License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 17:07:57 +03:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 00:27:30 +03:00
|
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#ifndef _LINUX_KCOV_H
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#define _LINUX_KCOV_H
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2021-02-18 20:31:24 +03:00
|
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#include <linux/sched.h>
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 00:27:30 +03:00
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#include <uapi/linux/kcov.h>
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struct task_struct;
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#ifdef CONFIG_KCOV
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enum kcov_mode {
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/* Coverage collection is not enabled yet. */
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KCOV_MODE_DISABLED = 0,
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2017-11-18 02:30:46 +03:00
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/* KCOV was initialized, but tracing mode hasn't been chosen yet. */
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KCOV_MODE_INIT = 1,
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 00:27:30 +03:00
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/*
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* Tracing coverage collection mode.
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* Covered PCs are collected in a per-task buffer.
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*/
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2017-11-18 02:30:46 +03:00
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KCOV_MODE_TRACE_PC = 2,
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/* Collecting comparison operands mode. */
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KCOV_MODE_TRACE_CMP = 3,
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 00:27:30 +03:00
|
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};
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sched/core / kcov: avoid kcov_area during task switch
During a context switch, we first switch_mm() to the next task's mm,
then switch_to() that new task. This means that vmalloc'd regions which
had previously been faulted in can transiently disappear in the context
of the prev task.
Functions instrumented by KCOV may try to access a vmalloc'd kcov_area
during this window, and as the fault handling code is instrumented, this
results in a recursive fault.
We must avoid accessing any kcov_area during this window. We can do so
with a new flag in kcov_mode, set prior to switching the mm, and cleared
once the new task is live. Since task_struct::kcov_mode isn't always a
specific enum kcov_mode value, this is made an unsigned int.
The manipulation is hidden behind kcov_{prepare,finish}_switch() helpers,
which are empty for !CONFIG_KCOV kernels.
The code uses macros because I can't use static inline functions without a
circular include dependency between <linux/sched.h> and <linux/kcov.h>,
since the definition of task_struct uses things defined in <linux/kcov.h>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504135535.53744-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-15 01:27:41 +03:00
|
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#define KCOV_IN_CTXSW (1 << 30)
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2017-11-18 02:30:46 +03:00
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void kcov_task_init(struct task_struct *t);
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void kcov_task_exit(struct task_struct *t);
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sched/core / kcov: avoid kcov_area during task switch
During a context switch, we first switch_mm() to the next task's mm,
then switch_to() that new task. This means that vmalloc'd regions which
had previously been faulted in can transiently disappear in the context
of the prev task.
Functions instrumented by KCOV may try to access a vmalloc'd kcov_area
during this window, and as the fault handling code is instrumented, this
results in a recursive fault.
We must avoid accessing any kcov_area during this window. We can do so
with a new flag in kcov_mode, set prior to switching the mm, and cleared
once the new task is live. Since task_struct::kcov_mode isn't always a
specific enum kcov_mode value, this is made an unsigned int.
The manipulation is hidden behind kcov_{prepare,finish}_switch() helpers,
which are empty for !CONFIG_KCOV kernels.
The code uses macros because I can't use static inline functions without a
circular include dependency between <linux/sched.h> and <linux/kcov.h>,
since the definition of task_struct uses things defined in <linux/kcov.h>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504135535.53744-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-15 01:27:41 +03:00
|
|
|
#define kcov_prepare_switch(t) \
|
|
|
|
|
do { \
|
|
|
|
|
(t)->kcov_mode |= KCOV_IN_CTXSW; \
|
|
|
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define kcov_finish_switch(t) \
|
|
|
|
|
do { \
|
|
|
|
|
(t)->kcov_mode &= ~KCOV_IN_CTXSW; \
|
|
|
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
kcov: remote coverage support
Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3.
This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound
kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of
the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset
implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost
workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov
extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and
vhost.
Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this
when custom annotations are added (the list is based on
process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot):
1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker,
2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers,
3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker,
4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers,
5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker.
These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with
syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md
This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit
instance:
https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524
This patch (of 3):
Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov.
With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued
from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to
collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that
those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background
threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a
limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is
spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user
interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers).
To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique
global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding
kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of
such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field
of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to
the code sections, that are referenced by those handles.
Since there might be many local background threads spawned from
different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per
annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle
through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This
common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current
task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via
custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with
kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a
handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs
to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance
within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for
common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The
bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the
number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased.
When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common
handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is
annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the
current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect
coverage selectively from different subsystems.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 03:52:43 +03:00
|
|
|
/* See Documentation/dev-tools/kcov.rst for usage details. */
|
|
|
|
|
void kcov_remote_start(u64 handle);
|
|
|
|
|
void kcov_remote_stop(void);
|
|
|
|
|
u64 kcov_common_handle(void);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void kcov_remote_start_common(u64 id)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
kcov_remote_start(kcov_remote_handle(KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_COMMON, id));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void kcov_remote_start_usb(u64 id)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
kcov_remote_start(kcov_remote_handle(KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_USB, id));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021-01-05 22:53:42 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* The softirq flavor of kcov_remote_*() functions is introduced as a temporary
|
|
|
|
|
* work around for kcov's lack of nested remote coverage sections support in
|
|
|
|
|
* task context. Adding suport for nested sections is tracked in:
|
|
|
|
|
* https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210337
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void kcov_remote_start_usb_softirq(u64 id)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if (in_serving_softirq())
|
|
|
|
|
kcov_remote_start_usb(id);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void kcov_remote_stop_softirq(void)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if (in_serving_softirq())
|
|
|
|
|
kcov_remote_stop();
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 00:27:30 +03:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void kcov_task_init(struct task_struct *t) {}
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void kcov_task_exit(struct task_struct *t) {}
|
sched/core / kcov: avoid kcov_area during task switch
During a context switch, we first switch_mm() to the next task's mm,
then switch_to() that new task. This means that vmalloc'd regions which
had previously been faulted in can transiently disappear in the context
of the prev task.
Functions instrumented by KCOV may try to access a vmalloc'd kcov_area
during this window, and as the fault handling code is instrumented, this
results in a recursive fault.
We must avoid accessing any kcov_area during this window. We can do so
with a new flag in kcov_mode, set prior to switching the mm, and cleared
once the new task is live. Since task_struct::kcov_mode isn't always a
specific enum kcov_mode value, this is made an unsigned int.
The manipulation is hidden behind kcov_{prepare,finish}_switch() helpers,
which are empty for !CONFIG_KCOV kernels.
The code uses macros because I can't use static inline functions without a
circular include dependency between <linux/sched.h> and <linux/kcov.h>,
since the definition of task_struct uses things defined in <linux/kcov.h>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504135535.53744-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-15 01:27:41 +03:00
|
|
|
static inline void kcov_prepare_switch(struct task_struct *t) {}
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void kcov_finish_switch(struct task_struct *t) {}
|
kcov: remote coverage support
Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3.
This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound
kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of
the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset
implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost
workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov
extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and
vhost.
Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this
when custom annotations are added (the list is based on
process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot):
1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker,
2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers,
3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker,
4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers,
5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker.
These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with
syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md
This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit
instance:
https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524
This patch (of 3):
Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov.
With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued
from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to
collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that
those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background
threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a
limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is
spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user
interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers).
To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique
global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding
kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of
such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field
of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to
the code sections, that are referenced by those handles.
Since there might be many local background threads spawned from
different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per
annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle
through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This
common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current
task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via
custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with
kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a
handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs
to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance
within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for
common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The
bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the
number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased.
When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common
handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is
annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the
current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect
coverage selectively from different subsystems.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 03:52:43 +03:00
|
|
|
static inline void kcov_remote_start(u64 handle) {}
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void kcov_remote_stop(void) {}
|
|
|
|
|
static inline u64 kcov_common_handle(void)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void kcov_remote_start_common(u64 id) {}
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void kcov_remote_start_usb(u64 id) {}
|
2021-01-05 22:53:42 +03:00
|
|
|
static inline void kcov_remote_start_usb_softirq(u64 id) {}
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void kcov_remote_stop_softirq(void) {}
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 00:27:30 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_KCOV */
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* _LINUX_KCOV_H */
|
