parisc: Fix kernel panic due invalid values in IAOQ0 or IAOQ1
On parisc the privilege level of a process is stored in the lowest two bits of the instruction pointers (IAOQ0 and IAOQ1). On Linux we use privilege level 0 for the kernel and privilege level 3 for user-space. So userspace should not be allowed to modify IAOQ0 or IAOQ1 of a ptraced process to change it's privilege level to e.g. 0 to try to gain kernel privileges. This patch prevents such modifications by always setting the two lowest bits to one (which relates to privilege level 3 for user-space) if IAOQ0 or IAOQ1 are modified via ptrace calls in the native and compat ptrace paths. Link: https://bugs.gentoo.org/481768 Reported-by: Jeroen Roovers <jer@gentoo.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Tested-by: Rolf Eike Beer <eike-kernel@sf-tec.de> Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
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10835c8546
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@ -167,6 +167,9 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
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if ((addr & (sizeof(unsigned long)-1)) ||
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addr >= sizeof(struct pt_regs))
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break;
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if (addr == PT_IAOQ0 || addr == PT_IAOQ1) {
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data |= 3; /* ensure userspace privilege */
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}
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if ((addr >= PT_GR1 && addr <= PT_GR31) ||
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addr == PT_IAOQ0 || addr == PT_IAOQ1 ||
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(addr >= PT_FR0 && addr <= PT_FR31 + 4) ||
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@ -228,16 +231,18 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
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static compat_ulong_t translate_usr_offset(compat_ulong_t offset)
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{
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if (offset < 0)
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return sizeof(struct pt_regs);
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else if (offset <= 32*4) /* gr[0..31] */
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return offset * 2 + 4;
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else if (offset <= 32*4+32*8) /* gr[0..31] + fr[0..31] */
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return offset + 32*4;
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else if (offset < sizeof(struct pt_regs)/2 + 32*4)
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return offset * 2 + 4 - 32*8;
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compat_ulong_t pos;
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if (offset < 32*4) /* gr[0..31] */
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pos = offset * 2 + 4;
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else if (offset < 32*4+32*8) /* fr[0] ... fr[31] */
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pos = (offset - 32*4) + PT_FR0;
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else if (offset < sizeof(struct pt_regs)/2 + 32*4) /* sr[0] ... ipsw */
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pos = (offset - 32*4 - 32*8) * 2 + PT_SR0 + 4;
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else
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return sizeof(struct pt_regs);
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pos = sizeof(struct pt_regs);
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return pos;
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}
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long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
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@ -281,9 +286,12 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
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addr = translate_usr_offset(addr);
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if (addr >= sizeof(struct pt_regs))
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break;
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if (addr == PT_IAOQ0+4 || addr == PT_IAOQ1+4) {
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data |= 3; /* ensure userspace privilege */
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}
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if (addr >= PT_FR0 && addr <= PT_FR31 + 4) {
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/* Special case, fp regs are 64 bits anyway */
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*(__u64 *) ((char *) task_regs(child) + addr) = data;
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*(__u32 *) ((char *) task_regs(child) + addr) = data;
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ret = 0;
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}
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else if ((addr >= PT_GR1+4 && addr <= PT_GR31+4) ||
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