WSL2-Linux-Kernel/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c

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/*
* fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
*
* Encryption and hashing operations relating to NTLM, NTLMv2. See MS-NLMP
* for more detailed information
*
* Copyright (C) International Business Machines Corp., 2005,2013
* Author(s): Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com)
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published
* by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See
* the GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
* along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*/
#include <linux/fs.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 11:04:11 +03:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "cifspdu.h"
#include "cifsglob.h"
#include "cifs_debug.h"
#include "cifs_unicode.h"
#include "cifsproto.h"
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
#include "ntlmssp.h"
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include <crypto/aead.h>
static int
cifs_crypto_shash_md5_allocate(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
int rc;
unsigned int size;
if (server->secmech.sdescmd5 != NULL)
return 0; /* already allocated */
server->secmech.md5 = crypto_alloc_shash("md5", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(server->secmech.md5)) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto md5\n");
cifs: fix bad error handling in crypto code Jarod reported an Oops like when testing with fips=1: CIFS VFS: could not allocate crypto hmacmd5 CIFS VFS: could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc -2 CIFS VFS: Error -2 during NTLMSSP authentication CIFS VFS: Send error in SessSetup = -2 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000004e IP: [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: md4 nls_utf8 cifs dns_resolver fscache kvm serio_raw virtio_balloon virtio_net mperf i2c_piix4 cirrus drm_kms_helper ttm drm i2c_core virtio_blk ata_generic pata_acpi CPU: 1 PID: 639 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 3.11.0-0.rc3.git0.1.fc20.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88007bf496e0 ti: ffff88007b080000 task.ti: ffff88007b080000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812b5c7a>] [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 RSP: 0018:ffff88007b081d10 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000001f1f RBX: ffff880037422000 RCX: ffff88007b081fd8 RDX: 000000000000001f RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: fffffffffffffffe RBP: ffff88007b081d30 R08: ffff880037422000 R09: ffff88007c090100 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000fffffffe R12: fffffffffffffffe R13: ffff880037422000 R14: ffff880037422000 R15: 00000000fffffffe FS: 00007fc322f4f780(0000) GS:ffff88007fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 000000000000004e CR3: 000000007bdaa000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffffffff81085845 ffff880037422000 ffff8800375e7400 ffff880037422000 ffff88007b081d48 ffffffffa0176022 ffff880037422000 ffff88007b081d60 ffffffffa015c07b ffff880037600600 ffff88007b081dc8 ffffffffa01610e1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81085845>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x75/0xf0 [<ffffffffa0176022>] cifs_crypto_shash_release+0x82/0xf0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa015c07b>] cifs_put_tcp_session+0x8b/0xe0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa01610e1>] cifs_mount+0x9d1/0xad0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa014ff50>] cifs_do_mount+0xa0/0x4d0 [cifs] [<ffffffff811ab6e9>] mount_fs+0x39/0x1b0 [<ffffffff811c466f>] vfs_kern_mount+0x5f/0xf0 [<ffffffff811c6a9e>] do_mount+0x23e/0xa20 [<ffffffff811c66e6>] ? copy_mount_options+0x36/0x170 [<ffffffff811c7303>] SyS_mount+0x83/0xc0 [<ffffffff8165c8d9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: eb 9e 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 83 ec 08 48 85 ff 74 46 <48> 83 7e 48 00 48 8b 5e 50 74 4b 48 89 f7 e8 83 fc ff ff 4c 8b RIP [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 RSP <ffff88007b081d10> CR2: 000000000000004e The cifs code allocates some crypto structures. If that fails, it returns an error, but it leaves the pointers set to their PTR_ERR values. Then later when it tries to clean up, it sees that those values are non-NULL and then passes them to the routine that frees them. Fix this by setting the pointers to NULL after collecting the error code in this situation. Cc: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-07-31 21:48:00 +04:00
rc = PTR_ERR(server->secmech.md5);
server->secmech.md5 = NULL;
return rc;
}
size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.md5);
server->secmech.sdescmd5 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!server->secmech.sdescmd5) {
crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.md5);
server->secmech.md5 = NULL;
cifs: fix bad error handling in crypto code Jarod reported an Oops like when testing with fips=1: CIFS VFS: could not allocate crypto hmacmd5 CIFS VFS: could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc -2 CIFS VFS: Error -2 during NTLMSSP authentication CIFS VFS: Send error in SessSetup = -2 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000004e IP: [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: md4 nls_utf8 cifs dns_resolver fscache kvm serio_raw virtio_balloon virtio_net mperf i2c_piix4 cirrus drm_kms_helper ttm drm i2c_core virtio_blk ata_generic pata_acpi CPU: 1 PID: 639 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 3.11.0-0.rc3.git0.1.fc20.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88007bf496e0 ti: ffff88007b080000 task.ti: ffff88007b080000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812b5c7a>] [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 RSP: 0018:ffff88007b081d10 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000001f1f RBX: ffff880037422000 RCX: ffff88007b081fd8 RDX: 000000000000001f RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: fffffffffffffffe RBP: ffff88007b081d30 R08: ffff880037422000 R09: ffff88007c090100 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000fffffffe R12: fffffffffffffffe R13: ffff880037422000 R14: ffff880037422000 R15: 00000000fffffffe FS: 00007fc322f4f780(0000) GS:ffff88007fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 000000000000004e CR3: 000000007bdaa000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffffffff81085845 ffff880037422000 ffff8800375e7400 ffff880037422000 ffff88007b081d48 ffffffffa0176022 ffff880037422000 ffff88007b081d60 ffffffffa015c07b ffff880037600600 ffff88007b081dc8 ffffffffa01610e1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81085845>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x75/0xf0 [<ffffffffa0176022>] cifs_crypto_shash_release+0x82/0xf0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa015c07b>] cifs_put_tcp_session+0x8b/0xe0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa01610e1>] cifs_mount+0x9d1/0xad0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa014ff50>] cifs_do_mount+0xa0/0x4d0 [cifs] [<ffffffff811ab6e9>] mount_fs+0x39/0x1b0 [<ffffffff811c466f>] vfs_kern_mount+0x5f/0xf0 [<ffffffff811c6a9e>] do_mount+0x23e/0xa20 [<ffffffff811c66e6>] ? copy_mount_options+0x36/0x170 [<ffffffff811c7303>] SyS_mount+0x83/0xc0 [<ffffffff8165c8d9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: eb 9e 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 83 ec 08 48 85 ff 74 46 <48> 83 7e 48 00 48 8b 5e 50 74 4b 48 89 f7 e8 83 fc ff ff 4c 8b RIP [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 RSP <ffff88007b081d10> CR2: 000000000000004e The cifs code allocates some crypto structures. If that fails, it returns an error, but it leaves the pointers set to their PTR_ERR values. Then later when it tries to clean up, it sees that those values are non-NULL and then passes them to the routine that frees them. Fix this by setting the pointers to NULL after collecting the error code in this situation. Cc: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-07-31 21:48:00 +04:00
return -ENOMEM;
}
server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash.tfm = server->secmech.md5;
server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash.flags = 0x0;
return 0;
}
int __cifs_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *signature,
struct shash_desc *shash)
{
int i;
int rc;
struct kvec *iov = rqst->rq_iov;
int n_vec = rqst->rq_nvec;
if (n_vec < 2 || iov[0].iov_len != 4)
return -EIO;
for (i = 1; i < n_vec; i++) {
if (iov[i].iov_len == 0)
continue;
if (iov[i].iov_base == NULL) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "null iovec entry\n");
return -EIO;
}
if (i == 1 && iov[1].iov_len <= 4)
break; /* nothing to sign or corrupt header */
rc = crypto_shash_update(shash,
iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with payload\n",
__func__);
return rc;
}
}
/* now hash over the rq_pages array */
for (i = 0; i < rqst->rq_npages; i++) {
void *kaddr = kmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]);
size_t len = rqst->rq_pagesz;
if (i == rqst->rq_npages - 1)
len = rqst->rq_tailsz;
crypto_shash_update(shash, kaddr, len);
kunmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]);
}
rc = crypto_shash_final(shash, signature);
if (rc)
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate hash\n", __func__);
return rc;
}
/*
* Calculate and return the CIFS signature based on the mac key and SMB PDU.
* The 16 byte signature must be allocated by the caller. Note we only use the
* 1st eight bytes and that the smb header signature field on input contains
* the sequence number before this function is called. Also, this function
* should be called with the server->srv_mutex held.
*/
static int cifs_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *signature)
{
int rc;
if (!rqst->rq_iov || !signature || !server)
return -EINVAL;
if (!server->secmech.sdescmd5) {
rc = cifs_crypto_shash_md5_allocate(server);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Can't alloc md5 crypto\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
}
rc = crypto_shash_init(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init md5\n", __func__);
return rc;
}
rc = crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
server->session_key.response, server->session_key.len);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
return rc;
}
return __cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, signature,
&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash);
}
/* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */
int cifs_sign_rqst(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
__u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number)
{
int rc = 0;
char smb_signature[20];
struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base;
if (rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_len != 4 ||
rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base + 4 != rqst->rq_iov[1].iov_base)
return -EIO;
if ((cifs_pdu == NULL) || (server == NULL))
return -EINVAL;
if (!(cifs_pdu->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE) ||
server->tcpStatus == CifsNeedNegotiate)
return rc;
if (!server->session_estab) {
memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL", 8);
return rc;
}
cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber =
cpu_to_le32(server->sequence_number);
cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0;
*pexpected_response_sequence_number = ++server->sequence_number;
++server->sequence_number;
rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, smb_signature);
if (rc)
memset(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 0, 8);
else
memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, smb_signature, 8);
return rc;
}
int cifs_sign_smbv(struct kvec *iov, int n_vec, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
__u32 *pexpected_response_sequence)
{
struct smb_rqst rqst = { .rq_iov = iov,
.rq_nvec = n_vec };
return cifs_sign_rqst(&rqst, server, pexpected_response_sequence);
}
/* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */
int cifs_sign_smb(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
__u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number)
{
struct kvec iov[2];
iov[0].iov_base = cifs_pdu;
iov[0].iov_len = 4;
iov[1].iov_base = (char *)cifs_pdu + 4;
iov[1].iov_len = be32_to_cpu(cifs_pdu->smb_buf_length);
return cifs_sign_smbv(iov, 2, server,
pexpected_response_sequence_number);
}
int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
__u32 expected_sequence_number)
{
unsigned int rc;
char server_response_sig[8];
char what_we_think_sig_should_be[20];
struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base;
if (rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_len != 4 ||
rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base + 4 != rqst->rq_iov[1].iov_base)
return -EIO;
if (cifs_pdu == NULL || server == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
if (!server->session_estab)
return 0;
if (cifs_pdu->Command == SMB_COM_LOCKING_ANDX) {
struct smb_com_lock_req *pSMB =
(struct smb_com_lock_req *)cifs_pdu;
if (pSMB->LockType & LOCKING_ANDX_OPLOCK_RELEASE)
return 0;
}
/* BB what if signatures are supposed to be on for session but
server does not send one? BB */
/* Do not need to verify session setups with signature "BSRSPYL " */
if (memcmp(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL ", 8) == 0)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "dummy signature received for smb command 0x%x\n",
cifs_pdu->Command);
/* save off the origiginal signature so we can modify the smb and check
its signature against what the server sent */
memcpy(server_response_sig, cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 8);
cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber =
cpu_to_le32(expected_sequence_number);
cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0;
mutex_lock(&server->srv_mutex);
rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, what_we_think_sig_should_be);
mutex_unlock(&server->srv_mutex);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* cifs_dump_mem("what we think it should be: ",
what_we_think_sig_should_be, 16); */
if (memcmp(server_response_sig, what_we_think_sig_should_be, 8))
return -EACCES;
else
return 0;
}
/* first calculate 24 bytes ntlm response and then 16 byte session key */
int setup_ntlm_response(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc = 0;
unsigned int temp_len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
char temp_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE];
if (!ses)
return -EINVAL;
ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(temp_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ses->auth_key.response)
return -ENOMEM;
ses->auth_key.len = temp_len;
rc = SMBNTencrypt(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey,
ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NTLM response, error: %d\n",
__func__, rc);
return rc;
}
rc = E_md4hash(ses->password, temp_key, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NT hash, error: %d\n",
__func__, rc);
return rc;
}
rc = mdfour(ses->auth_key.response, temp_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
if (rc)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NTLM session key, error: %d\n",
__func__, rc);
return rc;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
int calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey, bool encrypt,
char *lnm_session_key)
{
int i;
int rc;
char password_with_pad[CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE] = {0};
if (password)
strncpy(password_with_pad, password, CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE);
if (!encrypt && global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_PLNTXT) {
memcpy(lnm_session_key, password_with_pad,
CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE);
return 0;
}
/* calculate old style session key */
/* calling toupper is less broken than repeatedly
calling nls_toupper would be since that will never
work for UTF8, but neither handles multibyte code pages
but the only alternative would be converting to UCS-16 (Unicode)
(using a routine something like UniStrupr) then
uppercasing and then converting back from Unicode - which
would only worth doing it if we knew it were utf8. Basically
utf8 and other multibyte codepages each need their own strupper
function since a byte at a time will ont work. */
for (i = 0; i < CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE; i++)
password_with_pad[i] = toupper(password_with_pad[i]);
rc = SMBencrypt(password_with_pad, cryptkey, lnm_session_key);
return rc;
}
#endif /* CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH */
/* Build a proper attribute value/target info pairs blob.
* Fill in netbios and dns domain name and workstation name
* and client time (total five av pairs and + one end of fields indicator.
* Allocate domain name which gets freed when session struct is deallocated.
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
*/
static int
build_avpair_blob(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
{
unsigned int dlen;
unsigned int size = 2 * sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
char *defdmname = "WORKGROUP";
unsigned char *blobptr;
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
if (!ses->domainName) {
ses->domainName = kstrdup(defdmname, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ses->domainName)
return -ENOMEM;
}
dlen = strlen(ses->domainName);
/*
* The length of this blob is two times the size of a
* structure (av pair) which holds name/size
* ( for NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME followed by NTLMSSP_AV_EOL ) +
* unicode length of a netbios domain name
*/
ses->auth_key.len = size + 2 * dlen;
ses->auth_key.response = kzalloc(ses->auth_key.len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
ses->auth_key.len = 0;
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
return -ENOMEM;
}
blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
/*
* As defined in MS-NTLM 3.3.2, just this av pair field
* is sufficient as part of the temp
*/
attrptr->type = cpu_to_le16(NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME);
attrptr->length = cpu_to_le16(2 * dlen);
blobptr = (unsigned char *)attrptr + sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)blobptr, ses->domainName, dlen, nls_cp);
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
return 0;
}
/* Server has provided av pairs/target info in the type 2 challenge
* packet and we have plucked it and stored within smb session.
* We parse that blob here to find netbios domain name to be used
* as part of ntlmv2 authentication (in Target String), if not already
* specified on the command line.
* If this function returns without any error but without fetching
* domain name, authentication may fail against some server but
* may not fail against other (those who are not very particular
* about target string i.e. for some, just user name might suffice.
*/
static int
find_domain_name(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
{
unsigned int attrsize;
unsigned int type;
unsigned int onesize = sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
unsigned char *blobptr;
unsigned char *blobend;
struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
if (!ses->auth_key.len || !ses->auth_key.response)
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
return 0;
blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
blobend = blobptr + ses->auth_key.len;
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
while (blobptr + onesize < blobend) {
attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
type = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->type);
if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_EOL)
break;
blobptr += 2; /* advance attr type */
attrsize = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->length);
blobptr += 2; /* advance attr size */
if (blobptr + attrsize > blobend)
break;
if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME) {
if (!attrsize || attrsize >= CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN)
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
break;
if (!ses->domainName) {
ses->domainName =
kmalloc(attrsize + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ses->domainName)
return -ENOMEM;
cifs_from_utf16(ses->domainName,
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
(__le16 *)blobptr, attrsize, attrsize,
Allow conversion of characters in Mac remap range. Part 1 This allows directory listings to Mac to display filenames correctly which have been created with illegal (to Windows) characters in their filename. It does not allow converting the other direction yet ie opening files with these characters (followon patch). There are seven reserved characters that need to be remapped when mounting to Windows, Mac (or any server without Unix Extensions) which are valid in POSIX but not in the other OS. : \ < > ? * | We used the normal UCS-2 remap range for this in order to convert this to/from UTF8 as did Windows Services for Unix (basically add 0xF000 to any of the 7 reserved characters), at least when the "mapchars" mount option was specified. Mac used a very slightly different "Services for Mac" remap range 0xF021 through 0xF027. The attached patch allows cifs.ko (the kernel client) to read directories on macs containing files with these characters and display their names properly. In theory this even might be useful on mounts to Samba when the vfs_catia or new "vfs_fruit" module is loaded. Currently the 7 reserved characters look very strange in directory listings from cifs.ko to Mac server. This patch allows these file name characters to be read (requires specifying mapchars on mount). Two additional changes are needed: 1) Make it more automatic: a way of detecting enough info so that we know to try to always remap these characters or not. Various have suggested that the SFM approach be made the default when the server does not support POSIX Unix extensions (cifs mounts to Samba for example) so need to make SFM remapping the default unless mapchars (SFU style mapping) specified on mount or no mapping explicitly requested or no mapping needed (cifs mounts to Samba). 2) Adding a patch to map the characters the other direction (ie UTF-8 to UCS-2 on open). This patch does it for translating readdir entries (ie UCS-2 to UTF-8) Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
2014-09-25 22:20:05 +04:00
nls_cp, NO_MAP_UNI_RSVD);
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
break;
}
}
blobptr += attrsize; /* advance attr value */
}
return 0;
}
/* Server has provided av pairs/target info in the type 2 challenge
* packet and we have plucked it and stored within smb session.
* We parse that blob here to find the server given timestamp
* as part of ntlmv2 authentication (or local current time as
* default in case of failure)
*/
static __le64
find_timestamp(struct cifs_ses *ses)
{
unsigned int attrsize;
unsigned int type;
unsigned int onesize = sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
unsigned char *blobptr;
unsigned char *blobend;
struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
struct timespec ts;
if (!ses->auth_key.len || !ses->auth_key.response)
return 0;
blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
blobend = blobptr + ses->auth_key.len;
while (blobptr + onesize < blobend) {
attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
type = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->type);
if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_EOL)
break;
blobptr += 2; /* advance attr type */
attrsize = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->length);
blobptr += 2; /* advance attr size */
if (blobptr + attrsize > blobend)
break;
if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_TIMESTAMP) {
if (attrsize == sizeof(u64))
return *((__le64 *)blobptr);
}
blobptr += attrsize; /* advance attr value */
}
ktime_get_real_ts(&ts);
return cpu_to_le64(cifs_UnixTimeToNT(ts));
}
static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc = 0;
int len;
char nt_hash[CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE];
__le16 *user;
wchar_t *domain;
wchar_t *server;
if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
/* calculate md4 hash of password */
E_md4hash(ses->password, nt_hash, nls_cp);
rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5, nt_hash,
CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NT Hash as a key\n", __func__);
return rc;
}
rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
return rc;
}
/* convert ses->user_name to unicode */
len = ses->user_name ? strlen(ses->user_name) : 0;
user = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
if (user == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
return rc;
}
if (len) {
len = cifs_strtoUTF16(user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp);
UniStrupr(user);
} else {
memset(user, '\0', 2);
}
rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
(char *)user, 2 * len);
kfree(user);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with user\n", __func__);
return rc;
}
/* convert ses->domainName to unicode and uppercase */
if (ses->domainName) {
len = strlen(ses->domainName);
domain = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
if (domain == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
return rc;
}
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)domain, ses->domainName, len,
nls_cp);
rc =
crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
(char *)domain, 2 * len);
kfree(domain);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with domain\n",
__func__);
return rc;
}
} else {
/* We use ses->serverName if no domain name available */
len = strlen(ses->serverName);
server = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
if (server == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
return rc;
}
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)server, ses->serverName, len,
nls_cp);
rc =
crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
(char *)server, 2 * len);
kfree(server);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with server\n",
__func__);
return rc;
}
}
rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
ntlmv2_hash);
if (rc)
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
return rc;
}
static int
CalcNTLMv2_response(const struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash)
{
int rc;
struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *)
(ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
unsigned int hash_len;
/* The MD5 hash starts at challenge_key.key */
hash_len = ses->auth_key.len - (CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE +
offsetof(struct ntlmv2_resp, challenge.key[0]));
if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n",
__func__);
return rc;
}
rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
return rc;
}
if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED)
memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key,
ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
else
memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key,
ses->server->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
ntlmv2->challenge.key, hash_len);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
return rc;
}
/* Note that the MD5 digest over writes anon.challenge_key.key */
rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash);
if (rc)
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
return rc;
}
static int crypto_hmacmd5_alloc(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
cifs: fix bad error handling in crypto code Jarod reported an Oops like when testing with fips=1: CIFS VFS: could not allocate crypto hmacmd5 CIFS VFS: could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc -2 CIFS VFS: Error -2 during NTLMSSP authentication CIFS VFS: Send error in SessSetup = -2 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000004e IP: [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: md4 nls_utf8 cifs dns_resolver fscache kvm serio_raw virtio_balloon virtio_net mperf i2c_piix4 cirrus drm_kms_helper ttm drm i2c_core virtio_blk ata_generic pata_acpi CPU: 1 PID: 639 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 3.11.0-0.rc3.git0.1.fc20.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88007bf496e0 ti: ffff88007b080000 task.ti: ffff88007b080000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812b5c7a>] [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 RSP: 0018:ffff88007b081d10 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000001f1f RBX: ffff880037422000 RCX: ffff88007b081fd8 RDX: 000000000000001f RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: fffffffffffffffe RBP: ffff88007b081d30 R08: ffff880037422000 R09: ffff88007c090100 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000fffffffe R12: fffffffffffffffe R13: ffff880037422000 R14: ffff880037422000 R15: 00000000fffffffe FS: 00007fc322f4f780(0000) GS:ffff88007fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 000000000000004e CR3: 000000007bdaa000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffffffff81085845 ffff880037422000 ffff8800375e7400 ffff880037422000 ffff88007b081d48 ffffffffa0176022 ffff880037422000 ffff88007b081d60 ffffffffa015c07b ffff880037600600 ffff88007b081dc8 ffffffffa01610e1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81085845>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x75/0xf0 [<ffffffffa0176022>] cifs_crypto_shash_release+0x82/0xf0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa015c07b>] cifs_put_tcp_session+0x8b/0xe0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa01610e1>] cifs_mount+0x9d1/0xad0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa014ff50>] cifs_do_mount+0xa0/0x4d0 [cifs] [<ffffffff811ab6e9>] mount_fs+0x39/0x1b0 [<ffffffff811c466f>] vfs_kern_mount+0x5f/0xf0 [<ffffffff811c6a9e>] do_mount+0x23e/0xa20 [<ffffffff811c66e6>] ? copy_mount_options+0x36/0x170 [<ffffffff811c7303>] SyS_mount+0x83/0xc0 [<ffffffff8165c8d9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: eb 9e 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 83 ec 08 48 85 ff 74 46 <48> 83 7e 48 00 48 8b 5e 50 74 4b 48 89 f7 e8 83 fc ff ff 4c 8b RIP [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 RSP <ffff88007b081d10> CR2: 000000000000004e The cifs code allocates some crypto structures. If that fails, it returns an error, but it leaves the pointers set to their PTR_ERR values. Then later when it tries to clean up, it sees that those values are non-NULL and then passes them to the routine that frees them. Fix this by setting the pointers to NULL after collecting the error code in this situation. Cc: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-07-31 21:48:00 +04:00
int rc;
unsigned int size;
/* check if already allocated */
if (server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5)
return 0;
server->secmech.hmacmd5 = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(md5)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(server->secmech.hmacmd5)) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto hmacmd5\n");
cifs: fix bad error handling in crypto code Jarod reported an Oops like when testing with fips=1: CIFS VFS: could not allocate crypto hmacmd5 CIFS VFS: could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc -2 CIFS VFS: Error -2 during NTLMSSP authentication CIFS VFS: Send error in SessSetup = -2 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000004e IP: [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: md4 nls_utf8 cifs dns_resolver fscache kvm serio_raw virtio_balloon virtio_net mperf i2c_piix4 cirrus drm_kms_helper ttm drm i2c_core virtio_blk ata_generic pata_acpi CPU: 1 PID: 639 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 3.11.0-0.rc3.git0.1.fc20.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88007bf496e0 ti: ffff88007b080000 task.ti: ffff88007b080000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812b5c7a>] [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 RSP: 0018:ffff88007b081d10 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000001f1f RBX: ffff880037422000 RCX: ffff88007b081fd8 RDX: 000000000000001f RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: fffffffffffffffe RBP: ffff88007b081d30 R08: ffff880037422000 R09: ffff88007c090100 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000fffffffe R12: fffffffffffffffe R13: ffff880037422000 R14: ffff880037422000 R15: 00000000fffffffe FS: 00007fc322f4f780(0000) GS:ffff88007fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 000000000000004e CR3: 000000007bdaa000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffffffff81085845 ffff880037422000 ffff8800375e7400 ffff880037422000 ffff88007b081d48 ffffffffa0176022 ffff880037422000 ffff88007b081d60 ffffffffa015c07b ffff880037600600 ffff88007b081dc8 ffffffffa01610e1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81085845>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x75/0xf0 [<ffffffffa0176022>] cifs_crypto_shash_release+0x82/0xf0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa015c07b>] cifs_put_tcp_session+0x8b/0xe0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa01610e1>] cifs_mount+0x9d1/0xad0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa014ff50>] cifs_do_mount+0xa0/0x4d0 [cifs] [<ffffffff811ab6e9>] mount_fs+0x39/0x1b0 [<ffffffff811c466f>] vfs_kern_mount+0x5f/0xf0 [<ffffffff811c6a9e>] do_mount+0x23e/0xa20 [<ffffffff811c66e6>] ? copy_mount_options+0x36/0x170 [<ffffffff811c7303>] SyS_mount+0x83/0xc0 [<ffffffff8165c8d9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: eb 9e 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 83 ec 08 48 85 ff 74 46 <48> 83 7e 48 00 48 8b 5e 50 74 4b 48 89 f7 e8 83 fc ff ff 4c 8b RIP [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 RSP <ffff88007b081d10> CR2: 000000000000004e The cifs code allocates some crypto structures. If that fails, it returns an error, but it leaves the pointers set to their PTR_ERR values. Then later when it tries to clean up, it sees that those values are non-NULL and then passes them to the routine that frees them. Fix this by setting the pointers to NULL after collecting the error code in this situation. Cc: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-07-31 21:48:00 +04:00
rc = PTR_ERR(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL;
return rc;
}
size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL;
return -ENOMEM;
}
server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash.tfm = server->secmech.hmacmd5;
server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash.flags = 0x0;
return 0;
}
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
int
setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc;
int baselen;
unsigned int tilen;
struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2;
char ntlmv2_hash[16];
unsigned char *tiblob = NULL; /* target info blob */
__le64 rsp_timestamp;
if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED) {
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
if (!ses->domainName) {
Fix default behaviour for empty domains and add domainauto option With commit 2b149f119 many things have been fixed/introduced. However, the default behaviour for RawNTLMSSP authentication seems to be wrong in case the domain is not passed on the command line. The main points (see below) of the patch are: - It alignes behaviour with Windows clients - It fixes backward compatibility - It fixes UPN I compared this behavour with the one from a Windows 10 command line client. When no domains are specified on the command line, I traced the packets and observed that the client does send an empty domain to the server. In the linux kernel case, the empty domain is replaced by the primary domain communicated by the SMB server. This means that, if the credentials are valid against the local server but that server is part of a domain, then the kernel module will ask to authenticate against that domain and we will get LOGON failure. I compared the packet trace from the smbclient when no domain is passed and, in that case, a default domain from the client smb.conf is taken. Apparently, connection succeeds anyway, because when the domain passed is not valid (in my case WORKGROUP), then the local one is tried and authentication succeeds. I tried with any kind of invalid domain and the result was always a connection. So, trying to interpret what to do and picking a valid domain if none is passed, seems the wrong thing to do. To this end, a new option "domainauto" has been added in case the user wants a mechanism for guessing. Without this patch, backward compatibility also is broken. With kernel 3.10, the default auth mechanism was NTLM. One of our testing servers accepted NTLM and, because no domains are passed, authentication was local. Moving to RawNTLMSSP forced us to change our command line to add a fake domain to pass to prevent this mechanism to kick in. For the same reasons, UPN is broken because the domain is specified in the username. The SMB server will work out the domain from the UPN and authenticate against the right server. Without the patch, though, given the domain is empty, it gets replaced with another domain that could be the wrong one for the authentication. Signed-off-by: Germano Percossi <germano.percossi@citrix.com> Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2016-12-15 10:01:18 +03:00
if (ses->domainAuto) {
rc = find_domain_name(ses, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d finding domain name\n",
rc);
goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
}
} else {
ses->domainName = kstrdup("", GFP_KERNEL);
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
}
}
} else {
rc = build_avpair_blob(ses, nls_cp);
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d building av pair blob\n", rc);
goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
}
}
/* Must be within 5 minutes of the server (or in range +/-2h
* in case of Mac OS X), so simply carry over server timestamp
* (as Windows 7 does)
*/
rsp_timestamp = find_timestamp(ses);
baselen = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
tilen = ses->auth_key.len;
tiblob = ses->auth_key.response;
ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(baselen + tilen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
ses->auth_key.len = 0;
goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
}
ses->auth_key.len += baselen;
ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *)
(ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
ntlmv2->blob_signature = cpu_to_le32(0x00000101);
ntlmv2->reserved = 0;
ntlmv2->time = rsp_timestamp;
get_random_bytes(&ntlmv2->client_chal, sizeof(ntlmv2->client_chal));
ntlmv2->reserved2 = 0;
memcpy(ses->auth_key.response + baselen, tiblob, tilen);
cifs: fix crash due to race in hmac(md5) handling The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions. However, the server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below: mount.cifs(8) #1 mount.cifs(8) #2 Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash.. secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc.. sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm = &secmec.hmacmd; secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc // sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm // not yet assigned crypto_shash_update() deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030 epc : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 ra : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 Call Trace: crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248 CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178 cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314 cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440 mount_fs+0x20/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138 do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4 syscall_common+0x30/0x54 Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these hmac(md5) structures. All the other secmech algos already have similar locking. Fixes: 95dc8dd14e2e84cc ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires") Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com> Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2016-07-19 10:26:21 +03:00
mutex_lock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
rc = crypto_hmacmd5_alloc(ses->server);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc %d\n", rc);
cifs: fix crash due to race in hmac(md5) handling The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions. However, the server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below: mount.cifs(8) #1 mount.cifs(8) #2 Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash.. secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc.. sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm = &secmec.hmacmd; secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc // sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm // not yet assigned crypto_shash_update() deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030 epc : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 ra : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 Call Trace: crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248 CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178 cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314 cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440 mount_fs+0x20/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138 do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4 syscall_common+0x30/0x54 Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these hmac(md5) structures. All the other secmech algos already have similar locking. Fixes: 95dc8dd14e2e84cc ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires") Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com> Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2016-07-19 10:26:21 +03:00
goto unlock;
}
/* calculate ntlmv2_hash */
rc = calc_ntlmv2_hash(ses, ntlmv2_hash, nls_cp);
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not get v2 hash rc %d\n", rc);
cifs: fix crash due to race in hmac(md5) handling The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions. However, the server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below: mount.cifs(8) #1 mount.cifs(8) #2 Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash.. secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc.. sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm = &secmec.hmacmd; secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc // sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm // not yet assigned crypto_shash_update() deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030 epc : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 ra : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 Call Trace: crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248 CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178 cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314 cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440 mount_fs+0x20/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138 do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4 syscall_common+0x30/0x54 Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these hmac(md5) structures. All the other secmech algos already have similar locking. Fixes: 95dc8dd14e2e84cc ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires") Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com> Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2016-07-19 10:26:21 +03:00
goto unlock;
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
}
/* calculate first part of the client response (CR1) */
rc = CalcNTLMv2_response(ses, ntlmv2_hash);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Could not calculate CR1 rc: %d\n", rc);
cifs: fix crash due to race in hmac(md5) handling The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions. However, the server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below: mount.cifs(8) #1 mount.cifs(8) #2 Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash.. secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc.. sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm = &secmec.hmacmd; secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc // sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm // not yet assigned crypto_shash_update() deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030 epc : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 ra : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 Call Trace: crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248 CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178 cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314 cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440 mount_fs+0x20/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138 do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4 syscall_common+0x30/0x54 Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these hmac(md5) structures. All the other secmech algos already have similar locking. Fixes: 95dc8dd14e2e84cc ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires") Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com> Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2016-07-19 10:26:21 +03:00
goto unlock;
}
/* now calculate the session key for NTLMv2 */
rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n",
__func__);
cifs: fix crash due to race in hmac(md5) handling The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions. However, the server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below: mount.cifs(8) #1 mount.cifs(8) #2 Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash.. secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc.. sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm = &secmec.hmacmd; secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc // sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm // not yet assigned crypto_shash_update() deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030 epc : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 ra : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 Call Trace: crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248 CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178 cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314 cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440 mount_fs+0x20/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138 do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4 syscall_common+0x30/0x54 Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these hmac(md5) structures. All the other secmech algos already have similar locking. Fixes: 95dc8dd14e2e84cc ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires") Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com> Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2016-07-19 10:26:21 +03:00
goto unlock;
}
rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
cifs: fix crash due to race in hmac(md5) handling The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions. However, the server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below: mount.cifs(8) #1 mount.cifs(8) #2 Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash.. secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc.. sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm = &secmec.hmacmd; secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc // sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm // not yet assigned crypto_shash_update() deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030 epc : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 ra : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 Call Trace: crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248 CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178 cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314 cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440 mount_fs+0x20/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138 do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4 syscall_common+0x30/0x54 Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these hmac(md5) structures. All the other secmech algos already have similar locking. Fixes: 95dc8dd14e2e84cc ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires") Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com> Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2016-07-19 10:26:21 +03:00
goto unlock;
}
rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash,
CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
cifs: fix crash due to race in hmac(md5) handling The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions. However, the server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below: mount.cifs(8) #1 mount.cifs(8) #2 Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash.. secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc.. sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm = &secmec.hmacmd; secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc // sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm // not yet assigned crypto_shash_update() deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030 epc : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 ra : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 Call Trace: crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248 CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178 cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314 cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440 mount_fs+0x20/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138 do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4 syscall_common+0x30/0x54 Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these hmac(md5) structures. All the other secmech algos already have similar locking. Fixes: 95dc8dd14e2e84cc ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires") Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com> Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2016-07-19 10:26:21 +03:00
goto unlock;
}
rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
ses->auth_key.response);
if (rc)
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
cifs: fix crash due to race in hmac(md5) handling The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions. However, the server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below: mount.cifs(8) #1 mount.cifs(8) #2 Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash.. secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc.. sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm = &secmec.hmacmd; secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc // sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm // not yet assigned crypto_shash_update() deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030 epc : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 ra : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 Call Trace: crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248 CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178 cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314 cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440 mount_fs+0x20/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138 do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4 syscall_common+0x30/0x54 Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these hmac(md5) structures. All the other secmech algos already have similar locking. Fixes: 95dc8dd14e2e84cc ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires") Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com> Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2016-07-19 10:26:21 +03:00
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret:
kfree(tiblob);
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 07:02:18 +04:00
return rc;
}
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
int
calc_seckey(struct cifs_ses *ses)
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
{
int rc;
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm_arc4;
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
struct scatterlist sgin, sgout;
struct skcipher_request *req;
unsigned char *sec_key;
sec_key = kmalloc(CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (sec_key == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
get_random_bytes(sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
tfm_arc4 = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm_arc4)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(tfm_arc4);
cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto API arc4\n");
goto out;
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
}
rc = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm_arc4, ses->auth_key.response,
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set response as a key\n",
__func__);
goto out_free_cipher;
}
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm_arc4, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto API arc4 request\n");
goto out_free_cipher;
}
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
sg_init_one(&sgin, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
sg_init_one(&sgout, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sgin, &sgout, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE, NULL);
rc = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
skcipher_request_free(req);
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not encrypt session key rc: %d\n", rc);
goto out_free_cipher;
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
}
/* make secondary_key/nonce as session key */
memcpy(ses->auth_key.response, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
/* and make len as that of session key only */
ses->auth_key.len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
out_free_cipher:
crypto_free_skcipher(tfm_arc4);
out:
kfree(sec_key);
return rc;
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
}
void
cifs_crypto_secmech_release(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
{
if (server->secmech.cmacaes) {
crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.cmacaes);
server->secmech.cmacaes = NULL;
}
if (server->secmech.hmacsha256) {
crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacsha256);
server->secmech.hmacsha256 = NULL;
}
if (server->secmech.md5) {
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.md5);
server->secmech.md5 = NULL;
}
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
if (server->secmech.hmacmd5) {
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL;
}
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
if (server->secmech.ccmaesencrypt) {
crypto_free_aead(server->secmech.ccmaesencrypt);
server->secmech.ccmaesencrypt = NULL;
}
if (server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt) {
crypto_free_aead(server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt);
server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt = NULL;
}
kfree(server->secmech.sdesccmacaes);
server->secmech.sdesccmacaes = NULL;
kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256);
server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256 = NULL;
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5);
server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5 = NULL;
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
kfree(server->secmech.sdescmd5);
server->secmech.sdescmd5 = NULL;
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 23:25:08 +04:00
}