proc: remove kernel.maps_protect
After commit 831830b5a2
aka
"restrict reading from /proc/<pid>/maps to those who share ->mm or can ptrace"
sysctl stopped being relevant because commit moved security checks from ->show
time to ->start time (mm_for_maps()).
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
This commit is contained in:
Родитель
45acb8db06
Коммит
3bbfe05967
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@ -1332,13 +1332,6 @@ determine whether or not they are still functioning properly.
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Because the NMI watchdog shares registers with oprofile, by disabling the NMI
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watchdog, oprofile may have more registers to utilize.
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maps_protect
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------------
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Enables/Disables the protection of the per-process proc entries "maps" and
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"smaps". When enabled, the contents of these files are visible only to
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readers that are allowed to ptrace() the given process.
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msgmni
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------
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@ -148,9 +148,6 @@ static unsigned int pid_entry_count_dirs(const struct pid_entry *entries,
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return count;
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}
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int maps_protect;
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(maps_protect);
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static struct fs_struct *get_fs_struct(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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struct fs_struct *fs;
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@ -45,8 +45,6 @@ do { \
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extern int nommu_vma_show(struct seq_file *, struct vm_area_struct *);
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#endif
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extern int maps_protect;
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extern int proc_tid_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
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struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task);
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extern int proc_tgid_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
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@ -210,9 +210,6 @@ static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
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dev_t dev = 0;
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int len;
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if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
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return -EACCES;
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if (file) {
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struct inode *inode = vma->vm_file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
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dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
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@ -742,22 +739,11 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pagemap_operations = {
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#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
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extern int show_numa_map(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
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static int show_numa_map_checked(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
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{
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struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
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struct task_struct *task = priv->task;
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if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
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return -EACCES;
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return show_numa_map(m, v);
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}
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static const struct seq_operations proc_pid_numa_maps_op = {
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.start = m_start,
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.next = m_next,
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.stop = m_stop,
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.show = show_numa_map_checked
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.show = show_numa_map,
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};
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static int numa_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
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@ -110,11 +110,6 @@ int task_statm(struct mm_struct *mm, int *shared, int *text,
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static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, void *_vml)
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{
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struct vm_list_struct *vml = _vml;
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struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
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struct task_struct *task = priv->task;
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if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
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return -EACCES;
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return nommu_vma_show(m, vml->vma);
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}
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@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max;
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extern int sysctl_drop_caches;
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extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction;
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extern int compat_log;
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extern int maps_protect;
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extern int latencytop_enabled;
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extern int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max;
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#ifdef CONFIG_RCU_TORTURE_TEST
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@ -809,16 +808,6 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
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.mode = 0644,
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.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
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},
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
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{
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.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
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.procname = "maps_protect",
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.data = &maps_protect,
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.maxlen = sizeof(int),
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.mode = 0644,
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.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
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},
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#endif
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{
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.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
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