2019-06-01 11:08:55 +03:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
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2009-02-04 17:06:57 +03:00
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
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* Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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*/
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#ifndef _LINUX_IMA_H
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#define _LINUX_IMA_H
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2020-10-02 20:38:15 +03:00
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#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
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2009-02-11 07:01:19 +03:00
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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2018-07-13 21:05:58 +03:00
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#include <linux/security.h>
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2016-12-20 03:22:48 +03:00
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#include <linux/kexec.h>
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2021-07-23 11:53:02 +03:00
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#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
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2009-02-11 07:01:19 +03:00
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struct linux_binprm;
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2009-02-04 17:06:58 +03:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
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2021-07-23 11:53:02 +03:00
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extern enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void);
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2009-02-04 17:06:58 +03:00
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extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
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2018-06-08 20:40:10 +03:00
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extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
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2023-01-13 14:49:23 +03:00
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extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
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2021-01-21 16:19:45 +03:00
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struct inode *inode);
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2009-02-04 17:06:58 +03:00
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extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
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ima: Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook
Commit 98de59bfe4b2f ("take calculation of final prot in
security_mmap_file() into a helper") moved the code to update prot, to be
the actual protections applied to the kernel, to a new helper called
mmap_prot().
However, while without the helper ima_file_mmap() was getting the updated
prot, with the helper ima_file_mmap() gets the original prot, which
contains the protections requested by the application.
A possible consequence of this change is that, if an application calls
mmap() with only PROT_READ, and the kernel applies PROT_EXEC in addition,
that application would have access to executable memory without having this
event recorded in the IMA measurement list. This situation would occur for
example if the application, before mmap(), calls the personality() system
call with READ_IMPLIES_EXEC as the first argument.
Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with those of the mmap_file LSM hook, so
that IMA can receive both the requested prot and the final prot. Since the
requested protections are stored in a new variable, and the final
protections are stored in the existing variable, this effectively restores
the original behavior of the MMAP_CHECK hook.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 98de59bfe4b2 ("take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-01-31 20:42:43 +03:00
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extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
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unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
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2020-05-03 08:00:02 +03:00
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extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot);
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2020-10-02 20:38:20 +03:00
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extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
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extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
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enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description);
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2020-10-02 20:38:23 +03:00
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extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
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bool contents);
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2016-01-15 01:57:47 +03:00
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extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
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enum kernel_read_file_id id);
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2023-01-13 14:49:23 +03:00
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extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
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2021-01-21 16:19:45 +03:00
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struct dentry *dentry);
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2020-01-13 12:42:44 +03:00
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extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
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2020-11-24 18:12:08 +03:00
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extern int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
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2020-07-09 09:19:11 +03:00
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extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
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ima: Return int in the functions to measure a buffer
ima_measure_critical_data() and process_buffer_measurement() currently
don't return a result as, unlike appraisal-related functions, the result is
not used by callers to deny an operation. Measurement-related functions
instead rely on the audit subsystem to notify the system administrator when
an error occurs.
However, ima_measure_critical_data() and process_buffer_measurement() are a
special case, as these are the only functions that can return a buffer
measurement (for files, there is ima_file_hash()). In a subsequent patch,
they will be modified to return the calculated digest.
In preparation to return the result of the digest calculation, this patch
modifies the return type from void to int, and returns 0 if the buffer has
been successfully measured, a negative value otherwise.
Given that the result of the measurement is still not necessary, this patch
does not modify the behavior of existing callers by processing the returned
value. For those, the return value is ignored.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (for the SELinux bits)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-07-23 11:53:03 +03:00
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extern int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
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const char *event_name,
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const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
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2021-07-23 11:53:04 +03:00
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bool hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len);
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2009-02-04 17:06:58 +03:00
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2020-10-13 11:18:04 +03:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
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extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void);
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#else
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static inline void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void) {}
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#endif
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2016-12-20 03:22:48 +03:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
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extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
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#endif
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2009-02-04 17:06:58 +03:00
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#else
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2021-07-23 11:53:02 +03:00
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static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
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{
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return HASH_ALGO__LAST;
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}
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2009-02-04 17:06:57 +03:00
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static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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2018-06-08 20:40:10 +03:00
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static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
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2009-02-04 17:06:57 +03:00
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{
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return 0;
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}
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2023-01-13 14:49:23 +03:00
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static inline void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
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2021-01-21 16:19:45 +03:00
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struct inode *inode)
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2019-01-22 23:06:49 +03:00
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{
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}
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2009-02-04 17:06:57 +03:00
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static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
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{
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return;
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}
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ima: Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook
Commit 98de59bfe4b2f ("take calculation of final prot in
security_mmap_file() into a helper") moved the code to update prot, to be
the actual protections applied to the kernel, to a new helper called
mmap_prot().
However, while without the helper ima_file_mmap() was getting the updated
prot, with the helper ima_file_mmap() gets the original prot, which
contains the protections requested by the application.
A possible consequence of this change is that, if an application calls
mmap() with only PROT_READ, and the kernel applies PROT_EXEC in addition,
that application would have access to executable memory without having this
event recorded in the IMA measurement list. This situation would occur for
example if the application, before mmap(), calls the personality() system
call with READ_IMPLIES_EXEC as the first argument.
Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with those of the mmap_file LSM hook, so
that IMA can receive both the requested prot and the final prot. Since the
requested protections are stored in a new variable, and the final
protections are stored in the existing variable, this effectively restores
the original behavior of the MMAP_CHECK hook.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 98de59bfe4b2 ("take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-01-31 20:42:43 +03:00
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static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
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unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
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2009-02-04 17:06:57 +03:00
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{
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return 0;
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}
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2011-03-10 06:57:53 +03:00
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2020-05-03 08:00:02 +03:00
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static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
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unsigned long prot)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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2020-10-02 20:38:20 +03:00
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static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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static inline int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
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enum kernel_load_data_id id,
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char *description)
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2018-07-13 21:05:58 +03:00
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{
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return 0;
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}
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2020-10-02 20:38:23 +03:00
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static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
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bool contents)
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2016-01-31 06:23:26 +03:00
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{
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return 0;
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}
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2016-01-15 01:57:47 +03:00
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static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
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enum kernel_read_file_id id)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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2023-01-13 14:49:23 +03:00
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static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
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2021-01-21 16:19:45 +03:00
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struct dentry *dentry)
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2016-03-01 03:52:05 +03:00
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{
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return;
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}
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2020-01-13 12:42:44 +03:00
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static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
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{
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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}
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2020-11-24 18:12:08 +03:00
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static inline int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
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{
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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}
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2020-07-09 09:19:11 +03:00
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static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {}
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2021-01-08 07:07:03 +03:00
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ima: Return int in the functions to measure a buffer
ima_measure_critical_data() and process_buffer_measurement() currently
don't return a result as, unlike appraisal-related functions, the result is
not used by callers to deny an operation. Measurement-related functions
instead rely on the audit subsystem to notify the system administrator when
an error occurs.
However, ima_measure_critical_data() and process_buffer_measurement() are a
special case, as these are the only functions that can return a buffer
measurement (for files, there is ima_file_hash()). In a subsequent patch,
they will be modified to return the calculated digest.
In preparation to return the result of the digest calculation, this patch
modifies the return type from void to int, and returns 0 if the buffer has
been successfully measured, a negative value otherwise.
Given that the result of the measurement is still not necessary, this patch
does not modify the behavior of existing callers by processing the returned
value. For those, the return value is ignored.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (for the SELinux bits)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-07-23 11:53:03 +03:00
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static inline int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
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2021-01-08 07:07:06 +03:00
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const char *event_name,
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2021-01-08 07:07:03 +03:00
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const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
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2021-07-23 11:53:04 +03:00
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bool hash, u8 *digest,
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size_t digest_len)
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ima: Return int in the functions to measure a buffer
ima_measure_critical_data() and process_buffer_measurement() currently
don't return a result as, unlike appraisal-related functions, the result is
not used by callers to deny an operation. Measurement-related functions
instead rely on the audit subsystem to notify the system administrator when
an error occurs.
However, ima_measure_critical_data() and process_buffer_measurement() are a
special case, as these are the only functions that can return a buffer
measurement (for files, there is ima_file_hash()). In a subsequent patch,
they will be modified to return the calculated digest.
In preparation to return the result of the digest calculation, this patch
modifies the return type from void to int, and returns 0 if the buffer has
been successfully measured, a negative value otherwise.
Given that the result of the measurement is still not necessary, this patch
does not modify the behavior of existing callers by processing the returned
value. For those, the return value is ignored.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (for the SELinux bits)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-07-23 11:53:03 +03:00
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{
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return -ENOENT;
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}
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2021-01-08 07:07:06 +03:00
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2013-03-26 00:12:27 +04:00
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#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
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2011-03-10 06:57:53 +03:00
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2022-06-30 11:36:12 +03:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
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int __init ima_free_kexec_buffer(void);
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int __init ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size);
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#endif
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2021-12-13 19:11:45 +03:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
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extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void);
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extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void);
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#else
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static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
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{
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return false;
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}
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static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
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{
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return NULL;
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}
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#endif
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2016-12-20 03:22:48 +03:00
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#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
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struct kimage;
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static inline void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
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{}
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#endif
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2020-01-08 19:05:08 +03:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
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2019-12-11 19:47:05 +03:00
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extern void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
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struct key *key,
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const void *payload, size_t plen,
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unsigned long flags, bool create);
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#else
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static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
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struct key *key,
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const void *payload,
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size_t plen,
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unsigned long flags,
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bool create) {}
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2020-01-08 19:05:08 +03:00
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#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
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2019-12-11 19:47:05 +03:00
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2011-03-10 06:57:53 +03:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
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2017-04-25 05:43:52 +03:00
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extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void);
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2023-01-13 14:49:23 +03:00
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extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
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2021-01-21 16:19:45 +03:00
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struct dentry *dentry);
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2011-03-11 02:54:15 +03:00
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extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
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const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len);
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2023-01-13 14:49:24 +03:00
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extern int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
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2022-09-22 18:17:10 +03:00
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struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
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struct posix_acl *kacl);
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2023-01-13 14:49:24 +03:00
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static inline int ima_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
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2022-09-22 18:17:10 +03:00
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struct dentry *dentry,
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const char *acl_name)
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{
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2023-01-13 14:49:24 +03:00
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return ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
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2022-09-22 18:17:10 +03:00
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}
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2011-03-11 02:54:15 +03:00
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extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
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2011-03-10 06:57:53 +03:00
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#else
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2017-04-25 05:43:52 +03:00
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static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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2023-01-13 14:49:23 +03:00
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static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
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2021-01-21 16:19:45 +03:00
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struct dentry *dentry)
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2011-03-10 06:57:53 +03:00
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{
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return;
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}
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2011-03-11 02:54:15 +03:00
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static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
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const char *xattr_name,
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const void *xattr_value,
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size_t xattr_value_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-13 14:49:24 +03:00
|
|
|
static inline int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
|
2022-09-22 18:17:10 +03:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
|
|
|
|
struct posix_acl *kacl)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-11 02:54:15 +03:00
|
|
|
static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
|
|
const char *xattr_name)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-09-22 18:17:10 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-13 14:49:24 +03:00
|
|
|
static inline int ima_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
|
2022-09-22 18:17:10 +03:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
|
|
const char *acl_name)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-03-26 00:12:27 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
|
2019-08-20 03:18:01 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
|
|
|
|
extern bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func);
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
|
2009-02-04 17:06:57 +03:00
|
|
|
#endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
|