* Fix the PMCR_EL0 reset value after the PMU rework
 
 * Correctly handle S2 fault triggered by a S1 page table walk
   by not always classifying it as a write, as this breaks on
   R/O memslots
 
 * Document why we cannot exit with KVM_EXIT_MMIO when taking
   a write fault from a S1 PTW on a R/O memslot
 
 * Put the Apple M2 on the naughty list for not being able to
   correctly implement the vgic SEIS feature, just like the M1
   before it
 
 * Reviewer updates: Alex is stepping down, replaced by Zenghui
 
 x86:
 
 * Fix various rare locking issues in Xen emulation and teach lockdep
   to detect them
 
 * Documentation improvements
 
 * Do not return host topology information from KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "ARM:

   - Fix the PMCR_EL0 reset value after the PMU rework

   - Correctly handle S2 fault triggered by a S1 page table walk by not
     always classifying it as a write, as this breaks on R/O memslots

   - Document why we cannot exit with KVM_EXIT_MMIO when taking a write
     fault from a S1 PTW on a R/O memslot

   - Put the Apple M2 on the naughty list for not being able to
     correctly implement the vgic SEIS feature, just like the M1 before
     it

   - Reviewer updates: Alex is stepping down, replaced by Zenghui

  x86:

   - Fix various rare locking issues in Xen emulation and teach lockdep
     to detect them

   - Documentation improvements

   - Do not return host topology information from KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  KVM: x86/xen: Avoid deadlock by adding kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock leaf node lock
  KVM: Ensure lockdep knows about kvm->lock vs. vcpu->mutex ordering rule
  KVM: x86/xen: Fix potential deadlock in kvm_xen_update_runstate_guest()
  KVM: x86/xen: Fix lockdep warning on "recursive" gpc locking
  Documentation: kvm: fix SRCU locking order docs
  KVM: x86: Do not return host topology information from KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
  KVM: nSVM: clarify recalc_intercepts() wrt CR8
  MAINTAINERS: Remove myself as a KVM/arm64 reviewer
  MAINTAINERS: Add Zenghui Yu as a KVM/arm64 reviewer
  KVM: arm64: vgic: Add Apple M2 cpus to the list of broken SEIS implementations
  KVM: arm64: Convert FSC_* over to ESR_ELx_FSC_*
  KVM: arm64: Document the behaviour of S1PTW faults on RO memslots
  KVM: arm64: Fix S1PTW handling on RO memslots
  KVM: arm64: PMU: Fix PMCR_EL0 reset value
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2023-01-13 14:41:50 -06:00
Родитель f5fe24ef17 310bc39546
Коммит 92783a90bc
17 изменённых файлов: 175 добавлений и 115 удалений

Просмотреть файл

@ -1354,6 +1354,14 @@ the memory region are automatically reflected into the guest. For example, an
mmap() that affects the region will be made visible immediately. Another
example is madvise(MADV_DROP).
Note: On arm64, a write generated by the page-table walker (to update
the Access and Dirty flags, for example) never results in a
KVM_EXIT_MMIO exit when the slot has the KVM_MEM_READONLY flag. This
is because KVM cannot provide the data that would be written by the
page-table walker, making it impossible to emulate the access.
Instead, an abort (data abort if the cause of the page-table update
was a load or a store, instruction abort if it was an instruction
fetch) is injected in the guest.
4.36 KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR
---------------------
@ -8310,6 +8318,20 @@ CPU[EAX=1]:ECX[24] (TSC_DEADLINE) is not reported by ``KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID``
It can be enabled if ``KVM_CAP_TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER`` is present and the kernel
has enabled in-kernel emulation of the local APIC.
CPU topology
~~~~~~~~~~~~
Several CPUID values include topology information for the host CPU:
0x0b and 0x1f for Intel systems, 0x8000001e for AMD systems. Different
versions of KVM return different values for this information and userspace
should not rely on it. Currently they return all zeroes.
If userspace wishes to set up a guest topology, it should be careful that
the values of these three leaves differ for each CPU. In particular,
the APIC ID is found in EDX for all subleaves of 0x0b and 0x1f, and in EAX
for 0x8000001e; the latter also encodes the core id and node id in bits
7:0 of EBX and ECX respectively.
Obsolete ioctls and capabilities
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

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@ -24,21 +24,22 @@ The acquisition orders for mutexes are as follows:
For SRCU:
- ``synchronize_srcu(&kvm->srcu)`` is called _inside_
the kvm->slots_lock critical section, therefore kvm->slots_lock
cannot be taken inside a kvm->srcu read-side critical section.
Instead, kvm->slots_arch_lock is released before the call
to ``synchronize_srcu()`` and _can_ be taken inside a
kvm->srcu read-side critical section.
- ``synchronize_srcu(&kvm->srcu)`` is called inside critical sections
for kvm->lock, vcpu->mutex and kvm->slots_lock. These locks _cannot_
be taken inside a kvm->srcu read-side critical section; that is, the
following is broken::
- kvm->lock is taken inside kvm->srcu, therefore
``synchronize_srcu(&kvm->srcu)`` cannot be called inside
a kvm->lock critical section. If you cannot delay the
call until after kvm->lock is released, use ``call_srcu``.
srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
- kvm->slots_arch_lock instead is released before the call to
``synchronize_srcu()``. It _can_ therefore be taken inside a
kvm->srcu read-side critical section, for example while processing
a vmexit.
On x86:
- vcpu->mutex is taken outside kvm->arch.hyperv.hv_lock
- vcpu->mutex is taken outside kvm->arch.hyperv.hv_lock and kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock
- kvm->arch.mmu_lock is an rwlock. kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages_lock and
kvm->arch.mmu_unsync_pages_lock are taken inside kvm->arch.mmu_lock, and

Просмотреть файл

@ -11356,9 +11356,9 @@ F: virt/kvm/*
KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR ARM64 (KVM/arm64)
M: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
R: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
R: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
R: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
R: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
R: Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
L: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev
L: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu (deprecated, moderated for non-subscribers)

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@ -124,6 +124,8 @@
#define APPLE_CPU_PART_M1_FIRESTORM_PRO 0x025
#define APPLE_CPU_PART_M1_ICESTORM_MAX 0x028
#define APPLE_CPU_PART_M1_FIRESTORM_MAX 0x029
#define APPLE_CPU_PART_M2_BLIZZARD 0x032
#define APPLE_CPU_PART_M2_AVALANCHE 0x033
#define AMPERE_CPU_PART_AMPERE1 0xAC3
@ -177,6 +179,8 @@
#define MIDR_APPLE_M1_FIRESTORM_PRO MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_APPLE, APPLE_CPU_PART_M1_FIRESTORM_PRO)
#define MIDR_APPLE_M1_ICESTORM_MAX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_APPLE, APPLE_CPU_PART_M1_ICESTORM_MAX)
#define MIDR_APPLE_M1_FIRESTORM_MAX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_APPLE, APPLE_CPU_PART_M1_FIRESTORM_MAX)
#define MIDR_APPLE_M2_BLIZZARD MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_APPLE, APPLE_CPU_PART_M2_BLIZZARD)
#define MIDR_APPLE_M2_AVALANCHE MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_APPLE, APPLE_CPU_PART_M2_AVALANCHE)
#define MIDR_AMPERE1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_AMPERE, AMPERE_CPU_PART_AMPERE1)
/* Fujitsu Erratum 010001 affects A64FX 1.0 and 1.1, (v0r0 and v1r0) */

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@ -114,6 +114,15 @@
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_ACCESS (0x08)
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT (0x04)
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM (0x0C)
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW0 (0x14)
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW1 (0x15)
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW2 (0x16)
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW3 (0x17)
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC (0x18)
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW0 (0x1c)
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW1 (0x1d)
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW2 (0x1e)
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW3 (0x1f)
/* ISS field definitions for Data Aborts */
#define ESR_ELx_ISV_SHIFT (24)

Просмотреть файл

@ -319,21 +319,6 @@
BIT(18) | \
GENMASK(16, 15))
/* For compatibility with fault code shared with 32-bit */
#define FSC_FAULT ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT
#define FSC_ACCESS ESR_ELx_FSC_ACCESS
#define FSC_PERM ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM
#define FSC_SEA ESR_ELx_FSC_EXTABT
#define FSC_SEA_TTW0 (0x14)
#define FSC_SEA_TTW1 (0x15)
#define FSC_SEA_TTW2 (0x16)
#define FSC_SEA_TTW3 (0x17)
#define FSC_SECC (0x18)
#define FSC_SECC_TTW0 (0x1c)
#define FSC_SECC_TTW1 (0x1d)
#define FSC_SECC_TTW2 (0x1e)
#define FSC_SECC_TTW3 (0x1f)
/* Hyp Prefetch Fault Address Register (HPFAR/HDFAR) */
#define HPFAR_MASK (~UL(0xf))
/*

Просмотреть файл

@ -349,16 +349,16 @@ static __always_inline u8 kvm_vcpu_trap_get_fault_level(const struct kvm_vcpu *v
static __always_inline bool kvm_vcpu_abt_issea(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
switch (kvm_vcpu_trap_get_fault(vcpu)) {
case FSC_SEA:
case FSC_SEA_TTW0:
case FSC_SEA_TTW1:
case FSC_SEA_TTW2:
case FSC_SEA_TTW3:
case FSC_SECC:
case FSC_SECC_TTW0:
case FSC_SECC_TTW1:
case FSC_SECC_TTW2:
case FSC_SECC_TTW3:
case ESR_ELx_FSC_EXTABT:
case ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW0:
case ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW1:
case ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW2:
case ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW3:
case ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC:
case ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW0:
case ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW1:
case ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW2:
case ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW3:
return true;
default:
return false;
@ -373,8 +373,26 @@ static __always_inline int kvm_vcpu_sys_get_rt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static inline bool kvm_is_write_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(vcpu))
return true;
if (kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(vcpu)) {
/*
* Only a permission fault on a S1PTW should be
* considered as a write. Otherwise, page tables baked
* in a read-only memslot will result in an exception
* being delivered in the guest.
*
* The drawback is that we end-up faulting twice if the
* guest is using any of HW AF/DB: a translation fault
* to map the page containing the PT (read only at
* first), then a permission fault to allow the flags
* to be set.
*/
switch (kvm_vcpu_trap_get_fault_type(vcpu)) {
case ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
if (kvm_vcpu_trap_is_iabt(vcpu))
return false;

Просмотреть файл

@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static inline bool __get_fault_info(u64 esr, struct kvm_vcpu_fault_info *fault)
*/
if (!(esr & ESR_ELx_S1PTW) &&
(cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_834220) ||
(esr & ESR_ELx_FSC_TYPE) == FSC_PERM)) {
(esr & ESR_ELx_FSC_TYPE) == ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM)) {
if (!__translate_far_to_hpfar(far, &hpfar))
return false;
} else {

Просмотреть файл

@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ static bool kvm_hyp_handle_dabt_low(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
if (static_branch_unlikely(&vgic_v2_cpuif_trap)) {
bool valid;
valid = kvm_vcpu_trap_get_fault_type(vcpu) == FSC_FAULT &&
valid = kvm_vcpu_trap_get_fault_type(vcpu) == ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT &&
kvm_vcpu_dabt_isvalid(vcpu) &&
!kvm_vcpu_abt_issea(vcpu) &&
!kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(vcpu);

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@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
exec_fault = kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(vcpu);
VM_BUG_ON(write_fault && exec_fault);
if (fault_status == FSC_PERM && !write_fault && !exec_fault) {
if (fault_status == ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM && !write_fault && !exec_fault) {
kvm_err("Unexpected L2 read permission error\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
@ -1277,7 +1277,8 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
* only exception to this is when dirty logging is enabled at runtime
* and a write fault needs to collapse a block entry into a table.
*/
if (fault_status != FSC_PERM || (logging_active && write_fault)) {
if (fault_status != ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM ||
(logging_active && write_fault)) {
ret = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(memcache,
kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages(kvm));
if (ret)
@ -1342,7 +1343,8 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
* backed by a THP and thus use block mapping if possible.
*/
if (vma_pagesize == PAGE_SIZE && !(force_pte || device)) {
if (fault_status == FSC_PERM && fault_granule > PAGE_SIZE)
if (fault_status == ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM &&
fault_granule > PAGE_SIZE)
vma_pagesize = fault_granule;
else
vma_pagesize = transparent_hugepage_adjust(kvm, memslot,
@ -1350,7 +1352,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
&fault_ipa);
}
if (fault_status != FSC_PERM && !device && kvm_has_mte(kvm)) {
if (fault_status != ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM && !device && kvm_has_mte(kvm)) {
/* Check the VMM hasn't introduced a new disallowed VMA */
if (kvm_vma_mte_allowed(vma)) {
sanitise_mte_tags(kvm, pfn, vma_pagesize);
@ -1376,7 +1378,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
* permissions only if vma_pagesize equals fault_granule. Otherwise,
* kvm_pgtable_stage2_map() should be called to change block size.
*/
if (fault_status == FSC_PERM && vma_pagesize == fault_granule)
if (fault_status == ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM && vma_pagesize == fault_granule)
ret = kvm_pgtable_stage2_relax_perms(pgt, fault_ipa, prot);
else
ret = kvm_pgtable_stage2_map(pgt, fault_ipa, vma_pagesize,
@ -1441,7 +1443,7 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
fault_ipa = kvm_vcpu_get_fault_ipa(vcpu);
is_iabt = kvm_vcpu_trap_is_iabt(vcpu);
if (fault_status == FSC_FAULT) {
if (fault_status == ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT) {
/* Beyond sanitised PARange (which is the IPA limit) */
if (fault_ipa >= BIT_ULL(get_kvm_ipa_limit())) {
kvm_inject_size_fault(vcpu);
@ -1476,8 +1478,9 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kvm_vcpu_get_hfar(vcpu), fault_ipa);
/* Check the stage-2 fault is trans. fault or write fault */
if (fault_status != FSC_FAULT && fault_status != FSC_PERM &&
fault_status != FSC_ACCESS) {
if (fault_status != ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT &&
fault_status != ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM &&
fault_status != ESR_ELx_FSC_ACCESS) {
kvm_err("Unsupported FSC: EC=%#x xFSC=%#lx ESR_EL2=%#lx\n",
kvm_vcpu_trap_get_class(vcpu),
(unsigned long)kvm_vcpu_trap_get_fault(vcpu),
@ -1539,7 +1542,7 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
/* Userspace should not be able to register out-of-bounds IPAs */
VM_BUG_ON(fault_ipa >= kvm_phys_size(vcpu->kvm));
if (fault_status == FSC_ACCESS) {
if (fault_status == ESR_ELx_FSC_ACCESS) {
handle_access_fault(vcpu, fault_ipa);
ret = 1;
goto out_unlock;

Просмотреть файл

@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static void reset_pmcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
return;
/* Only preserve PMCR_EL0.N, and reset the rest to 0 */
pmcr = read_sysreg(pmcr_el0) & ARMV8_PMU_PMCR_N_MASK;
pmcr = read_sysreg(pmcr_el0) & (ARMV8_PMU_PMCR_N_MASK << ARMV8_PMU_PMCR_N_SHIFT);
if (!kvm_supports_32bit_el0())
pmcr |= ARMV8_PMU_PMCR_LC;

Просмотреть файл

@ -616,6 +616,8 @@ static const struct midr_range broken_seis[] = {
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_APPLE_M1_FIRESTORM_PRO),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_APPLE_M1_ICESTORM_MAX),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_APPLE_M1_FIRESTORM_MAX),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_APPLE_M2_BLIZZARD),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_APPLE_M2_AVALANCHE),
{},
};

Просмотреть файл

@ -1111,6 +1111,7 @@ struct msr_bitmap_range {
/* Xen emulation context */
struct kvm_xen {
struct mutex xen_lock;
u32 xen_version;
bool long_mode;
bool runstate_update_flag;

Просмотреть файл

@ -770,15 +770,21 @@ struct kvm_cpuid_array {
int nent;
};
static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *do_host_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array,
u32 function, u32 index)
static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *get_next_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
if (array->nent >= array->maxnent)
return NULL;
entry = &array->entries[array->nent++];
return &array->entries[array->nent++];
}
static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *do_host_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array,
u32 function, u32 index)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry = get_next_cpuid(array);
if (!entry)
return NULL;
memset(entry, 0, sizeof(*entry));
entry->function = function;
@ -956,22 +962,13 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
entry->edx = edx.full;
break;
}
/*
* Per Intel's SDM, the 0x1f is a superset of 0xb,
* thus they can be handled by common code.
*/
case 0x1f:
case 0xb:
/*
* Populate entries until the level type (ECX[15:8]) of the
* previous entry is zero. Note, CPUID EAX.{0x1f,0xb}.0 is
* the starting entry, filled by the primary do_host_cpuid().
* No topology; a valid topology is indicated by the presence
* of subleaf 1.
*/
for (i = 1; entry->ecx & 0xff00; ++i) {
entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, i);
if (!entry)
goto out;
}
entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = 0;
break;
case 0xd: {
u64 permitted_xcr0 = kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 & xstate_get_guest_group_perm();
@ -1202,6 +1199,9 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
break;
case 0x8000001e:
/* Do not return host topology information. */
entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = 0;
entry->edx = 0; /* reserved */
break;
case 0x8000001F:
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV)) {

Просмотреть файл

@ -138,15 +138,13 @@ void recalc_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
c->intercepts[i] = h->intercepts[i];
if (g->int_ctl & V_INTR_MASKING_MASK) {
/* We only want the cr8 intercept bits of L1 */
vmcb_clr_intercept(c, INTERCEPT_CR8_READ);
vmcb_clr_intercept(c, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
/*
* Once running L2 with HF_VINTR_MASK, EFLAGS.IF does not
* affect any interrupt we may want to inject; therefore,
* interrupt window vmexits are irrelevant to L0.
* Once running L2 with HF_VINTR_MASK, EFLAGS.IF and CR8
* does not affect any interrupt we may want to inject;
* therefore, writes to CR8 are irrelevant to L0, as are
* interrupt window vmexits.
*/
vmcb_clr_intercept(c, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
vmcb_clr_intercept(c, INTERCEPT_VINTR);
}

Просмотреть файл

@ -271,7 +271,15 @@ static void kvm_xen_update_runstate_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *v, bool atomic)
* Attempt to obtain the GPC lock on *both* (if there are two)
* gfn_to_pfn caches that cover the region.
*/
read_lock_irqsave(&gpc1->lock, flags);
if (atomic) {
local_irq_save(flags);
if (!read_trylock(&gpc1->lock)) {
local_irq_restore(flags);
return;
}
} else {
read_lock_irqsave(&gpc1->lock, flags);
}
while (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc1, user_len1)) {
read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc1->lock, flags);
@ -304,9 +312,18 @@ static void kvm_xen_update_runstate_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *v, bool atomic)
* The guest's runstate_info is split across two pages and we
* need to hold and validate both GPCs simultaneously. We can
* declare a lock ordering GPC1 > GPC2 because nothing else
* takes them more than one at a time.
* takes them more than one at a time. Set a subclass on the
* gpc1 lock to make lockdep shut up about it.
*/
read_lock(&gpc2->lock);
lock_set_subclass(&gpc1->lock.dep_map, 1, _THIS_IP_);
if (atomic) {
if (!read_trylock(&gpc2->lock)) {
read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc1->lock, flags);
return;
}
} else {
read_lock(&gpc2->lock);
}
if (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc2, user_len2)) {
read_unlock(&gpc2->lock);
@ -590,26 +607,26 @@ int kvm_xen_hvm_set_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr *data)
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && data->u.long_mode) {
r = -EINVAL;
} else {
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
kvm->arch.xen.long_mode = !!data->u.long_mode;
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
r = 0;
}
break;
case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO:
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
r = kvm_xen_shared_info_init(kvm, data->u.shared_info.gfn);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
break;
case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_UPCALL_VECTOR:
if (data->u.vector && data->u.vector < 0x10)
r = -EINVAL;
else {
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
kvm->arch.xen.upcall_vector = data->u.vector;
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
r = 0;
}
break;
@ -619,9 +636,9 @@ int kvm_xen_hvm_set_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr *data)
break;
case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_XEN_VERSION:
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
kvm->arch.xen.xen_version = data->u.xen_version;
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
r = 0;
break;
@ -630,9 +647,9 @@ int kvm_xen_hvm_set_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr *data)
r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
kvm->arch.xen.runstate_update_flag = !!data->u.runstate_update_flag;
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
r = 0;
break;
@ -647,7 +664,7 @@ int kvm_xen_hvm_get_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr *data)
{
int r = -ENOENT;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
switch (data->type) {
case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_LONG_MODE:
@ -686,7 +703,7 @@ int kvm_xen_hvm_get_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr *data)
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
return r;
}
@ -694,7 +711,7 @@ int kvm_xen_vcpu_set_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr *data)
{
int idx, r = -ENOENT;
mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
switch (data->type) {
@ -922,7 +939,7 @@ int kvm_xen_vcpu_set_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr *data)
}
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
return r;
}
@ -930,7 +947,7 @@ int kvm_xen_vcpu_get_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr *data)
{
int r = -ENOENT;
mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
switch (data->type) {
case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO:
@ -1013,7 +1030,7 @@ int kvm_xen_vcpu_get_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr *data)
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
return r;
}
@ -1106,7 +1123,7 @@ int kvm_xen_hvm_config(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_config *xhc)
xhc->blob_size_32 || xhc->blob_size_64))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
if (xhc->msr && !kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr)
static_branch_inc(&kvm_xen_enabled.key);
@ -1115,7 +1132,7 @@ int kvm_xen_hvm_config(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_config *xhc)
memcpy(&kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config, xhc, sizeof(*xhc));
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
return 0;
}
@ -1658,15 +1675,7 @@ static int kvm_xen_set_evtchn(struct kvm_xen_evtchn *xe, struct kvm *kvm)
mm_borrowed = true;
}
/*
* For the irqfd workqueue, using the main kvm->lock mutex is
* fine since this function is invoked from kvm_set_irq() with
* no other lock held, no srcu. In future if it will be called
* directly from a vCPU thread (e.g. on hypercall for an IPI)
* then it may need to switch to using a leaf-node mutex for
* serializing the shared_info mapping.
*/
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
/*
* It is theoretically possible for the page to be unmapped
@ -1695,7 +1704,7 @@ static int kvm_xen_set_evtchn(struct kvm_xen_evtchn *xe, struct kvm *kvm)
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
} while(!rc);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
if (mm_borrowed)
kthread_unuse_mm(kvm->mm);
@ -1811,7 +1820,7 @@ static int kvm_xen_eventfd_update(struct kvm *kvm,
int ret;
/* Protect writes to evtchnfd as well as the idr lookup. */
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
evtchnfd = idr_find(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports, port);
ret = -ENOENT;
@ -1842,7 +1851,7 @@ static int kvm_xen_eventfd_update(struct kvm *kvm,
}
ret = 0;
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
return ret;
}
@ -1905,10 +1914,10 @@ static int kvm_xen_eventfd_assign(struct kvm *kvm,
evtchnfd->deliver.port.priority = data->u.evtchn.deliver.port.priority;
}
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
ret = idr_alloc(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports, evtchnfd, port, port + 1,
GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
if (ret >= 0)
return 0;
@ -1926,9 +1935,9 @@ static int kvm_xen_eventfd_deassign(struct kvm *kvm, u32 port)
{
struct evtchnfd *evtchnfd;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
evtchnfd = idr_remove(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports, port);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
if (!evtchnfd)
return -ENOENT;
@ -1946,7 +1955,7 @@ static int kvm_xen_eventfd_reset(struct kvm *kvm)
int i;
int n = 0;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
/*
* Because synchronize_srcu() cannot be called inside the
@ -1958,7 +1967,7 @@ static int kvm_xen_eventfd_reset(struct kvm *kvm)
all_evtchnfds = kmalloc_array(n, sizeof(struct evtchnfd *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!all_evtchnfds) {
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
return -ENOMEM;
}
@ -1967,7 +1976,7 @@ static int kvm_xen_eventfd_reset(struct kvm *kvm)
all_evtchnfds[n++] = evtchnfd;
idr_remove(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports, evtchnfd->send_port);
}
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
synchronize_srcu(&kvm->srcu);
@ -2069,6 +2078,7 @@ void kvm_xen_destroy_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
void kvm_xen_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
{
mutex_init(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
idr_init(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports);
kvm_gpc_init(&kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache, kvm, NULL, KVM_HOST_USES_PFN);
}

Просмотреть файл

@ -3954,6 +3954,13 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, u32 id)
}
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
/* Ensure that lockdep knows vcpu->mutex is taken *inside* kvm->lock */
mutex_lock(&vcpu->mutex);
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
#endif
if (kvm_get_vcpu_by_id(kvm, id)) {
r = -EEXIST;
goto unlock_vcpu_destroy;