From b6dff3ec5e116e3af6f537d4caedcad6b9e5082a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2008 10:39:16 +1100 Subject: [PATCH] CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers pointing to it. Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in entry.S via asm-offsets. With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne Signed-off-by: David Howells Acked-by: James Morris Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris --- arch/alpha/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 11 +- arch/alpha/kernel/entry.S | 10 +- arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c | 8 +- arch/mips/kernel/kspd.c | 4 +- arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c | 28 ++-- drivers/connector/cn_proc.c | 8 +- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 12 +- fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c | 12 +- fs/exec.c | 4 +- fs/fcntl.c | 4 +- fs/file_table.c | 4 +- fs/fuse/dir.c | 12 +- fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 4 +- fs/ioprio.c | 12 +- fs/nfsd/auth.c | 22 +-- fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c | 12 +- fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | 6 +- fs/open.c | 17 +- fs/proc/array.c | 18 ++- fs/proc/base.c | 16 +- fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h | 6 +- fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_globals.h | 2 +- fs/xfs/xfs_inode.h | 2 +- fs/xfs/xfs_vnodeops.h | 10 +- include/linux/cred.h | 151 +++++++++++++++--- include/linux/init_task.h | 24 ++- include/linux/sched.h | 52 +----- include/linux/securebits.h | 2 +- ipc/mqueue.c | 2 +- ipc/shm.c | 4 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 52 +++--- kernel/capability.c | 4 +- kernel/cgroup.c | 4 +- kernel/exit.c | 10 +- kernel/fork.c | 24 +-- kernel/futex.c | 6 +- kernel/futex_compat.c | 5 +- kernel/ptrace.c | 19 +-- kernel/sched.c | 10 +- kernel/signal.c | 16 +- kernel/sys.c | 266 ++++++++++++++++++------------- kernel/trace/trace.c | 2 +- kernel/tsacct.c | 4 +- kernel/uid16.c | 28 ++-- kernel/user.c | 4 +- mm/mempolicy.c | 10 +- mm/migrate.c | 10 +- mm/oom_kill.c | 2 +- net/core/scm.c | 10 +- net/sunrpc/auth.c | 2 +- security/commoncap.c | 161 ++++++++++--------- security/keys/keyctl.c | 25 +-- security/keys/permission.c | 11 +- security/keys/process_keys.c | 98 ++++++------ security/keys/request_key.c | 18 ++- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 12 +- security/selinux/exports.c | 2 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 116 +++++++------- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 2 +- security/selinux/xfrm.c | 6 +- security/smack/smack_access.c | 4 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 77 ++++----- security/smack/smackfs.c | 6 +- 63 files changed, 830 insertions(+), 675 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/asm-offsets.c index 4b18cd94d59d..6ff8886e7e22 100644 --- a/arch/alpha/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -19,15 +19,18 @@ void foo(void) BLANK(); DEFINE(TASK_BLOCKED, offsetof(struct task_struct, blocked)); - DEFINE(TASK_UID, offsetof(struct task_struct, uid)); - DEFINE(TASK_EUID, offsetof(struct task_struct, euid)); - DEFINE(TASK_GID, offsetof(struct task_struct, gid)); - DEFINE(TASK_EGID, offsetof(struct task_struct, egid)); + DEFINE(TASK_CRED, offsetof(struct task_struct, cred)); DEFINE(TASK_REAL_PARENT, offsetof(struct task_struct, real_parent)); DEFINE(TASK_GROUP_LEADER, offsetof(struct task_struct, group_leader)); DEFINE(TASK_TGID, offsetof(struct task_struct, tgid)); BLANK(); + DEFINE(CRED_UID, offsetof(struct cred, uid)); + DEFINE(CRED_EUID, offsetof(struct cred, euid)); + DEFINE(CRED_GID, offsetof(struct cred, gid)); + DEFINE(CRED_EGID, offsetof(struct cred, egid)); + BLANK(); + DEFINE(SIZEOF_PT_REGS, sizeof(struct pt_regs)); DEFINE(PT_PTRACED, PT_PTRACED); DEFINE(CLONE_VM, CLONE_VM); diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/entry.S b/arch/alpha/kernel/entry.S index 5fc61e281ac7..f77345bc66a9 100644 --- a/arch/alpha/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/entry.S @@ -850,8 +850,9 @@ osf_getpriority: sys_getxuid: .prologue 0 ldq $2, TI_TASK($8) - ldl $0, TASK_UID($2) - ldl $1, TASK_EUID($2) + ldq $3, TASK_CRED($2) + ldl $0, CRED_UID($3) + ldl $1, CRED_EUID($3) stq $1, 80($sp) ret .end sys_getxuid @@ -862,8 +863,9 @@ sys_getxuid: sys_getxgid: .prologue 0 ldq $2, TI_TASK($8) - ldl $0, TASK_GID($2) - ldl $1, TASK_EGID($2) + ldq $3, TASK_CRED($2) + ldl $0, CRED_GID($3) + ldl $1, CRED_EGID($3) stq $1, 80($sp) ret .end sys_getxgid diff --git a/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c b/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c index 5e92ae00bdbb..2445a9d3488e 100644 --- a/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c +++ b/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c @@ -1772,20 +1772,20 @@ sys32_getgroups16 (int gidsetsize, short __user *grouplist) if (gidsetsize < 0) return -EINVAL; - get_group_info(current->group_info); - i = current->group_info->ngroups; + get_group_info(current->cred->group_info); + i = current->cred->group_info->ngroups; if (gidsetsize) { if (i > gidsetsize) { i = -EINVAL; goto out; } - if (groups16_to_user(grouplist, current->group_info)) { + if (groups16_to_user(grouplist, current->cred->group_info)) { i = -EFAULT; goto out; } } out: - put_group_info(current->group_info); + put_group_info(current->cred->group_info); return i; } diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/kspd.c b/arch/mips/kernel/kspd.c index b0591ae0ce56..fd6e51224034 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/kspd.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/kspd.c @@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ static unsigned int translate_open_flags(int flags) static void sp_setfsuidgid( uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { - current->fsuid = uid; - current->fsgid = gid; + current->cred->fsuid = uid; + current->cred->fsgid = gid; key_fsuid_changed(current); key_fsgid_changed(current); diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c index 4646382af34f..6cc87d8c8682 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c @@ -148,9 +148,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys32_getresuid16(u16 __user *ruid, u16 __user *euid, u16 __user { int retval; - if (!(retval = put_user(high2lowuid(current->uid), ruid)) && - !(retval = put_user(high2lowuid(current->euid), euid))) - retval = put_user(high2lowuid(current->suid), suid); + if (!(retval = put_user(high2lowuid(current->cred->uid), ruid)) && + !(retval = put_user(high2lowuid(current->cred->euid), euid))) + retval = put_user(high2lowuid(current->cred->suid), suid); return retval; } @@ -165,9 +165,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys32_getresgid16(u16 __user *rgid, u16 __user *egid, u16 __user { int retval; - if (!(retval = put_user(high2lowgid(current->gid), rgid)) && - !(retval = put_user(high2lowgid(current->egid), egid))) - retval = put_user(high2lowgid(current->sgid), sgid); + if (!(retval = put_user(high2lowgid(current->cred->gid), rgid)) && + !(retval = put_user(high2lowgid(current->cred->egid), egid))) + retval = put_user(high2lowgid(current->cred->sgid), sgid); return retval; } @@ -217,20 +217,20 @@ asmlinkage long sys32_getgroups16(int gidsetsize, u16 __user *grouplist) if (gidsetsize < 0) return -EINVAL; - get_group_info(current->group_info); - i = current->group_info->ngroups; + get_group_info(current->cred->group_info); + i = current->cred->group_info->ngroups; if (gidsetsize) { if (i > gidsetsize) { i = -EINVAL; goto out; } - if (groups16_to_user(grouplist, current->group_info)) { + if (groups16_to_user(grouplist, current->cred->group_info)) { i = -EFAULT; goto out; } } out: - put_group_info(current->group_info); + put_group_info(current->cred->group_info); return i; } @@ -261,22 +261,22 @@ asmlinkage long sys32_setgroups16(int gidsetsize, u16 __user *grouplist) asmlinkage long sys32_getuid16(void) { - return high2lowuid(current->uid); + return high2lowuid(current->cred->uid); } asmlinkage long sys32_geteuid16(void) { - return high2lowuid(current->euid); + return high2lowuid(current->cred->euid); } asmlinkage long sys32_getgid16(void) { - return high2lowgid(current->gid); + return high2lowgid(current->cred->gid); } asmlinkage long sys32_getegid16(void) { - return high2lowgid(current->egid); + return high2lowgid(current->cred->egid); } /* diff --git a/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c b/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c index 5c9f67f98d10..354c1ff17159 100644 --- a/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c +++ b/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c @@ -116,11 +116,11 @@ void proc_id_connector(struct task_struct *task, int which_id) ev->event_data.id.process_pid = task->pid; ev->event_data.id.process_tgid = task->tgid; if (which_id == PROC_EVENT_UID) { - ev->event_data.id.r.ruid = task->uid; - ev->event_data.id.e.euid = task->euid; + ev->event_data.id.r.ruid = task->cred->uid; + ev->event_data.id.e.euid = task->cred->euid; } else if (which_id == PROC_EVENT_GID) { - ev->event_data.id.r.rgid = task->gid; - ev->event_data.id.e.egid = task->egid; + ev->event_data.id.r.rgid = task->cred->gid; + ev->event_data.id.e.egid = task->cred->egid; } else return; get_seq(&msg->seq, &ev->cpu); diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c index 8fcfa398d350..7a52477ce493 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c @@ -223,10 +223,10 @@ create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct elfhdr *exec, NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_BASE, interp_load_addr); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_FLAGS, 0); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_ENTRY, exec->e_entry); - NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_UID, tsk->uid); - NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID, tsk->euid); - NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_GID, tsk->gid); - NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EGID, tsk->egid); + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_UID, tsk->cred->uid); + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID, tsk->cred->euid); + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_GID, tsk->cred->gid); + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EGID, tsk->cred->egid); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, security_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EXECFN, bprm->exec); if (k_platform) { @@ -1388,8 +1388,8 @@ static int fill_psinfo(struct elf_prpsinfo *psinfo, struct task_struct *p, psinfo->pr_zomb = psinfo->pr_sname == 'Z'; psinfo->pr_nice = task_nice(p); psinfo->pr_flag = p->flags; - SET_UID(psinfo->pr_uid, p->uid); - SET_GID(psinfo->pr_gid, p->gid); + SET_UID(psinfo->pr_uid, p->cred->uid); + SET_GID(psinfo->pr_gid, p->cred->gid); strncpy(psinfo->pr_fname, p->comm, sizeof(psinfo->pr_fname)); return 0; diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c index 488584c87512..9f67054c2c4e 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c @@ -623,10 +623,10 @@ static int create_elf_fdpic_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_BASE, interp_params->elfhdr_addr); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_FLAGS, 0); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_ENTRY, exec_params->entry_addr); - NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_UID, (elf_addr_t) current_uid()); - NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID, (elf_addr_t) current_euid()); - NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_GID, (elf_addr_t) current_gid()); - NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EGID, (elf_addr_t) current_egid()); + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_UID, (elf_addr_t) current->cred->uid); + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID, (elf_addr_t) current->cred->euid); + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_GID, (elf_addr_t) current->cred->gid); + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EGID, (elf_addr_t) current->cred->egid); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, security_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EXECFN, bprm->exec); @@ -1440,8 +1440,8 @@ static int fill_psinfo(struct elf_prpsinfo *psinfo, struct task_struct *p, psinfo->pr_zomb = psinfo->pr_sname == 'Z'; psinfo->pr_nice = task_nice(p); psinfo->pr_flag = p->flags; - SET_UID(psinfo->pr_uid, p->uid); - SET_GID(psinfo->pr_gid, p->gid); + SET_UID(psinfo->pr_uid, p->cred->uid); + SET_GID(psinfo->pr_gid, p->cred->gid); strncpy(psinfo->pr_fname, p->comm, sizeof(psinfo->pr_fname)); return 0; diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 604834f3b208..31149e430a89 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1738,7 +1738,7 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs) */ if (get_dumpable(mm) == 2) { /* Setuid core dump mode */ flag = O_EXCL; /* Stop rewrite attacks */ - current->fsuid = 0; /* Dump root private */ + current->cred->fsuid = 0; /* Dump root private */ } retval = coredump_wait(exit_code, &core_state); @@ -1834,7 +1834,7 @@ fail_unlock: if (helper_argv) argv_free(helper_argv); - current->fsuid = fsuid; + current->cred->fsuid = fsuid; coredump_finish(mm); fail: return retval; diff --git a/fs/fcntl.c b/fs/fcntl.c index bf049a805e59..63964d863ad6 100644 --- a/fs/fcntl.c +++ b/fs/fcntl.c @@ -401,8 +401,8 @@ static inline int sigio_perm(struct task_struct *p, struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) { return (((fown->euid == 0) || - (fown->euid == p->suid) || (fown->euid == p->uid) || - (fown->uid == p->suid) || (fown->uid == p->uid)) && + (fown->euid == p->cred->suid) || (fown->euid == p->cred->uid) || + (fown->uid == p->cred->suid) || (fown->uid == p->cred->uid)) && !security_file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, sig)); } diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c index 5ad0eca6eea2..3152b53cfab0 100644 --- a/fs/file_table.c +++ b/fs/file_table.c @@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ struct file *get_empty_filp(void) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&f->f_u.fu_list); atomic_long_set(&f->f_count, 1); rwlock_init(&f->f_owner.lock); - f->f_uid = tsk->fsuid; - f->f_gid = tsk->fsgid; + f->f_uid = tsk->cred->fsuid; + f->f_gid = tsk->cred->fsgid; eventpoll_init_file(f); /* f->f_version: 0 */ return f; diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index fd03330cadeb..e97a98981862 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -872,12 +872,12 @@ int fuse_allow_task(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct task_struct *task) if (fc->flags & FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER) return 1; - if (task->euid == fc->user_id && - task->suid == fc->user_id && - task->uid == fc->user_id && - task->egid == fc->group_id && - task->sgid == fc->group_id && - task->gid == fc->group_id) + if (task->cred->euid == fc->user_id && + task->cred->suid == fc->user_id && + task->cred->uid == fc->user_id && + task->cred->egid == fc->group_id && + task->cred->sgid == fc->group_id && + task->cred->gid == fc->group_id) return 1; return 0; diff --git a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c index 08ad76c79b49..870a721b8bd2 100644 --- a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c @@ -958,7 +958,7 @@ struct file *hugetlb_file_setup(const char *name, size_t size) if (!can_do_hugetlb_shm()) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); - if (!user_shm_lock(size, current->user)) + if (!user_shm_lock(size, current->cred->user)) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); root = hugetlbfs_vfsmount->mnt_root; @@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ out_inode: out_dentry: dput(dentry); out_shm_unlock: - user_shm_unlock(size, current->user); + user_shm_unlock(size, current->cred->user); return ERR_PTR(error); } diff --git a/fs/ioprio.c b/fs/ioprio.c index 68d2cd807118..bb5210af77c2 100644 --- a/fs/ioprio.c +++ b/fs/ioprio.c @@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ static int set_task_ioprio(struct task_struct *task, int ioprio) int err; struct io_context *ioc; - if (task->uid != current_euid() && - task->uid != current_uid() && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) + if (task->cred->uid != current_euid() && + task->cred->uid != current_uid() && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) return -EPERM; err = security_task_setioprio(task, ioprio); @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioprio_set(int which, int who, int ioprio) break; case IOPRIO_WHO_USER: if (!who) - user = current->user; + user = current->cred->user; else user = find_user(who); @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioprio_set(int which, int who, int ioprio) break; do_each_thread(g, p) { - if (p->uid != who) + if (p->cred->uid != who) continue; ret = set_task_ioprio(p, ioprio); if (ret) @@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioprio_get(int which, int who) break; case IOPRIO_WHO_USER: if (!who) - user = current->user; + user = current->cred->user; else user = find_user(who); @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioprio_get(int which, int who) break; do_each_thread(g, p) { - if (p->uid != user->uid) + if (p->cred->uid != user->uid) continue; tmpio = get_task_ioprio(p); if (tmpio < 0) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/auth.c b/fs/nfsd/auth.c index 294992e9bf69..808fc03a6fbd 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/auth.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/auth.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ int nfsexp_flags(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp) int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp) { + struct cred *act_as = current->cred ; struct svc_cred cred = rqstp->rq_cred; int i; int flags = nfsexp_flags(rqstp, exp); @@ -55,25 +56,26 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp) get_group_info(cred.cr_group_info); if (cred.cr_uid != (uid_t) -1) - current->fsuid = cred.cr_uid; + act_as->fsuid = cred.cr_uid; else - current->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid; + act_as->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid; if (cred.cr_gid != (gid_t) -1) - current->fsgid = cred.cr_gid; + act_as->fsgid = cred.cr_gid; else - current->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid; + act_as->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid; if (!cred.cr_group_info) return -ENOMEM; - ret = set_current_groups(cred.cr_group_info); + ret = set_groups(act_as, cred.cr_group_info); put_group_info(cred.cr_group_info); if ((cred.cr_uid)) { - current->cap_effective = - cap_drop_nfsd_set(current->cap_effective); + act_as->cap_effective = + cap_drop_nfsd_set(act_as->cap_effective); } else { - current->cap_effective = - cap_raise_nfsd_set(current->cap_effective, - current->cap_permitted); + act_as->cap_effective = + cap_raise_nfsd_set(act_as->cap_effective, + act_as->cap_permitted); } return ret; } + diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c index bb93946ace22..a5e14e8695ea 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c @@ -57,17 +57,17 @@ static int rec_dir_init = 0; static void nfs4_save_user(uid_t *saveuid, gid_t *savegid) { - *saveuid = current->fsuid; - *savegid = current->fsgid; - current->fsuid = 0; - current->fsgid = 0; + *saveuid = current->cred->fsuid; + *savegid = current->cred->fsgid; + current->cred->fsuid = 0; + current->cred->fsgid = 0; } static void nfs4_reset_user(uid_t saveuid, gid_t savegid) { - current->fsuid = saveuid; - current->fsgid = savegid; + current->cred->fsuid = saveuid; + current->cred->fsgid = savegid; } static void diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c index cd25d91895a1..e67cfaea0865 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c @@ -186,9 +186,9 @@ static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp) * access control settings being in effect, we cannot * fix that case easily. */ - current->cap_effective = - cap_raise_nfsd_set(current->cap_effective, - current->cap_permitted); + current->cred->cap_effective = + cap_raise_nfsd_set(current->cred->cap_effective, + current->cred->cap_permitted); } else { error = nfsd_setuser_and_check_port(rqstp, exp); if (error) diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index 500cc0c54762..b1238e195e7e 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -425,6 +425,7 @@ out: */ asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode) { + struct cred *cred = current->cred; struct path path; struct inode *inode; int old_fsuid, old_fsgid; @@ -434,18 +435,18 @@ asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode) if (mode & ~S_IRWXO) /* where's F_OK, X_OK, W_OK, R_OK? */ return -EINVAL; - old_fsuid = current->fsuid; - old_fsgid = current->fsgid; + old_fsuid = cred->fsuid; + old_fsgid = cred->fsgid; - current->fsuid = current->uid; - current->fsgid = current->gid; + cred->fsuid = cred->uid; + cred->fsgid = cred->gid; if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) { /* Clear the capabilities if we switch to a non-root user */ - if (current->uid) + if (current->cred->uid) old_cap = cap_set_effective(__cap_empty_set); else - old_cap = cap_set_effective(current->cap_permitted); + old_cap = cap_set_effective(cred->cap_permitted); } res = user_path_at(dfd, filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path); @@ -484,8 +485,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode) out_path_release: path_put(&path); out: - current->fsuid = old_fsuid; - current->fsgid = old_fsgid; + cred->fsuid = old_fsuid; + cred->fsgid = old_fsgid; if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) cap_set_effective(old_cap); diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index 6af7fba7abb1..62fe9b2009b6 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -182,8 +182,8 @@ static inline void task_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, task_tgid_nr_ns(p, ns), pid_nr_ns(pid, ns), ppid, tpid, - p->uid, p->euid, p->suid, p->fsuid, - p->gid, p->egid, p->sgid, p->fsgid); + p->cred->uid, p->cred->euid, p->cred->suid, p->cred->fsuid, + p->cred->gid, p->cred->egid, p->cred->sgid, p->cred->fsgid); task_lock(p); if (p->files) @@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static inline void task_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, fdt ? fdt->max_fds : 0); rcu_read_unlock(); - group_info = p->group_info; + group_info = p->cred->group_info; get_group_info(group_info); task_unlock(p); @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static inline void task_sig(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) blocked = p->blocked; collect_sigign_sigcatch(p, &ignored, &caught); num_threads = atomic_read(&p->signal->count); - qsize = atomic_read(&p->user->sigpending); + qsize = atomic_read(&p->cred->user->sigpending); qlim = p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_SIGPENDING].rlim_cur; unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags); } @@ -293,10 +293,12 @@ static void render_cap_t(struct seq_file *m, const char *header, static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) { - render_cap_t(m, "CapInh:\t", &p->cap_inheritable); - render_cap_t(m, "CapPrm:\t", &p->cap_permitted); - render_cap_t(m, "CapEff:\t", &p->cap_effective); - render_cap_t(m, "CapBnd:\t", &p->cap_bset); + struct cred *cred = p->cred; + + render_cap_t(m, "CapInh:\t", &cred->cap_inheritable); + render_cap_t(m, "CapPrm:\t", &cred->cap_permitted); + render_cap_t(m, "CapEff:\t", &cred->cap_effective); + render_cap_t(m, "CapBnd:\t", &cred->cap_bset); } static inline void task_context_switch_counts(struct seq_file *m, diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 486cf3fe7139..6862b360c36c 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -1428,8 +1428,8 @@ static struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb, struct task_st inode->i_uid = 0; inode->i_gid = 0; if (task_dumpable(task)) { - inode->i_uid = task->euid; - inode->i_gid = task->egid; + inode->i_uid = task->cred->euid; + inode->i_gid = task->cred->egid; } security_task_to_inode(task, inode); @@ -1454,8 +1454,8 @@ static int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat if (task) { if ((inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) || task_dumpable(task)) { - stat->uid = task->euid; - stat->gid = task->egid; + stat->uid = task->cred->euid; + stat->gid = task->cred->egid; } } rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -1486,8 +1486,8 @@ static int pid_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd) if (task) { if ((inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) || task_dumpable(task)) { - inode->i_uid = task->euid; - inode->i_gid = task->egid; + inode->i_uid = task->cred->euid; + inode->i_gid = task->cred->egid; } else { inode->i_uid = 0; inode->i_gid = 0; @@ -1658,8 +1658,8 @@ static int tid_fd_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd) rcu_read_unlock(); put_files_struct(files); if (task_dumpable(task)) { - inode->i_uid = task->euid; - inode->i_gid = task->egid; + inode->i_uid = task->cred->euid; + inode->i_gid = task->cred->egid; } else { inode->i_uid = 0; inode->i_gid = 0; diff --git a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h index 293043a5573a..8c022cd0ad67 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h +++ b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h @@ -23,11 +23,9 @@ /* * Credentials */ -typedef struct cred { - /* EMPTY */ -} cred_t; +typedef const struct cred cred_t; -extern struct cred *sys_cred; +extern cred_t *sys_cred; /* this is a hack.. (assumes sys_cred is the only cred_t in the system) */ static inline int capable_cred(cred_t *cr, int cid) diff --git a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_globals.h b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_globals.h index 2770b0085ee8..6eda8a3eb6f1 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_globals.h +++ b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_globals.h @@ -19,6 +19,6 @@ #define __XFS_GLOBALS_H__ extern uint64_t xfs_panic_mask; /* set to cause more panics */ -extern struct cred *sys_cred; +extern cred_t *sys_cred; #endif /* __XFS_GLOBALS_H__ */ diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.h b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.h index 1420c49674d7..6be310d41daf 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.h +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.h @@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ int xfs_iread(struct xfs_mount *, struct xfs_trans *, xfs_ino_t, xfs_inode_t **, xfs_daddr_t, uint); int xfs_iread_extents(struct xfs_trans *, xfs_inode_t *, int); int xfs_ialloc(struct xfs_trans *, xfs_inode_t *, mode_t, - xfs_nlink_t, xfs_dev_t, struct cred *, xfs_prid_t, + xfs_nlink_t, xfs_dev_t, cred_t *, xfs_prid_t, int, struct xfs_buf **, boolean_t *, xfs_inode_t **); void xfs_dinode_from_disk(struct xfs_icdinode *, struct xfs_dinode_core *); diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_vnodeops.h b/fs/xfs/xfs_vnodeops.h index e932a96bec54..7b0c2ab88333 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_vnodeops.h +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_vnodeops.h @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ struct xfs_iomap; int xfs_open(struct xfs_inode *ip); int xfs_setattr(struct xfs_inode *ip, struct iattr *vap, int flags, - struct cred *credp); + cred_t *credp); #define XFS_ATTR_DMI 0x01 /* invocation from a DMI function */ #define XFS_ATTR_NONBLOCK 0x02 /* return EAGAIN if operation would block */ #define XFS_ATTR_NOLOCK 0x04 /* Don't grab any conflicting locks */ @@ -28,24 +28,24 @@ int xfs_inactive(struct xfs_inode *ip); int xfs_lookup(struct xfs_inode *dp, struct xfs_name *name, struct xfs_inode **ipp, struct xfs_name *ci_name); int xfs_create(struct xfs_inode *dp, struct xfs_name *name, mode_t mode, - xfs_dev_t rdev, struct xfs_inode **ipp, struct cred *credp); + xfs_dev_t rdev, struct xfs_inode **ipp, cred_t *credp); int xfs_remove(struct xfs_inode *dp, struct xfs_name *name, struct xfs_inode *ip); int xfs_link(struct xfs_inode *tdp, struct xfs_inode *sip, struct xfs_name *target_name); int xfs_mkdir(struct xfs_inode *dp, struct xfs_name *dir_name, - mode_t mode, struct xfs_inode **ipp, struct cred *credp); + mode_t mode, struct xfs_inode **ipp, cred_t *credp); int xfs_readdir(struct xfs_inode *dp, void *dirent, size_t bufsize, xfs_off_t *offset, filldir_t filldir); int xfs_symlink(struct xfs_inode *dp, struct xfs_name *link_name, const char *target_path, mode_t mode, struct xfs_inode **ipp, - struct cred *credp); + cred_t *credp); int xfs_inode_flush(struct xfs_inode *ip, int flags); int xfs_set_dmattrs(struct xfs_inode *ip, u_int evmask, u_int16_t state); int xfs_reclaim(struct xfs_inode *ip); int xfs_change_file_space(struct xfs_inode *ip, int cmd, xfs_flock64_t *bf, xfs_off_t offset, - struct cred *credp, int attr_flags); + cred_t *credp, int attr_flags); int xfs_rename(struct xfs_inode *src_dp, struct xfs_name *src_name, struct xfs_inode *src_ip, struct xfs_inode *target_dp, struct xfs_name *target_name, struct xfs_inode *target_ip); diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h index b69222cc1fd2..3e65587a72e5 100644 --- a/include/linux/cred.h +++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -12,39 +12,150 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_CRED_H #define _LINUX_CRED_H -#define get_current_user() (get_uid(current->user)) +#include +#include +#include -#define task_uid(task) ((task)->uid) -#define task_gid(task) ((task)->gid) -#define task_euid(task) ((task)->euid) -#define task_egid(task) ((task)->egid) +struct user_struct; +struct cred; -#define current_uid() (current->uid) -#define current_gid() (current->gid) -#define current_euid() (current->euid) -#define current_egid() (current->egid) -#define current_suid() (current->suid) -#define current_sgid() (current->sgid) -#define current_fsuid() (current->fsuid) -#define current_fsgid() (current->fsgid) -#define current_cap() (current->cap_effective) +/* + * COW Supplementary groups list + */ +#define NGROUPS_SMALL 32 +#define NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK ((unsigned int)(PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(gid_t))) + +struct group_info { + atomic_t usage; + int ngroups; + int nblocks; + gid_t small_block[NGROUPS_SMALL]; + gid_t *blocks[0]; +}; + +/** + * get_group_info - Get a reference to a group info structure + * @group_info: The group info to reference + * + * This must be called with the owning task locked (via task_lock()) when task + * != current. The reason being that the vast majority of callers are looking + * at current->group_info, which can not be changed except by the current task. + * Changing current->group_info requires the task lock, too. + */ +#define get_group_info(group_info) \ +do { \ + atomic_inc(&(group_info)->usage); \ +} while (0) + +/** + * put_group_info - Release a reference to a group info structure + * @group_info: The group info to release + */ +#define put_group_info(group_info) \ +do { \ + if (atomic_dec_and_test(&(group_info)->usage)) \ + groups_free(group_info); \ +} while (0) + +extern struct group_info *groups_alloc(int); +extern void groups_free(struct group_info *); +extern int set_current_groups(struct group_info *); +extern int set_groups(struct cred *, struct group_info *); +extern int groups_search(struct group_info *, gid_t); + +/* access the groups "array" with this macro */ +#define GROUP_AT(gi, i) \ + ((gi)->blocks[(i) / NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK][(i) % NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK]) + +extern int in_group_p(gid_t); +extern int in_egroup_p(gid_t); + +/* + * The security context of a task + * + * The parts of the context break down into two categories: + * + * (1) The objective context of a task. These parts are used when some other + * task is attempting to affect this one. + * + * (2) The subjective context. These details are used when the task is acting + * upon another object, be that a file, a task, a key or whatever. + * + * Note that some members of this structure belong to both categories - the + * LSM security pointer for instance. + * + * A task has two security pointers. task->real_cred points to the objective + * context that defines that task's actual details. The objective part of this + * context is used whenever that task is acted upon. + * + * task->cred points to the subjective context that defines the details of how + * that task is going to act upon another object. This may be overridden + * temporarily to point to another security context, but normally points to the + * same context as task->real_cred. + */ +struct cred { + atomic_t usage; + uid_t uid; /* real UID of the task */ + gid_t gid; /* real GID of the task */ + uid_t suid; /* saved UID of the task */ + gid_t sgid; /* saved GID of the task */ + uid_t euid; /* effective UID of the task */ + gid_t egid; /* effective GID of the task */ + uid_t fsuid; /* UID for VFS ops */ + gid_t fsgid; /* GID for VFS ops */ + unsigned securebits; /* SUID-less security management */ + kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable; /* caps our children can inherit */ + kernel_cap_t cap_permitted; /* caps we're permitted */ + kernel_cap_t cap_effective; /* caps we can actually use */ + kernel_cap_t cap_bset; /* capability bounding set */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + unsigned char jit_keyring; /* default keyring to attach requested + * keys to */ + struct key *thread_keyring; /* keyring private to this thread */ + struct key *request_key_auth; /* assumed request_key authority */ +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + void *security; /* subjective LSM security */ +#endif + struct user_struct *user; /* real user ID subscription */ + struct group_info *group_info; /* supplementary groups for euid/fsgid */ + struct rcu_head rcu; /* RCU deletion hook */ + spinlock_t lock; /* lock for pointer changes */ +}; + +#define get_current_user() (get_uid(current->cred->user)) + +#define task_uid(task) ((task)->cred->uid) +#define task_gid(task) ((task)->cred->gid) +#define task_euid(task) ((task)->cred->euid) +#define task_egid(task) ((task)->cred->egid) + +#define current_uid() (current->cred->uid) +#define current_gid() (current->cred->gid) +#define current_euid() (current->cred->euid) +#define current_egid() (current->cred->egid) +#define current_suid() (current->cred->suid) +#define current_sgid() (current->cred->sgid) +#define current_fsuid() (current->cred->fsuid) +#define current_fsgid() (current->cred->fsgid) +#define current_cap() (current->cred->cap_effective) #define current_uid_gid(_uid, _gid) \ do { \ - *(_uid) = current->uid; \ - *(_gid) = current->gid; \ + *(_uid) = current->cred->uid; \ + *(_gid) = current->cred->gid; \ } while(0) #define current_euid_egid(_uid, _gid) \ do { \ - *(_uid) = current->euid; \ - *(_gid) = current->egid; \ + *(_uid) = current->cred->euid; \ + *(_gid) = current->cred->egid; \ } while(0) #define current_fsuid_fsgid(_uid, _gid) \ do { \ - *(_uid) = current->fsuid; \ - *(_gid) = current->fsgid; \ + *(_uid) = current->cred->fsuid; \ + *(_gid) = current->cred->fsgid; \ } while(0) #endif /* _LINUX_CRED_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h index 23fd8909b9e5..9de41ccd67b5 100644 --- a/include/linux/init_task.h +++ b/include/linux/init_task.h @@ -113,6 +113,21 @@ extern struct group_info init_groups; # define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_INIT_EFF_SET #endif +extern struct cred init_cred; + +#define INIT_CRED(p) \ +{ \ + .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(3), \ + .securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT, \ + .cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET, \ + .cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET, \ + .cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET, \ + .cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET, \ + .user = INIT_USER, \ + .group_info = &init_groups, \ + .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(p.lock), \ +} + /* * INIT_TASK is used to set up the first task table, touch at * your own risk!. Base=0, limit=0x1fffff (=2MB) @@ -147,13 +162,8 @@ extern struct group_info init_groups; .children = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.children), \ .sibling = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.sibling), \ .group_leader = &tsk, \ - .group_info = &init_groups, \ - .cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET, \ - .cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET, \ - .cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET, \ - .cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET, \ - .securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT, \ - .user = INIT_USER, \ + .__temp_cred = INIT_CRED(tsk.__temp_cred), \ + .cred = &tsk.__temp_cred, \ .comm = "swapper", \ .thread = INIT_THREAD, \ .fs = &init_fs, \ diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h index b483f39a7112..c8b92502354d 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched.h +++ b/include/linux/sched.h @@ -660,6 +660,7 @@ extern struct user_struct *find_user(uid_t); extern struct user_struct root_user; #define INIT_USER (&root_user) + struct backing_dev_info; struct reclaim_state; @@ -883,38 +884,7 @@ partition_sched_domains(int ndoms_new, cpumask_t *doms_new, #endif /* !CONFIG_SMP */ struct io_context; /* See blkdev.h */ -#define NGROUPS_SMALL 32 -#define NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK ((unsigned int)(PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(gid_t))) -struct group_info { - int ngroups; - atomic_t usage; - gid_t small_block[NGROUPS_SMALL]; - int nblocks; - gid_t *blocks[0]; -}; -/* - * get_group_info() must be called with the owning task locked (via task_lock()) - * when task != current. The reason being that the vast majority of callers are - * looking at current->group_info, which can not be changed except by the - * current task. Changing current->group_info requires the task lock, too. - */ -#define get_group_info(group_info) do { \ - atomic_inc(&(group_info)->usage); \ -} while (0) - -#define put_group_info(group_info) do { \ - if (atomic_dec_and_test(&(group_info)->usage)) \ - groups_free(group_info); \ -} while (0) - -extern struct group_info *groups_alloc(int gidsetsize); -extern void groups_free(struct group_info *group_info); -extern int set_current_groups(struct group_info *group_info); -extern int groups_search(struct group_info *group_info, gid_t grp); -/* access the groups "array" with this macro */ -#define GROUP_AT(gi, i) \ - ((gi)->blocks[(i)/NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK][(i)%NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK]) #ifdef ARCH_HAS_PREFETCH_SWITCH_STACK extern void prefetch_stack(struct task_struct *t); @@ -1181,17 +1151,9 @@ struct task_struct { struct list_head cpu_timers[3]; /* process credentials */ - uid_t uid,euid,suid,fsuid; - gid_t gid,egid,sgid,fsgid; - struct group_info *group_info; - kernel_cap_t cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_bset; - struct user_struct *user; - unsigned securebits; -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - unsigned char jit_keyring; /* default keyring to attach requested keys to */ - struct key *request_key_auth; /* assumed request_key authority */ - struct key *thread_keyring; /* keyring private to this thread */ -#endif + struct cred __temp_cred __deprecated; /* temporary credentials to be removed */ + struct cred *cred; /* actual/objective task credentials */ + char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; /* executable name excluding path - access with [gs]et_task_comm (which lock it with task_lock()) @@ -1228,9 +1190,6 @@ struct task_struct { int (*notifier)(void *priv); void *notifier_data; sigset_t *notifier_mask; -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY - void *security; -#endif struct audit_context *audit_context; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL uid_t loginuid; @@ -1787,9 +1746,6 @@ extern void wake_up_new_task(struct task_struct *tsk, extern void sched_fork(struct task_struct *p, int clone_flags); extern void sched_dead(struct task_struct *p); -extern int in_group_p(gid_t); -extern int in_egroup_p(gid_t); - extern void proc_caches_init(void); extern void flush_signals(struct task_struct *); extern void ignore_signals(struct task_struct *); diff --git a/include/linux/securebits.h b/include/linux/securebits.h index 92f09bdf1175..6d389491bfa2 100644 --- a/include/linux/securebits.h +++ b/include/linux/securebits.h @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be changed from user-level. */ #define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X)) -#define issecure(X) (issecure_mask(X) & current->securebits) +#define issecure(X) (issecure_mask(X) & current->cred->securebits) #define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \ issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \ diff --git a/ipc/mqueue.c b/ipc/mqueue.c index abda5991d7e3..e1885b494bac 100644 --- a/ipc/mqueue.c +++ b/ipc/mqueue.c @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static struct inode *mqueue_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode, if (S_ISREG(mode)) { struct mqueue_inode_info *info; struct task_struct *p = current; - struct user_struct *u = p->user; + struct user_struct *u = p->cred->user; unsigned long mq_bytes, mq_msg_tblsz; inode->i_fop = &mqueue_file_operations; diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c index 0c3debbe32d5..264a9d33c5dd 100644 --- a/ipc/shm.c +++ b/ipc/shm.c @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static int newseg(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_params *params) if (shmflg & SHM_HUGETLB) { /* hugetlb_file_setup takes care of mlock user accounting */ file = hugetlb_file_setup(name, size); - shp->mlock_user = current->user; + shp->mlock_user = current->cred->user; } else { int acctflag = VM_ACCOUNT; /* @@ -767,7 +767,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmctl(int shmid, int cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *buf) goto out_unlock; if(cmd==SHM_LOCK) { - struct user_struct * user = current->user; + struct user_struct *user = current->cred->user; if (!is_file_hugepages(shp->shm_file)) { err = shmem_lock(shp->shm_file, 1, user); if (!err && !(shp->shm_perm.mode & SHM_LOCKED)){ diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 9c7e47ae4576..2febf5165fad 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -447,6 +447,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_names *name, enum audit_state *state) { + struct cred *cred = tsk->cred; int i, j, need_sid = 1; u32 sid; @@ -466,28 +467,28 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, } break; case AUDIT_UID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_EUID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_SUID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_FSUID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_GID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_EGID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_SGID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_FSGID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_PERS: result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); @@ -1228,6 +1229,7 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) { + struct cred *cred = tsk->cred; int i, call_panic = 0; struct audit_buffer *ab; struct audit_aux_data *aux; @@ -1237,14 +1239,14 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts context->pid = tsk->pid; if (!context->ppid) context->ppid = sys_getppid(); - context->uid = tsk->uid; - context->gid = tsk->gid; - context->euid = tsk->euid; - context->suid = tsk->suid; - context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid; - context->egid = tsk->egid; - context->sgid = tsk->sgid; - context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid; + context->uid = cred->uid; + context->gid = cred->gid; + context->euid = cred->euid; + context->suid = cred->suid; + context->fsuid = cred->fsuid; + context->egid = cred->egid; + context->sgid = cred->sgid; + context->fsgid = cred->fsgid; context->personality = tsk->personality; ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); @@ -2086,7 +2088,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " "old auid=%u new auid=%u" " old ses=%u new ses=%u", - task->pid, task->uid, + task->pid, task->cred->uid, task->loginuid, loginuid, task->sessionid, sessionid); audit_log_end(ab); @@ -2469,7 +2471,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) context->target_pid = t->pid; context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); - context->target_uid = t->uid; + context->target_uid = t->cred->uid; context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); @@ -2495,7 +2497,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) if (tsk->loginuid != -1) audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid; else - audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid; + audit_sig_uid = tsk->cred->uid; security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); } if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) @@ -2507,7 +2509,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) if (!ctx->target_pid) { ctx->target_pid = t->tgid; ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); - ctx->target_uid = t->uid; + ctx->target_uid = t->cred->uid; ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); @@ -2528,7 +2530,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid; axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); - axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t->uid; + axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t->cred->uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); @@ -2575,12 +2577,12 @@ void __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, kernel_cap_t *pP, kernel_ ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; ax->old_pcap.permitted = *pP; - ax->old_pcap.inheritable = current->cap_inheritable; + ax->old_pcap.inheritable = current->cred->cap_inheritable; ax->old_pcap.effective = *pE; - ax->new_pcap.permitted = current->cap_permitted; - ax->new_pcap.inheritable = current->cap_inheritable; - ax->new_pcap.effective = current->cap_effective; + ax->new_pcap.permitted = current->cred->cap_permitted; + ax->new_pcap.inheritable = current->cred->cap_inheritable; + ax->new_pcap.effective = current->cred->cap_effective; } /** diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 58b00519624a..a404b980b1bd 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -171,8 +171,8 @@ kernel_cap_t cap_set_effective(const kernel_cap_t pE_new) spin_lock(&task_capability_lock); - pE_old = current->cap_effective; - current->cap_effective = pE_new; + pE_old = current->cred->cap_effective; + current->cred->cap_effective = pE_new; spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock); diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c index 78f9b310c4f3..e210526e6401 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c @@ -1293,7 +1293,9 @@ static int attach_task_by_pid(struct cgroup *cgrp, u64 pid) rcu_read_unlock(); euid = current_euid(); - if (euid && euid != tsk->uid && euid != tsk->suid) { + if (euid && + euid != tsk->cred->uid && + euid != tsk->cred->suid) { put_task_struct(tsk); return -EACCES; } diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index 80137a5d9467..e0f6e1892fb9 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ void release_task(struct task_struct * p) int zap_leader; repeat: tracehook_prepare_release_task(p); - atomic_dec(&p->user->processes); + atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes); proc_flush_task(p); write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); tracehook_finish_release_task(p); @@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ static int wait_task_zombie(struct task_struct *p, int options, return 0; if (unlikely(options & WNOWAIT)) { - uid_t uid = p->uid; + uid_t uid = p->cred->uid; int exit_code = p->exit_code; int why, status; @@ -1393,7 +1393,7 @@ static int wait_task_zombie(struct task_struct *p, int options, if (!retval && infop) retval = put_user(pid, &infop->si_pid); if (!retval && infop) - retval = put_user(p->uid, &infop->si_uid); + retval = put_user(p->cred->uid, &infop->si_uid); if (!retval) retval = pid; @@ -1458,7 +1458,7 @@ static int wait_task_stopped(int ptrace, struct task_struct *p, if (!unlikely(options & WNOWAIT)) p->exit_code = 0; - uid = p->uid; + uid = p->cred->uid; unlock_sig: spin_unlock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock); if (!exit_code) @@ -1535,7 +1535,7 @@ static int wait_task_continued(struct task_struct *p, int options, spin_unlock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock); pid = task_pid_vnr(p); - uid = p->uid; + uid = p->cred->uid; get_task_struct(p); read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index f6083561dfe0..81fdc7733908 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -147,8 +147,8 @@ void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk) WARN_ON(tsk == current); security_task_free(tsk); - free_uid(tsk->user); - put_group_info(tsk->group_info); + free_uid(tsk->__temp_cred.user); + put_group_info(tsk->__temp_cred.group_info); delayacct_tsk_free(tsk); if (!profile_handoff_task(tsk)) @@ -969,17 +969,18 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags, DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->hardirqs_enabled); DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled); #endif + p->cred = &p->__temp_cred; retval = -EAGAIN; - if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >= + if (atomic_read(&p->cred->user->processes) >= p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) { if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && - p->user != current->nsproxy->user_ns->root_user) + p->cred->user != current->nsproxy->user_ns->root_user) goto bad_fork_free; } - atomic_inc(&p->user->__count); - atomic_inc(&p->user->processes); - get_group_info(p->group_info); + atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->__count); + atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes); + get_group_info(p->cred->group_info); /* * If multiple threads are within copy_process(), then this check @@ -1035,9 +1036,8 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags, p->real_start_time = p->start_time; monotonic_to_bootbased(&p->real_start_time); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY - p->security = NULL; + p->cred->security = NULL; #endif - p->cap_bset = current->cap_bset; p->io_context = NULL; p->audit_context = NULL; cgroup_fork(p); @@ -1298,9 +1298,9 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_cgroup: bad_fork_cleanup_put_domain: module_put(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module); bad_fork_cleanup_count: - put_group_info(p->group_info); - atomic_dec(&p->user->processes); - free_uid(p->user); + put_group_info(p->cred->group_info); + atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes); + free_uid(p->cred->user); bad_fork_free: free_task(p); fork_out: diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index e06962132aaf..28421d8210b8 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -443,7 +443,8 @@ static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) rcu_read_lock(); p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); - if (!p || (euid != p->euid && euid != p->uid)) + if (!p || (euid != p->cred->euid && + euid != p->cred->uid)) p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); else get_task_struct(p); @@ -1846,7 +1847,8 @@ sys_get_robust_list(int pid, struct robust_list_head __user * __user *head_ptr, if (!p) goto err_unlock; ret = -EPERM; - if (euid != p->euid && euid != p->uid && + if (euid != p->cred->euid && + euid != p->cred->uid && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto err_unlock; head = p->robust_list; diff --git a/kernel/futex_compat.c b/kernel/futex_compat.c index 3254d4e41e88..2c3fd5ed34f5 100644 --- a/kernel/futex_compat.c +++ b/kernel/futex_compat.c @@ -151,8 +151,9 @@ compat_sys_get_robust_list(int pid, compat_uptr_t __user *head_ptr, if (!p) goto err_unlock; ret = -EPERM; - if (euid != p->euid && euid != p->uid && - !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + if (euid != p->cred->euid && + euid != p->cred->uid && + !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto err_unlock; head = p->compat_robust_list; read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 937f6b5b2008..49849d12dd12 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, int kill) int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) { + struct cred *cred = current->cred, *tcred = task->cred; + /* May we inspect the given task? * This check is used both for attaching with ptrace * and for allowing access to sensitive information in /proc. @@ -123,19 +125,18 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) * because setting up the necessary parent/child relationship * or halting the specified task is impossible. */ - uid_t uid; - gid_t gid; + uid_t uid = cred->uid; + gid_t gid = cred->gid; int dumpable = 0; /* Don't let security modules deny introspection */ if (task == current) return 0; - current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); - if ((uid != task->euid || - uid != task->suid || - uid != task->uid || - gid != task->egid || - gid != task->sgid || - gid != task->gid) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + if ((uid != tcred->euid || + uid != tcred->suid || + uid != tcred->uid || + gid != tcred->egid || + gid != tcred->sgid || + gid != tcred->gid) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) return -EPERM; smp_rmb(); if (task->mm) diff --git a/kernel/sched.c b/kernel/sched.c index c3b8b1fcde0d..733c59e645aa 100644 --- a/kernel/sched.c +++ b/kernel/sched.c @@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static inline struct task_group *task_group(struct task_struct *p) struct task_group *tg; #ifdef CONFIG_USER_SCHED - tg = p->user->tg; + tg = p->cred->user->tg; #elif defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED) tg = container_of(task_subsys_state(p, cpu_cgroup_subsys_id), struct task_group, css); @@ -5182,8 +5182,8 @@ recheck: /* can't change other user's priorities */ euid = current_euid(); - if (euid != p->euid && - euid != p->uid) + if (euid != p->cred->euid && + euid != p->cred->uid) return -EPERM; } @@ -5417,7 +5417,9 @@ long sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, const cpumask_t *in_mask) euid = current_euid(); retval = -EPERM; - if (euid != p->euid && euid != p->uid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) + if (euid != p->cred->euid && + euid != p->cred->uid && + !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) goto out_unlock; retval = security_task_setscheduler(p, 0, NULL); diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index 167b535fe1a9..80e8a6489f97 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static struct sigqueue *__sigqueue_alloc(struct task_struct *t, gfp_t flags, * In order to avoid problems with "switch_user()", we want to make * sure that the compiler doesn't re-load "t->user" */ - user = t->user; + user = t->cred->user; barrier(); atomic_inc(&user->sigpending); if (override_rlimit || @@ -582,8 +582,8 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info, uid = current_uid(); euid = current_euid(); - if ((euid ^ t->suid) && (euid ^ t->uid) && - (uid ^ t->suid) && (uid ^ t->uid) && + if ((euid ^ t->cred->suid) && (euid ^ t->cred->uid) && + (uid ^ t->cred->suid) && (uid ^ t->cred->uid) && !capable(CAP_KILL)) { switch (sig) { case SIGCONT: @@ -1100,8 +1100,8 @@ int kill_pid_info_as_uid(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pid, goto out_unlock; } if ((info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special(info) && SI_FROMUSER(info))) - && (euid != p->suid) && (euid != p->uid) - && (uid != p->suid) && (uid != p->uid)) { + && (euid != p->cred->suid) && (euid != p->cred->uid) + && (uid != p->cred->suid) && (uid != p->cred->uid)) { ret = -EPERM; goto out_unlock; } @@ -1374,7 +1374,7 @@ int do_notify_parent(struct task_struct *tsk, int sig) info.si_pid = task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, tsk->parent->nsproxy->pid_ns); rcu_read_unlock(); - info.si_uid = tsk->uid; + info.si_uid = tsk->cred->uid; thread_group_cputime(tsk, &cputime); info.si_utime = cputime_to_jiffies(cputime.utime); @@ -1445,7 +1445,7 @@ static void do_notify_parent_cldstop(struct task_struct *tsk, int why) info.si_pid = task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, tsk->parent->nsproxy->pid_ns); rcu_read_unlock(); - info.si_uid = tsk->uid; + info.si_uid = tsk->cred->uid; info.si_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(tsk->utime); info.si_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(tsk->stime); @@ -1713,7 +1713,7 @@ static int ptrace_signal(int signr, siginfo_t *info, info->si_errno = 0; info->si_code = SI_USER; info->si_pid = task_pid_vnr(current->parent); - info->si_uid = current->parent->uid; + info->si_uid = current->parent->cred->uid; } /* If the (new) signal is now blocked, requeue it. */ diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index ed5c29c748ac..5d81f07c0150 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -117,7 +117,9 @@ static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error) uid_t euid = current_euid(); int no_nice; - if (p->uid != euid && p->euid != euid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) { + if (p->cred->uid != euid && + p->cred->euid != euid && + !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) { error = -EPERM; goto out; } @@ -174,7 +176,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setpriority(int which, int who, int niceval) } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); break; case PRIO_USER: - user = current->user; + user = current->cred->user; if (!who) who = current_uid(); else @@ -182,7 +184,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setpriority(int which, int who, int niceval) goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ do_each_thread(g, p) - if (p->uid == who) + if (p->cred->uid == who) error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); while_each_thread(g, p); if (who != current_uid()) @@ -236,7 +238,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getpriority(int which, int who) } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); break; case PRIO_USER: - user = current->user; + user = current->cred->user; if (!who) who = current_uid(); else @@ -244,7 +246,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getpriority(int which, int who) goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ do_each_thread(g, p) - if (p->uid == who) { + if (p->cred->uid == who) { niceval = 20 - task_nice(p); if (niceval > retval) retval = niceval; @@ -472,8 +474,9 @@ void ctrl_alt_del(void) */ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) { - int old_rgid = current->gid; - int old_egid = current->egid; + struct cred *cred = current->cred; + int old_rgid = cred->gid; + int old_egid = cred->egid; int new_rgid = old_rgid; int new_egid = old_egid; int retval; @@ -484,7 +487,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { if ((old_rgid == rgid) || - (current->egid==rgid) || + (cred->egid == rgid) || capable(CAP_SETGID)) new_rgid = rgid; else @@ -492,8 +495,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) } if (egid != (gid_t) -1) { if ((old_rgid == egid) || - (current->egid == egid) || - (current->sgid == egid) || + (cred->egid == egid) || + (cred->sgid == egid) || capable(CAP_SETGID)) new_egid = egid; else @@ -505,10 +508,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) } if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid)) - current->sgid = new_egid; - current->fsgid = new_egid; - current->egid = new_egid; - current->gid = new_rgid; + cred->sgid = new_egid; + cred->fsgid = new_egid; + cred->egid = new_egid; + cred->gid = new_rgid; key_fsgid_changed(current); proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID); return 0; @@ -521,7 +524,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) */ asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid) { - int old_egid = current->egid; + struct cred *cred = current->cred; + int old_egid = cred->egid; int retval; retval = security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID); @@ -533,13 +537,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid) set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); smp_wmb(); } - current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid; - } else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid)) { + cred->gid = cred->egid = cred->sgid = cred->fsgid = gid; + } else if ((gid == cred->gid) || (gid == cred->sgid)) { if (old_egid != gid) { set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); smp_wmb(); } - current->egid = current->fsgid = gid; + cred->egid = cred->fsgid = gid; } else return -EPERM; @@ -570,7 +574,7 @@ static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int dumpclear) set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); smp_wmb(); } - current->uid = new_ruid; + current->cred->uid = new_ruid; return 0; } @@ -591,6 +595,7 @@ static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int dumpclear) */ asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) { + struct cred *cred = current->cred; int old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, new_ruid, new_euid; int retval; @@ -598,14 +603,14 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) if (retval) return retval; - new_ruid = old_ruid = current->uid; - new_euid = old_euid = current->euid; - old_suid = current->suid; + new_ruid = old_ruid = cred->uid; + new_euid = old_euid = cred->euid; + old_suid = cred->suid; if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { new_ruid = ruid; if ((old_ruid != ruid) && - (current->euid != ruid) && + (cred->euid != ruid) && !capable(CAP_SETUID)) return -EPERM; } @@ -613,8 +618,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) if (euid != (uid_t) -1) { new_euid = euid; if ((old_ruid != euid) && - (current->euid != euid) && - (current->suid != euid) && + (cred->euid != euid) && + (cred->suid != euid) && !capable(CAP_SETUID)) return -EPERM; } @@ -626,11 +631,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); smp_wmb(); } - current->fsuid = current->euid = new_euid; + cred->fsuid = cred->euid = new_euid; if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 || (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old_ruid)) - current->suid = current->euid; - current->fsuid = current->euid; + cred->suid = cred->euid; + cred->fsuid = cred->euid; key_fsuid_changed(current); proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_UID); @@ -653,7 +658,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) */ asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid) { - int old_euid = current->euid; + struct cred *cred = current->cred; + int old_euid = cred->euid; int old_ruid, old_suid, new_suid; int retval; @@ -661,23 +667,23 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid) if (retval) return retval; - old_ruid = current->uid; - old_suid = current->suid; + old_ruid = cred->uid; + old_suid = cred->suid; new_suid = old_suid; if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) { if (uid != old_ruid && set_user(uid, old_euid != uid) < 0) return -EAGAIN; new_suid = uid; - } else if ((uid != current->uid) && (uid != new_suid)) + } else if ((uid != cred->uid) && (uid != new_suid)) return -EPERM; if (old_euid != uid) { set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); smp_wmb(); } - current->fsuid = current->euid = uid; - current->suid = new_suid; + cred->fsuid = cred->euid = uid; + cred->suid = new_suid; key_fsuid_changed(current); proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_UID); @@ -692,9 +698,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid) */ asmlinkage long sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid) { - int old_ruid = current->uid; - int old_euid = current->euid; - int old_suid = current->suid; + struct cred *cred = current->cred; + int old_ruid = cred->uid; + int old_euid = cred->euid; + int old_suid = cred->suid; int retval; retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES); @@ -702,30 +709,31 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid) return retval; if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) { - if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && (ruid != current->uid) && - (ruid != current->euid) && (ruid != current->suid)) + if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && (ruid != cred->uid) && + (ruid != cred->euid) && (ruid != cred->suid)) return -EPERM; - if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && (euid != current->uid) && - (euid != current->euid) && (euid != current->suid)) + if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && (euid != cred->uid) && + (euid != cred->euid) && (euid != cred->suid)) return -EPERM; - if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && (suid != current->uid) && - (suid != current->euid) && (suid != current->suid)) + if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && (suid != cred->uid) && + (suid != cred->euid) && (suid != cred->suid)) return -EPERM; } if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { - if (ruid != current->uid && set_user(ruid, euid != current->euid) < 0) + if (ruid != cred->uid && + set_user(ruid, euid != cred->euid) < 0) return -EAGAIN; } if (euid != (uid_t) -1) { - if (euid != current->euid) { + if (euid != cred->euid) { set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); smp_wmb(); } - current->euid = euid; + cred->euid = euid; } - current->fsuid = current->euid; + cred->fsuid = cred->euid; if (suid != (uid_t) -1) - current->suid = suid; + cred->suid = suid; key_fsuid_changed(current); proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_UID); @@ -735,11 +743,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid) asmlinkage long sys_getresuid(uid_t __user *ruid, uid_t __user *euid, uid_t __user *suid) { + struct cred *cred = current->cred; int retval; - if (!(retval = put_user(current->uid, ruid)) && - !(retval = put_user(current->euid, euid))) - retval = put_user(current->suid, suid); + if (!(retval = put_user(cred->uid, ruid)) && + !(retval = put_user(cred->euid, euid))) + retval = put_user(cred->suid, suid); return retval; } @@ -749,6 +758,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getresuid(uid_t __user *ruid, uid_t __user *euid, uid_t __us */ asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) { + struct cred *cred = current->cred; int retval; retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, sgid, LSM_SETID_RES); @@ -756,28 +766,28 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) return retval; if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) { - if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && (rgid != current->gid) && - (rgid != current->egid) && (rgid != current->sgid)) + if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && (rgid != cred->gid) && + (rgid != cred->egid) && (rgid != cred->sgid)) return -EPERM; - if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && (egid != current->gid) && - (egid != current->egid) && (egid != current->sgid)) + if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && (egid != cred->gid) && + (egid != cred->egid) && (egid != cred->sgid)) return -EPERM; - if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && (sgid != current->gid) && - (sgid != current->egid) && (sgid != current->sgid)) + if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && (sgid != cred->gid) && + (sgid != cred->egid) && (sgid != cred->sgid)) return -EPERM; } if (egid != (gid_t) -1) { - if (egid != current->egid) { + if (egid != cred->egid) { set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); smp_wmb(); } - current->egid = egid; + cred->egid = egid; } - current->fsgid = current->egid; + cred->fsgid = cred->egid; if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) - current->gid = rgid; + cred->gid = rgid; if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) - current->sgid = sgid; + cred->sgid = sgid; key_fsgid_changed(current); proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID); @@ -786,11 +796,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) asmlinkage long sys_getresgid(gid_t __user *rgid, gid_t __user *egid, gid_t __user *sgid) { + struct cred *cred = current->cred; int retval; - if (!(retval = put_user(current->gid, rgid)) && - !(retval = put_user(current->egid, egid))) - retval = put_user(current->sgid, sgid); + if (!(retval = put_user(cred->gid, rgid)) && + !(retval = put_user(cred->egid, egid))) + retval = put_user(cred->sgid, sgid); return retval; } @@ -804,20 +815,21 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getresgid(gid_t __user *rgid, gid_t __user *egid, gid_t __us */ asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid) { + struct cred *cred = current->cred; int old_fsuid; - old_fsuid = current->fsuid; + old_fsuid = cred->fsuid; if (security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS)) return old_fsuid; - if (uid == current->uid || uid == current->euid || - uid == current->suid || uid == current->fsuid || + if (uid == cred->uid || uid == cred->euid || + uid == cred->suid || uid == cred->fsuid || capable(CAP_SETUID)) { if (uid != old_fsuid) { set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); smp_wmb(); } - current->fsuid = uid; + cred->fsuid = uid; } key_fsuid_changed(current); @@ -833,20 +845,21 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid) */ asmlinkage long sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid) { + struct cred *cred = current->cred; int old_fsgid; - old_fsgid = current->fsgid; + old_fsgid = cred->fsgid; if (security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS)) return old_fsgid; - if (gid == current->gid || gid == current->egid || - gid == current->sgid || gid == current->fsgid || + if (gid == cred->gid || gid == cred->egid || + gid == cred->sgid || gid == cred->fsgid || capable(CAP_SETGID)) { if (gid != old_fsgid) { set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); smp_wmb(); } - current->fsgid = gid; + cred->fsgid = gid; key_fsgid_changed(current); proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID); } @@ -1208,8 +1221,15 @@ int groups_search(struct group_info *group_info, gid_t grp) return 0; } -/* validate and set current->group_info */ -int set_current_groups(struct group_info *group_info) +/** + * set_groups - Change a group subscription in a security record + * @sec: The security record to alter + * @group_info: The group list to impose + * + * Validate a group subscription and, if valid, impose it upon a task security + * record. + */ +int set_groups(struct cred *cred, struct group_info *group_info) { int retval; struct group_info *old_info; @@ -1221,20 +1241,34 @@ int set_current_groups(struct group_info *group_info) groups_sort(group_info); get_group_info(group_info); - task_lock(current); - old_info = current->group_info; - current->group_info = group_info; - task_unlock(current); + spin_lock(&cred->lock); + old_info = cred->group_info; + cred->group_info = group_info; + spin_unlock(&cred->lock); put_group_info(old_info); - return 0; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_groups); + +/** + * set_current_groups - Change current's group subscription + * @group_info: The group list to impose + * + * Validate a group subscription and, if valid, impose it upon current's task + * security record. + */ +int set_current_groups(struct group_info *group_info) +{ + return set_groups(current->cred, group_info); +} + EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_current_groups); asmlinkage long sys_getgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t __user *grouplist) { + struct cred *cred = current->cred; int i = 0; /* @@ -1246,13 +1280,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t __user *grouplist) return -EINVAL; /* no need to grab task_lock here; it cannot change */ - i = current->group_info->ngroups; + i = cred->group_info->ngroups; if (gidsetsize) { if (i > gidsetsize) { i = -EINVAL; goto out; } - if (groups_to_user(grouplist, current->group_info)) { + if (groups_to_user(grouplist, cred->group_info)) { i = -EFAULT; goto out; } @@ -1296,9 +1330,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t __user *grouplist) */ int in_group_p(gid_t grp) { + struct cred *cred = current->cred; int retval = 1; - if (grp != current->fsgid) - retval = groups_search(current->group_info, grp); + if (grp != cred->fsgid) + retval = groups_search(cred->group_info, grp); return retval; } @@ -1306,9 +1341,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(in_group_p); int in_egroup_p(gid_t grp) { + struct cred *cred = current->cred; int retval = 1; - if (grp != current->egid) - retval = groups_search(current->group_info, grp); + if (grp != cred->egid) + retval = groups_search(cred->group_info, grp); return retval; } @@ -1624,7 +1660,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_umask(int mask) asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) { - long error = 0; + struct task_struct *me = current; + unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)]; + long error; if (security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, &error)) return error; @@ -1635,39 +1673,41 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, error = -EINVAL; break; } - current->pdeath_signal = arg2; + me->pdeath_signal = arg2; + error = 0; break; case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG: - error = put_user(current->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2); + error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2); break; case PR_GET_DUMPABLE: - error = get_dumpable(current->mm); + error = get_dumpable(me->mm); break; case PR_SET_DUMPABLE: if (arg2 < 0 || arg2 > 1) { error = -EINVAL; break; } - set_dumpable(current->mm, arg2); + set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2); + error = 0; break; case PR_SET_UNALIGN: - error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(current, arg2); + error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_UNALIGN: - error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(current, arg2); + error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_SET_FPEMU: - error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(current, arg2); + error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_FPEMU: - error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(current, arg2); + error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_SET_FPEXC: - error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(current, arg2); + error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_FPEXC: - error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(current, arg2); + error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_TIMING: error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL; @@ -1675,33 +1715,28 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, case PR_SET_TIMING: if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL) error = -EINVAL; + else + error = 0; break; - case PR_SET_NAME: { - struct task_struct *me = current; - unsigned char ncomm[sizeof(me->comm)]; - - ncomm[sizeof(me->comm)-1] = 0; - if (strncpy_from_user(ncomm, (char __user *)arg2, - sizeof(me->comm)-1) < 0) + case PR_SET_NAME: + comm[sizeof(me->comm)-1] = 0; + if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2, + sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0) return -EFAULT; - set_task_comm(me, ncomm); + set_task_comm(me, comm); return 0; - } - case PR_GET_NAME: { - struct task_struct *me = current; - unsigned char tcomm[sizeof(me->comm)]; - - get_task_comm(tcomm, me); - if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, tcomm, sizeof(tcomm))) + case PR_GET_NAME: + get_task_comm(comm, me); + if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, + sizeof(comm))) return -EFAULT; return 0; - } case PR_GET_ENDIAN: - error = GET_ENDIAN(current, arg2); + error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); break; case PR_SET_ENDIAN: - error = SET_ENDIAN(current, arg2); + error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_SECCOMP: @@ -1725,6 +1760,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, current->default_timer_slack_ns; else current->timer_slack_ns = arg2; + error = 0; break; default: error = -EINVAL; diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c index 9f3b478f9171..5c97c5b4ea8f 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ __update_max_tr(struct trace_array *tr, struct task_struct *tsk, int cpu) memcpy(data->comm, tsk->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); data->pid = tsk->pid; - data->uid = tsk->uid; + data->uid = task_uid(tsk); data->nice = tsk->static_prio - 20 - MAX_RT_PRIO; data->policy = tsk->policy; data->rt_priority = tsk->rt_priority; diff --git a/kernel/tsacct.c b/kernel/tsacct.c index 8ebcd8532dfb..6d1ed07bf312 100644 --- a/kernel/tsacct.c +++ b/kernel/tsacct.c @@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ void bacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *stats, struct task_struct *tsk) stats->ac_flag |= AXSIG; stats->ac_nice = task_nice(tsk); stats->ac_sched = tsk->policy; - stats->ac_uid = tsk->uid; - stats->ac_gid = tsk->gid; + stats->ac_uid = tsk->cred->uid; + stats->ac_gid = tsk->cred->gid; stats->ac_pid = tsk->pid; rcu_read_lock(); stats->ac_ppid = pid_alive(tsk) ? diff --git a/kernel/uid16.c b/kernel/uid16.c index 3e41c1673e2f..71f07fc39fea 100644 --- a/kernel/uid16.c +++ b/kernel/uid16.c @@ -86,9 +86,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getresuid16(old_uid_t __user *ruid, old_uid_t __user *euid, { int retval; - if (!(retval = put_user(high2lowuid(current->uid), ruid)) && - !(retval = put_user(high2lowuid(current->euid), euid))) - retval = put_user(high2lowuid(current->suid), suid); + if (!(retval = put_user(high2lowuid(current->cred->uid), ruid)) && + !(retval = put_user(high2lowuid(current->cred->euid), euid))) + retval = put_user(high2lowuid(current->cred->suid), suid); return retval; } @@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getresgid16(old_gid_t __user *rgid, old_gid_t __user *egid, { int retval; - if (!(retval = put_user(high2lowgid(current->gid), rgid)) && - !(retval = put_user(high2lowgid(current->egid), egid))) - retval = put_user(high2lowgid(current->sgid), sgid); + if (!(retval = put_user(high2lowgid(current->cred->gid), rgid)) && + !(retval = put_user(high2lowgid(current->cred->egid), egid))) + retval = put_user(high2lowgid(current->cred->sgid), sgid); return retval; } @@ -166,20 +166,20 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getgroups16(int gidsetsize, old_gid_t __user *grouplist) if (gidsetsize < 0) return -EINVAL; - get_group_info(current->group_info); - i = current->group_info->ngroups; + get_group_info(current->cred->group_info); + i = current->cred->group_info->ngroups; if (gidsetsize) { if (i > gidsetsize) { i = -EINVAL; goto out; } - if (groups16_to_user(grouplist, current->group_info)) { + if (groups16_to_user(grouplist, current->cred->group_info)) { i = -EFAULT; goto out; } } out: - put_group_info(current->group_info); + put_group_info(current->cred->group_info); return i; } @@ -210,20 +210,20 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setgroups16(int gidsetsize, old_gid_t __user *grouplist) asmlinkage long sys_getuid16(void) { - return high2lowuid(current->uid); + return high2lowuid(current->cred->uid); } asmlinkage long sys_geteuid16(void) { - return high2lowuid(current->euid); + return high2lowuid(current->cred->euid); } asmlinkage long sys_getgid16(void) { - return high2lowgid(current->gid); + return high2lowgid(current->cred->gid); } asmlinkage long sys_getegid16(void) { - return high2lowgid(current->egid); + return high2lowgid(current->cred->egid); } diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c index 39d6159fae43..104d22ac84d5 100644 --- a/kernel/user.c +++ b/kernel/user.c @@ -457,11 +457,11 @@ void switch_uid(struct user_struct *new_user) * cheaply with the new uid cache, so if it matters * we should be checking for it. -DaveM */ - old_user = current->user; + old_user = current->cred->user; atomic_inc(&new_user->processes); atomic_dec(&old_user->processes); switch_uid_keyring(new_user); - current->user = new_user; + current->cred->user = new_user; sched_switch_user(current); /* diff --git a/mm/mempolicy.c b/mm/mempolicy.c index 07a96474077d..b23492ee3e50 100644 --- a/mm/mempolicy.c +++ b/mm/mempolicy.c @@ -1110,12 +1110,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_migrate_pages(pid_t pid, unsigned long maxnode, const unsigned long __user *old_nodes, const unsigned long __user *new_nodes) { + struct cred *cred, *tcred; struct mm_struct *mm; struct task_struct *task; nodemask_t old; nodemask_t new; nodemask_t task_nodes; - uid_t uid, euid; int err; err = get_nodes(&old, old_nodes, maxnode); @@ -1145,10 +1145,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_migrate_pages(pid_t pid, unsigned long maxnode, * capabilities, superuser privileges or the same * userid as the target process. */ - uid = current_uid(); - euid = current_euid(); - if (euid != task->suid && euid != task->uid && - uid != task->suid && uid != task->uid && + cred = current->cred; + tcred = task->cred; + if (cred->euid != tcred->suid && cred->euid != tcred->uid && + cred->uid != tcred->suid && cred->uid != tcred->uid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) { err = -EPERM; goto out; diff --git a/mm/migrate.c b/mm/migrate.c index 6263c24c4afe..794443da1b4f 100644 --- a/mm/migrate.c +++ b/mm/migrate.c @@ -1045,10 +1045,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_move_pages(pid_t pid, unsigned long nr_pages, const int __user *nodes, int __user *status, int flags) { + struct cred *cred, *tcred; struct task_struct *task; struct mm_struct *mm; int err; - uid_t uid, euid; /* Check flags */ if (flags & ~(MPOL_MF_MOVE|MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL)) @@ -1076,10 +1076,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_move_pages(pid_t pid, unsigned long nr_pages, * capabilities, superuser privileges or the same * userid as the target process. */ - uid = current_uid(); - euid = current_euid(); - if (euid != task->suid && euid != task->uid && - uid != task->suid && uid != task->uid && + cred = current->cred; + tcred = task->cred; + if (cred->euid != tcred->suid && cred->euid != tcred->uid && + cred->uid != tcred->suid && cred->uid != tcred->uid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) { err = -EPERM; goto out; diff --git a/mm/oom_kill.c b/mm/oom_kill.c index 34a458aa7997..3af787ba2077 100644 --- a/mm/oom_kill.c +++ b/mm/oom_kill.c @@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ static void dump_tasks(const struct mem_cgroup *mem) task_lock(p); printk(KERN_INFO "[%5d] %5d %5d %8lu %8lu %3d %3d %s\n", - p->pid, p->uid, p->tgid, p->mm->total_vm, + p->pid, p->cred->uid, p->tgid, p->mm->total_vm, get_mm_rss(p->mm), (int)task_cpu(p), p->oomkilladj, p->comm); task_unlock(p); diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c index 4681d8f9b45b..c28ca32a7d93 100644 --- a/net/core/scm.c +++ b/net/core/scm.c @@ -44,11 +44,13 @@ static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds) { + struct cred *cred = current->cred; + if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) && - ((creds->uid == current_uid() || creds->uid == current_euid() || - creds->uid == current_suid()) || capable(CAP_SETUID)) && - ((creds->gid == current_gid() || creds->gid == current_egid() || - creds->gid == current_sgid()) || capable(CAP_SETGID))) { + ((creds->uid == cred->uid || creds->uid == cred->euid || + creds->uid == cred->suid) || capable(CAP_SETUID)) && + ((creds->gid == cred->gid || creds->gid == cred->egid || + creds->gid == cred->sgid) || capable(CAP_SETGID))) { return 0; } return -EPERM; diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth.c b/net/sunrpc/auth.c index 8fc380578807..c79543212602 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth.c @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ rpcauth_lookupcred(struct rpc_auth *auth, int flags) struct auth_cred acred = { .uid = current_fsuid(), .gid = current_fsgid(), - .group_info = current->group_info, + .group_info = current->cred->group_info, }; struct rpc_cred *ret; diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index fb4e240720d8..fa61679f8c73 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { - NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective; + NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current_cap(); return 0; } @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv); int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit) { /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */ - if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap)) + if (cap_raised(tsk->cred->cap_effective, cap)) return 0; return -EPERM; } @@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz) int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */ - if (cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) + if (cap_issubset(child->cred->cap_permitted, + current->cred->cap_permitted)) return 0; if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) return 0; @@ -76,8 +77,8 @@ int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { - /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */ - if (cap_issubset(current->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted)) + if (cap_issubset(current->cred->cap_permitted, + parent->cred->cap_permitted)) return 0; if (has_capability(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) return 0; @@ -87,10 +88,12 @@ int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) { + struct cred *cred = target->cred; + /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */ - *effective = target->cap_effective; - *inheritable = target->cap_inheritable; - *permitted = target->cap_permitted; + *effective = cred->cap_effective; + *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; + *permitted = cred->cap_permitted; return 0; } @@ -122,24 +125,26 @@ int cap_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted) { + const struct cred *cred = current->cred; + if (cap_inh_is_capped() && !cap_issubset(*inheritable, - cap_combine(current->cap_inheritable, - current->cap_permitted))) { + cap_combine(cred->cap_inheritable, + cred->cap_permitted))) { /* incapable of using this inheritable set */ return -EPERM; } if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable, - cap_combine(current->cap_inheritable, - current->cap_bset))) { + cap_combine(cred->cap_inheritable, + cred->cap_bset))) { /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */ return -EPERM; } /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */ if (!cap_issubset (*permitted, - cap_combine (current->cap_permitted, - current->cap_permitted))) { + cap_combine (cred->cap_permitted, + cred->cap_permitted))) { return -EPERM; } @@ -155,9 +160,11 @@ void cap_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted) { - current->cap_effective = *effective; - current->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; - current->cap_permitted = *permitted; + struct cred *cred = current->cred; + + cred->cap_effective = *effective; + cred->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; + cred->cap_permitted = *permitted; } static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) @@ -211,8 +218,8 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps, * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) */ bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i] = - (current->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) | - (current->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable); + (current->cred->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) | + (current->cred->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable); if (permitted & ~bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i]) { /* @@ -354,8 +361,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current_uid() == 0) { /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */ bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted = cap_combine( - current->cap_bset, current->cap_inheritable - ); + current->cred->cap_bset, + current->cred->cap_inheritable); bprm->cap_effective = (bprm->e_uid == 0); ret = 0; } @@ -366,44 +373,39 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) { - kernel_cap_t pP = current->cap_permitted; - kernel_cap_t pE = current->cap_effective; - uid_t uid; - gid_t gid; + struct cred *cred = current->cred; - current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); - - if (bprm->e_uid != uid || bprm->e_gid != gid || + if (bprm->e_uid != cred->uid || bprm->e_gid != cred->gid || !cap_issubset(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted, - current->cap_permitted)) { + cred->cap_permitted)) { set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); current->pdeath_signal = 0; if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) { if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) { - bprm->e_uid = uid; - bprm->e_gid = gid; + bprm->e_uid = cred->uid; + bprm->e_gid = cred->gid; } if (cap_limit_ptraced_target()) { bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted = cap_intersect( bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted, - current->cap_permitted); + cred->cap_permitted); } } } - current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; - current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; + cred->suid = cred->euid = cred->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; + cred->sgid = cred->egid = cred->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual * capability rules */ if (!is_global_init(current)) { - current->cap_permitted = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted; + cred->cap_permitted = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted; if (bprm->cap_effective) - current->cap_effective = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted; + cred->cap_effective = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted; else - cap_clear(current->cap_effective); + cap_clear(cred->cap_effective); } /* @@ -418,27 +420,30 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think * that is interesting information to audit. */ - if (!cap_isclear(current->cap_effective)) { - if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, current->cap_effective) || - (bprm->e_uid != 0) || (current->uid != 0) || + if (!cap_isclear(cred->cap_effective)) { + if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_effective) || + (bprm->e_uid != 0) || (cred->uid != 0) || issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) - audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, &pP, &pE); + audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, &cred->cap_permitted, + &cred->cap_effective); } - current->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); + cred->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); } int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - if (current_uid() != 0) { + const struct cred *cred = current->cred; + + if (cred->uid != 0) { if (bprm->cap_effective) return 1; if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted)) return 1; } - return (current_euid() != current_uid() || - current_egid() != current_gid()); + return (cred->euid != cred->uid || + cred->egid != cred->gid); } int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, @@ -501,25 +506,27 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid, int old_suid) { - uid_t euid = current_euid(); + struct cred *cred = current->cred; if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) && - (current_uid() != 0 && euid != 0 && current_suid() != 0) && + (cred->uid != 0 && cred->euid != 0 && cred->suid != 0) && !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) { - cap_clear (current->cap_permitted); - cap_clear (current->cap_effective); + cap_clear (cred->cap_permitted); + cap_clear (cred->cap_effective); } - if (old_euid == 0 && euid != 0) { - cap_clear (current->cap_effective); + if (old_euid == 0 && cred->euid != 0) { + cap_clear (cred->cap_effective); } - if (old_euid != 0 && euid == 0) { - current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted; + if (old_euid != 0 && cred->euid == 0) { + cred->cap_effective = cred->cap_permitted; } } int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags) { + struct cred *cred = current->cred; + switch (flags) { case LSM_SETID_RE: case LSM_SETID_ID: @@ -541,16 +548,16 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, */ if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) { - if (old_fsuid == 0 && current_fsuid() != 0) { - current->cap_effective = + if (old_fsuid == 0 && cred->fsuid != 0) { + cred->cap_effective = cap_drop_fs_set( - current->cap_effective); + cred->cap_effective); } - if (old_fsuid != 0 && current_fsuid() == 0) { - current->cap_effective = + if (old_fsuid != 0 && cred->fsuid == 0) { + cred->cap_effective = cap_raise_fs_set( - current->cap_effective, - current->cap_permitted); + cred->cap_effective, + cred->cap_permitted); } } break; @@ -575,7 +582,8 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, */ static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p) { - if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) && + if (!cap_issubset(p->cred->cap_permitted, + current->cred->cap_permitted) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) return -EPERM; return 0; @@ -610,7 +618,7 @@ static long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap) return -EPERM; if (!cap_valid(cap)) return -EINVAL; - cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap); + cap_lower(current->cred->cap_bset, cap); return 0; } @@ -633,6 +641,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p) { + struct cred *cred = current->cred; long error = 0; switch (option) { @@ -640,7 +649,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, if (!cap_valid(arg2)) error = -EINVAL; else - error = !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2); + error = !!cap_raised(cred->cap_bset, arg2); break; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES case PR_CAPBSET_DROP: @@ -667,9 +676,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, * capability-based-privilege environment. */ case PR_SET_SECUREBITS: - if ((((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1) - & (current->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/ - || ((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS + if ((((cred->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1) + & (cred->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/ + || ((cred->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0)) { /*[4]*/ @@ -682,11 +691,11 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, */ error = -EPERM; /* cannot change a locked bit */ } else { - current->securebits = arg2; + cred->securebits = arg2; } break; case PR_GET_SECUREBITS: - error = current->securebits; + error = cred->securebits; break; #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ @@ -701,10 +710,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, else if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)) error = -EPERM; else if (arg2) - current->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); + cred->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); else - current->securebits &= - ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); + cred->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); break; default: @@ -719,11 +727,12 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p) { - cap_set_init_eff(p->cap_effective); - cap_clear(p->cap_inheritable); - cap_set_full(p->cap_permitted); - p->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; - return; + struct cred *cred = p->cred; + + cap_set_init_eff(cred->cap_effective); + cap_clear(cred->cap_inheritable); + cap_set_full(cred->cap_permitted); + p->cred->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; } int cap_syslog (int type) diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index fcce331eca72..8833b447adef 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id, /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been * assumed before calling this */ ret = -EPERM; - instkey = current->request_key_auth; + instkey = current->cred->request_key_auth; if (!instkey) goto error; @@ -932,8 +932,8 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id, /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by * instantiation of the key */ if (ret == 0) { - key_put(current->request_key_auth); - current->request_key_auth = NULL; + key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth); + current->cred->request_key_auth = NULL; } error2: @@ -960,7 +960,7 @@ long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid) /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been * assumed before calling this */ ret = -EPERM; - instkey = current->request_key_auth; + instkey = current->cred->request_key_auth; if (!instkey) goto error; @@ -983,8 +983,8 @@ long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid) /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by * instantiation of the key */ if (ret == 0) { - key_put(current->request_key_auth); - current->request_key_auth = NULL; + key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth); + current->cred->request_key_auth = NULL; } error: @@ -999,6 +999,7 @@ error: */ long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl) { + struct cred *cred = current->cred; int ret; switch (reqkey_defl) { @@ -1018,10 +1019,10 @@ long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl) case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING: case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING: set: - current->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl; + cred->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl; case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE: - return current->jit_keyring; + return cred->jit_keyring; case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING: default: @@ -1086,8 +1087,8 @@ long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id) /* we divest ourselves of authority if given an ID of 0 */ if (id == 0) { - key_put(current->request_key_auth); - current->request_key_auth = NULL; + key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth); + current->cred->request_key_auth = NULL; ret = 0; goto error; } @@ -1103,8 +1104,8 @@ long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id) goto error; } - key_put(current->request_key_auth); - current->request_key_auth = authkey; + key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth); + current->cred->request_key_auth = authkey; ret = authkey->serial; error: diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c index 3b41f9b52537..baf3d5f31e71 100644 --- a/security/keys/permission.c +++ b/security/keys/permission.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, struct task_struct *context, key_perm_t perm) { + struct cred *cred = context->cred; struct key *key; key_perm_t kperm; int ret; @@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); /* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */ - if (key->uid == context->fsuid) { + if (key->uid == cred->fsuid) { kperm = key->perm >> 16; goto use_these_perms; } @@ -37,14 +38,14 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, /* use the third 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller has a group * membership in common with */ if (key->gid != -1 && key->perm & KEY_GRP_ALL) { - if (key->gid == context->fsgid) { + if (key->gid == cred->fsgid) { kperm = key->perm >> 8; goto use_these_perms; } - task_lock(context); - ret = groups_search(context->group_info, key->gid); - task_unlock(context); + spin_lock(&cred->lock); + ret = groups_search(cred->group_info, key->gid); + spin_unlock(&cred->lock); if (ret) { kperm = key->perm >> 8; diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 1c793b7090a7..b0904cdda2e7 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ struct key_user root_key_user = { */ int install_user_keyrings(void) { - struct user_struct *user = current->user; + struct user_struct *user = current->cred->user; struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring; char buf[20]; int ret; @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int install_thread_keyring(void) sprintf(buf, "_tid.%u", tsk->pid); - keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk, + keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->cred->uid, tsk->cred->gid, tsk, KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); @@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ int install_thread_keyring(void) } task_lock(tsk); - old = tsk->thread_keyring; - tsk->thread_keyring = keyring; + old = tsk->cred->thread_keyring; + tsk->cred->thread_keyring = keyring; task_unlock(tsk); ret = 0; @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ int install_process_keyring(void) if (!tsk->signal->process_keyring) { sprintf(buf, "_pid.%u", tsk->tgid); - keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk, + keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->cred->uid, tsk->cred->gid, tsk, KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); @@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring) if (tsk->signal->session_keyring) flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA; - keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk, + keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->cred->uid, tsk->cred->gid, tsk, flags, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) return PTR_ERR(keyring); @@ -292,14 +292,14 @@ int copy_thread_group_keys(struct task_struct *tsk) */ int copy_keys(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk) { - key_check(tsk->thread_keyring); - key_check(tsk->request_key_auth); + key_check(tsk->cred->thread_keyring); + key_check(tsk->cred->request_key_auth); /* no thread keyring yet */ - tsk->thread_keyring = NULL; + tsk->cred->thread_keyring = NULL; /* copy the request_key() authorisation for this thread */ - key_get(tsk->request_key_auth); + key_get(tsk->cred->request_key_auth); return 0; @@ -322,8 +322,8 @@ void exit_thread_group_keys(struct signal_struct *tg) */ void exit_keys(struct task_struct *tsk) { - key_put(tsk->thread_keyring); - key_put(tsk->request_key_auth); + key_put(tsk->cred->thread_keyring); + key_put(tsk->cred->request_key_auth); } /* end exit_keys() */ @@ -337,8 +337,8 @@ int exec_keys(struct task_struct *tsk) /* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */ task_lock(tsk); - old = tsk->thread_keyring; - tsk->thread_keyring = NULL; + old = tsk->cred->thread_keyring; + tsk->cred->thread_keyring = NULL; task_unlock(tsk); key_put(old); @@ -373,10 +373,11 @@ int suid_keys(struct task_struct *tsk) void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk) { /* update the ownership of the thread keyring */ - if (tsk->thread_keyring) { - down_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem); - tsk->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->fsuid; - up_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem); + BUG_ON(!tsk->cred); + if (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) { + down_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem); + tsk->cred->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->cred->fsuid; + up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem); } } /* end key_fsuid_changed() */ @@ -388,10 +389,11 @@ void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk) void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk) { /* update the ownership of the thread keyring */ - if (tsk->thread_keyring) { - down_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem); - tsk->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->fsgid; - up_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem); + BUG_ON(!tsk->cred); + if (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) { + down_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem); + tsk->cred->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->cred->fsgid; + up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem); } } /* end key_fsgid_changed() */ @@ -426,9 +428,9 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN); /* search the thread keyring first */ - if (context->thread_keyring) { + if (context->cred->thread_keyring) { key_ref = keyring_search_aux( - make_key_ref(context->thread_keyring, 1), + make_key_ref(context->cred->thread_keyring, 1), context, type, description, match); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) goto found; @@ -493,9 +495,9 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, } } /* or search the user-session keyring */ - else if (context->user->session_keyring) { + else if (context->cred->user->session_keyring) { key_ref = keyring_search_aux( - make_key_ref(context->user->session_keyring, 1), + make_key_ref(context->cred->user->session_keyring, 1), context, type, description, match); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) goto found; @@ -517,20 +519,20 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, * search the keyrings of the process mentioned there * - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method */ - if (context->request_key_auth && + if (context->cred->request_key_auth && context == current && type != &key_type_request_key_auth ) { /* defend against the auth key being revoked */ - down_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem); + down_read(&context->cred->request_key_auth->sem); - if (key_validate(context->request_key_auth) == 0) { - rka = context->request_key_auth->payload.data; + if (key_validate(context->cred->request_key_auth) == 0) { + rka = context->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data; key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, match, rka->context); - up_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem); + up_read(&context->cred->request_key_auth->sem); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) goto found; @@ -547,7 +549,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, break; } } else { - up_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem); + up_read(&context->cred->request_key_auth->sem); } } @@ -580,15 +582,16 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial, { struct request_key_auth *rka; struct task_struct *t = current; - key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref; + struct cred *cred = t->cred; struct key *key; + key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref; int ret; key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); switch (id) { case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING: - if (!t->thread_keyring) { + if (!cred->thread_keyring) { if (!create) goto error; @@ -599,7 +602,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial, } } - key = t->thread_keyring; + key = cred->thread_keyring; atomic_inc(&key->usage); key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); break; @@ -628,7 +631,8 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial, ret = install_user_keyrings(); if (ret < 0) goto error; - ret = install_session_keyring(t->user->session_keyring); + ret = install_session_keyring( + cred->user->session_keyring); if (ret < 0) goto error; } @@ -641,25 +645,25 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial, break; case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING: - if (!t->user->uid_keyring) { + if (!cred->user->uid_keyring) { ret = install_user_keyrings(); if (ret < 0) goto error; } - key = t->user->uid_keyring; + key = cred->user->uid_keyring; atomic_inc(&key->usage); key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); break; case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING: - if (!t->user->session_keyring) { + if (!cred->user->session_keyring) { ret = install_user_keyrings(); if (ret < 0) goto error; } - key = t->user->session_keyring; + key = cred->user->session_keyring; atomic_inc(&key->usage); key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); break; @@ -670,7 +674,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial, goto error; case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY: - key = t->request_key_auth; + key = cred->request_key_auth; if (!key) goto error; @@ -679,19 +683,19 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial, break; case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING: - if (!t->request_key_auth) + if (!cred->request_key_auth) goto error; - down_read(&t->request_key_auth->sem); - if (t->request_key_auth->flags & KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) { + down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); + if (cred->request_key_auth->flags & KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) { key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); key = NULL; } else { - rka = t->request_key_auth->payload.data; + rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data; key = rka->dest_keyring; atomic_inc(&key->usage); } - up_read(&t->request_key_auth->sem); + up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); if (!key) goto error; key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); @@ -791,7 +795,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name) keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false); if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) { /* not found - try and create a new one */ - keyring = keyring_alloc(name, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk, + keyring = keyring_alloc(name, tsk->cred->uid, tsk->cred->gid, tsk, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 8e9d93b4a402..3e9b9eb1dd28 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, /* we specify the process's default keyrings */ sprintf(keyring_str[0], "%d", - tsk->thread_keyring ? tsk->thread_keyring->serial : 0); + tsk->cred->thread_keyring ? + tsk->cred->thread_keyring->serial : 0); prkey = 0; if (tsk->signal->process_keyring) @@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, sskey = rcu_dereference(tsk->signal->session_keyring)->serial; rcu_read_unlock(); } else { - sskey = tsk->user->session_keyring->serial; + sskey = tsk->cred->user->session_keyring->serial; } sprintf(keyring_str[2], "%d", sskey); @@ -232,11 +233,11 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) } else { /* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we * find one that we actually have */ - switch (tsk->jit_keyring) { + switch (tsk->cred->jit_keyring) { case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT: case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING: - if (tsk->request_key_auth) { - authkey = tsk->request_key_auth; + if (tsk->cred->request_key_auth) { + authkey = tsk->cred->request_key_auth; down_read(&authkey->sem); rka = authkey->payload.data; if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, @@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) } case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING: - dest_keyring = key_get(tsk->thread_keyring); + dest_keyring = key_get(tsk->cred->thread_keyring); if (dest_keyring) break; @@ -268,11 +269,12 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) break; case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING: - dest_keyring = key_get(tsk->user->session_keyring); + dest_keyring = + key_get(tsk->cred->user->session_keyring); break; case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING: - dest_keyring = key_get(tsk->user->uid_keyring); + dest_keyring = key_get(tsk->cred->user->uid_keyring); break; case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING: diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 1762d44711d5..2125579d5d73 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -164,22 +164,22 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, /* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of * another process */ - if (current->request_key_auth) { + if (current->cred->request_key_auth) { /* it is - use that instantiation context here too */ - down_read(¤t->request_key_auth->sem); + down_read(¤t->cred->request_key_auth->sem); /* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're * servicing is already instantiated */ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, - ¤t->request_key_auth->flags)) + ¤t->cred->request_key_auth->flags)) goto auth_key_revoked; - irka = current->request_key_auth->payload.data; + irka = current->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data; rka->context = irka->context; rka->pid = irka->pid; get_task_struct(rka->context); - up_read(¤t->request_key_auth->sem); + up_read(¤t->cred->request_key_auth->sem); } else { /* it isn't - use this process as the context */ @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, return authkey; auth_key_revoked: - up_read(¤t->request_key_auth->sem); + up_read(¤t->cred->request_key_auth->sem); kfree(rka->callout_info); kfree(rka); kleave("= -EKEYREVOKED"); diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c index 64af2d3409ef..cf02490cd1eb 100644 --- a/security/selinux/exports.c +++ b/security/selinux/exports.c @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_string_to_sid); int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid) { if (selinux_enabled) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security; return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 9f6da154cc82..328308f2882a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -167,21 +167,21 @@ static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task) return -ENOMEM; tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; - task->security = tsec; + task->cred->security = tsec; return 0; } static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security; - task->security = NULL; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->cred->security; + task->cred->security = NULL; kfree(tsec); } static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security; struct inode_security_struct *isec; isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security; struct file_security_struct *fsec; fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, struct security_mnt_opts *opts) { int rc = 0, i; - struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; const char *name = sb->s_type->name; struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode; @@ -1353,8 +1353,8 @@ static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1, { struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2; - tsec1 = tsk1->security; - tsec2 = tsk2->security; + tsec1 = tsk1->cred->security; + tsec2 = tsk2->cred->security; return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); } @@ -1374,7 +1374,7 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap); int rc; - tsec = tsk->security; + tsec = tsk->cred->security; AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP); ad.tsk = tsk; @@ -1405,7 +1405,7 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk, { struct task_security_struct *tsec; - tsec = tsk->security; + tsec = tsk->cred->security; return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL); @@ -1426,7 +1426,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; - tsec = tsk->security; + tsec = tsk->cred->security; isec = inode->i_security; if (!adp) { @@ -1466,7 +1466,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, struct file *file, u32 av) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->cred->security; struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; struct avc_audit_data ad; @@ -1503,7 +1503,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct avc_audit_data ad; int rc; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; dsec = dir->i_security; sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; @@ -1540,7 +1540,7 @@ static int may_create_key(u32 ksid, { struct task_security_struct *tsec; - tsec = ctx->security; + tsec = ctx->cred->security; return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL); } @@ -1561,7 +1561,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, u32 av; int rc; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; dsec = dir->i_security; isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security; @@ -1606,7 +1606,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; int rc; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; old_dsec = old_dir->i_security; old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security; old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); @@ -1659,7 +1659,7 @@ static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; - tsec = tsk->security; + tsec = tsk->cred->security; sbsec = sb->s_security; return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad); @@ -1758,8 +1758,8 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, return rc; if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; - struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security; + struct task_security_struct *csec = child->cred->security; return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL); } @@ -1874,7 +1874,7 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op) if (rc) return rc; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ? SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid); @@ -2025,7 +2025,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (bsec->set) return 0; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; isec = inode->i_security; /* Default to the current task SID. */ @@ -2090,7 +2090,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security; int atsecure = 0; if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) { @@ -2214,7 +2214,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe); - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; bsec = bprm->security; sid = bsec->sid; @@ -2243,7 +2243,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) rcu_read_lock(); tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current); if (likely(tracer != NULL)) { - sec = tracer->security; + sec = tracer->cred->security; ptsid = sec->sid; } rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -2274,7 +2274,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) int rc, i; unsigned long flags; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; bsec = bprm->security; if (bsec->unsafe) { @@ -2521,7 +2521,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, int rc; char *namep = NULL, *context; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; dsec = dir->i_security; sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; @@ -2706,7 +2706,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security; struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; @@ -2918,7 +2918,7 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; - struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security; struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; @@ -2995,7 +2995,8 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) { int rc = 0; - u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid; + u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *) + (current->cred->security))->sid; if (addr < mmap_min_addr) rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, @@ -3107,7 +3108,7 @@ static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct file_security_struct *fsec; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; fsec = file->f_security; fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid; @@ -3125,7 +3126,7 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); - tsec = tsk->security; + tsec = tsk->cred->security; fsec = file->f_security; if (!signum) @@ -3188,12 +3189,12 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk) struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2; int rc; - tsec1 = current->security; + tsec1 = current->cred->security; rc = task_alloc_security(tsk); if (rc) return rc; - tsec2 = tsk->security; + tsec2 = tsk->cred->security; tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid; tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid; @@ -3251,7 +3252,7 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->cred->security; *secid = tsec->sid; } @@ -3343,7 +3344,7 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ else perm = signal_to_av(sig); - tsec = p->security; + tsec = p->cred->security; if (secid) rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); else @@ -3375,7 +3376,7 @@ static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p) secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p); - tsec = p->security; + tsec = p->cred->security; tsec->osid = tsec->sid; tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; return; @@ -3384,7 +3385,7 @@ static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p) static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->cred->security; struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; isec->sid = tsec->sid; @@ -3632,7 +3633,7 @@ static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock, struct avc_audit_data ad; int err = 0; - tsec = task->security; + tsec = task->cred->security; isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) @@ -3656,7 +3657,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, if (kern) goto out; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid; err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, @@ -3677,7 +3678,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid; isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid; @@ -3723,7 +3724,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in struct sock *sk = sock->sk; u32 sid, node_perm; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; if (family == PF_INET) { @@ -4764,7 +4765,7 @@ static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, u16 sclass) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->cred->security; struct ipc_security_struct *isec; isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -4814,7 +4815,7 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct avc_audit_data ad; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; isec = ipc_perms->security; AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); @@ -4845,7 +4846,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) if (rc) return rc; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; isec = msq->q_perm.security; AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); @@ -4871,7 +4872,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct avc_audit_data ad; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; isec = msq->q_perm.security; AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); @@ -4917,7 +4918,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct avc_audit_data ad; int rc; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; isec = msq->q_perm.security; msec = msg->security; @@ -4965,7 +4966,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct avc_audit_data ad; int rc; - tsec = target->security; + tsec = target->cred->security; isec = msq->q_perm.security; msec = msg->security; @@ -4992,7 +4993,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) if (rc) return rc; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; isec = shp->shm_perm.security; AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); @@ -5018,7 +5019,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct avc_audit_data ad; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; isec = shp->shm_perm.security; AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); @@ -5091,7 +5092,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) if (rc) return rc; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; isec = sma->sem_perm.security; AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); @@ -5117,7 +5118,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct avc_audit_data ad; - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; isec = sma->sem_perm.security; AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); @@ -5224,7 +5225,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, return error; } - tsec = p->security; + tsec = p->cred->security; if (!strcmp(name, "current")) sid = tsec->sid; @@ -5308,7 +5309,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */ - tsec = p->security; + tsec = p->cred->security; if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) tsec->exec_sid = sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) @@ -5361,7 +5362,8 @@ boundary_ok: rcu_read_lock(); tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p); if (tracer != NULL) { - struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security; + struct task_security_struct *ptsec = + tracer->cred->security; u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid; rcu_read_unlock(); error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid, @@ -5405,7 +5407,7 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long flags) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->cred->security; struct key_security_struct *ksec; ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -5439,7 +5441,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); - tsec = ctx->security; + tsec = ctx->cred->security; ksec = key->security; /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the @@ -5683,7 +5685,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) /* Set the security state for the initial task. */ if (task_alloc_security(current)) panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n"); - tsec = current->security; + tsec = current->cred->security; tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security", diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 69c9dccc8cf0..10715d1330b9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int task_has_security(struct task_struct *tsk, { struct task_security_struct *tsec; - tsec = tsk->security; + tsec = tsk->cred->security; if (!tsec) return -EACCES; diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index 8f17f542a116..d7db76617b0e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, u32 sid) { int rc = 0; - struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security; struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL; char *ctx_str = NULL; u32 str_len; @@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) */ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security; int rc = 0; if (ctx) { @@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) */ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security; struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; int rc = 0; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 79ff21ed4c3b..b6dd4fc0fb0b 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode) { int rc; - rc = smk_access(current->security, obj_label, mode); + rc = smk_access(current->cred->security, obj_label, mode); if (rc == 0) return 0; @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode) * only one that gets privilege and current does not * have that label. */ - if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->security) + if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->cred->security) return rc; if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 6e2dc0bab70d..791da238d049 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode) if (rc != 0) return rc; - rc = smk_access(current->security, ctp->security, MAY_READWRITE); + rc = smk_access(current->cred->security, ctp->cred->security, + MAY_READWRITE); if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; return rc; @@ -124,7 +125,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) if (rc != 0) return rc; - rc = smk_access(ptp->security, current->security, MAY_READWRITE); + rc = smk_access(ptp->cred->security, current->cred->security, + MAY_READWRITE); if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; return rc; @@ -141,7 +143,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) static int smack_syslog(int type) { int rc; - char *sp = current->security; + char *sp = current->cred->security; rc = cap_syslog(type); if (rc != 0) @@ -373,7 +375,7 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) */ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) { - inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current->security); + inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current->cred->security); if (inode->i_security == NULL) return -ENOMEM; return 0; @@ -818,7 +820,7 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) */ static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) { - file->f_security = current->security; + file->f_security = current->cred->security; return 0; } @@ -916,7 +918,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, */ static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) { - file->f_security = current->security; + file->f_security = current->cred->security; return 0; } @@ -941,7 +943,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); - rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->security, MAY_WRITE); + rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->cred->security, MAY_WRITE); if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; return rc; @@ -984,7 +986,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) */ static int smack_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk) { - tsk->security = current->security; + tsk->cred->security = current->cred->security; return 0; } @@ -999,7 +1001,7 @@ static int smack_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk) */ static void smack_task_free_security(struct task_struct *task) { - task->security = NULL; + task->cred->security = NULL; } /** @@ -1011,7 +1013,7 @@ static void smack_task_free_security(struct task_struct *task) */ static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) { - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE); } /** @@ -1022,7 +1024,7 @@ static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) */ static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) { - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ); + return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_READ); } /** @@ -1033,7 +1035,7 @@ static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) */ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) { - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ); + return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_READ); } /** @@ -1045,7 +1047,7 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) */ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { - *secid = smack_to_secid(p->security); + *secid = smack_to_secid(p->cred->security); } /** @@ -1061,7 +1063,7 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice); if (rc == 0) - rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + rc = smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE); return rc; } @@ -1078,7 +1080,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio); if (rc == 0) - rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + rc = smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE); return rc; } @@ -1090,7 +1092,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) */ static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) { - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ); + return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_READ); } /** @@ -1108,7 +1110,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp); if (rc == 0) - rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + rc = smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE); return rc; } @@ -1120,7 +1122,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, */ static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ); + return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_READ); } /** @@ -1131,7 +1133,7 @@ static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) */ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) { - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE); } /** @@ -1154,13 +1156,13 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, * can write the receiver. */ if (secid == 0) - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE); /* * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing * we can't take privilege into account. */ - return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), p->security, MAY_WRITE); + return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE); } /** @@ -1173,7 +1175,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) { int rc; - rc = smk_access(current->security, p->security, MAY_WRITE); + rc = smk_access(current->cred->security, p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE); if (rc == 0) return 0; @@ -1204,7 +1206,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security; - isp->smk_inode = p->security; + isp->smk_inode = p->cred->security; } /* @@ -1223,7 +1225,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) */ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags) { - char *csp = current->security; + char *csp = current->cred->security; struct socket_smack *ssp; ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags); @@ -1448,7 +1450,7 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags) */ static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) { - msg->security = current->security; + msg->security = current->cred->security; return 0; } @@ -1484,7 +1486,7 @@ static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) { struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm; - isp->security = current->security; + isp->security = current->cred->security; return 0; } @@ -1593,7 +1595,7 @@ static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) { struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm; - isp->security = current->security; + isp->security = current->cred->security; return 0; } @@ -1697,7 +1699,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) { struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm; - kisp->security = current->security; + kisp->security = current->cred->security; return 0; } @@ -1852,7 +1854,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) struct super_block *sbp; struct superblock_smack *sbsp; struct inode_smack *isp; - char *csp = current->security; + char *csp = current->cred->security; char *fetched; char *final; struct dentry *dp; @@ -2009,7 +2011,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0) return -EINVAL; - cp = kstrdup(p->security, GFP_KERNEL); + cp = kstrdup(p->cred->security, GFP_KERNEL); if (cp == NULL) return -ENOMEM; @@ -2055,7 +2057,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, if (newsmack == NULL) return -EINVAL; - p->security = newsmack; + p->cred->security = newsmack; return size; } @@ -2288,8 +2290,8 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) return; ssp = sk->sk_security; - ssp->smk_in = current->security; - ssp->smk_out = current->security; + ssp->smk_in = current->cred->security; + ssp->smk_out = current->cred->security; ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0'; rc = smack_netlabel(sk); @@ -2362,7 +2364,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long flags) { - key->security = tsk->security; + key->security = tsk->cred->security; return 0; } @@ -2403,10 +2405,11 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, /* * This should not occur */ - if (context->security == NULL) + if (context->cred->security == NULL) return -EACCES; - return smk_access(context->security, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE); + return smk_access(context->cred->security, keyp->security, + MAY_READWRITE); } #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ @@ -2726,7 +2729,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) /* * Set the security state for the initial task. */ - current->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known; + current->cred->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known; /* * Initialize locks diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index c21d8c8bf0c7..c5ca279e0506 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ static void smk_cipso_doi(void) audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); - audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->security); + audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->cred->security); rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, &audit_info); if (rc != 0) @@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient) audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); - audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->security); + audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->cred->security); if (oldambient != NULL) { rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(oldambient, &audit_info); @@ -843,7 +843,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { char in[SMK_LABELLEN]; - char *sp = current->security; + char *sp = current->cred->security; if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM;