integrity-v5.19-fix

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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.19-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity fixes from Mimi Zohar:
 "Here are a number of fixes for recently found bugs.

  Only 'ima: fix violation measurement list record' was introduced in
  the current release. The rest address existing bugs"

* tag 'integrity-v5.19-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: Fix potential memory leak in ima_init_crypto()
  ima: force signature verification when CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG is configured
  ima: Fix a potential integer overflow in ima_appraise_measurement
  ima: fix violation measurement list record
  Revert "evm: Fix memleak in init_desc"

include/linux/kexec.h

@@ -452,6 +452,12 @@ static inline int kexec_crash_loaded(void) { return 0; }
 #define kexec_in_progress false
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+void set_kexec_sig_enforced(void);
+#else
+static inline void set_kexec_sig_enforced(void) {}
+#endif
+
 #endif /* !defined(__ASSEBMLY__) */
 
 #endif /* LINUX_KEXEC_H */

kernel/kexec_file.c

@@ -29,6 +29,15 @@
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include "kexec_internal.h"
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+static bool sig_enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE);
+
+void set_kexec_sig_enforced(void)
+{
+	sig_enforce = true;
+}
+#endif
+
 static int kexec_calculate_store_digests(struct kimage *image);
 
 /*
@@ -159,7 +168,7 @@ kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
 					   image->kernel_buf_len);
 	if (ret) {
 
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) {
+		if (sig_enforce) {
 			pr_notice("Enforced kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret);
 			return ret;
 		}

security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
 {
 	long rc;
 	const char *algo;
-	struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm = NULL;
+	struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm;
 	struct shash_desc *desc;
 
 	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
@@ -120,16 +120,13 @@ unlock:
 alloc:
 	desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
 			GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!desc) {
-		crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm);
+	if (!desc)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-	}
 
 	desc->tfm = *tfm;
 
 	rc = crypto_shash_init(desc);
 	if (rc) {
-		crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm);
 		kfree(desc);
 		return ERR_PTR(rc);
 	}

security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c

@@ -514,7 +514,8 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
+	status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value,
+				 rc < 0 ? 0 : rc, iint);
 	switch (status) {
 	case INTEGRITY_PASS:
 	case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE:

security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c

@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ out_array:
 
 		crypto_free_shash(ima_algo_array[i].tfm);
 	}
+	kfree(ima_algo_array);
 out:
 	crypto_free_shash(ima_shash_tfm);
 	return rc;

security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c

@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
 			set_module_sig_enforced();
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG))
+			set_kexec_sig_enforced();
 		return sb_arch_rules;
 	}
 	return NULL;

security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c

@@ -323,10 +323,10 @@ static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(const u8 *digest, u32 digestsize,
 	else
 		/*
 		 * If digest is NULL, the event being recorded is a violation.
-		 * Make room for the digest by increasing the offset of
-		 * IMA_DIGEST_SIZE.
+		 * Make room for the digest by increasing the offset by the
+		 * hash algorithm digest size.
 		 */
-		offset += IMA_DIGEST_SIZE;
+		offset += hash_digest_size[hash_algo];
 
 	return ima_write_template_field_data(buffer, offset + digestsize,
 					     fmt, field_data);