evm: re-release
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity attacks. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method. The initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures). While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately (eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper: http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf. EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. A sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM. Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined at compile. EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks: evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr. To initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks. To verify the integrity of a security xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(). Changelog v7: - Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentation Changelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn's review) - fix URL in patch description - remove evm_hmac_size definition - use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size) - moved linux include before other includes - test for crypto_hash_setkey failure - fail earlier for invalid key - clear entire encrypted key, even on failure - check xattr name length before comparing xattr names Changelog: - locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex - using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1 operation. - replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin) - support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs (Dmitry Kasatkin) - iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised - Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin - Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
This commit is contained in:
Mimi Zohar
Родитель
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Коммит
66dbc325af
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@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
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What: security/evm
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Date: March 2011
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Contact: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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Description:
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EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs)
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against integrity attacks. The initial method maintains an
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HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the
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value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
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EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it
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with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation.
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The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until
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EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully
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loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM
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can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but
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returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM
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should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done
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in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part
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of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and
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loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to:
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Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. (A sample dracut
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patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables
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EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)
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@ -12,6 +12,13 @@
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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enum integrity_status {
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INTEGRITY_PASS = 0,
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INTEGRITY_FAIL,
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INTEGRITY_NOLABEL,
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INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN,
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};
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#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY
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extern int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
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extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
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@ -30,6 +30,9 @@
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#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1)
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/* Security namespace */
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#define XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX "evm"
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#define XATTR_NAME_EVM XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX
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#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
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#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
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@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
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#
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config INTEGRITY
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def_bool y
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depends on IMA
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depends on IMA || EVM
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source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
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source security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
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@ -8,3 +8,5 @@ integrity-y := iint.o
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subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima
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obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/built-in.o
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subdir-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm
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obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/built-in.o
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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
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config EVM
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boolean "EVM support"
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depends on SECURITY && KEYS && ENCRYPTED_KEYS
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select CRYPTO_HMAC
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select CRYPTO_MD5
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select CRYPTO_SHA1
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default n
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help
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EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against
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integrity attacks.
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If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
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#
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# Makefile for building the Extended Verification Module(EVM)
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#
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obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm.o
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evm-y := evm_main.o evm_crypto.o evm_secfs.o
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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
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*
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* Authors:
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* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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* Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
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*
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* File: evm.h
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*
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*/
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include "../integrity.h"
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extern int evm_initialized;
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extern char *evm_hmac;
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/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
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extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
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extern int evm_init_key(void);
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extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
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const char *req_xattr_name,
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const char *req_xattr_value,
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size_t req_xattr_value_len);
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extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
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const char *req_xattr_value,
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size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
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extern int evm_init_secfs(void);
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extern void evm_cleanup_secfs(void);
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@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
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*
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* Authors:
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* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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* Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
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*
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* File: evm_crypto.c
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* Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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#include <linux/xattr.h>
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#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
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#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
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#include "evm.h"
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#define EVMKEY "evm-key"
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#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
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static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
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static int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
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static int init_desc(struct hash_desc *desc)
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{
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int rc;
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desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(evm_hmac, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
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if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
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pr_info("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n",
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evm_hmac, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm));
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rc = PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
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return rc;
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}
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desc->flags = 0;
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rc = crypto_hash_setkey(desc->tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
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if (rc)
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goto out;
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rc = crypto_hash_init(desc);
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out:
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if (rc)
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crypto_free_hash(desc->tfm);
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return rc;
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}
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/* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode
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* specific info.
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*
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* (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete
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* protection.)
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*/
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static void hmac_add_misc(struct hash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
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char *digest)
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{
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struct h_misc {
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unsigned long ino;
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__u32 generation;
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uid_t uid;
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gid_t gid;
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umode_t mode;
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} hmac_misc;
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struct scatterlist sg[1];
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memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc);
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hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
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hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
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hmac_misc.uid = inode->i_uid;
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hmac_misc.gid = inode->i_gid;
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hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
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sg_init_one(sg, &hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
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crypto_hash_update(desc, sg, sizeof hmac_misc);
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crypto_hash_final(desc, digest);
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}
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/*
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* Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs.
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*
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* Instead of retrieving the requested xattr, for performance, calculate
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* the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for
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* each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory.
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*/
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int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
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const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
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char *digest)
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{
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struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
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struct hash_desc desc;
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struct scatterlist sg[1];
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char **xattrname;
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size_t xattr_size = 0;
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char *xattr_value = NULL;
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int error;
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int size;
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if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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error = init_desc(&desc);
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if (error)
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return error;
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error = -ENODATA;
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for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
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if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
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&& !strcmp(*xattrname, req_xattr_name)) {
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error = 0;
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sg_init_one(sg, req_xattr_value, req_xattr_value_len);
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crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, req_xattr_value_len);
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continue;
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}
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size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, *xattrname,
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&xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS);
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if (size == -ENOMEM) {
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error = -ENOMEM;
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goto out;
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}
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if (size < 0)
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continue;
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error = 0;
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xattr_size = size;
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sg_init_one(sg, xattr_value, xattr_size);
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crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, xattr_size);
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}
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hmac_add_misc(&desc, inode, digest);
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kfree(xattr_value);
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out:
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crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
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return error;
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}
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/*
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* Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr
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*
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* Expects to be called with i_mutex locked.
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*/
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int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
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const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
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{
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struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
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u8 hmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
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int rc = 0;
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rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
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xattr_value_len, hmac);
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if (rc == 0)
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rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
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hmac, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
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else if (rc == -ENODATA)
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rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
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return rc;
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}
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/*
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* Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC
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*/
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int evm_init_key(void)
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{
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struct key *evm_key;
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struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
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int rc = 0;
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evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(evm_key))
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return -ENOENT;
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down_read(&evm_key->sem);
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ekp = evm_key->payload.data;
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if (ekp->decrypted_datalen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
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rc = -EINVAL;
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goto out;
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}
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memcpy(evmkey, ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
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out:
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/* burn the original key contents */
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memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
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up_read(&evm_key->sem);
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key_put(evm_key);
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return rc;
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}
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@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
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*
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* Author:
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* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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* Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
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*
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* File: evm_main.c
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* implements evm_inode_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr,
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* evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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#include <linux/xattr.h>
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#include <linux/integrity.h>
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#include "evm.h"
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int evm_initialized;
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char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
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char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
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XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
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XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
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#endif
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XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
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NULL
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};
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/*
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* evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr
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*
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* Compute the HMAC on the dentry's protected set of extended attributes
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* and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr. (For performance,
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* use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the
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* HMAC.)
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*
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* Returns integrity status
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*/
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static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
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const char *xattr_name,
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char *xattr_value,
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size_t xattr_value_len,
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struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
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{
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char hmac_val[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
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int rc;
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if (iint->hmac_status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)
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return iint->hmac_status;
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memset(hmac_val, 0, sizeof hmac_val);
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rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
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xattr_value_len, hmac_val);
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if (rc < 0)
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return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
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rc = vfs_xattr_cmp(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, hmac_val, sizeof hmac_val,
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GFP_NOFS);
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if (rc < 0)
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goto err_out;
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iint->hmac_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
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return iint->hmac_status;
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err_out:
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switch (rc) {
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case -ENODATA: /* file not labelled */
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iint->hmac_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
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break;
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case -EINVAL:
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iint->hmac_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
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break;
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default:
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iint->hmac_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
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}
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return iint->hmac_status;
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}
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static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
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{
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char **xattrname;
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int namelen;
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int found = 0;
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namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
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for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
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if ((strlen(*xattrname) == namelen)
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&& (strncmp(req_xattr_name, *xattrname, namelen) == 0)) {
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found = 1;
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break;
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||||
}
|
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}
|
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return found;
|
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}
|
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|
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/**
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* evm_verifyxattr - verify the integrity of the requested xattr
|
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* @dentry: object of the verify xattr
|
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* @xattr_name: requested xattr
|
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* @xattr_value: requested xattr value
|
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* @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
|
||||
*
|
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* Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored
|
||||
* security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length
|
||||
* previously retrieved to calculate the HMAC.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Returns the xattr integrity status.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
|
||||
* is executed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
|
||||
const char *xattr_name,
|
||||
void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
|
||||
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
|
||||
enum integrity_status status;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
|
||||
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
|
||||
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
|
||||
if (!iint)
|
||||
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
status = evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
|
||||
xattr_value_len, iint);
|
||||
return status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
|
||||
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
|
||||
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
||||
return -EPERM;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
|
||||
* @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
|
||||
* @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
|
||||
* @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
|
||||
* @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Prevent 'security.evm' from being modified
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
|
||||
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
|
||||
xattr_value_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
|
||||
* @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
|
||||
* @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Prevent 'security.evm' from being removed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes
|
||||
* @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
|
||||
* @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
|
||||
* @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
|
||||
* @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
|
||||
* __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's
|
||||
* i_mutex lock.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
|
||||
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr
|
||||
* @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
|
||||
* @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
|
||||
evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
|
||||
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata
|
||||
* @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
|
||||
* @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status
|
||||
*
|
||||
* For now, update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect UID/GID
|
||||
* changes.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
|
||||
* to lock the inode's i_mutex.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (!evm_initialized)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
|
||||
evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static struct crypto_hash *tfm_hmac; /* preload crypto alg */
|
||||
static int __init init_evm(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int error;
|
||||
|
||||
tfm_hmac = crypto_alloc_hash(evm_hmac, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
|
||||
error = evm_init_secfs();
|
||||
if (error < 0) {
|
||||
printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: Error registering secfs\n");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
err:
|
||||
return error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void __exit cleanup_evm(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
evm_cleanup_secfs();
|
||||
crypto_free_hash(tfm_hmac);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* evm_display_config - list the EVM protected security extended attributes
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int __init evm_display_config(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
char **xattrname;
|
||||
|
||||
for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++)
|
||||
printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: %s\n", *xattrname);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pure_initcall(evm_display_config);
|
||||
late_initcall(init_evm);
|
||||
|
||||
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Extended Verification Module");
|
||||
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
|
|||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Authors:
|
||||
* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
||||
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
||||
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* File: evm_secfs.c
|
||||
* - Used to signal when key is on keyring
|
||||
* - Get the key and enable EVM
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/module.h>
|
||||
#include "evm.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static struct dentry *evm_init_tpm;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* evm_read_key - read() for <securityfs>/evm
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @filp: file pointer, not actually used
|
||||
* @buf: where to put the result
|
||||
* @count: maximum to send along
|
||||
* @ppos: where to start
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
|
||||
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
||||
{
|
||||
char temp[80];
|
||||
ssize_t rc;
|
||||
|
||||
if (*ppos != 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
sprintf(temp, "%d", evm_initialized);
|
||||
rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
|
||||
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* evm_write_key - write() for <securityfs>/evm
|
||||
* @file: file pointer, not actually used
|
||||
* @buf: where to get the data from
|
||||
* @count: bytes sent
|
||||
* @ppos: where to start
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Used to signal that key is on the kernel key ring.
|
||||
* - get the integrity hmac key from the kernel key ring
|
||||
* - create list of hmac protected extended attributes
|
||||
* Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
|
||||
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
||||
{
|
||||
char temp[80];
|
||||
int i, error;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || evm_initialized)
|
||||
return -EPERM;
|
||||
|
||||
if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
|
||||
return -EFAULT;
|
||||
|
||||
temp[count] = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
if ((sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1) || (i != 1))
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
|
||||
error = evm_init_key();
|
||||
if (!error) {
|
||||
evm_initialized = 1;
|
||||
pr_info("EVM: initialized\n");
|
||||
} else
|
||||
pr_err("EVM: initialization failed\n");
|
||||
return count;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const struct file_operations evm_key_ops = {
|
||||
.read = evm_read_key,
|
||||
.write = evm_write_key,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
int __init evm_init_secfs(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int error = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
evm_init_tpm = securityfs_create_file("evm", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
|
||||
NULL, NULL, &evm_key_ops);
|
||||
if (!evm_init_tpm || IS_ERR(evm_init_tpm))
|
||||
error = -EFAULT;
|
||||
return error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void __exit evm_cleanup_secfs(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (evm_init_tpm)
|
||||
securityfs_remove(evm_init_tpm);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
|
|||
iint->version = 0;
|
||||
iint->flags = 0UL;
|
||||
mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
|
||||
iint->hmac_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
|
|||
unsigned char flags;
|
||||
u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
|
||||
struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */
|
||||
enum integrity_status hmac_status;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
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