Livepatching changes for 5.12
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This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
Коммит
54ab35d6bb
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@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ Kernel Livepatching
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module-elf-format
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shadow-vars
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system-state
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reliable-stacktrace
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.. only:: subproject and html
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@ -6,20 +6,7 @@ This document outlines basic information about kernel livepatching.
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.. Table of Contents:
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1. Motivation
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2. Kprobes, Ftrace, Livepatching
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3. Consistency model
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4. Livepatch module
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4.1. New functions
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4.2. Metadata
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5. Livepatch life-cycle
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5.1. Loading
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5.2. Enabling
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5.3. Replacing
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5.4. Disabling
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5.5. Removing
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6. Sysfs
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7. Limitations
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.. contents:: :local:
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1. Motivation
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@ -7,14 +7,8 @@ This document outlines the Elf format requirements that livepatch modules must f
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.. Table of Contents
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1. Background and motivation
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2. Livepatch modinfo field
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3. Livepatch relocation sections
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3.1 Livepatch relocation section format
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4. Livepatch symbols
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4.1 A livepatch module's symbol table
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4.2 Livepatch symbol format
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5. Symbol table and Elf section access
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.. contents:: :local:
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1. Background and motivation
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============================
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@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
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===================
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Reliable Stacktrace
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===================
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This document outlines basic information about reliable stacktracing.
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.. Table of Contents:
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.. contents:: :local:
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1. Introduction
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===============
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The kernel livepatch consistency model relies on accurately identifying which
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functions may have live state and therefore may not be safe to patch. One way
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to identify which functions are live is to use a stacktrace.
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Existing stacktrace code may not always give an accurate picture of all
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functions with live state, and best-effort approaches which can be helpful for
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debugging are unsound for livepatching. Livepatching depends on architectures
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to provide a *reliable* stacktrace which ensures it never omits any live
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functions from a trace.
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2. Requirements
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===============
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Architectures must implement one of the reliable stacktrace functions.
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Architectures using CONFIG_ARCH_STACKWALK must implement
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'arch_stack_walk_reliable', and other architectures must implement
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'save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable'.
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Principally, the reliable stacktrace function must ensure that either:
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* The trace includes all functions that the task may be returned to, and the
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return code is zero to indicate that the trace is reliable.
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* The return code is non-zero to indicate that the trace is not reliable.
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.. note::
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In some cases it is legitimate to omit specific functions from the trace,
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but all other functions must be reported. These cases are described in
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futher detail below.
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Secondly, the reliable stacktrace function must be robust to cases where
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the stack or other unwind state is corrupt or otherwise unreliable. The
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function should attempt to detect such cases and return a non-zero error
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code, and should not get stuck in an infinite loop or access memory in
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an unsafe way. Specific cases are described in further detail below.
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3. Compile-time analysis
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========================
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To ensure that kernel code can be correctly unwound in all cases,
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architectures may need to verify that code has been compiled in a manner
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expected by the unwinder. For example, an unwinder may expect that
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functions manipulate the stack pointer in a limited way, or that all
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functions use specific prologue and epilogue sequences. Architectures
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with such requirements should verify the kernel compilation using
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objtool.
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In some cases, an unwinder may require metadata to correctly unwind.
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Where necessary, this metadata should be generated at build time using
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objtool.
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4. Considerations
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=================
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The unwinding process varies across architectures, their respective procedure
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call standards, and kernel configurations. This section describes common
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details that architectures should consider.
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4.1 Identifying successful termination
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--------------------------------------
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Unwinding may terminate early for a number of reasons, including:
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* Stack or frame pointer corruption.
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* Missing unwind support for an uncommon scenario, or a bug in the unwinder.
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* Dynamically generated code (e.g. eBPF) or foreign code (e.g. EFI runtime
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services) not following the conventions expected by the unwinder.
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To ensure that this does not result in functions being omitted from the trace,
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even if not caught by other checks, it is strongly recommended that
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architectures verify that a stacktrace ends at an expected location, e.g.
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* Within a specific function that is an entry point to the kernel.
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* At a specific location on a stack expected for a kernel entry point.
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* On a specific stack expected for a kernel entry point (e.g. if the
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architecture has separate task and IRQ stacks).
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4.2 Identifying unwindable code
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-------------------------------
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Unwinding typically relies on code following specific conventions (e.g.
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manipulating a frame pointer), but there can be code which may not follow these
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conventions and may require special handling in the unwinder, e.g.
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* Exception vectors and entry assembly.
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* Procedure Linkage Table (PLT) entries and veneer functions.
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* Trampoline assembly (e.g. ftrace, kprobes).
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* Dynamically generated code (e.g. eBPF, optprobe trampolines).
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* Foreign code (e.g. EFI runtime services).
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To ensure that such cases do not result in functions being omitted from a
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trace, it is strongly recommended that architectures positively identify code
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which is known to be reliable to unwind from, and reject unwinding from all
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other code.
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Kernel code including modules and eBPF can be distinguished from foreign code
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using '__kernel_text_address()'. Checking for this also helps to detect stack
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corruption.
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There are several ways an architecture may identify kernel code which is deemed
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unreliable to unwind from, e.g.
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* Placing such code into special linker sections, and rejecting unwinding from
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any code in these sections.
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* Identifying specific portions of code using bounds information.
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4.3 Unwinding across interrupts and exceptions
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----------------------------------------------
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At function call boundaries the stack and other unwind state is expected to be
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in a consistent state suitable for reliable unwinding, but this may not be the
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case part-way through a function. For example, during a function prologue or
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epilogue a frame pointer may be transiently invalid, or during the function
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body the return address may be held in an arbitrary general purpose register.
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For some architectures this may change at runtime as a result of dynamic
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instrumentation.
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If an interrupt or other exception is taken while the stack or other unwind
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state is in an inconsistent state, it may not be possible to reliably unwind,
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and it may not be possible to identify whether such unwinding will be reliable.
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See below for examples.
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Architectures which cannot identify when it is reliable to unwind such cases
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(or where it is never reliable) must reject unwinding across exception
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boundaries. Note that it may be reliable to unwind across certain
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exceptions (e.g. IRQ) but unreliable to unwind across other exceptions
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(e.g. NMI).
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Architectures which can identify when it is reliable to unwind such cases (or
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have no such cases) should attempt to unwind across exception boundaries, as
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doing so can prevent unnecessarily stalling livepatch consistency checks and
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permits livepatch transitions to complete more quickly.
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4.4 Rewriting of return addresses
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---------------------------------
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Some trampolines temporarily modify the return address of a function in order
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to intercept when that function returns with a return trampoline, e.g.
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* An ftrace trampoline may modify the return address so that function graph
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tracing can intercept returns.
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* A kprobes (or optprobes) trampoline may modify the return address so that
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kretprobes can intercept returns.
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When this happens, the original return address will not be in its usual
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location. For trampolines which are not subject to live patching, where an
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unwinder can reliably determine the original return address and no unwind state
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is altered by the trampoline, the unwinder may report the original return
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address in place of the trampoline and report this as reliable. Otherwise, an
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unwinder must report these cases as unreliable.
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Special care is required when identifying the original return address, as this
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information is not in a consistent location for the duration of the entry
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trampoline or return trampoline. For example, considering the x86_64
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'return_to_handler' return trampoline:
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.. code-block:: none
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SYM_CODE_START(return_to_handler)
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UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
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subq $24, %rsp
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/* Save the return values */
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movq %rax, (%rsp)
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movq %rdx, 8(%rsp)
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movq %rbp, %rdi
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call ftrace_return_to_handler
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movq %rax, %rdi
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movq 8(%rsp), %rdx
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movq (%rsp), %rax
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addq $24, %rsp
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JMP_NOSPEC rdi
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SYM_CODE_END(return_to_handler)
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While the traced function runs its return address on the stack points to
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the start of return_to_handler, and the original return address is stored in
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the task's cur_ret_stack. During this time the unwinder can find the return
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address using ftrace_graph_ret_addr().
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When the traced function returns to return_to_handler, there is no longer a
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return address on the stack, though the original return address is still stored
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in the task's cur_ret_stack. Within ftrace_return_to_handler(), the original
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return address is removed from cur_ret_stack and is transiently moved
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arbitrarily by the compiler before being returned in rax. The return_to_handler
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trampoline moves this into rdi before jumping to it.
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Architectures might not always be able to unwind such sequences, such as when
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ftrace_return_to_handler() has removed the address from cur_ret_stack, and the
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location of the return address cannot be reliably determined.
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It is recommended that architectures unwind cases where return_to_handler has
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not yet been returned to, but architectures are not required to unwind from the
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middle of return_to_handler and can report this as unreliable. Architectures
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are not required to unwind from other trampolines which modify the return
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address.
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4.5 Obscuring of return addresses
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---------------------------------
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Some trampolines do not rewrite the return address in order to intercept
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returns, but do transiently clobber the return address or other unwind state.
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For example, the x86_64 implementation of optprobes patches the probed function
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with a JMP instruction which targets the associated optprobe trampoline. When
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the probe is hit, the CPU will branch to the optprobe trampoline, and the
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address of the probed function is not held in any register or on the stack.
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Similarly, the arm64 implementation of DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS patches traced
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functions with the following:
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.. code-block:: none
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MOV X9, X30
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BL <trampoline>
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The MOV saves the link register (X30) into X9 to preserve the return address
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before the BL clobbers the link register and branches to the trampoline. At the
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start of the trampoline, the address of the traced function is in X9 rather
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than the link register as would usually be the case.
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Architectures must either ensure that unwinders either reliably unwind
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such cases, or report the unwinding as unreliable.
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4.6 Link register unreliability
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-------------------------------
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On some other architectures, 'call' instructions place the return address into a
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link register, and 'return' instructions consume the return address from the
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link register without modifying the register. On these architectures software
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must save the return address to the stack prior to making a function call. Over
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the duration of a function call, the return address may be held in the link
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register alone, on the stack alone, or in both locations.
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Unwinders typically assume the link register is always live, but this
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assumption can lead to unreliable stack traces. For example, consider the
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following arm64 assembly for a simple function:
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.. code-block:: none
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function:
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STP X29, X30, [SP, -16]!
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MOV X29, SP
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BL <other_function>
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LDP X29, X30, [SP], #16
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RET
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At entry to the function, the link register (x30) points to the caller, and the
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frame pointer (X29) points to the caller's frame including the caller's return
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address. The first two instructions create a new stackframe and update the
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frame pointer, and at this point the link register and the frame pointer both
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describe this function's return address. A trace at this point may describe
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this function twice, and if the function return is being traced, the unwinder
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may consume two entries from the fgraph return stack rather than one entry.
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The BL invokes 'other_function' with the link register pointing to this
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function's LDR and the frame pointer pointing to this function's stackframe.
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When 'other_function' returns, the link register is left pointing at the BL,
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and so a trace at this point could result in 'function' appearing twice in the
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backtrace.
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Similarly, a function may deliberately clobber the LR, e.g.
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.. code-block:: none
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caller:
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STP X29, X30, [SP, -16]!
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MOV X29, SP
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ADR LR, <callee>
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BLR LR
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LDP X29, X30, [SP], #16
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RET
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The ADR places the address of 'callee' into the LR, before the BLR branches to
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this address. If a trace is made immediately after the ADR, 'callee' will
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appear to be the parent of 'caller', rather than the child.
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Due to cases such as the above, it may only be possible to reliably consume a
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link register value at a function call boundary. Architectures where this is
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the case must reject unwinding across exception boundaries unless they can
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reliably identify when the LR or stack value should be used (e.g. using
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metadata generated by objtool).
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