sctp: sm_statefuns: Fix spelling mistakes
Fix some spelling mistakes in comments: genereate ==> generate correclty ==> correctly boundries ==> boundaries failes ==> fails isses ==> issues assocition ==> association signe ==> sign assocaition ==> association managemement ==> management restransmissions ==> retransmission sideffect ==> sideeffect bomming ==> booming chukns ==> chunks SHUDOWN ==> SHUTDOWN violationg ==> violating explcitly ==> explicitly CHunk ==> Chunk Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210601020801.3625358-1-zhengyongjun3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
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/* If the INIT is coming toward a closing socket, we'll send back
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* and ABORT. Essentially, this catches the race of INIT being
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* backloged to the socket at the same time as the user isses close().
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* backloged to the socket at the same time as the user issues close().
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* Since the socket and all its associations are going away, we
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* can treat this OOTB
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*/
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@ -608,8 +608,8 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net,
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sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
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SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED));
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/* SCTP-AUTH: genereate the assocition shared keys so that
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* we can potentially signe the COOKIE-ECHO.
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/* SCTP-AUTH: generate the association shared keys so that
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* we can potentially sign the COOKIE-ECHO.
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*/
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sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY, SCTP_NULL());
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@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net,
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goto nomem_init;
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/* SCTP-AUTH: Now that we've populate required fields in
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* sctp_process_init, set up the assocaition shared keys as
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* sctp_process_init, set up the association shared keys as
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* necessary so that we can potentially authenticate the ACK
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*/
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error = sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(new_asoc, GFP_ATOMIC);
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@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net,
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/* Add all the state machine commands now since we've created
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* everything. This way we don't introduce memory corruptions
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* during side-effect processing and correclty count established
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* during side-effect processing and correctly count established
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* associations.
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*/
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sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
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@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(struct net *net,
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commands);
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/* Reset init error count upon receipt of COOKIE-ACK,
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* to avoid problems with the managemement of this
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* to avoid problems with the management of this
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* counter in stale cookie situations when a transition back
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* from the COOKIE-ECHOED state to the COOKIE-WAIT
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* state is performed.
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@ -2950,7 +2950,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(
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commands);
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/* Since we are not going to really process this INIT, there
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* is no point in verifying chunk boundries. Just generate
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* is no point in verifying chunk boundaries. Just generate
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* the SHUTDOWN ACK.
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*/
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reply = sctp_make_shutdown_ack(asoc, chunk);
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@ -3560,7 +3560,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_final(struct net *net,
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goto nomem_chunk;
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/* Do all the commands now (after allocation), so that we
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* have consistent state if memory allocation failes
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* have consistent state if memory allocation fails
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*/
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sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_EVENT_ULP, SCTP_ULPEVENT(ev));
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@ -3747,7 +3747,7 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(
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return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
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/* We need to discard the rest of the packet to prevent
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* potential bomming attacks from additional bundled chunks.
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* potential boomming attacks from additional bundled chunks.
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* This is documented in SCTP Threats ID.
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*/
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return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
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@ -4257,7 +4257,7 @@ gen_shutdown:
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}
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/*
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* SCTP-AUTH Section 6.3 Receiving authenticated chukns
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* SCTP-AUTH Section 6.3 Receiving authenticated chunks
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*
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* The receiver MUST use the HMAC algorithm indicated in the HMAC
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* Identifier field. If this algorithm was not specified by the
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@ -4812,7 +4812,7 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_violation_ctsn(
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/* Handle protocol violation of an invalid chunk bundling. For example,
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* when we have an association and we receive bundled INIT-ACK, or
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* SHUDOWN-COMPLETE, our peer is clearly violationg the "MUST NOT bundle"
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* SHUTDOWN-COMPLETE, our peer is clearly violating the "MUST NOT bundle"
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* statement from the specs. Additionally, there might be an attacker
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* on the path and we may not want to continue this communication.
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*/
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@ -5208,7 +5208,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_cookie_wait_prm_shutdown(
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* Inputs
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* (endpoint, asoc)
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*
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* The RFC does not explcitly address this issue, but is the route through the
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* The RFC does not explicitly address this issue, but is the route through the
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* state table when someone issues a shutdown while in COOKIE_ECHOED state.
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*
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* Outputs
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@ -5932,7 +5932,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_t1_cookie_timer_expire(
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/* RFC2960 9.2 If the timer expires, the endpoint must re-send the SHUTDOWN
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* with the updated last sequential TSN received from its peer.
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*
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* An endpoint should limit the number of retransmissions of the
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* An endpoint should limit the number of retransmission of the
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* SHUTDOWN chunk to the protocol parameter 'Association.Max.Retrans'.
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* If this threshold is exceeded the endpoint should destroy the TCB and
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* MUST report the peer endpoint unreachable to the upper layer (and
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@ -6010,7 +6010,7 @@ nomem:
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}
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/*
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* ADDIP Section 4.1 ASCONF CHunk Procedures
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* ADDIP Section 4.1 ASCONF Chunk Procedures
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* If the T4 RTO timer expires the endpoint should do B1 to B5
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*/
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enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_t4_timer_expire(
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@ -6441,7 +6441,7 @@ static int sctp_eat_data(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
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chunk->ecn_ce_done = 1;
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if (af->is_ce(sctp_gso_headskb(chunk->skb))) {
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/* Do real work as sideffect. */
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/* Do real work as side effect. */
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sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ECN_CE,
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SCTP_U32(tsn));
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}
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