License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 17:07:57 +03:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
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#ifndef __LINUX_NET_AFUNIX_H
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#define __LINUX_NET_AFUNIX_H
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2005-08-16 09:18:02 +04:00
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#include <linux/socket.h>
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#include <linux/un.h>
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2006-03-21 09:35:41 +03:00
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#include <linux/mutex.h>
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2017-06-30 13:08:05 +03:00
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#include <linux/refcount.h>
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2005-08-16 09:18:02 +04:00
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#include <net/sock.h>
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2016-02-03 04:11:03 +03:00
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void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
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void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
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2019-02-08 19:01:44 +03:00
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void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb);
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2013-08-01 04:31:33 +04:00
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void unix_gc(void);
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void wait_for_unix_gc(void);
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struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp);
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2018-10-30 06:42:09 +03:00
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struct sock *unix_peer_get(struct sock *sk);
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2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
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#define UNIX_HASH_SIZE 256
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2012-06-08 09:03:21 +04:00
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#define UNIX_HASH_BITS 8
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2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
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2007-11-11 09:06:01 +03:00
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extern unsigned int unix_tot_inflight;
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2011-12-15 06:44:03 +04:00
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extern spinlock_t unix_table_lock;
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2012-06-08 09:03:21 +04:00
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extern struct hlist_head unix_socket_table[2 * UNIX_HASH_SIZE];
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2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
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struct unix_address {
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2017-06-30 13:08:05 +03:00
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refcount_t refcnt;
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2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
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int len;
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2012-04-15 09:58:06 +04:00
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unsigned int hash;
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2020-02-28 17:01:43 +03:00
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struct sockaddr_un name[];
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2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
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};
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struct unix_skb_parms {
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2010-06-13 07:34:33 +04:00
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struct pid *pid; /* Skb credentials */
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2013-04-03 21:28:16 +04:00
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kuid_t uid;
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kgid_t gid;
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2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
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struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
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[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec
This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the
label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of
recvmsg.
Patch purpose:
This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application
can then use this security context to determine the security context for
processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet.
Patch design and implementation:
The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET
sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security
context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by
setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application
retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism.
An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this:
toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
}
}
sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.
Testing:
We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server
applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context
using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-29 23:27:47 +04:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
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2006-08-03 01:12:06 +04:00
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u32 secid; /* Security ID */
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[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec
This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the
label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of
recvmsg.
Patch purpose:
This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application
can then use this security context to determine the security context for
processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet.
Patch design and implementation:
The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET
sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security
context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by
setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application
retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism.
An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this:
toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
}
}
sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.
Testing:
We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server
applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context
using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-29 23:27:47 +04:00
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#endif
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2013-08-09 01:37:32 +04:00
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u32 consumed;
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2016-10-28 11:22:25 +03:00
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} __randomize_layout;
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2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
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2019-12-09 13:03:46 +03:00
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struct scm_stat {
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2020-02-28 16:45:21 +03:00
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atomic_t nr_fds;
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2019-12-09 13:03:46 +03:00
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};
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2018-10-30 06:42:10 +03:00
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#define UNIXCB(skb) (*(struct unix_skb_parms *)&((skb)->cb))
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2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
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2007-06-01 00:24:26 +04:00
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#define unix_state_lock(s) spin_lock(&unix_sk(s)->lock)
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#define unix_state_unlock(s) spin_unlock(&unix_sk(s)->lock)
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#define unix_state_lock_nested(s) \
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2006-07-03 11:25:12 +04:00
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spin_lock_nested(&unix_sk(s)->lock, \
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SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING)
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2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
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/* The AF_UNIX socket */
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struct unix_sock {
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/* WARNING: sk has to be the first member */
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struct sock sk;
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2018-10-21 14:33:03 +03:00
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struct unix_address *addr;
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2012-03-15 05:54:32 +04:00
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struct path path;
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2016-09-02 00:43:53 +03:00
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struct mutex iolock, bindlock;
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2010-04-29 15:01:49 +04:00
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struct sock *peer;
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2007-07-12 01:22:39 +04:00
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struct list_head link;
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2010-04-29 15:01:49 +04:00
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atomic_long_t inflight;
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spinlock_t lock;
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2013-05-01 09:24:03 +04:00
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unsigned long gc_flags;
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#define UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE 0
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#define UNIX_GC_MAYBE_CYCLE 1
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2010-04-29 15:01:49 +04:00
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struct socket_wq peer_wq;
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2018-10-21 14:33:03 +03:00
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wait_queue_entry_t peer_wake;
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2019-12-09 13:03:46 +03:00
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struct scm_stat scm_stat;
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2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
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};
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2015-09-27 01:50:42 +03:00
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2015-10-06 22:03:53 +03:00
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static inline struct unix_sock *unix_sk(const struct sock *sk)
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2015-09-27 01:50:42 +03:00
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{
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return (struct unix_sock *)sk;
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}
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2005-08-16 09:18:02 +04:00
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2010-04-29 15:01:49 +04:00
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#define peer_wait peer_wq.wait
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2011-12-30 04:54:11 +04:00
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long unix_inq_len(struct sock *sk);
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long unix_outq_len(struct sock *sk);
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2005-08-16 09:18:02 +04:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
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2013-08-01 04:31:33 +04:00
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int unix_sysctl_register(struct net *net);
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void unix_sysctl_unregister(struct net *net);
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2005-08-16 09:18:02 +04:00
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#else
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2007-12-01 15:40:40 +03:00
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static inline int unix_sysctl_register(struct net *net) { return 0; }
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static inline void unix_sysctl_unregister(struct net *net) {}
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2005-08-16 09:18:02 +04:00
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#endif
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2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
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#endif
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