WSL2-Linux-Kernel/include/linux/compiler-clang.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 17:07:57 +03:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
linux/compiler.h: Split into compiler.h and compiler_types.h linux/compiler.h is included indirectly by linux/types.h via uapi/linux/types.h -> uapi/linux/posix_types.h -> linux/stddef.h -> uapi/linux/stddef.h and is needed to provide a proper definition of offsetof. Unfortunately, compiler.h requires a definition of smp_read_barrier_depends() for defining lockless_dereference() and soon for defining READ_ONCE(), which means that all users of READ_ONCE() will need to include asm/barrier.h to avoid splats such as: In file included from include/uapi/linux/stddef.h:1:0, from include/linux/stddef.h:4, from arch/h8300/kernel/asm-offsets.c:11: include/linux/list.h: In function 'list_empty': >> include/linux/compiler.h:343:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'smp_read_barrier_depends' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] smp_read_barrier_depends(); /* Enforce dependency ordering from x */ \ ^ A better alternative is to include asm/barrier.h in linux/compiler.h, but this requires a type definition for "bool" on some architectures (e.g. x86), which is defined later by linux/types.h. Type "bool" is also used directly in linux/compiler.h, so the whole thing is pretty fragile. This patch splits compiler.h in two: compiler_types.h contains type annotations, definitions and the compiler-specific parts, whereas compiler.h #includes compiler-types.h and additionally defines macros such as {READ,WRITE.ACCESS}_ONCE(). uapi/linux/stddef.h and linux/linkage.h are then moved over to include linux/compiler_types.h, which fixes the build for h8 and blackfin. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508840570-22169-2-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-10-24 13:22:46 +03:00
#ifndef __LINUX_COMPILER_TYPES_H
#error "Please don't include <linux/compiler-clang.h> directly, include <linux/compiler.h> instead."
#endif
/* Compiler specific definitions for Clang compiler */
/* same as gcc, this was present in clang-2.6 so we can assume it works
* with any version that can compile the kernel
*/
#define __UNIQUE_ID(prefix) __PASTE(__PASTE(__UNIQUE_ID_, prefix), __COUNTER__)
include/linux/compiler-clang.h: handle randomizable anonymous structs The GCC randomize layout plugin can randomize the member offsets of sensitive kernel data structures. To use this feature, certain annotations and members are added to the structures which affect the member offsets even if this plugin is not used. All of these structures are completely randomized, except for task_struct which leaves out some of its members. All the other members are wrapped within an anonymous struct with the __randomize_layout attribute. This is done using the randomized_struct_fields_start and randomized_struct_fields_end defines. When the plugin is disabled, the behaviour of this attribute can vary based on the GCC version. For GCC 5.1+, this attribute maps to __designated_init otherwise it is just an empty define but the anonymous structure is still present. For other compilers, both randomized_struct_fields_start and randomized_struct_fields_end default to empty defines meaning the anonymous structure is not introduced at all. So, if a module compiled with Clang, such as a BPF program, needs to access task_struct fields such as pid and comm, the offsets of these members as recognized by Clang are different from those recognized by modules compiled with GCC. If GCC 4.6+ is used to build the kernel, this can be solved by introducing appropriate defines for Clang so that the anonymous structure is seen when determining the offsets for the members. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171109064645.25581-1-sandipan@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-18 02:27:28 +03:00
/* all clang versions usable with the kernel support KASAN ABI version 5 */
#define KASAN_ABI_VERSION 5
kcov: add __no_sanitize_coverage to fix noinstr for all architectures Until now no compiler supported an attribute to disable coverage instrumentation as used by KCOV. To work around this limitation on x86, noinstr functions have their coverage instrumentation turned into nops by objtool. However, this solution doesn't scale automatically to other architectures, such as arm64, which are migrating to use the generic entry code. Clang [1] and GCC [2] have added support for the attribute recently. [1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/280333021e9550d80f5c1152a34e33e81df1e178 [2] https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=cec4d4a6782c9bd8d071839c50a239c49caca689 The changes will appear in Clang 13 and GCC 12. Add __no_sanitize_coverage for both compilers, and add it to noinstr. Note: In the Clang case, __has_feature(coverage_sanitizer) is only true if the feature is enabled, and therefore we do not require an additional defined(CONFIG_KCOV) (like in the GCC case where __has_attribute(..) is always true) to avoid adding redundant attributes to functions if KCOV is off. That being said, compilers that support the attribute will not generate errors/warnings if the attribute is redundantly used; however, where possible let's avoid it as it reduces preprocessed code size and associated compile-time overheads. [elver@google.com: Implement __has_feature(coverage_sanitizer) in Clang] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210527162655.3246381-1-elver@google.com [elver@google.com: add comment explaining __has_feature() in Clang] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210527194448.3470080-1-elver@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210525175819.699786-1-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com> Cc: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-01 04:56:49 +03:00
/*
* Note: Checking __has_feature(*_sanitizer) is only true if the feature is
* enabled. Therefore it is not required to additionally check defined(CONFIG_*)
* to avoid adding redundant attributes in other configurations.
*/
kasan: add CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC and CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS This commit splits the current CONFIG_KASAN config option into two: 1. CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC, that enables the generic KASAN mode (the one that exists now); 2. CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS, that enables the software tag-based KASAN mode. The name CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS is chosen as in the future we will have another hardware tag-based KASAN mode, that will rely on hardware memory tagging support in arm64. With CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS enabled, compiler options are changed to instrument kernel files with -fsantize=kernel-hwaddress (except the ones for which KASAN_SANITIZE := n is set). Both CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC and CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS support both CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE instrumentation modes. This commit also adds empty placeholder (for now) implementation of tag-based KASAN specific hooks inserted by the compiler and adjusts common hooks implementation. While this commit adds the CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS config option, this option is not selectable, as it depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS, which we will enable once all the infrastracture code has been added. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2550106eb8a68b10fefbabce820910b115aa853.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 11:29:53 +03:00
#if __has_feature(address_sanitizer) || __has_feature(hwaddress_sanitizer)
/* Emulate GCC's __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__ flag */
#define __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__
kasan: add CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC and CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS This commit splits the current CONFIG_KASAN config option into two: 1. CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC, that enables the generic KASAN mode (the one that exists now); 2. CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS, that enables the software tag-based KASAN mode. The name CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS is chosen as in the future we will have another hardware tag-based KASAN mode, that will rely on hardware memory tagging support in arm64. With CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS enabled, compiler options are changed to instrument kernel files with -fsantize=kernel-hwaddress (except the ones for which KASAN_SANITIZE := n is set). Both CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC and CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS support both CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE instrumentation modes. This commit also adds empty placeholder (for now) implementation of tag-based KASAN specific hooks inserted by the compiler and adjusts common hooks implementation. While this commit adds the CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS config option, this option is not selectable, as it depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS, which we will enable once all the infrastracture code has been added. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2550106eb8a68b10fefbabce820910b115aa853.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 11:29:53 +03:00
#define __no_sanitize_address \
__attribute__((no_sanitize("address", "hwaddress")))
#else
#define __no_sanitize_address
#endif
#if __has_feature(thread_sanitizer)
/* emulate gcc's __SANITIZE_THREAD__ flag */
#define __SANITIZE_THREAD__
#define __no_sanitize_thread \
__attribute__((no_sanitize("thread")))
#else
#define __no_sanitize_thread
#endif
linux/compiler-clang.h: define HAVE_BUILTIN_BSWAP* Separating compiler-clang.h from compiler-gcc.h inadventently dropped the definitions of the three HAVE_BUILTIN_BSWAP macros, which requires falling back to the open-coded version and hoping that the compiler detects it. Since all versions of clang support the __builtin_bswap interfaces, add back the flags and have the headers pick these up automatically. This results in a 4% improvement of compilation speed for arm defconfig. Note: it might also be worth revisiting which architectures set CONFIG_ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP for one compiler or the other, today this is set on six architectures (arm32, csky, mips, powerpc, s390, x86), while another ten architectures define custom helpers (alpha, arc, ia64, m68k, mips, nios2, parisc, sh, sparc, xtensa), and the rest (arm64, h8300, hexagon, microblaze, nds32, openrisc, riscv) just get the unoptimized version and rely on the compiler to detect it. A long time ago, the compiler builtins were architecture specific, but nowadays, all compilers that are able to build the kernel have correct implementations of them, though some may not be as optimized as the inline asm versions. The patch that dropped the optimization landed in v4.19, so as discussed it would be fairly safe to backport this revert to stable kernels to the 4.19/5.4/5.10 stable kernels, but there is a remaining risk for regressions, and it has no known side-effects besides compile speed. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210226161151.2629097-1-arnd@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210225164513.3667778-1-arnd@kernel.org/ Fixes: 815f0ddb346c ("include/linux/compiler*.h: make compiler-*.h mutually exclusive") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Acked-by: Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com> Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-03-13 08:07:47 +03:00
#if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP)
#define __HAVE_BUILTIN_BSWAP32__
#define __HAVE_BUILTIN_BSWAP64__
#define __HAVE_BUILTIN_BSWAP16__
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP */
#if __has_feature(undefined_behavior_sanitizer)
/* GCC does not have __SANITIZE_UNDEFINED__ */
#define __no_sanitize_undefined \
__attribute__((no_sanitize("undefined")))
#else
#define __no_sanitize_undefined
#endif
kcov: add __no_sanitize_coverage to fix noinstr for all architectures Until now no compiler supported an attribute to disable coverage instrumentation as used by KCOV. To work around this limitation on x86, noinstr functions have their coverage instrumentation turned into nops by objtool. However, this solution doesn't scale automatically to other architectures, such as arm64, which are migrating to use the generic entry code. Clang [1] and GCC [2] have added support for the attribute recently. [1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/280333021e9550d80f5c1152a34e33e81df1e178 [2] https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=cec4d4a6782c9bd8d071839c50a239c49caca689 The changes will appear in Clang 13 and GCC 12. Add __no_sanitize_coverage for both compilers, and add it to noinstr. Note: In the Clang case, __has_feature(coverage_sanitizer) is only true if the feature is enabled, and therefore we do not require an additional defined(CONFIG_KCOV) (like in the GCC case where __has_attribute(..) is always true) to avoid adding redundant attributes to functions if KCOV is off. That being said, compilers that support the attribute will not generate errors/warnings if the attribute is redundantly used; however, where possible let's avoid it as it reduces preprocessed code size and associated compile-time overheads. [elver@google.com: Implement __has_feature(coverage_sanitizer) in Clang] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210527162655.3246381-1-elver@google.com [elver@google.com: add comment explaining __has_feature() in Clang] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210527194448.3470080-1-elver@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210525175819.699786-1-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com> Cc: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-01 04:56:49 +03:00
/*
* Support for __has_feature(coverage_sanitizer) was added in Clang 13 together
* with no_sanitize("coverage"). Prior versions of Clang support coverage
* instrumentation, but cannot be queried for support by the preprocessor.
*/
#if __has_feature(coverage_sanitizer)
#define __no_sanitize_coverage __attribute__((no_sanitize("coverage")))
#else
#define __no_sanitize_coverage
#endif
#if __has_feature(shadow_call_stack)
# define __noscs __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack")))
#endif
add support for Clang CFI This change adds support for Clang’s forward-edge Control Flow Integrity (CFI) checking. With CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, the compiler injects a runtime check before each indirect function call to ensure the target is a valid function with the correct static type. This restricts possible call targets and makes it more difficult for an attacker to exploit bugs that allow the modification of stored function pointers. For more details, see: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html Clang requires CONFIG_LTO_CLANG to be enabled with CFI to gain visibility to possible call targets. Kernel modules are supported with Clang’s cross-DSO CFI mode, which allows checking between independently compiled components. With CFI enabled, the compiler injects a __cfi_check() function into the kernel and each module for validating local call targets. For cross-module calls that cannot be validated locally, the compiler calls the global __cfi_slowpath_diag() function, which determines the target module and calls the correct __cfi_check() function. This patch includes a slowpath implementation that uses __module_address() to resolve call targets, and with CONFIG_CFI_CLANG_SHADOW enabled, a shadow map that speeds up module look-ups by ~3x. Clang implements indirect call checking using jump tables and offers two methods of generating them. With canonical jump tables, the compiler renames each address-taken function to <function>.cfi and points the original symbol to a jump table entry, which passes __cfi_check() validation. This isn’t compatible with stand-alone assembly code, which the compiler doesn’t instrument, and would result in indirect calls to assembly code to fail. Therefore, we default to using non-canonical jump tables instead, where the compiler generates a local jump table entry <function>.cfi_jt for each address-taken function, and replaces all references to the function with the address of the jump table entry. Note that because non-canonical jump table addresses are local to each component, they break cross-module function address equality. Specifically, the address of a global function will be different in each module, as it's replaced with the address of a local jump table entry. If this address is passed to a different module, it won’t match the address of the same function taken there. This may break code that relies on comparing addresses passed from other components. CFI checking can be disabled in a function with the __nocfi attribute. Additionally, CFI can be disabled for an entire compilation unit by filtering out CC_FLAGS_CFI. By default, CFI failures result in a kernel panic to stop a potential exploit. CONFIG_CFI_PERMISSIVE enables a permissive mode, where the kernel prints out a rate-limited warning instead, and allows execution to continue. This option is helpful for locating type mismatches, but should only be enabled during development. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408182843.1754385-2-samitolvanen@google.com
2021-04-08 21:28:26 +03:00
#define __nocfi __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("cfi")))
#define __cficanonical __attribute__((__cfi_canonical_jump_table__))