selinux: cleanup selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() and selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match()
Do some basic simplification and comment reformatting. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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@ -155,42 +155,30 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
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int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
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{
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int rc;
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u32 sel_sid;
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/* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
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if (ctx) {
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if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
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return -EINVAL;
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sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
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} else
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/*
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* All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an
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* otherwise applicable "non-labeled" policy. This
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* would prevent inadvertent "leaks".
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*/
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/* All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an otherwise applicable
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* "non-labeled" policy. This would prevent inadvertent "leaks". */
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if (!ctx)
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return 0;
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rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
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ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
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NULL);
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/* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
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if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (rc == -EACCES)
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return -ESRCH;
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return rc;
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rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
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SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL);
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return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc);
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}
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/*
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* LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
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* the given policy, flow combo.
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*/
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int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
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const struct flowi *fl)
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int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
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struct xfrm_policy *xp,
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const struct flowi *fl)
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{
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u32 state_sid;
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int rc;
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if (!xp->security)
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if (x->security)
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@ -213,18 +201,12 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *
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if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid)
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return 0;
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rc = avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
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ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
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NULL)? 0:1;
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/*
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* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check
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* since the SA is now of the same label as the flow and
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* a flow Vs. policy polmatch check had already happened
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* in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above.
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*/
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return rc;
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/* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
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* is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
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* check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
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return (avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
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SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
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NULL) ? 0 : 1);
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}
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/*
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