WSL2-Linux-Kernel/include/linux/socket.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 17:07:57 +03:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _LINUX_SOCKET_H
#define _LINUX_SOCKET_H
#include <asm/socket.h> /* arch-dependent defines */
#include <linux/sockios.h> /* the SIOCxxx I/O controls */
#include <linux/uio.h> /* iovec support */
#include <linux/types.h> /* pid_t */
#include <linux/compiler.h> /* __user */
#include <uapi/linux/socket.h>
struct pid;
struct cred;
struct socket;
#define __sockaddr_check_size(size) \
BUILD_BUG_ON(((size) > sizeof(struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage)))
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
struct seq_file;
extern void socket_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq);
#endif
typedef __kernel_sa_family_t sa_family_t;
/*
* 1003.1g requires sa_family_t and that sa_data is char.
*/
struct sockaddr {
sa_family_t sa_family; /* address family, AF_xxx */
char sa_data[14]; /* 14 bytes of protocol address */
};
struct linger {
int l_onoff; /* Linger active */
int l_linger; /* How long to linger for */
};
#define sockaddr_storage __kernel_sockaddr_storage
/*
* As we do 4.4BSD message passing we use a 4.4BSD message passing
* system, not 4.3. Thus msg_accrights(len) are now missing. They
* belong in an obscure libc emulation or the bin.
*/
struct msghdr {
void *msg_name; /* ptr to socket address structure */
int msg_namelen; /* size of socket address structure */
struct iov_iter msg_iter; /* data */
void *msg_control; /* ancillary data */
__kernel_size_t msg_controllen; /* ancillary data buffer length */
unsigned int msg_flags; /* flags on received message */
struct kiocb *msg_iocb; /* ptr to iocb for async requests */
};
separate kernel- and userland-side msghdr Kernel-side struct msghdr is (currently) using the same layout as userland one, but it's not a one-to-one copy - even without considering 32bit compat issues, we have msg_iov, msg_name and msg_control copied to kernel[1]. It's fairly localized, so we get away with a few functions where that knowledge is needed (and we could shrink that set even more). Pretty much everything deals with the kernel-side variant and the few places that want userland one just use a bunch of force-casts to paper over the differences. The thing is, kernel-side definition of struct msghdr is *not* exposed in include/uapi - libc doesn't see it, etc. So we can add struct user_msghdr, with proper annotations and let the few places that ever deal with those beasts use it for userland pointers. Saner typechecking aside, that will allow to change the layout of kernel-side msghdr - e.g. replace msg_iov/msg_iovlen there with struct iov_iter, getting rid of the need to modify the iovec as we copy data to/from it, etc. We could introduce kernel_msghdr instead, but that would create much more noise - the absolute majority of the instances would need to have the type switched to kernel_msghdr and definition of struct msghdr in include/linux/socket.h is not going to be seen by userland anyway. This commit just introduces user_msghdr and switches the few places that are dealing with userland-side msghdr to it. [1] actually, it's even trickier than that - we copy msg_control for sendmsg, but keep the userland address on recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-04-06 22:03:05 +04:00
struct user_msghdr {
void __user *msg_name; /* ptr to socket address structure */
int msg_namelen; /* size of socket address structure */
struct iovec __user *msg_iov; /* scatter/gather array */
__kernel_size_t msg_iovlen; /* # elements in msg_iov */
void __user *msg_control; /* ancillary data */
__kernel_size_t msg_controllen; /* ancillary data buffer length */
unsigned int msg_flags; /* flags on received message */
};
/* For recvmmsg/sendmmsg */
struct mmsghdr {
separate kernel- and userland-side msghdr Kernel-side struct msghdr is (currently) using the same layout as userland one, but it's not a one-to-one copy - even without considering 32bit compat issues, we have msg_iov, msg_name and msg_control copied to kernel[1]. It's fairly localized, so we get away with a few functions where that knowledge is needed (and we could shrink that set even more). Pretty much everything deals with the kernel-side variant and the few places that want userland one just use a bunch of force-casts to paper over the differences. The thing is, kernel-side definition of struct msghdr is *not* exposed in include/uapi - libc doesn't see it, etc. So we can add struct user_msghdr, with proper annotations and let the few places that ever deal with those beasts use it for userland pointers. Saner typechecking aside, that will allow to change the layout of kernel-side msghdr - e.g. replace msg_iov/msg_iovlen there with struct iov_iter, getting rid of the need to modify the iovec as we copy data to/from it, etc. We could introduce kernel_msghdr instead, but that would create much more noise - the absolute majority of the instances would need to have the type switched to kernel_msghdr and definition of struct msghdr in include/linux/socket.h is not going to be seen by userland anyway. This commit just introduces user_msghdr and switches the few places that are dealing with userland-side msghdr to it. [1] actually, it's even trickier than that - we copy msg_control for sendmsg, but keep the userland address on recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-04-06 22:03:05 +04:00
struct user_msghdr msg_hdr;
unsigned int msg_len;
};
/*
* POSIX 1003.1g - ancillary data object information
* Ancillary data consits of a sequence of pairs of
* (cmsghdr, cmsg_data[])
*/
struct cmsghdr {
__kernel_size_t cmsg_len; /* data byte count, including hdr */
int cmsg_level; /* originating protocol */
int cmsg_type; /* protocol-specific type */
};
/*
* Ancillary data object information MACROS
* Table 5-14 of POSIX 1003.1g
*/
#define __CMSG_NXTHDR(ctl, len, cmsg) __cmsg_nxthdr((ctl),(len),(cmsg))
#define CMSG_NXTHDR(mhdr, cmsg) cmsg_nxthdr((mhdr), (cmsg))
#define CMSG_ALIGN(len) ( ((len)+sizeof(long)-1) & ~(sizeof(long)-1) )
#define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((void *)((char *)(cmsg) + sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))
#define CMSG_SPACE(len) (sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + CMSG_ALIGN(len))
#define CMSG_LEN(len) (sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + (len))
#define __CMSG_FIRSTHDR(ctl,len) ((len) >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \
(struct cmsghdr *)(ctl) : \
(struct cmsghdr *)NULL)
#define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg) __CMSG_FIRSTHDR((msg)->msg_control, (msg)->msg_controllen)
#define CMSG_OK(mhdr, cmsg) ((cmsg)->cmsg_len >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) && \
(cmsg)->cmsg_len <= (unsigned long) \
((mhdr)->msg_controllen - \
((char *)(cmsg) - (char *)(mhdr)->msg_control)))
#define for_each_cmsghdr(cmsg, msg) \
for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg); \
cmsg; \
cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(msg, cmsg))
/*
* Get the next cmsg header
*
* PLEASE, do not touch this function. If you think, that it is
* incorrect, grep kernel sources and think about consequences
* before trying to improve it.
*
* Now it always returns valid, not truncated ancillary object
* HEADER. But caller still MUST check, that cmsg->cmsg_len is
* inside range, given by msg->msg_controllen before using
* ancillary object DATA. --ANK (980731)
*/
static inline struct cmsghdr * __cmsg_nxthdr(void *__ctl, __kernel_size_t __size,
struct cmsghdr *__cmsg)
{
struct cmsghdr * __ptr;
__ptr = (struct cmsghdr*)(((unsigned char *) __cmsg) + CMSG_ALIGN(__cmsg->cmsg_len));
if ((unsigned long)((char*)(__ptr+1) - (char *) __ctl) > __size)
return (struct cmsghdr *)0;
return __ptr;
}
static inline struct cmsghdr * cmsg_nxthdr (struct msghdr *__msg, struct cmsghdr *__cmsg)
{
return __cmsg_nxthdr(__msg->msg_control, __msg->msg_controllen, __cmsg);
}
static inline size_t msg_data_left(struct msghdr *msg)
{
return iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter);
}
/* "Socket"-level control message types: */
#define SCM_RIGHTS 0x01 /* rw: access rights (array of int) */
#define SCM_CREDENTIALS 0x02 /* rw: struct ucred */
[SECURITY]: TCP/UDP getpeersec This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking controls whereby an application can determine the label of the security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the security context is for each individual packet. An example application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client. Patch design approach: - Design for TCP The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security association. The application may retrieve this context using getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a security association has a security context, the context string is returned, as for UNIX domain sockets. - Design for UDP Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have different peer and thus the security context might change every time. As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with the packet retrieval. The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). Patch implementation details: - Implementation for TCP The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error checking): getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen); printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf); The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED == sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If these have security associations with security contexts, the security context is returned. getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or the buffer is unmodified. - Implementation for UDP To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for UDP should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY. When the packet is received we get the security context from the sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook, selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security context from the SELinux space. The existing function, selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to kernel space. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 09:41:23 +03:00
#define SCM_SECURITY 0x03 /* rw: security label */
struct ucred {
__u32 pid;
__u32 uid;
__u32 gid;
};
/* Supported address families. */
#define AF_UNSPEC 0
#define AF_UNIX 1 /* Unix domain sockets */
#define AF_LOCAL 1 /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX */
#define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */
#define AF_AX25 3 /* Amateur Radio AX.25 */
#define AF_IPX 4 /* Novell IPX */
#define AF_APPLETALK 5 /* AppleTalk DDP */
#define AF_NETROM 6 /* Amateur Radio NET/ROM */
#define AF_BRIDGE 7 /* Multiprotocol bridge */
#define AF_ATMPVC 8 /* ATM PVCs */
#define AF_X25 9 /* Reserved for X.25 project */
#define AF_INET6 10 /* IP version 6 */
#define AF_ROSE 11 /* Amateur Radio X.25 PLP */
#define AF_DECnet 12 /* Reserved for DECnet project */
#define AF_NETBEUI 13 /* Reserved for 802.2LLC project*/
#define AF_SECURITY 14 /* Security callback pseudo AF */
#define AF_KEY 15 /* PF_KEY key management API */
#define AF_NETLINK 16
#define AF_ROUTE AF_NETLINK /* Alias to emulate 4.4BSD */
#define AF_PACKET 17 /* Packet family */
#define AF_ASH 18 /* Ash */
#define AF_ECONET 19 /* Acorn Econet */
#define AF_ATMSVC 20 /* ATM SVCs */
#define AF_RDS 21 /* RDS sockets */
#define AF_SNA 22 /* Linux SNA Project (nutters!) */
#define AF_IRDA 23 /* IRDA sockets */
#define AF_PPPOX 24 /* PPPoX sockets */
#define AF_WANPIPE 25 /* Wanpipe API Sockets */
#define AF_LLC 26 /* Linux LLC */
#define AF_IB 27 /* Native InfiniBand address */
mpls: Basic routing support This change adds a new Kconfig option MPLS_ROUTING. The core of this change is the code to look at an mpls packet received from another machine. Look that packet up in a routing table and forward the packet on. Support of MPLS over ATM is not considered or attempted here. This implemntation follows RFC3032 and implements the MPLS shim header that can pass over essentially any network. What RFC3021 refers to as the as the Incoming Label Map (ILM) I call net->mpls.platform_label[]. What RFC3031 refers to as the Next Label Hop Forwarding Entry (NHLFE) I call mpls_route. Though calling it the label fordwarding information base (lfib) might also be valid. Further the implemntation forwards packets as described in RFC3032. There is no need and given the original motivation for MPLS a strong discincentive to have a flexible label forwarding path. In essence the logic is the topmost label is read, looked up, removed, and replaced by 0 or more new lables and the sent out the specified interface to it's next hop. Quite a few optional features are not implemented here. Among them are generation of ICMP errors when the TTL is exceeded or the packet is larger than the next hop MTU (those conditions are detected and the packets are dropped instead of generating an icmp error). The traffic class field is always set to 0. The implementation focuses on IP over MPLS and does not handle egress of other kinds of protocols. Instead of implementing coordination with the neighbour table and sorting out how to input next hops in a different address family (for which there is value). I was lazy and implemented a next hop mac address instead. The code is simpler and there are flavor of MPLS such as MPLS-TP where neither an IPv4 nor an IPv6 next hop is appropriate so a next hop by mac address would need to be implemented at some point. Two new definitions AF_MPLS and PF_MPLS are exposed to userspace. Decoding the mpls header must be done by first byeswapping a 32bit bit endian word into the local cpu endian and then bit shifting to extract the pieces. There is no C bit-field that can represent a wire format mpls header on a little endian machine as the low bits of the 20bit label wind up in the wrong half of third byte. Therefore internally everything is deal with in cpu native byte order except when writing to and reading from a packet. For management simplicity if a label is configured to forward out an interface that is down the packet is dropped early. Similarly if an network interface is removed rt_dev is updated to NULL (so no reference is preserved) and any packets for that label are dropped. Keeping the label entries in the kernel allows the kernel label table to function as the definitive source of which labels are allocated and which are not. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-04 04:10:47 +03:00
#define AF_MPLS 28 /* MPLS */
#define AF_CAN 29 /* Controller Area Network */
#define AF_TIPC 30 /* TIPC sockets */
#define AF_BLUETOOTH 31 /* Bluetooth sockets */
#define AF_IUCV 32 /* IUCV sockets */
#define AF_RXRPC 33 /* RxRPC sockets */
#define AF_ISDN 34 /* mISDN sockets */
#define AF_PHONET 35 /* Phonet sockets */
#define AF_IEEE802154 36 /* IEEE802154 sockets */
#define AF_CAIF 37 /* CAIF sockets */
#define AF_ALG 38 /* Algorithm sockets */
#define AF_NFC 39 /* NFC sockets */
VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets VM Sockets allows communication between virtual machines and the hypervisor. User level applications both in a virtual machine and on the host can use the VM Sockets API, which facilitates fast and efficient communication between guest virtual machines and their host. A socket address family, designed to be compatible with UDP and TCP at the interface level, is provided. Today, VM Sockets is used by various VMware Tools components inside the guest for zero-config, network-less access to VMware host services. In addition to this, VMware's users are using VM Sockets for various applications, where network access of the virtual machine is restricted or non-existent. Examples of this are VMs communicating with device proxies for proprietary hardware running as host applications and automated testing of applications running within virtual machines. The VMware VM Sockets are similar to other socket types, like Berkeley UNIX socket interface. The VM Sockets module supports both connection-oriented stream sockets like TCP, and connectionless datagram sockets like UDP. The VM Sockets protocol family is defined as "AF_VSOCK" and the socket operations split for SOCK_DGRAM and SOCK_STREAM. For additional information about the use of VM Sockets, please refer to the VM Sockets Programming Guide available at: https://www.vmware.com/support/developer/vmci-sdk/ Signed-off-by: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Andy king <acking@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-02-06 18:23:56 +04:00
#define AF_VSOCK 40 /* vSockets */
#define AF_KCM 41 /* Kernel Connection Multiplexor*/
#define AF_QIPCRTR 42 /* Qualcomm IPC Router */
#define AF_SMC 43 /* smc sockets: reserve number for
* PF_SMC protocol family that
* reuses AF_INET address family
*/
#define AF_XDP 44 /* XDP sockets */
#define AF_MAX 45 /* For now.. */
/* Protocol families, same as address families. */
#define PF_UNSPEC AF_UNSPEC
#define PF_UNIX AF_UNIX
#define PF_LOCAL AF_LOCAL
#define PF_INET AF_INET
#define PF_AX25 AF_AX25
#define PF_IPX AF_IPX
#define PF_APPLETALK AF_APPLETALK
#define PF_NETROM AF_NETROM
#define PF_BRIDGE AF_BRIDGE
#define PF_ATMPVC AF_ATMPVC
#define PF_X25 AF_X25
#define PF_INET6 AF_INET6
#define PF_ROSE AF_ROSE
#define PF_DECnet AF_DECnet
#define PF_NETBEUI AF_NETBEUI
#define PF_SECURITY AF_SECURITY
#define PF_KEY AF_KEY
#define PF_NETLINK AF_NETLINK
#define PF_ROUTE AF_ROUTE
#define PF_PACKET AF_PACKET
#define PF_ASH AF_ASH
#define PF_ECONET AF_ECONET
#define PF_ATMSVC AF_ATMSVC
#define PF_RDS AF_RDS
#define PF_SNA AF_SNA
#define PF_IRDA AF_IRDA
#define PF_PPPOX AF_PPPOX
#define PF_WANPIPE AF_WANPIPE
#define PF_LLC AF_LLC
#define PF_IB AF_IB
mpls: Basic routing support This change adds a new Kconfig option MPLS_ROUTING. The core of this change is the code to look at an mpls packet received from another machine. Look that packet up in a routing table and forward the packet on. Support of MPLS over ATM is not considered or attempted here. This implemntation follows RFC3032 and implements the MPLS shim header that can pass over essentially any network. What RFC3021 refers to as the as the Incoming Label Map (ILM) I call net->mpls.platform_label[]. What RFC3031 refers to as the Next Label Hop Forwarding Entry (NHLFE) I call mpls_route. Though calling it the label fordwarding information base (lfib) might also be valid. Further the implemntation forwards packets as described in RFC3032. There is no need and given the original motivation for MPLS a strong discincentive to have a flexible label forwarding path. In essence the logic is the topmost label is read, looked up, removed, and replaced by 0 or more new lables and the sent out the specified interface to it's next hop. Quite a few optional features are not implemented here. Among them are generation of ICMP errors when the TTL is exceeded or the packet is larger than the next hop MTU (those conditions are detected and the packets are dropped instead of generating an icmp error). The traffic class field is always set to 0. The implementation focuses on IP over MPLS and does not handle egress of other kinds of protocols. Instead of implementing coordination with the neighbour table and sorting out how to input next hops in a different address family (for which there is value). I was lazy and implemented a next hop mac address instead. The code is simpler and there are flavor of MPLS such as MPLS-TP where neither an IPv4 nor an IPv6 next hop is appropriate so a next hop by mac address would need to be implemented at some point. Two new definitions AF_MPLS and PF_MPLS are exposed to userspace. Decoding the mpls header must be done by first byeswapping a 32bit bit endian word into the local cpu endian and then bit shifting to extract the pieces. There is no C bit-field that can represent a wire format mpls header on a little endian machine as the low bits of the 20bit label wind up in the wrong half of third byte. Therefore internally everything is deal with in cpu native byte order except when writing to and reading from a packet. For management simplicity if a label is configured to forward out an interface that is down the packet is dropped early. Similarly if an network interface is removed rt_dev is updated to NULL (so no reference is preserved) and any packets for that label are dropped. Keeping the label entries in the kernel allows the kernel label table to function as the definitive source of which labels are allocated and which are not. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-04 04:10:47 +03:00
#define PF_MPLS AF_MPLS
#define PF_CAN AF_CAN
#define PF_TIPC AF_TIPC
#define PF_BLUETOOTH AF_BLUETOOTH
#define PF_IUCV AF_IUCV
#define PF_RXRPC AF_RXRPC
#define PF_ISDN AF_ISDN
#define PF_PHONET AF_PHONET
#define PF_IEEE802154 AF_IEEE802154
#define PF_CAIF AF_CAIF
#define PF_ALG AF_ALG
#define PF_NFC AF_NFC
VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets VM Sockets allows communication between virtual machines and the hypervisor. User level applications both in a virtual machine and on the host can use the VM Sockets API, which facilitates fast and efficient communication between guest virtual machines and their host. A socket address family, designed to be compatible with UDP and TCP at the interface level, is provided. Today, VM Sockets is used by various VMware Tools components inside the guest for zero-config, network-less access to VMware host services. In addition to this, VMware's users are using VM Sockets for various applications, where network access of the virtual machine is restricted or non-existent. Examples of this are VMs communicating with device proxies for proprietary hardware running as host applications and automated testing of applications running within virtual machines. The VMware VM Sockets are similar to other socket types, like Berkeley UNIX socket interface. The VM Sockets module supports both connection-oriented stream sockets like TCP, and connectionless datagram sockets like UDP. The VM Sockets protocol family is defined as "AF_VSOCK" and the socket operations split for SOCK_DGRAM and SOCK_STREAM. For additional information about the use of VM Sockets, please refer to the VM Sockets Programming Guide available at: https://www.vmware.com/support/developer/vmci-sdk/ Signed-off-by: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Andy king <acking@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-02-06 18:23:56 +04:00
#define PF_VSOCK AF_VSOCK
#define PF_KCM AF_KCM
#define PF_QIPCRTR AF_QIPCRTR
#define PF_SMC AF_SMC
#define PF_XDP AF_XDP
#define PF_MAX AF_MAX
/* Maximum queue length specifiable by listen. */
#define SOMAXCONN 128
/* Flags we can use with send/ and recv.
Added those for 1003.1g not all are supported yet
*/
#define MSG_OOB 1
#define MSG_PEEK 2
#define MSG_DONTROUTE 4
#define MSG_TRYHARD 4 /* Synonym for MSG_DONTROUTE for DECnet */
#define MSG_CTRUNC 8
#define MSG_PROBE 0x10 /* Do not send. Only probe path f.e. for MTU */
#define MSG_TRUNC 0x20
#define MSG_DONTWAIT 0x40 /* Nonblocking io */
#define MSG_EOR 0x80 /* End of record */
#define MSG_WAITALL 0x100 /* Wait for a full request */
#define MSG_FIN 0x200
#define MSG_SYN 0x400
#define MSG_CONFIRM 0x800 /* Confirm path validity */
#define MSG_RST 0x1000
#define MSG_ERRQUEUE 0x2000 /* Fetch message from error queue */
#define MSG_NOSIGNAL 0x4000 /* Do not generate SIGPIPE */
#define MSG_MORE 0x8000 /* Sender will send more */
#define MSG_WAITFORONE 0x10000 /* recvmmsg(): block until 1+ packets avail */
bpf: sk_msg, sock{map|hash} redirect through ULP A sockmap program that redirects through a kTLS ULP enabled socket will not work correctly because the ULP layer is skipped. This fixes the behavior to call through the ULP layer on redirect to ensure any operations required on the data stream at the ULP layer continue to be applied. To do this we add an internal flag MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY to avoid calling the BPF layer on a redirected message. This is required to avoid calling the BPF layer multiple times (possibly recursively) which is not the current/expected behavior without ULPs. In the future we may add a redirect flag if users _do_ want the policy applied again but this would need to work for both ULP and non-ULP sockets and be opt-in to avoid breaking existing programs. Also to avoid polluting the flag space with an internal flag we reuse the flag space overlapping MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY with MSG_WAITFORONE. Here WAITFORONE is specific to recv path and SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY is only used for sendpage hooks. The last thing to verify is user space API is masked correctly to ensure the flag can not be set by user. (Note this needs to be true regardless because we have internal flags already in-use that user space should not be able to set). But for completeness we have two UAPI paths into sendpage, sendfile and splice. In the sendfile case the function do_sendfile() zero's flags, ./fs/read_write.c: static ssize_t do_sendfile(int out_fd, int in_fd, loff_t *ppos, size_t count, loff_t max) { ... fl = 0; #if 0 /* * We need to debate whether we can enable this or not. The * man page documents EAGAIN return for the output at least, * and the application is arguably buggy if it doesn't expect * EAGAIN on a non-blocking file descriptor. */ if (in.file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) fl = SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK; #endif file_start_write(out.file); retval = do_splice_direct(in.file, &pos, out.file, &out_pos, count, fl); } In the splice case the pipe_to_sendpage "actor" is used which masks flags with SPLICE_F_MORE. ./fs/splice.c: static int pipe_to_sendpage(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf, struct splice_desc *sd) { ... more = (sd->flags & SPLICE_F_MORE) ? MSG_MORE : 0; ... } Confirming what we expect that internal flags are in fact internal to socket side. Fixes: d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-12-20 22:35:35 +03:00
#define MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY 0x10000 /* sendpage() internal : do no apply policy */
#define MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST 0x20000 /* sendpage() internal : not the last page */
#define MSG_BATCH 0x40000 /* sendmmsg(): more messages coming */
#define MSG_EOF MSG_FIN
#define MSG_NO_SHARED_FRAGS 0x80000 /* sendpage() internal : page frags are not shared */
net/tls: prevent skb_orphan() from leaking TLS plain text with offload sk_validate_xmit_skb() and drivers depend on the sk member of struct sk_buff to identify segments requiring encryption. Any operation which removes or does not preserve the original TLS socket such as skb_orphan() or skb_clone() will cause clear text leaks. Make the TCP socket underlying an offloaded TLS connection mark all skbs as decrypted, if TLS TX is in offload mode. Then in sk_validate_xmit_skb() catch skbs which have no socket (or a socket with no validation) and decrypted flag set. Note that CONFIG_SOCK_VALIDATE_XMIT, CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE and sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb are slightly interchangeable right now, they all imply TLS offload. The new checks are guarded by CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE because that's the option guarding the sk_buff->decrypted member. Second, smaller issue with orphaning is that it breaks the guarantee that packets will be delivered to device queues in-order. All TLS offload drivers depend on that scheduling property. This means skb_orphan_partial()'s trick of preserving partial socket references will cause issues in the drivers. We need a full orphan, and as a result netem delay/throttling will cause all TLS offload skbs to be dropped. Reusing the sk_buff->decrypted flag also protects from leaking clear text when incoming, decrypted skb is redirected (e.g. by TC). See commit 0608c69c9a80 ("bpf: sk_msg, sock{map|hash} redirect through ULP") for justification why the internal flag is safe. The only location which could leak the flag in is tcp_bpf_sendmsg(), which is taken care of by clearing the previously unused bit. v2: - remove superfluous decrypted mark copy (Willem); - remove the stale doc entry (Boris); - rely entirely on EOR marking to prevent coalescing (Boris); - use an internal sendpages flag instead of marking the socket (Boris). v3 (Willem): - reorganize the can_skb_orphan_partial() condition; - fix the flag leak-in through tcp_bpf_sendmsg. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-08-08 03:03:59 +03:00
#define MSG_SENDPAGE_DECRYPTED 0x100000 /* sendpage() internal : page may carry
* plain text and require encryption
*/
#define MSG_ZEROCOPY 0x4000000 /* Use user data in kernel path */
#define MSG_FASTOPEN 0x20000000 /* Send data in TCP SYN */
#define MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC 0x40000000 /* Set close_on_exec for file
O_CLOEXEC for SCM_RIGHTS Part two in the O_CLOEXEC saga: adding support for file descriptors received through Unix domain sockets. The patch is once again pretty minimal, it introduces a new flag for recvmsg and passes it just like the existing MSG_CMSG_COMPAT flag. I think this bit is not used otherwise but the networking people will know better. This new flag is not recognized by recvfrom and recv. These functions cannot be used for that purpose and the asymmetry this introduces is not worse than the already existing MSG_CMSG_COMPAT situations. The patch must be applied on the patch which introduced O_CLOEXEC. It has to remove static from the new get_unused_fd_flags function but since scm.c cannot live in a module the function still hasn't to be exported. Here's a test program to make sure the code works. It's so much longer than the actual patch... #include <errno.h> #include <error.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <sys/un.h> #ifndef O_CLOEXEC # define O_CLOEXEC 02000000 #endif #ifndef MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC # define MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC 0x40000000 #endif int main (int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc > 1) { int fd = atol (argv[1]); printf ("child: fd = %d\n", fd); if (fcntl (fd, F_GETFD) == 0 || errno != EBADF) { puts ("file descriptor valid in child"); return 1; } return 0; } struct sockaddr_un sun; strcpy (sun.sun_path, "./testsocket"); sun.sun_family = AF_UNIX; char databuf[] = "hello"; struct iovec iov[1]; iov[0].iov_base = databuf; iov[0].iov_len = sizeof (databuf); union { struct cmsghdr hdr; char bytes[CMSG_SPACE (sizeof (int))]; } buf; struct msghdr msg = { .msg_iov = iov, .msg_iovlen = 1, .msg_control = buf.bytes, .msg_controllen = sizeof (buf) }; struct cmsghdr *cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR (&msg); cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET; cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS; cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN (sizeof (int)); msg.msg_controllen = cmsg->cmsg_len; pid_t child = fork (); if (child == -1) error (1, errno, "fork"); if (child == 0) { int sock = socket (PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (sock < 0) error (1, errno, "socket"); if (bind (sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sun, sizeof (sun)) < 0) error (1, errno, "bind"); if (listen (sock, SOMAXCONN) < 0) error (1, errno, "listen"); int conn = accept (sock, NULL, NULL); if (conn == -1) error (1, errno, "accept"); *(int *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg) = sock; if (sendmsg (conn, &msg, MSG_NOSIGNAL) < 0) error (1, errno, "sendmsg"); return 0; } /* For a test suite this should be more robust like a barrier in shared memory. */ sleep (1); int sock = socket (PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (sock < 0) error (1, errno, "socket"); if (connect (sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sun, sizeof (sun)) < 0) error (1, errno, "connect"); unlink (sun.sun_path); *(int *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg) = -1; if (recvmsg (sock, &msg, MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC) < 0) error (1, errno, "recvmsg"); int fd = *(int *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg); if (fd == -1) error (1, 0, "no descriptor received"); char fdname[20]; snprintf (fdname, sizeof (fdname), "%d", fd); execl ("/proc/self/exe", argv[0], fdname, NULL); puts ("execl failed"); return 1; } [akpm@linux-foundation.org: Fix fastcall inconsistency noted by Michael Buesch] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Michael Buesch <mb@bu3sch.de> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-16 10:40:34 +04:00
descriptor received through
SCM_RIGHTS */
#if defined(CONFIG_COMPAT)
#define MSG_CMSG_COMPAT 0x80000000 /* This message needs 32 bit fixups */
#else
#define MSG_CMSG_COMPAT 0 /* We never have 32 bit fixups */
#endif
/* Setsockoptions(2) level. Thanks to BSD these must match IPPROTO_xxx */
#define SOL_IP 0
/* #define SOL_ICMP 1 No-no-no! Due to Linux :-) we cannot use SOL_ICMP=1 */
#define SOL_TCP 6
#define SOL_UDP 17
#define SOL_IPV6 41
#define SOL_ICMPV6 58
#define SOL_SCTP 132
[NET]: Supporting UDP-Lite (RFC 3828) in Linux This is a revision of the previously submitted patch, which alters the way files are organized and compiled in the following manner: * UDP and UDP-Lite now use separate object files * source file dependencies resolved via header files net/ipv{4,6}/udp_impl.h * order of inclusion files in udp.c/udplite.c adapted accordingly [NET/IPv4]: Support for the UDP-Lite protocol (RFC 3828) This patch adds support for UDP-Lite to the IPv4 stack, provided as an extension to the existing UDPv4 code: * generic routines are all located in net/ipv4/udp.c * UDP-Lite specific routines are in net/ipv4/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp and /proc/net/udplite * shared API with extensions for partial checksum coverage [NET/IPv6]: Extension for UDP-Lite over IPv6 It extends the existing UDPv6 code base with support for UDP-Lite in the same manner as per UDPv4. In particular, * UDPv6 generic and shared code is in net/ipv6/udp.c * UDP-Litev6 specific extensions are in net/ipv6/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp6 and /proc/net/udplite6 * support for IPV6_ADDRFORM * aligned the coding style of protocol initialisation with af_inet6.c * made the error handling in udpv6_queue_rcv_skb consistent; to return `-1' on error on all error cases * consolidation of shared code [NET]: UDP-Lite Documentation and basic XFRM/Netfilter support The UDP-Lite patch further provides * API documentation for UDP-Lite * basic xfrm support * basic netfilter support for IPv4 and IPv6 (LOG target) Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-11-27 22:10:57 +03:00
#define SOL_UDPLITE 136 /* UDP-Lite (RFC 3828) */
#define SOL_RAW 255
#define SOL_IPX 256
#define SOL_AX25 257
#define SOL_ATALK 258
#define SOL_NETROM 259
#define SOL_ROSE 260
#define SOL_DECNET 261
#define SOL_X25 262
#define SOL_PACKET 263
#define SOL_ATM 264 /* ATM layer (cell level) */
#define SOL_AAL 265 /* ATM Adaption Layer (packet level) */
#define SOL_IRDA 266
#define SOL_NETBEUI 267
#define SOL_LLC 268
#define SOL_DCCP 269
#define SOL_NETLINK 270
#define SOL_TIPC 271
#define SOL_RXRPC 272
#define SOL_PPPOL2TP 273
#define SOL_BLUETOOTH 274
#define SOL_PNPIPE 275
#define SOL_RDS 276
#define SOL_IUCV 277
#define SOL_CAIF 278
#define SOL_ALG 279
#define SOL_NFC 280
#define SOL_KCM 281
#define SOL_TLS 282
#define SOL_XDP 283
/* IPX options */
#define IPX_TYPE 1
extern int move_addr_to_kernel(void __user *uaddr, int ulen, struct sockaddr_storage *kaddr);
extern int put_cmsg(struct msghdr*, int level, int type, int len, void *data);
struct timespec64;
y2038: socket: Add compat_sys_recvmmsg_time64 recvmmsg() takes two arguments to pointers of structures that differ between 32-bit and 64-bit architectures: mmsghdr and timespec. For y2038 compatbility, we are changing the native system call from timespec to __kernel_timespec with a 64-bit time_t (in another patch), and use the existing compat system call on both 32-bit and 64-bit architectures for compatibility with traditional 32-bit user space. As we now have two variants of recvmmsg() for 32-bit tasks that are both different from the variant that we use on 64-bit tasks, this means we also require two compat system calls! The solution I picked is to flip things around: The existing compat_sys_recvmmsg() call gets moved from net/compat.c into net/socket.c and now handles the case for old user space on all architectures that have set CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME. A new compat_sys_recvmmsg_time64() call gets added in the old place for 64-bit architectures only, this one handles the case of a compat mmsghdr structure combined with __kernel_timespec. In the indirect sys_socketcall(), we now need to call either do_sys_recvmmsg() or __compat_sys_recvmmsg(), depending on what kind of architecture we are on. For compat_sys_socketcall(), no such change is needed, we always call __compat_sys_recvmmsg(). I decided to not add a new SYS_RECVMMSG_TIME64 socketcall: Any libc implementation for 64-bit time_t will need significant changes including an updated asm/unistd.h, and it seems better to consistently use the separate syscalls that configuration, leaving the socketcall only for backward compatibility with 32-bit time_t based libc. The naming is asymmetric for the moment, so both existing syscalls entry points keep their names, while the new ones are recvmmsg_time32 and compat_recvmmsg_time64 respectively. I expect that we will rename the compat syscalls later as we start using generated syscall tables everywhere and add these entry points. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2018-04-18 14:43:52 +03:00
struct __kernel_timespec;
struct old_timespec32;
struct scm_timestamping_internal {
struct timespec64 ts[3];
};
extern void put_cmsg_scm_timestamping64(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_timestamping_internal *tss);
extern void put_cmsg_scm_timestamping(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_timestamping_internal *tss);
/* The __sys_...msg variants allow MSG_CMSG_COMPAT iff
* forbid_cmsg_compat==false
*/
extern long __sys_recvmsg(int fd, struct user_msghdr __user *msg,
unsigned int flags, bool forbid_cmsg_compat);
extern long __sys_sendmsg(int fd, struct user_msghdr __user *msg,
unsigned int flags, bool forbid_cmsg_compat);
y2038: socket: Add compat_sys_recvmmsg_time64 recvmmsg() takes two arguments to pointers of structures that differ between 32-bit and 64-bit architectures: mmsghdr and timespec. For y2038 compatbility, we are changing the native system call from timespec to __kernel_timespec with a 64-bit time_t (in another patch), and use the existing compat system call on both 32-bit and 64-bit architectures for compatibility with traditional 32-bit user space. As we now have two variants of recvmmsg() for 32-bit tasks that are both different from the variant that we use on 64-bit tasks, this means we also require two compat system calls! The solution I picked is to flip things around: The existing compat_sys_recvmmsg() call gets moved from net/compat.c into net/socket.c and now handles the case for old user space on all architectures that have set CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME. A new compat_sys_recvmmsg_time64() call gets added in the old place for 64-bit architectures only, this one handles the case of a compat mmsghdr structure combined with __kernel_timespec. In the indirect sys_socketcall(), we now need to call either do_sys_recvmmsg() or __compat_sys_recvmmsg(), depending on what kind of architecture we are on. For compat_sys_socketcall(), no such change is needed, we always call __compat_sys_recvmmsg(). I decided to not add a new SYS_RECVMMSG_TIME64 socketcall: Any libc implementation for 64-bit time_t will need significant changes including an updated asm/unistd.h, and it seems better to consistently use the separate syscalls that configuration, leaving the socketcall only for backward compatibility with 32-bit time_t based libc. The naming is asymmetric for the moment, so both existing syscalls entry points keep their names, while the new ones are recvmmsg_time32 and compat_recvmmsg_time64 respectively. I expect that we will rename the compat syscalls later as we start using generated syscall tables everywhere and add these entry points. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2018-04-18 14:43:52 +03:00
extern int __sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *mmsg,
unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags,
struct __kernel_timespec __user *timeout,
struct old_timespec32 __user *timeout32);
extern int __sys_sendmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *mmsg,
unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags,
bool forbid_cmsg_compat);
extern long __sys_sendmsg_sock(struct socket *sock,
struct user_msghdr __user *msg,
unsigned int flags);
extern long __sys_recvmsg_sock(struct socket *sock,
struct user_msghdr __user *msg,
unsigned int flags);
/* helpers which do the actual work for syscalls */
extern int __sys_recvfrom(int fd, void __user *ubuf, size_t size,
unsigned int flags, struct sockaddr __user *addr,
int __user *addr_len);
extern int __sys_sendto(int fd, void __user *buff, size_t len,
unsigned int flags, struct sockaddr __user *addr,
int addr_len);
extern int __sys_accept4(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *upeer_sockaddr,
int __user *upeer_addrlen, int flags);
extern int __sys_socket(int family, int type, int protocol);
extern int __sys_bind(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *umyaddr, int addrlen);
extern int __sys_connect(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *uservaddr,
int addrlen);
extern int __sys_listen(int fd, int backlog);
extern int __sys_getsockname(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *usockaddr,
int __user *usockaddr_len);
extern int __sys_getpeername(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *usockaddr,
int __user *usockaddr_len);
extern int __sys_socketpair(int family, int type, int protocol,
int __user *usockvec);
extern int __sys_shutdown(int fd, int how);
extern struct ns_common *get_net_ns(struct ns_common *ns);
#endif /* _LINUX_SOCKET_H */