arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass. The default behavior is unchanged. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> [will: reorder checks so KASLR implies KPTI and SSBS is affected by cmdline] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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@ -2545,8 +2545,8 @@
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http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
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mitigations=
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[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
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vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated,
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[X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] Control optional mitigations for
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CPU vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated,
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arch-independent options, each of which is an
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aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
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@ -2555,11 +2555,13 @@
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improves system performance, but it may also
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expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
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Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
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kpti=0 [ARM64]
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nospectre_v1 [PPC]
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nobp=0 [S390]
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nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
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nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
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spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
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spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
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ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
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l1tf=off [X86]
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auto (default)
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@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
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#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
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#include <linux/psci.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/cpu.h>
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#include <asm/cpu.h>
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#include <asm/cputype.h>
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#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
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@ -386,6 +387,9 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
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WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
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if (cpu_mitigations_off())
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ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE;
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/* delay setting __ssb_safe until we get a firmware response */
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if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list))
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this_cpu_safe = true;
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@ -589,7 +593,7 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
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}
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/* forced off */
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if (__nospectre_v2) {
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if (__nospectre_v2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
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pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
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__hardenbp_enab = false;
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return false;
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@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
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#include <linux/stop_machine.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/cpu.h>
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#include <asm/cpu.h>
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#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
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#include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
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@ -966,7 +967,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
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MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_HISI_TSV110),
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{ /* sentinel */ }
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};
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char const *str = "command line option";
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char const *str = "kpti command line option";
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bool meltdown_safe;
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meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list);
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@ -996,6 +997,11 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
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}
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}
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if (cpu_mitigations_off() && !__kpti_forced) {
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str = "mitigations=off";
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__kpti_forced = -1;
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}
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if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0)) {
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pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
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return false;
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