_msecs(stat.io_ticks),
(unsigned int)div_u64(stat.nsecs[STAT_READ] +
stat.nsecs[STAT_WRITE] +
stat.nsecs[STAT_DISCARD] +
stat.nsecs[STAT_FLUSH],
NSEC_PER_MSEC),
stat.ios[STAT_DISCARD],
stat.merges[STAT_DISCARD],
(unsigned long long)stat.sectors[STAT_DISCARD],
(unsigned int)div_u64(stat.nsecs[STAT_DISCARD], NSEC_PER_MSEC),
stat.ios[STAT_FLUSH],
(unsigned int)div_u64(stat.nsecs[STAT_FLUSH], NSEC_PER_MSEC));
}
ssize_t part_inflight_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct block_device *bdev = dev_to_bdev(dev);
struct request_queue *q = bdev->bd_disk->queue;
unsigned int inflight[2];
if (queue_is_mq(q))
blk_mq_in_flight_rw(q, bdev, inflight);
else
part_in_flight_rw(bdev, inflight);
return sprintf(buf, "%8u %8u\n", inflight[0], inflight[1]);
}
static ssize_t disk_capability_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%x\n", disk->flags);
}
static ssize_t disk_alignment_offset_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", queue_alignment_offset(disk->queue));
}
static ssize_t disk_discard_alignment_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", queue_discard_alignment(disk->queue));
}
static ssize_t diskseq_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%llu\n", disk->diskseq);
}
static DEVICE_ATTR(range, 0444, disk_range_show, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(ext_range, 0444, disk_ext_range_show, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(removable, 0444, disk_removable_show, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(hidden, 0444, disk_hidden_show, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(ro, 0444, disk_ro_show, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(size, 0444, part_size_show, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(alignment_offset, 0444, disk_alignment_offset_show, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(discard_alignment, 0444, disk_discard_alignment_show, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(capability, 0444, disk_capability_show, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(stat, 0444, part_stat_show, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(inflight, 0444, part_inflight_show, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(badblocks, 0644, disk_badblocks_show, disk_badblocks_store);
static DEVICE_ATTR(diskseq, 0444, diskseq_show, NULL);
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_MAKE_REQUEST
ssize_t part_fail_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", dev_to_bdev(dev)->bd_make_it_fail);
}
ssize_t part_fail_store(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t count)
{
int i;
if (count > 0 && sscanf(buf, "%d", &i) > 0)
dev_to_bdev(dev)->bd_make_it_fail = i;
return count;
}
static struct device_attribute dev_attr_fail =
__ATTR(make-it-fail, 0644, part_fail_show, part_fail_store);
#endif /* CONFIG_FAIL_MAKE_REQUEST */
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_IO_TIMEOUT
static struct device_attribute dev_attr_fail_timeout =
__ATTR(io-timeout-fail, 0644, part_timeout_show, part_timeout_store);
#endif
static struct attribute *disk_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_range.attr,
&dev_attr_ext_range.attr,
&dev_attr_removable.attr,
&dev_attr_hidden.attr,
&dev_attr_ro.attr,
&dev_attr_size.attr,
&dev_attr_alignment_offset.attr,
&dev_attr_discard_alignment.attr,
&dev_attr_capability.attr,
&dev_attr_stat.attr,
&dev_attr_inflight.attr,
&dev_attr_badblocks.attr,
&dev_attr_events.attr,
&dev_attr_events_async.attr,
&dev_attr_events_poll_msecs.attr,
&dev_attr_diskseq.attr,
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_MAKE_REQUEST
&dev_attr_fail.attr,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_IO_TIMEOUT
&dev_attr_fail_timeout.attr,
#endif
NULL
};
static umode_t disk_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *a, int n)
{
struct device *dev = container_of(kobj, typeof(*dev), kobj);
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
if (a == &dev_attr_badblocks.attr && !disk->bb)
return 0;
return a->mode;
}
static struct attribute_group disk_attr_group = {
.attrs = disk_attrs,
.is_visible = disk_visible,
};
static const struct attribute_group *disk_attr_groups[] = {
&disk_attr_group,
NULL
};
/**
* disk_release - releases all allocated resources of the gendisk
* @dev: the device representing this disk
*
* This function releases all allocated resources of the gendisk.
*
* Drivers which used __device_add_disk() have a gendisk with a request_queue
* assigned. Since the request_queue sits on top of the gendisk for these
* drivers we also call blk_put_queue() for them, and we expect the
* request_queue refcount to reach 0 at this point, and so the request_queue
* will also be freed prior to the disk.
block: revert back to synchronous request_queue removal Commit dc9edc44de6c ("block: Fix a blk_exit_rl() regression") merged on v4.12 moved the work behind blk_release_queue() into a workqueue after a splat floated around which indicated some work on blk_release_queue() could sleep in blk_exit_rl(). This splat would be possible when a driver called blk_put_queue() or blk_cleanup_queue() (which calls blk_put_queue() as its final call) from an atomic context. blk_put_queue() decrements the refcount for the request_queue kobject, and upon reaching 0 blk_release_queue() is called. Although blk_exit_rl() is now removed through commit db6d99523560 ("block: remove request_list code") on v5.0, we reserve the right to be able to sleep within blk_release_queue() context. The last reference for the request_queue must not be called from atomic context. *When* the last reference to the request_queue reaches 0 varies, and so let's take the opportunity to document when that is expected to happen and also document the context of the related calls as best as possible so we can avoid future issues, and with the hopes that the synchronous request_queue removal sticks. We revert back to synchronous request_queue removal because asynchronous removal creates a regression with expected userspace interaction with several drivers. An example is when removing the loopback driver, one uses ioctls from userspace to do so, but upon return and if successful, one expects the device to be removed. Likewise if one races to add another device the new one may not be added as it is still being removed. This was expected behavior before and it now fails as the device is still present and busy still. Moving to asynchronous request_queue removal could have broken many scripts which relied on the removal to have been completed if there was no error. Document this expectation as well so that this doesn't regress userspace again. Using asynchronous request_queue removal however has helped us find other bugs. In the future we can test what could break with this arrangement by enabling CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE. While at it, update the docs with the context expectations for the request_queue / gendisk refcount decrement, and make these expectations explicit by using might_sleep(). Fixes: dc9edc44de6c ("block: Fix a blk_exit_rl() regression") Suggested-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: yu kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-06-19 23:47:25 +03:00
*
* Context: can sleep
*/
static void disk_release(struct device *dev)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
block: revert back to synchronous request_queue removal Commit dc9edc44de6c ("block: Fix a blk_exit_rl() regression") merged on v4.12 moved the work behind blk_release_queue() into a workqueue after a splat floated around which indicated some work on blk_release_queue() could sleep in blk_exit_rl(). This splat would be possible when a driver called blk_put_queue() or blk_cleanup_queue() (which calls blk_put_queue() as its final call) from an atomic context. blk_put_queue() decrements the refcount for the request_queue kobject, and upon reaching 0 blk_release_queue() is called. Although blk_exit_rl() is now removed through commit db6d99523560 ("block: remove request_list code") on v5.0, we reserve the right to be able to sleep within blk_release_queue() context. The last reference for the request_queue must not be called from atomic context. *When* the last reference to the request_queue reaches 0 varies, and so let's take the opportunity to document when that is expected to happen and also document the context of the related calls as best as possible so we can avoid future issues, and with the hopes that the synchronous request_queue removal sticks. We revert back to synchronous request_queue removal because asynchronous removal creates a regression with expected userspace interaction with several drivers. An example is when removing the loopback driver, one uses ioctls from userspace to do so, but upon return and if successful, one expects the device to be removed. Likewise if one races to add another device the new one may not be added as it is still being removed. This was expected behavior before and it now fails as the device is still present and busy still. Moving to asynchronous request_queue removal could have broken many scripts which relied on the removal to have been completed if there was no error. Document this expectation as well so that this doesn't regress userspace again. Using asynchronous request_queue removal however has helped us find other bugs. In the future we can test what could break with this arrangement by enabling CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE. While at it, update the docs with the context expectations for the request_queue / gendisk refcount decrement, and make these expectations explicit by using might_sleep(). Fixes: dc9edc44de6c ("block: Fix a blk_exit_rl() regression") Suggested-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: yu kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-06-19 23:47:25 +03:00
might_sleep();
implement in-kernel gendisk events handling Currently, media presence polling for removeable block devices is done from userland. There are several issues with this. * Polling is done by periodically opening the device. For SCSI devices, the command sequence generated by such action involves a few different commands including TEST_UNIT_READY. This behavior, while perfectly legal, is different from Windows which only issues single command, GET_EVENT_STATUS_NOTIFICATION. Unfortunately, some ATAPI devices lock up after being periodically queried such command sequences. * There is no reliable and unintrusive way for a userland program to tell whether the target device is safe for media presence polling. For example, polling for media presence during an on-going burning session can make it fail. The polling program can avoid this by opening the device with O_EXCL but then it risks making a valid exclusive user of the device fail w/ -EBUSY. * Userland polling is unnecessarily heavy and in-kernel implementation is lighter and better coordinated (workqueue, timer slack). This patch implements framework for in-kernel disk event handling, which includes media presence polling. * bdops->check_events() is added, which supercedes ->media_changed(). It should check whether there's any pending event and return if so. Currently, two events are defined - DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE and DISK_EVENT_EJECT_REQUEST. ->check_events() is guaranteed not to be called parallelly. * gendisk->events and ->async_events are added. These should be initialized by block driver before passing the device to add_disk(). The former contains the mask of all supported events and the latter the mask of all events which the device can report without polling. /sys/block/*/events[_async] export these to userland. * Kernel parameter block.events_dfl_poll_msecs controls the system polling interval (default is 0 which means disable) and /sys/block/*/events_poll_msecs control polling intervals for individual devices (default is -1 meaning use system setting). Note that if a device can report all supported events asynchronously and its polling interval isn't explicitly set, the device won't be polled regardless of the system polling interval. * If a device is opened exclusively with write access, event checking is automatically disabled until all write exclusive accesses are released. * There are event 'clearing' events. For example, both of currently defined events are cleared after the device has been successfully opened. This information is passed to ->check_events() callback using @clearing argument as a hint. * Event checking is always performed from system_nrt_wq and timer slack is set to 25% for polling. * Nothing changes for drivers which implement ->media_changed() but not ->check_events(). Going forward, all drivers will be converted to ->check_events() and ->media_change() will be dropped. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com>
2010-12-08 22:57:37 +03:00
disk_release_events(disk);
kfree(disk->random);
xa_destroy(&disk->part_tbl);
disk->queue->disk = NULL;
blk_put_queue(disk->queue);
iput(disk->part0->bd_inode); /* frees the disk */
}
static int block_uevent(struct device *dev, struct kobj_uevent_env *env)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
return add_uevent_var(env, "DISKSEQ=%llu", disk->diskseq);
}
struct class block_class = {
.name = "block",
.dev_uevent = block_uevent,
};
static char *block_devnode(struct device *dev, umode_t *mode,
kuid_t *uid, kgid_t *gid)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
if (disk->fops->devnode)
return disk->fops->devnode(disk, mode);
return NULL;
}
const struct device_type disk_type = {
.name = "disk",
.groups = disk_attr_groups,
.release = disk_release,
.devnode = block_devnode,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
/*
* aggregate disk stat collector. Uses the same stats that the sysfs
* entries do, above, but makes them available through one seq_file.
*
* The output looks suspiciously like /proc/partitions with a bunch of
* extra fields.
*/
static int diskstats_show(struct seq_file *seqf, void *v)
{
struct gendisk *gp = v;
struct block_device *hd;
unsigned int inflight;
struct disk_stats stat;
unsigned long idx;
/*
if (&disk_to_dev(gp)->kobj.entry == block_class.devices.next)
seq_puts(seqf, "major minor name"
" rio rmerge rsect ruse wio wmerge "
"wsect wuse running use aveq"
"\n\n");
*/
rcu_read_lock();
xa_for_each(&gp->part_tbl, idx, hd) {
if (bdev_is_partition(hd) && !bdev_nr_sectors(hd))
continue;
part_stat_read_all(hd, &stat);
if (queue_is_mq(gp->queue))
inflight = blk_mq_in_flight(gp->queue, hd);
else
inflight = part_in_flight(hd);
seq_printf(seqf, "%4d %7d %pg "
"%lu %lu %lu %u "
"%lu %lu %lu %u "
"%u %u %u "
"%lu %lu %lu %u "
"%lu %u"
"\n",
MAJOR(hd->bd_dev), MINOR(hd->bd_dev), hd,
stat.ios[STAT_READ],
stat.merges[STAT_READ],
stat.sectors[STAT_READ],
(unsigned int)div_u64(stat.nsecs[STAT_READ],
NSEC_PER_MSEC),
stat.ios[STAT_WRITE],
stat.merges[STAT_WRITE],
stat.sectors[STAT_WRITE],
(unsigned int)div_u64(stat.nsecs[STAT_WRITE],
NSEC_PER_MSEC),
inflight,
jiffies_to_msecs(stat.io_ticks),
(unsigned int)div_u64(stat.nsecs[STAT_READ] +
stat.nsecs[STAT_WRITE] +
stat.nsecs[STAT_DISCARD] +
stat.nsecs[STAT_FLUSH],
NSEC_PER_MSEC),
stat.ios[STAT_DISCARD],
stat.merges[STAT_DISCARD],
stat.sectors[STAT_DISCARD],
(unsigned int)div_u64(stat.nsecs[STAT_DISCARD],
NSEC_PER_MSEC),
stat.ios[STAT_FLUSH],
(unsigned int)div_u64(stat.nsecs[STAT_FLUSH],
NSEC_PER_MSEC)
);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
static const struct seq_operations diskstats_op = {
.start = disk_seqf_start,
.next = disk_seqf_next,
.stop = disk_seqf_stop,
.show = diskstats_show
};
static int __init proc_genhd_init(void)
{
proc_create_seq("diskstats", 0, NULL, &diskstats_op);
proc_create_seq("partitions", 0, NULL, &partitions_op);
return 0;
}
module_init(proc_genhd_init);
#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
dev_t part_devt(struct gendisk *disk, u8 partno)
{
struct block_device *part;
dev_t devt = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
part = xa_load(&disk->part_tbl, partno);
if (part)
devt = part->bd_dev;
rcu_read_unlock();
return devt;
}
dev_t blk_lookup_devt(const char *name, int partno)
{
dev_t devt = MKDEV(0, 0);
struct class_dev_iter iter;
struct device *dev;
class_dev_iter_init(&iter, &block_class, NULL, &disk_type);
while ((dev = class_dev_iter_next(&iter))) {
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
if (strcmp(dev_name(dev), name))
continue;
if (partno < disk->minors) {
/* We need to return the right devno, even
* if the partition doesn't exist yet.
*/
devt = MKDEV(MAJOR(dev->devt),
MINOR(dev->devt) + partno);
} else {
devt = part_devt(disk, partno);
if (devt)
break;
}
}
class_dev_iter_exit(&iter);
return devt;
}
struct gendisk *__alloc_disk_node(struct request_queue *q, int node_id,
struct lock_class_key *lkclass)
{
struct gendisk *disk;
if (!blk_get_queue(q))
return NULL;
disk = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct gendisk), GFP_KERNEL, node_id);
if (!disk)
goto out_put_queue;
disk->bdi = bdi_alloc(node_id);
if (!disk->bdi)
goto out_free_disk;
disk->part0 = bdev_alloc(disk, 0);
if (!disk->part0)
goto out_free_bdi;
disk->node_id = node_id;
mutex_init(&disk->open_mutex);
xa_init(&disk->part_tbl);
if (xa_insert(&disk->part_tbl, 0, disk->part0, GFP_KERNEL))
goto out_destroy_part_tbl;
rand_initialize_disk(disk);
disk_to_dev(disk)->class = &block_class;
disk_to_dev(disk)->type = &disk_type;
device_initialize(disk_to_dev(disk));
block: add disk sequence number Associating uevents with block devices in userspace is difficult and racy: the uevent netlink socket is lossy, and on slow and overloaded systems has a very high latency. Block devices do not have exclusive owners in userspace, any process can set one up (e.g. loop devices). Moreover, device names can be reused (e.g. loop0 can be reused again and again). A userspace process setting up a block device and watching for its events cannot thus reliably tell whether an event relates to the device it just set up or another earlier instance with the same name. Being able to set a UUID on a loop device would solve the race conditions. But it does not allow to derive orderings from uevents: if you see a uevent with a UUID that does not match the device you are waiting for, you cannot tell whether it's because the right uevent has not arrived yet, or it was already sent and you missed it. So you cannot tell whether you should wait for it or not. Associating a unique, monotonically increasing sequential number to the lifetime of each block device, which can be retrieved with an ioctl immediately upon setting it up, allows to solve the race conditions with uevents, and also allows userspace processes to know whether they should wait for the uevent they need or if it was dropped and thus they should move on. Additionally, increment the disk sequence number when the media change, i.e. on DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE event. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712230530.29323-2-mcroce@linux.microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-07-13 02:05:25 +03:00
inc_diskseq(disk);
disk->queue = q;
q->disk = disk;
lockdep_init_map(&disk->lockdep_map, "(bio completion)", lkclass, 0);
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK_HOLDER_DEPRECATED
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&disk->slave_bdevs);
#endif
return disk;
out_destroy_part_tbl:
xa_destroy(&disk->part_tbl);
iput(disk->part0->bd_inode);
out_free_bdi:
bdi_put(disk->bdi);
out_free_disk:
kfree(disk);
out_put_queue:
blk_put_queue(q);
return NULL;
}
block, locking/lockdep: Assign a lock_class per gendisk used for wait_for_completion() Darrick posted the following warning and Dave Chinner analyzed it: > ====================================================== > WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected > 4.14.0-rc1-fixes #1 Tainted: G W > ------------------------------------------------------ > loop0/31693 is trying to acquire lock: > (&(&ip->i_mmaplock)->mr_lock){++++}, at: [<ffffffffa00f1b0c>] xfs_ilock+0x23c/0x330 [xfs] > > but now in release context of a crosslock acquired at the following: > ((complete)&ret.event){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81326c1f>] submit_bio_wait+0x7f/0xb0 > > which lock already depends on the new lock. > > the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: > > -> #2 ((complete)&ret.event){+.+.}: > lock_acquire+0xab/0x200 > wait_for_completion_io+0x4e/0x1a0 > submit_bio_wait+0x7f/0xb0 > blkdev_issue_zeroout+0x71/0xa0 > xfs_bmapi_convert_unwritten+0x11f/0x1d0 [xfs] > xfs_bmapi_write+0x374/0x11f0 [xfs] > xfs_iomap_write_direct+0x2ac/0x430 [xfs] > xfs_file_iomap_begin+0x20d/0xd50 [xfs] > iomap_apply+0x43/0xe0 > dax_iomap_rw+0x89/0xf0 > xfs_file_dax_write+0xcc/0x220 [xfs] > xfs_file_write_iter+0xf0/0x130 [xfs] > __vfs_write+0xd9/0x150 > vfs_write+0xc8/0x1c0 > SyS_write+0x45/0xa0 > entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe > > -> #1 (&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}: > lock_acquire+0xab/0x200 > down_write_nested+0x4a/0xb0 > xfs_ilock+0x263/0x330 [xfs] > xfs_setattr_size+0x152/0x370 [xfs] > xfs_vn_setattr+0x6b/0x90 [xfs] > notify_change+0x27d/0x3f0 > do_truncate+0x5b/0x90 > path_openat+0x237/0xa90 > do_filp_open+0x8a/0xf0 > do_sys_open+0x11c/0x1f0 > entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe > > -> #0 (&(&ip->i_mmaplock)->mr_lock){++++}: > up_write+0x1c/0x40 > xfs_iunlock+0x1d0/0x310 [xfs] > xfs_file_fallocate+0x8a/0x310 [xfs] > loop_queue_work+0xb7/0x8d0 > kthread_worker_fn+0xb9/0x1f0 > > Chain exists of: > &(&ip->i_mmaplock)->mr_lock --> &xfs_nondir_ilock_class --> (complete)&ret.event > > Possible unsafe locking scenario by crosslock: > > CPU0 CPU1 > ---- ---- > lock(&xfs_nondir_ilock_class); > lock((complete)&ret.event); > lock(&(&ip->i_mmaplock)->mr_lock); > unlock((complete)&ret.event); > > *** DEADLOCK *** The warning is a false positive, caused by the fact that all wait_for_completion()s in submit_bio_wait() are waiting with the same lock class. However, some bios have nothing to do with others, for example in the case of loop devices, there's no direct connection between the bios of an upper device and the bios of a lower device(=loop device). The safest way to assign different lock classes to different devices is to do it for each gendisk. In other words, this patch assigns a lockdep_map per gendisk and uses it when initializing completion in submit_bio_wait(). Analyzed-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Reported-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com> Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: amir73il@gmail.com Cc: axboe@kernel.dk Cc: david@fromorbit.com Cc: hch@infradead.org Cc: idryomov@gmail.com Cc: johan@kernel.org Cc: johannes.berg@intel.com Cc: kernel-team@lge.com Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: oleg@redhat.com Cc: tj@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508921765-15396-10-git-send-email-byungchul.park@lge.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-10-25 11:56:05 +03:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__alloc_disk_node);
struct gendisk *__blk_alloc_disk(int node, struct lock_class_key *lkclass)
{
struct request_queue *q;
struct gendisk *disk;
q = blk_alloc_queue(node);
if (!q)
return NULL;
disk = __alloc_disk_node(q, node, lkclass);
if (!disk) {
blk_cleanup_queue(q);
return NULL;
}
return disk;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__blk_alloc_disk);
/**
* put_disk - decrements the gendisk refcount
* @disk: the struct gendisk to decrement the refcount for
*
* This decrements the refcount for the struct gendisk. When this reaches 0
* we'll have disk_release() called.
block: revert back to synchronous request_queue removal Commit dc9edc44de6c ("block: Fix a blk_exit_rl() regression") merged on v4.12 moved the work behind blk_release_queue() into a workqueue after a splat floated around which indicated some work on blk_release_queue() could sleep in blk_exit_rl(). This splat would be possible when a driver called blk_put_queue() or blk_cleanup_queue() (which calls blk_put_queue() as its final call) from an atomic context. blk_put_queue() decrements the refcount for the request_queue kobject, and upon reaching 0 blk_release_queue() is called. Although blk_exit_rl() is now removed through commit db6d99523560 ("block: remove request_list code") on v5.0, we reserve the right to be able to sleep within blk_release_queue() context. The last reference for the request_queue must not be called from atomic context. *When* the last reference to the request_queue reaches 0 varies, and so let's take the opportunity to document when that is expected to happen and also document the context of the related calls as best as possible so we can avoid future issues, and with the hopes that the synchronous request_queue removal sticks. We revert back to synchronous request_queue removal because asynchronous removal creates a regression with expected userspace interaction with several drivers. An example is when removing the loopback driver, one uses ioctls from userspace to do so, but upon return and if successful, one expects the device to be removed. Likewise if one races to add another device the new one may not be added as it is still being removed. This was expected behavior before and it now fails as the device is still present and busy still. Moving to asynchronous request_queue removal could have broken many scripts which relied on the removal to have been completed if there was no error. Document this expectation as well so that this doesn't regress userspace again. Using asynchronous request_queue removal however has helped us find other bugs. In the future we can test what could break with this arrangement by enabling CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE. While at it, update the docs with the context expectations for the request_queue / gendisk refcount decrement, and make these expectations explicit by using might_sleep(). Fixes: dc9edc44de6c ("block: Fix a blk_exit_rl() regression") Suggested-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: yu kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-06-19 23:47:25 +03:00
*
* Context: Any context, but the last reference must not be dropped from
* atomic context.
*/
void put_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
{
if (disk)
put_device(disk_to_dev(disk));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_disk);
/**
* blk_cleanup_disk - shutdown a gendisk allocated by blk_alloc_disk
* @disk: gendisk to shutdown
*
* Mark the queue hanging off @disk DYING, drain all pending requests, then mark
* the queue DEAD, destroy and put it and the gendisk structure.
*
* Context: can sleep
*/
void blk_cleanup_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
{
blk_cleanup_queue(disk->queue);
put_disk(disk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blk_cleanup_disk);
static void set_disk_ro_uevent(struct gendisk *gd, int ro)
{
char event[] = "DISK_RO=1";
char *envp[] = { event, NULL };
if (!ro)
event[8] = '0';
kobject_uevent_env(&disk_to_dev(gd)->kobj, KOBJ_CHANGE, envp);
}
block: add a hard-readonly flag to struct gendisk Commit 20bd1d026aac ("scsi: sd: Keep disk read-only when re-reading partition") addressed a long-standing problem with user read-only policy being overridden as a result of a device-initiated revalidate. The commit has since been reverted due to a regression that left some USB devices read-only indefinitely. To fix the underlying problems with revalidate we need to keep track of hardware state and user policy separately. The gendisk has been updated to reflect the current hardware state set by the device driver. This is done to allow returning the device to the hardware state once the user clears the BLKROSET flag. The resulting semantics are as follows: - If BLKROSET sets a given partition read-only, that partition will remain read-only even if the underlying storage stack initiates a revalidate. However, the BLKRRPART ioctl will cause the partition table to be dropped and any user policy on partitions will be lost. - If BLKROSET has not been set, both the whole disk device and any partitions will reflect the current write-protect state of the underlying device. Based on a patch from Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>. Reported-by: Oleksii Kurochko <olkuroch@cisco.com> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201221 Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-01-09 13:42:51 +03:00
/**
* set_disk_ro - set a gendisk read-only
* @disk: gendisk to operate on
* @read_only: %true to set the disk read-only, %false set the disk read/write
block: add a hard-readonly flag to struct gendisk Commit 20bd1d026aac ("scsi: sd: Keep disk read-only when re-reading partition") addressed a long-standing problem with user read-only policy being overridden as a result of a device-initiated revalidate. The commit has since been reverted due to a regression that left some USB devices read-only indefinitely. To fix the underlying problems with revalidate we need to keep track of hardware state and user policy separately. The gendisk has been updated to reflect the current hardware state set by the device driver. This is done to allow returning the device to the hardware state once the user clears the BLKROSET flag. The resulting semantics are as follows: - If BLKROSET sets a given partition read-only, that partition will remain read-only even if the underlying storage stack initiates a revalidate. However, the BLKRRPART ioctl will cause the partition table to be dropped and any user policy on partitions will be lost. - If BLKROSET has not been set, both the whole disk device and any partitions will reflect the current write-protect state of the underlying device. Based on a patch from Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>. Reported-by: Oleksii Kurochko <olkuroch@cisco.com> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201221 Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-01-09 13:42:51 +03:00
*
* This function is used to indicate whether a given disk device should have its
* read-only flag set. set_disk_ro() is typically used by device drivers to
* indicate whether the underlying physical device is write-protected.
*/
void set_disk_ro(struct gendisk *disk, bool read_only)
{
block: add a hard-readonly flag to struct gendisk Commit 20bd1d026aac ("scsi: sd: Keep disk read-only when re-reading partition") addressed a long-standing problem with user read-only policy being overridden as a result of a device-initiated revalidate. The commit has since been reverted due to a regression that left some USB devices read-only indefinitely. To fix the underlying problems with revalidate we need to keep track of hardware state and user policy separately. The gendisk has been updated to reflect the current hardware state set by the device driver. This is done to allow returning the device to the hardware state once the user clears the BLKROSET flag. The resulting semantics are as follows: - If BLKROSET sets a given partition read-only, that partition will remain read-only even if the underlying storage stack initiates a revalidate. However, the BLKRRPART ioctl will cause the partition table to be dropped and any user policy on partitions will be lost. - If BLKROSET has not been set, both the whole disk device and any partitions will reflect the current write-protect state of the underlying device. Based on a patch from Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>. Reported-by: Oleksii Kurochko <olkuroch@cisco.com> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201221 Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-01-09 13:42:51 +03:00
if (read_only) {
if (test_and_set_bit(GD_READ_ONLY, &disk->state))
return;
} else {
if (!test_and_clear_bit(GD_READ_ONLY, &disk->state))
return;
}
block: add a hard-readonly flag to struct gendisk Commit 20bd1d026aac ("scsi: sd: Keep disk read-only when re-reading partition") addressed a long-standing problem with user read-only policy being overridden as a result of a device-initiated revalidate. The commit has since been reverted due to a regression that left some USB devices read-only indefinitely. To fix the underlying problems with revalidate we need to keep track of hardware state and user policy separately. The gendisk has been updated to reflect the current hardware state set by the device driver. This is done to allow returning the device to the hardware state once the user clears the BLKROSET flag. The resulting semantics are as follows: - If BLKROSET sets a given partition read-only, that partition will remain read-only even if the underlying storage stack initiates a revalidate. However, the BLKRRPART ioctl will cause the partition table to be dropped and any user policy on partitions will be lost. - If BLKROSET has not been set, both the whole disk device and any partitions will reflect the current write-protect state of the underlying device. Based on a patch from Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>. Reported-by: Oleksii Kurochko <olkuroch@cisco.com> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201221 Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-01-09 13:42:51 +03:00
set_disk_ro_uevent(disk, read_only);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_disk_ro);
int bdev_read_only(struct block_device *bdev)
{
block: propagate BLKROSET on the whole device to all partitions Change the policy so that a BLKROSET on the whole device also affects partitions. To quote Martin K. Petersen: It's very common for database folks to twiddle the read-only state of block devices and partitions. I know that our users will find it very counter-intuitive that setting /dev/sda read-only won't prevent writes to /dev/sda1. The existing behavior is inconsistent in the sense that doing: # blockdev --setro /dev/sda # echo foo > /dev/sda1 permits writes. But: # blockdev --setro /dev/sda <something triggers revalidate> # echo foo > /dev/sda1 doesn't. And a subsequent: # blockdev --setrw /dev/sda # echo foo > /dev/sda1 doesn't work either since sda1's read-only policy has been inherited from the whole-disk device. You need to do: # blockdev --rereadpt after setting the whole-disk device rw to effectuate the same change on the partitions, otherwise they are stuck being read-only indefinitely. However, setting the read-only policy on a partition does *not* require the revalidate step. As a matter of fact, doing the revalidate will blow away the policy setting you just made. So the user needs to take different actions depending on whether they are trying to read-protect a whole-disk device or a partition. Despite using the same ioctl. That is really confusing. I have lost count how many times our customers have had data clobbered because of ambiguity of the existing whole-disk device policy. The current behavior violates the principle of least surprise by letting the user think they write protected the whole disk when they actually didn't. Suggested-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-01-09 13:42:52 +03:00
return bdev->bd_read_only || get_disk_ro(bdev->bd_disk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bdev_read_only);
block: add disk sequence number Associating uevents with block devices in userspace is difficult and racy: the uevent netlink socket is lossy, and on slow and overloaded systems has a very high latency. Block devices do not have exclusive owners in userspace, any process can set one up (e.g. loop devices). Moreover, device names can be reused (e.g. loop0 can be reused again and again). A userspace process setting up a block device and watching for its events cannot thus reliably tell whether an event relates to the device it just set up or another earlier instance with the same name. Being able to set a UUID on a loop device would solve the race conditions. But it does not allow to derive orderings from uevents: if you see a uevent with a UUID that does not match the device you are waiting for, you cannot tell whether it's because the right uevent has not arrived yet, or it was already sent and you missed it. So you cannot tell whether you should wait for it or not. Associating a unique, monotonically increasing sequential number to the lifetime of each block device, which can be retrieved with an ioctl immediately upon setting it up, allows to solve the race conditions with uevents, and also allows userspace processes to know whether they should wait for the uevent they need or if it was dropped and thus they should move on. Additionally, increment the disk sequence number when the media change, i.e. on DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE event. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712230530.29323-2-mcroce@linux.microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-07-13 02:05:25 +03:00
void inc_diskseq(struct gendisk *disk)
{
disk->diskseq = atomic64_inc_return(&diskseq);
}