WSL2-Linux-Kernel/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c

236 строки
6.1 KiB
C
Исходник Обычный вид История

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 2012 Regents of the University of California
*/
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/kdebug.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
riscv: Add kprobes supported This patch enables "kprobe & kretprobe" to work with ftrace interface. It utilized software breakpoint as single-step mechanism. Some instructions which can't be single-step executed must be simulated in kernel execution slot, such as: branch, jal, auipc, la ... Some instructions should be rejected for probing and we use a blacklist to filter, such as: ecall, ebreak, ... We use ebreak & c.ebreak to replace origin instruction and the kprobe handler prepares an executable memory slot for out-of-line execution with a copy of the original instruction being probed. In execution slot we add ebreak behind original instruction to simulate a single-setp mechanism. The patch is based on packi's work [1] and csky's work [2]. - The kprobes_trampoline.S is all from packi's patch - The single-step mechanism is new designed for riscv without hw single-step trap - The simulation codes are from csky - Frankly, all codes refer to other archs' implementation [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20181113195804.22825-1-me@packi.ch/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-csky/20200403044150.20562-9-guoren@kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com> Co-developed-by: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Signed-off-by: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Tested-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com> Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
2020-12-17 19:01:42 +03:00
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/irq.h>
#include <asm/asm-prototypes.h>
#include <asm/bug.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/csr.h>
int show_unhandled_signals = 1;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(die_lock);
void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *str)
{
static int die_counter;
int ret;
oops_enter();
spin_lock_irq(&die_lock);
console_verbose();
bust_spinlocks(1);
pr_emerg("%s [#%d]\n", str, ++die_counter);
print_modules();
show_regs(regs);
ret = notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, 0, regs->cause, SIGSEGV);
bust_spinlocks(0);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
oops_exit();
if (in_interrupt())
panic("Fatal exception in interrupt");
if (panic_on_oops)
panic("Fatal exception");
if (ret != NOTIFY_STOP)
make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
}
void do_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, int signo, int code, unsigned long addr)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, signo)
&& printk_ratelimit()) {
pr_info("%s[%d]: unhandled signal %d code 0x%x at 0x" REG_FMT,
tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk), signo, code, addr);
print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", instruction_pointer(regs));
pr_cont("\n");
__show_regs(regs);
}
force_sig_fault(signo, code, (void __user *)addr);
}
static void do_trap_error(struct pt_regs *regs, int signo, int code,
unsigned long addr, const char *str)
{
current->thread.bad_cause = regs->cause;
if (user_mode(regs)) {
do_trap(regs, signo, code, addr);
} else {
if (!fixup_exception(regs))
die(regs, str);
}
}
#if defined (CONFIG_XIP_KERNEL) && defined (CONFIG_RISCV_ERRATA_ALTERNATIVE)
#define __trap_section __section(".xip.traps")
#else
#define __trap_section
#endif
#define DO_ERROR_INFO(name, signo, code, str) \
asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void name(struct pt_regs *regs) \
{ \
do_trap_error(regs, signo, code, regs->epc, "Oops - " str); \
}
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_unknown,
SIGILL, ILL_ILLTRP, "unknown exception");
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_insn_misaligned,
SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, "instruction address misaligned");
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_insn_fault,
SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "instruction access fault");
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_insn_illegal,
SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, "illegal instruction");
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_load_fault,
SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "load access fault");
#ifndef CONFIG_RISCV_M_MODE
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_load_misaligned,
SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, "Oops - load address misaligned");
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_store_misaligned,
SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, "Oops - store (or AMO) address misaligned");
#else
int handle_misaligned_load(struct pt_regs *regs);
int handle_misaligned_store(struct pt_regs *regs);
asmlinkage void __trap_section do_trap_load_misaligned(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (!handle_misaligned_load(regs))
return;
do_trap_error(regs, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, regs->epc,
"Oops - load address misaligned");
}
asmlinkage void __trap_section do_trap_store_misaligned(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (!handle_misaligned_store(regs))
return;
do_trap_error(regs, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, regs->epc,
"Oops - store (or AMO) address misaligned");
}
#endif
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_store_fault,
SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "store (or AMO) access fault");
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_ecall_u,
SIGILL, ILL_ILLTRP, "environment call from U-mode");
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_ecall_s,
SIGILL, ILL_ILLTRP, "environment call from S-mode");
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_ecall_m,
SIGILL, ILL_ILLTRP, "environment call from M-mode");
static inline unsigned long get_break_insn_length(unsigned long pc)
{
bug_insn_t insn;
if (get_kernel_nofault(insn, (bug_insn_t *)pc))
return 0;
return GET_INSN_LENGTH(insn);
}
asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void do_trap_break(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
riscv: Add kprobes supported This patch enables "kprobe & kretprobe" to work with ftrace interface. It utilized software breakpoint as single-step mechanism. Some instructions which can't be single-step executed must be simulated in kernel execution slot, such as: branch, jal, auipc, la ... Some instructions should be rejected for probing and we use a blacklist to filter, such as: ecall, ebreak, ... We use ebreak & c.ebreak to replace origin instruction and the kprobe handler prepares an executable memory slot for out-of-line execution with a copy of the original instruction being probed. In execution slot we add ebreak behind original instruction to simulate a single-setp mechanism. The patch is based on packi's work [1] and csky's work [2]. - The kprobes_trampoline.S is all from packi's patch - The single-step mechanism is new designed for riscv without hw single-step trap - The simulation codes are from csky - Frankly, all codes refer to other archs' implementation [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20181113195804.22825-1-me@packi.ch/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-csky/20200403044150.20562-9-guoren@kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com> Co-developed-by: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Signed-off-by: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Tested-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com> Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
2020-12-17 19:01:42 +03:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES
if (kprobe_single_step_handler(regs))
return;
if (kprobe_breakpoint_handler(regs))
return;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_UPROBES
if (uprobe_single_step_handler(regs))
return;
if (uprobe_breakpoint_handler(regs))
return;
#endif
current->thread.bad_cause = regs->cause;
riscv: Add kprobes supported This patch enables "kprobe & kretprobe" to work with ftrace interface. It utilized software breakpoint as single-step mechanism. Some instructions which can't be single-step executed must be simulated in kernel execution slot, such as: branch, jal, auipc, la ... Some instructions should be rejected for probing and we use a blacklist to filter, such as: ecall, ebreak, ... We use ebreak & c.ebreak to replace origin instruction and the kprobe handler prepares an executable memory slot for out-of-line execution with a copy of the original instruction being probed. In execution slot we add ebreak behind original instruction to simulate a single-setp mechanism. The patch is based on packi's work [1] and csky's work [2]. - The kprobes_trampoline.S is all from packi's patch - The single-step mechanism is new designed for riscv without hw single-step trap - The simulation codes are from csky - Frankly, all codes refer to other archs' implementation [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20181113195804.22825-1-me@packi.ch/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-csky/20200403044150.20562-9-guoren@kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com> Co-developed-by: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Signed-off-by: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Tested-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com> Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
2020-12-17 19:01:42 +03:00
if (user_mode(regs))
force_sig_fault(SIGTRAP, TRAP_BRKPT, (void __user *)regs->epc);
#ifdef CONFIG_KGDB
else if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, "EBREAK", regs, 0, regs->cause, SIGTRAP)
== NOTIFY_STOP)
return;
#endif
else if (report_bug(regs->epc, regs) == BUG_TRAP_TYPE_WARN)
regs->epc += get_break_insn_length(regs->epc);
else
die(regs, "Kernel BUG");
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_trap_break);
#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG
int is_valid_bugaddr(unsigned long pc)
{
bug_insn_t insn;
if (pc < VMALLOC_START)
return 0;
if (get_kernel_nofault(insn, (bug_insn_t *)pc))
return 0;
if ((insn & __INSN_LENGTH_MASK) == __INSN_LENGTH_32)
return (insn == __BUG_INSN_32);
else
return ((insn & __COMPRESSED_INSN_MASK) == __BUG_INSN_16);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
riscv: add VMAP_STACK overflow detection This patch adds stack overflow detection to riscv, usable when CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y. Overflow is detected in kernel exception entry(kernel/entry.S), if the kernel stack is overflow and been detected, the overflow handler is invoked on a per-cpu overflow stack. This approach preserves GPRs and the original exception information. The overflow detect is performed before any attempt is made to access the stack and the principle of stack overflow detection: kernel stacks are aligned to double their size, enabling overflow to be detected with a single bit test. For example, a 16K stack is aligned to 32K, ensuring that bit 14 of the SP must be zero. On an overflow (or underflow), this bit is flipped. Thus, overflow (of less than the size of the stack) can be detected by testing whether this bit is set. This gives us a useful error message on stack overflow, as can be trigger with the LKDTM overflow test: [ 388.053267] lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXHAUST_STACK [ 388.053663] lkdtm: Calling function with 1024 frame size to depth 32 ... [ 388.054016] lkdtm: loop 32/32 ... [ 388.054186] lkdtm: loop 31/32 ... [ 388.054491] lkdtm: loop 30/32 ... [ 388.054672] lkdtm: loop 29/32 ... [ 388.054859] lkdtm: loop 28/32 ... [ 388.055010] lkdtm: loop 27/32 ... [ 388.055163] lkdtm: loop 26/32 ... [ 388.055309] lkdtm: loop 25/32 ... [ 388.055481] lkdtm: loop 24/32 ... [ 388.055653] lkdtm: loop 23/32 ... [ 388.055837] lkdtm: loop 22/32 ... [ 388.056015] lkdtm: loop 21/32 ... [ 388.056188] lkdtm: loop 20/32 ... [ 388.058145] Insufficient stack space to handle exception! [ 388.058153] Task stack: [0xffffffd014260000..0xffffffd014264000] [ 388.058160] Overflow stack: [0xffffffe1f8d2c220..0xffffffe1f8d2d220] [ 388.058168] CPU: 0 PID: 89 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.12.0-rc8-dirty #90 [ 388.058175] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 388.058187] epc : number+0x32/0x2c0 [ 388.058247] ra : vsnprintf+0x2ae/0x3f0 [ 388.058255] epc : ffffffe0002d38f6 ra : ffffffe0002d814e sp : ffffffd01425ffc0 [ 388.058263] gp : ffffffe0012e4010 tp : ffffffe08014da00 t0 : ffffffd0142606e8 [ 388.058271] t1 : 0000000000000000 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ffffffd014260070 [ 388.058303] s1 : ffffffd014260158 a0 : ffffffd01426015e a1 : ffffffd014260158 [ 388.058311] a2 : 0000000000000013 a3 : ffff0a01ffffff10 a4 : ffffffe000c398e0 [ 388.058319] a5 : 511b02ec65f3e300 a6 : 0000000000a1749a a7 : 0000000000000000 [ 388.058327] s2 : ffffffff000000ff s3 : 00000000ffff0a01 s4 : ffffffe0012e50a8 [ 388.058335] s5 : 0000000000ffff0a s6 : ffffffe0012e50a8 s7 : ffffffe000da1cc0 [ 388.058343] s8 : ffffffffffffffff s9 : ffffffd0142602b0 s10: ffffffd0142602a8 [ 388.058351] s11: ffffffd01426015e t3 : 00000000000f0000 t4 : ffffffffffffffff [ 388.058359] t5 : 000000000000002f t6 : ffffffd014260158 [ 388.058366] status: 0000000000000100 badaddr: ffffffd01425fff8 cause: 000000000000000f [ 388.058374] Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow [ 388.058381] CPU: 0 PID: 89 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.12.0-rc8-dirty #90 [ 388.058387] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 388.058393] Call Trace: [ 388.058400] [<ffffffe000004944>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0xce [ 388.058406] [<ffffffe0006f0b28>] dump_backtrace+0x38/0x46 [ 388.058412] [<ffffffe0006f0b46>] show_stack+0x10/0x18 [ 388.058418] [<ffffffe0006f3690>] dump_stack+0x74/0x8e [ 388.058424] [<ffffffe0006f0d52>] panic+0xfc/0x2b2 [ 388.058430] [<ffffffe0006f0acc>] print_trace_address+0x0/0x24 [ 388.058436] [<ffffffe0002d814e>] vsnprintf+0x2ae/0x3f0 [ 388.058956] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Signed-off-by: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
2021-06-21 06:28:55 +03:00
#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long [OVERFLOW_STACK_SIZE/sizeof(long)],
overflow_stack)__aligned(16);
/*
* shadow stack, handled_ kernel_ stack_ overflow(in kernel/entry.S) is used
* to get per-cpu overflow stack(get_overflow_stack).
*/
long shadow_stack[SHADOW_OVERFLOW_STACK_SIZE/sizeof(long)];
asmlinkage unsigned long get_overflow_stack(void)
{
return (unsigned long)this_cpu_ptr(overflow_stack) +
OVERFLOW_STACK_SIZE;
}
asmlinkage void handle_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long tsk_stk = (unsigned long)current->stack;
unsigned long ovf_stk = (unsigned long)this_cpu_ptr(overflow_stack);
console_verbose();
pr_emerg("Insufficient stack space to handle exception!\n");
pr_emerg("Task stack: [0x%016lx..0x%016lx]\n",
tsk_stk, tsk_stk + THREAD_SIZE);
pr_emerg("Overflow stack: [0x%016lx..0x%016lx]\n",
ovf_stk, ovf_stk + OVERFLOW_STACK_SIZE);
__show_regs(regs);
panic("Kernel stack overflow");
for (;;)
wait_for_interrupt();
}
#endif