WSL2-Linux-Kernel/security/selinux/include/security.h

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C
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/*
* Security server interface.
*
* Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
*
*/
#ifndef _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
#define _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
#include "flask.h"
#define SECSID_NULL 0x00000000 /* unspecified SID */
#define SECSID_WILD 0xffffffff /* wildcard SID */
#define SECCLASS_NULL 0x0000 /* no class */
#define SELINUX_MAGIC 0xf97cff8c
/* Identify specific policy version changes */
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE 15
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL 16
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6 17
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS 18
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_VALIDATETRANS 19
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS 19
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB 20
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS 21
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP 22
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE 23
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 11:35:57 +04:00
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY 24
/* Range of policy versions we understand*/
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
#else
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 11:35:57 +04:00
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
#endif
/* Mask for just the mount related flags */
#define SE_MNTMASK 0x0f
/* Super block security struct flags for mount options */
#define CONTEXT_MNT 0x01
#define FSCONTEXT_MNT 0x02
#define ROOTCONTEXT_MNT 0x04
#define DEFCONTEXT_MNT 0x08
/* Non-mount related flags */
#define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x10
#define SE_SBPROC 0x20
#define SE_SBLABELSUPP 0x40
#define CONTEXT_STR "context="
#define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext="
#define ROOTCONTEXT_STR "rootcontext="
#define DEFCONTEXT_STR "defcontext="
#define LABELSUPP_STR "seclabel"
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
extern int selinux_enabled;
extern int selinux_mls_enabled;
/* Policy capabilities */
enum {
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM,
__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
};
#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 11:35:57 +04:00
/*
* type_datum properties
* available at the kernel policy version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
*/
#define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY 0x0001
#define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE 0x0002
/* limitation of boundary depth */
#define POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH 4
int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len);
int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
struct av_decision {
u32 allowed;
u32 auditallow;
u32 auditdeny;
u32 seqno;
};
int security_permissive_sid(u32 sid);
int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct av_decision *avd);
int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
int security_change_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext,
u32 *scontext_len);
selinux: support deferred mapping of contexts Introduce SELinux support for deferred mapping of security contexts in the SID table upon policy reload, and use this support for inode security contexts when the context is not yet valid under the current policy. Only processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in policy can set undefined security contexts on inodes. Inodes with such undefined contexts are treated as having the unlabeled context until the context becomes valid upon a policy reload that defines the context. Context invalidation upon policy reload also uses this support to save the context information in the SID table and later recover it upon a subsequent policy reload that defines the context again. This support is to enable package managers and similar programs to set down file contexts unknown to the system policy at the time the file is created in order to better support placing loadable policy modules in packages and to support build systems that need to create images of different distro releases with different policies w/o requiring all of the contexts to be defined or legal in the build host policy. With this patch applied, the following sequence is possible, although in practice it is recommended that this permission only be allowed to specific program domains such as the package manager. # rmdir baz # rm bar # touch bar # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # cat setundefined.te policy_module(setundefined, 1.0) require { type unconfined_t; type unlabeled_t; } files_type(unlabeled_t) allow unconfined_t self:capability2 mac_admin; # make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile setundefined.pp # semodule -i setundefined.pp # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz # cat foo.te policy_module(foo, 1.0) type foo_exec_t; files_type(foo_exec_t) # make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile foo.pp # semodule -i foo.pp # defines foo_exec_t # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # semodule -r foo # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz # semodule -i foo.pp # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # semodule -r setundefined foo # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # no longer defined and not allowed chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # rmdir baz # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-05-07 21:03:20 +04:00
int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
u32 *out_sid);
int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags);
selinux: support deferred mapping of contexts Introduce SELinux support for deferred mapping of security contexts in the SID table upon policy reload, and use this support for inode security contexts when the context is not yet valid under the current policy. Only processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in policy can set undefined security contexts on inodes. Inodes with such undefined contexts are treated as having the unlabeled context until the context becomes valid upon a policy reload that defines the context. Context invalidation upon policy reload also uses this support to save the context information in the SID table and later recover it upon a subsequent policy reload that defines the context again. This support is to enable package managers and similar programs to set down file contexts unknown to the system policy at the time the file is created in order to better support placing loadable policy modules in packages and to support build systems that need to create images of different distro releases with different policies w/o requiring all of the contexts to be defined or legal in the build host policy. With this patch applied, the following sequence is possible, although in practice it is recommended that this permission only be allowed to specific program domains such as the package manager. # rmdir baz # rm bar # touch bar # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # cat setundefined.te policy_module(setundefined, 1.0) require { type unconfined_t; type unlabeled_t; } files_type(unlabeled_t) allow unconfined_t self:capability2 mac_admin; # make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile setundefined.pp # semodule -i setundefined.pp # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz # cat foo.te policy_module(foo, 1.0) type foo_exec_t; files_type(foo_exec_t) # make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile foo.pp # semodule -i foo.pp # defines foo_exec_t # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # semodule -r foo # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz # semodule -i foo.pp # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # semodule -r setundefined foo # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # no longer defined and not allowed chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # rmdir baz # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-05-07 21:03:20 +04:00
int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
u32 *sid);
int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username,
u32 **sids, u32 *nel);
int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid);
int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid);
int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen,
u32 *out_sid);
int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
u16 tclass);
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request. When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context also means another thread can easily refer violated information. The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign a per-thread security context. Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two explicit or implicit ways. The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t". This feature requires a new policy version. The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-28 11:35:57 +04:00
int security_bounded_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid);
int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
u32 xfrm_sid,
u32 *peer_sid);
int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses);
int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
int security_get_reject_unknown(void);
int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR 1 /* use xattr */
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS 2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK 3 /* use task SIDs, e.g. pipefs/sockfs */
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS 4 /* use the genfs support */
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE 5 /* no labeling support */
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT 6 /* use mountpoint labeling */
int security_fs_use(const char *fstype, unsigned int *behavior,
u32 *sid);
int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
u32 *sid);
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
u32 *sid);
int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
#else
static inline int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
u32 *sid)
{
return -EIDRM;
}
static inline int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
return -ENOENT;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid);
#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */