Bluetooth: SMP: Add support for H7 crypto function and CT2 auth flag
Bluetooth 5.0 introduces a new H7 key generation function that's used when both sides of the pairing set the CT2 authentication flag to 1. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
This commit is contained in:
Johan Hedberg
Marcel Holtmann
Родитель
0705f7b12b
Коммит
a62da6f14d
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@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
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#define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
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#define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
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0x1f : 0x07)
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0x3f : 0x07)
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#define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07
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/* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
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@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ enum {
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SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
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SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB,
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SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB,
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SMP_FLAG_CT2,
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};
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struct smp_dev {
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@ -357,6 +358,22 @@ static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
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return err;
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}
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static int smp_h7(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
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const u8 salt[16], u8 res[16])
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{
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int err;
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SMP_DBG("w %16phN salt %16phN", w, salt);
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err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 16, res);
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if (err)
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return err;
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SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
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return err;
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}
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/* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
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* s1 and ah.
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*/
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@ -1130,20 +1147,31 @@ static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
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static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
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{
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/* These constants are as specified in the core specification.
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* In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp1' and 'lebr'.
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*/
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const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
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/* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'lebr'. */
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const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
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smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!smp->link_key)
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return;
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if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
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kzfree(smp->link_key);
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smp->link_key = NULL;
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return;
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if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
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/* SALT = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000746D7031 */
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const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
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if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) {
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kzfree(smp->link_key);
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smp->link_key = NULL;
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return;
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}
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} else {
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/* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp1'. */
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const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
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if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
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kzfree(smp->link_key);
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smp->link_key = NULL;
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return;
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}
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}
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if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
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@ -1169,10 +1197,7 @@ static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
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static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
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{
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/* These constants are as specified in the core specification.
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* In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp2' and 'brle'.
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*/
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const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
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/* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'brle'. */
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const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
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struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
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struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
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@ -1187,8 +1212,19 @@ static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
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if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
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set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
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if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
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return;
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if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
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/* SALT = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000746D7032 */
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const u8 salt[16] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
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if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, salt, smp->tk))
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return;
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} else {
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/* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp2'. */
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const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
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if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
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return;
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}
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if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
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return;
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@ -1669,6 +1705,7 @@ static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
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if (!rsp) {
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memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
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req->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
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req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
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req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
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req->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
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@ -1680,6 +1717,7 @@ static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
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memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
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rsp->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
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rsp->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
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rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
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rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
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@ -1744,6 +1782,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
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build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
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if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
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set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
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key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
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if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
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return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
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@ -1761,9 +1802,13 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
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build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
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if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC)
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if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) {
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set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
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if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
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set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
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}
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if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
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sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
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else
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@ -1917,6 +1962,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
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*/
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smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
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if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_CT2))
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set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
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/* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
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if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
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/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
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@ -2312,8 +2360,11 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
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authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
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if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
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if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) {
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authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
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if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED))
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authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2;
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}
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/* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
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* requires it.
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@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ struct smp_cmd_pairing {
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#define SMP_AUTH_MITM 0x04
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#define SMP_AUTH_SC 0x08
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#define SMP_AUTH_KEYPRESS 0x10
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#define SMP_AUTH_CT2 0x20
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#define SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM 0x03
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struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm {
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