2019-05-27 09:55:01 +03:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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2007-08-30 11:36:14 +04:00
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/*
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* AEAD: Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
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2010-02-16 15:24:07 +03:00
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*
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2007-08-30 11:36:14 +04:00
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* This file provides API support for AEAD algorithms.
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*
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2015-08-14 10:30:41 +03:00
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* Copyright (c) 2007-2015 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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2007-08-30 11:36:14 +04:00
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*/
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2019-11-08 13:41:58 +03:00
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#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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2007-08-30 11:36:14 +04:00
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/seq_file.h>
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2011-09-27 09:44:27 +04:00
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#include <linux/cryptouser.h>
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#include <net/netlink.h>
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2007-08-30 11:36:14 +04:00
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2007-12-12 14:23:36 +03:00
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#include "internal.h"
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2007-08-30 11:36:14 +04:00
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static int setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
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unsigned int keylen)
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{
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unsigned long alignmask = crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm);
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int ret;
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u8 *buffer, *alignbuffer;
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unsigned long absize;
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absize = keylen + alignmask;
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buffer = kmalloc(absize, GFP_ATOMIC);
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if (!buffer)
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return -ENOMEM;
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alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
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memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
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2015-08-14 10:30:41 +03:00
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ret = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
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2007-08-30 11:36:14 +04:00
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memset(alignbuffer, 0, keylen);
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kfree(buffer);
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return ret;
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}
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2015-05-11 12:48:12 +03:00
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int crypto_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
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const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
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2007-08-30 11:36:14 +04:00
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{
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unsigned long alignmask = crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm);
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2018-01-03 22:16:30 +03:00
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int err;
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2007-08-30 11:36:14 +04:00
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if ((unsigned long)key & alignmask)
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2018-01-03 22:16:30 +03:00
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err = setkey_unaligned(tfm, key, keylen);
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else
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err = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
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crypto: aead - set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails
Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the
sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the
tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up
in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key.
For example, in gcm.c, if the kzalloc() fails due to lack of memory,
then the CTR part of GCM will have the new key but GHASH will not.
It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones
that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set
CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails, to prevent the tfm from being
used until a new key is set.
[Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed
AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG
previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed"
states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the
opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.]
Fixes: dc26c17f743a ("crypto: aead - prevent using AEADs without setting key")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.16+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-01-07 05:47:44 +03:00
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if (unlikely(err)) {
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crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
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2018-01-03 22:16:30 +03:00
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return err;
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crypto: aead - set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails
Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the
sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the
tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up
in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key.
For example, in gcm.c, if the kzalloc() fails due to lack of memory,
then the CTR part of GCM will have the new key but GHASH will not.
It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones
that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set
CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails, to prevent the tfm from being
used until a new key is set.
[Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed
AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG
previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed"
states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the
opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.]
Fixes: dc26c17f743a ("crypto: aead - prevent using AEADs without setting key")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.16+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-01-07 05:47:44 +03:00
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}
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2007-08-30 11:36:14 +04:00
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2018-01-03 22:16:30 +03:00
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crypto_aead_clear_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
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return 0;
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2007-08-30 11:36:14 +04:00
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}
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2015-05-11 12:48:12 +03:00
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_aead_setkey);
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2007-08-30 11:36:14 +04:00
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2007-12-02 10:49:21 +03:00
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int crypto_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
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{
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int err;
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2019-08-09 18:51:07 +03:00
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if ((!authsize && crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm)) ||
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authsize > crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm))
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2007-12-02 10:49:21 +03:00
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return -EINVAL;
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2015-08-14 10:30:41 +03:00
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if (crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setauthsize) {
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err = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setauthsize(tfm, authsize);
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2007-12-02 10:49:21 +03:00
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if (err)
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return err;
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}
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2015-05-11 12:48:12 +03:00
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tfm->authsize = authsize;
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2007-12-02 10:49:21 +03:00
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_aead_setauthsize);
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2019-06-03 08:45:16 +03:00
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int crypto_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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{
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struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
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struct crypto_alg *alg = aead->base.__crt_alg;
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unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen;
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int ret;
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crypto_stats_get(alg);
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if (crypto_aead_get_flags(aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
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ret = -ENOKEY;
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else
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ret = crypto_aead_alg(aead)->encrypt(req);
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crypto_stats_aead_encrypt(cryptlen, alg, ret);
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_aead_encrypt);
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int crypto_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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{
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struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
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struct crypto_alg *alg = aead->base.__crt_alg;
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unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen;
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int ret;
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crypto_stats_get(alg);
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if (crypto_aead_get_flags(aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
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ret = -ENOKEY;
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else if (req->cryptlen < crypto_aead_authsize(aead))
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ret = -EINVAL;
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else
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ret = crypto_aead_alg(aead)->decrypt(req);
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crypto_stats_aead_decrypt(cryptlen, alg, ret);
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_aead_decrypt);
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2015-05-28 17:07:53 +03:00
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static void crypto_aead_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
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{
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struct crypto_aead *aead = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
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struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(aead);
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alg->exit(aead);
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}
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2015-05-21 10:11:08 +03:00
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static int crypto_aead_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
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{
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struct crypto_aead *aead = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
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struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(aead);
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2018-01-03 22:16:30 +03:00
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crypto_aead_set_flags(aead, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
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2015-05-21 10:11:08 +03:00
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aead->authsize = alg->maxauthsize;
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2015-05-28 17:07:53 +03:00
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if (alg->exit)
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aead->base.exit = crypto_aead_exit_tfm;
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if (alg->init)
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return alg->init(aead);
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2015-05-21 10:11:08 +03:00
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return 0;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_NET
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static int crypto_aead_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
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{
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struct crypto_report_aead raead;
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struct aead_alg *aead = container_of(alg, struct aead_alg, base);
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2018-11-04 00:56:03 +03:00
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memset(&raead, 0, sizeof(raead));
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strscpy(raead.type, "aead", sizeof(raead.type));
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strscpy(raead.geniv, "<none>", sizeof(raead.geniv));
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2015-05-21 10:11:08 +03:00
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raead.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
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raead.maxauthsize = aead->maxauthsize;
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raead.ivsize = aead->ivsize;
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2018-11-04 00:56:03 +03:00
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return nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_AEAD, sizeof(raead), &raead);
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2015-05-21 10:11:08 +03:00
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}
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#else
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static int crypto_aead_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
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{
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return -ENOSYS;
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}
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#endif
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static void crypto_aead_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
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2016-12-31 18:56:23 +03:00
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__maybe_unused;
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2015-05-21 10:11:08 +03:00
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static void crypto_aead_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
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{
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struct aead_alg *aead = container_of(alg, struct aead_alg, base);
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seq_printf(m, "type : aead\n");
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seq_printf(m, "async : %s\n", alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC ?
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"yes" : "no");
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seq_printf(m, "blocksize : %u\n", alg->cra_blocksize);
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seq_printf(m, "ivsize : %u\n", aead->ivsize);
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seq_printf(m, "maxauthsize : %u\n", aead->maxauthsize);
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seq_printf(m, "geniv : <none>\n");
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}
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2015-07-09 02:17:17 +03:00
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static void crypto_aead_free_instance(struct crypto_instance *inst)
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{
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struct aead_instance *aead = aead_instance(inst);
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aead->free(aead);
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}
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2015-08-14 10:30:41 +03:00
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static const struct crypto_type crypto_aead_type = {
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2015-05-21 10:11:08 +03:00
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.extsize = crypto_alg_extsize,
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.init_tfm = crypto_aead_init_tfm,
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2015-07-09 02:17:17 +03:00
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.free = crypto_aead_free_instance,
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2015-05-21 10:11:08 +03:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
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.show = crypto_aead_show,
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#endif
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.report = crypto_aead_report,
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.maskclear = ~CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK,
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.maskset = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK,
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.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
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.tfmsize = offsetof(struct crypto_aead, base),
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};
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2020-01-03 06:58:46 +03:00
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int crypto_grab_aead(struct crypto_aead_spawn *spawn,
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struct crypto_instance *inst,
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const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
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2007-12-12 14:24:27 +03:00
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{
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2015-05-11 12:48:12 +03:00
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spawn->base.frontend = &crypto_aead_type;
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2020-01-03 06:58:48 +03:00
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return crypto_grab_spawn(&spawn->base, inst, name, type, mask);
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2007-12-12 14:24:27 +03:00
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_grab_aead);
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struct crypto_aead *crypto_alloc_aead(const char *alg_name, u32 type, u32 mask)
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{
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2015-05-11 12:48:12 +03:00
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return crypto_alloc_tfm(alg_name, &crypto_aead_type, type, mask);
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2007-12-12 14:24:27 +03:00
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_alloc_aead);
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2015-05-21 10:11:08 +03:00
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static int aead_prepare_alg(struct aead_alg *alg)
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{
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struct crypto_alg *base = &alg->base;
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2016-07-12 08:17:33 +03:00
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if (max3(alg->maxauthsize, alg->ivsize, alg->chunksize) >
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PAGE_SIZE / 8)
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2015-05-21 10:11:08 +03:00
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return -EINVAL;
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2016-07-12 08:17:33 +03:00
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if (!alg->chunksize)
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alg->chunksize = base->cra_blocksize;
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2015-08-14 10:30:41 +03:00
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base->cra_type = &crypto_aead_type;
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2015-05-21 10:11:08 +03:00
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base->cra_flags &= ~CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK;
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base->cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD;
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return 0;
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}
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int crypto_register_aead(struct aead_alg *alg)
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{
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struct crypto_alg *base = &alg->base;
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int err;
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err = aead_prepare_alg(alg);
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if (err)
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return err;
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return crypto_register_alg(base);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_register_aead);
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2015-05-28 17:07:57 +03:00
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void crypto_unregister_aead(struct aead_alg *alg)
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2015-05-21 10:11:08 +03:00
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{
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2015-05-28 17:07:57 +03:00
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crypto_unregister_alg(&alg->base);
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2015-05-21 10:11:08 +03:00
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_unregister_aead);
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2015-05-28 17:07:59 +03:00
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int crypto_register_aeads(struct aead_alg *algs, int count)
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{
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int i, ret;
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for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
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ret = crypto_register_aead(&algs[i]);
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if (ret)
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goto err;
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}
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return 0;
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err:
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for (--i; i >= 0; --i)
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crypto_unregister_aead(&algs[i]);
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_register_aeads);
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void crypto_unregister_aeads(struct aead_alg *algs, int count)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = count - 1; i >= 0; --i)
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crypto_unregister_aead(&algs[i]);
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}
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|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_unregister_aeads);
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|
|
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2015-05-21 10:11:08 +03:00
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|
int aead_register_instance(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
|
|
|
|
struct aead_instance *inst)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int err;
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|
|
|
|
2020-01-03 07:04:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(!inst->free))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-21 10:11:08 +03:00
|
|
|
err = aead_prepare_alg(&inst->alg);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return crypto_register_instance(tmpl, aead_crypto_instance(inst));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aead_register_instance);
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-30 11:36:14 +04:00
|
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
|
|
|
|
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)");
|