diff --git a/Documentation/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/index.rst index 91b2fa456618..51982dee6c2a 100644 --- a/Documentation/x86/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/x86/index.rst @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ x86-specific Documentation intel_txt amd-memory-encryption amd_hsmp + tdx pti mds microcode diff --git a/Documentation/x86/tdx.rst b/Documentation/x86/tdx.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b8fa4329e1a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/x86/tdx.rst @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +===================================== +Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) +===================================== + +Intel's Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protect confidential guest VMs from +the host and physical attacks by isolating the guest register state and by +encrypting the guest memory. In TDX, a special module running in a special +mode sits between the host and the guest and manages the guest/host +separation. + +Since the host cannot directly access guest registers or memory, much +normal functionality of a hypervisor must be moved into the guest. This is +implemented using a Virtualization Exception (#VE) that is handled by the +guest kernel. A #VE is handled entirely inside the guest kernel, but some +require the hypervisor to be consulted. + +TDX includes new hypercall-like mechanisms for communicating from the +guest to the hypervisor or the TDX module. + +New TDX Exceptions +================== + +TDX guests behave differently from bare-metal and traditional VMX guests. +In TDX guests, otherwise normal instructions or memory accesses can cause +#VE or #GP exceptions. + +Instructions marked with an '*' conditionally cause exceptions. The +details for these instructions are discussed below. + +Instruction-based #VE +--------------------- + +- Port I/O (INS, OUTS, IN, OUT) +- HLT +- MONITOR, MWAIT +- WBINVD, INVD +- VMCALL +- RDMSR*,WRMSR* +- CPUID* + +Instruction-based #GP +--------------------- + +- All VMX instructions: INVEPT, INVVPID, VMCLEAR, VMFUNC, VMLAUNCH, + VMPTRLD, VMPTRST, VMREAD, VMRESUME, VMWRITE, VMXOFF, VMXON +- ENCLS, ENCLU +- GETSEC +- RSM +- ENQCMD +- RDMSR*,WRMSR* + +RDMSR/WRMSR Behavior +-------------------- + +MSR access behavior falls into three categories: + +- #GP generated +- #VE generated +- "Just works" + +In general, the #GP MSRs should not be used in guests. Their use likely +indicates a bug in the guest. The guest may try to handle the #GP with a +hypercall but it is unlikely to succeed. + +The #VE MSRs are typically able to be handled by the hypervisor. Guests +can make a hypercall to the hypervisor to handle the #VE. + +The "just works" MSRs do not need any special guest handling. They might +be implemented by directly passing through the MSR to the hardware or by +trapping and handling in the TDX module. Other than possibly being slow, +these MSRs appear to function just as they would on bare metal. + +CPUID Behavior +-------------- + +For some CPUID leaves and sub-leaves, the virtualized bit fields of CPUID +return values (in guest EAX/EBX/ECX/EDX) are configurable by the +hypervisor. For such cases, the Intel TDX module architecture defines two +virtualization types: + +- Bit fields for which the hypervisor controls the value seen by the guest + TD. + +- Bit fields for which the hypervisor configures the value such that the + guest TD either sees their native value or a value of 0. For these bit + fields, the hypervisor can mask off the native values, but it can not + turn *on* values. + +A #VE is generated for CPUID leaves and sub-leaves that the TDX module does +not know how to handle. The guest kernel may ask the hypervisor for the +value with a hypercall. + +#VE on Memory Accesses +====================== + +There are essentially two classes of TDX memory: private and shared. +Private memory receives full TDX protections. Its content is protected +against access from the hypervisor. Shared memory is expected to be +shared between guest and hypervisor and does not receive full TDX +protections. + +A TD guest is in control of whether its memory accesses are treated as +private or shared. It selects the behavior with a bit in its page table +entries. This helps ensure that a guest does not place sensitive +information in shared memory, exposing it to the untrusted hypervisor. + +#VE on Shared Memory +-------------------- + +Access to shared mappings can cause a #VE. The hypervisor ultimately +controls whether a shared memory access causes a #VE, so the guest must be +careful to only reference shared pages it can safely handle a #VE. For +instance, the guest should be careful not to access shared memory in the +#VE handler before it reads the #VE info structure (TDG.VP.VEINFO.GET). + +Shared mapping content is entirely controlled by the hypervisor. The guest +should only use shared mappings for communicating with the hypervisor. +Shared mappings must never be used for sensitive memory content like kernel +stacks. A good rule of thumb is that hypervisor-shared memory should be +treated the same as memory mapped to userspace. Both the hypervisor and +userspace are completely untrusted. + +MMIO for virtual devices is implemented as shared memory. The guest must +be careful not to access device MMIO regions unless it is also prepared to +handle a #VE. + +#VE on Private Pages +-------------------- + +An access to private mappings can also cause a #VE. Since all kernel +memory is also private memory, the kernel might theoretically need to +handle a #VE on arbitrary kernel memory accesses. This is not feasible, so +TDX guests ensure that all guest memory has been "accepted" before memory +is used by the kernel. + +A modest amount of memory (typically 512M) is pre-accepted by the firmware +before the kernel runs to ensure that the kernel can start up without +being subjected to a #VE. + +The hypervisor is permitted to unilaterally move accepted pages to a +"blocked" state. However, if it does this, page access will not generate a +#VE. It will, instead, cause a "TD Exit" where the hypervisor is required +to handle the exception. + +Linux #VE handler +================= + +Just like page faults or #GP's, #VE exceptions can be either handled or be +fatal. Typically, an unhandled userspace #VE results in a SIGSEGV. +An unhandled kernel #VE results in an oops. + +Handling nested exceptions on x86 is typically nasty business. A #VE +could be interrupted by an NMI which triggers another #VE and hilarity +ensues. The TDX #VE architecture anticipated this scenario and includes a +feature to make it slightly less nasty. + +During #VE handling, the TDX module ensures that all interrupts (including +NMIs) are blocked. The block remains in place until the guest makes a +TDG.VP.VEINFO.GET TDCALL. This allows the guest to control when interrupts +or a new #VE can be delivered. + +However, the guest kernel must still be careful to avoid potential +#VE-triggering actions (discussed above) while this block is in place. +While the block is in place, any #VE is elevated to a double fault (#DF) +which is not recoverable. + +MMIO handling +============= + +In non-TDX VMs, MMIO is usually implemented by giving a guest access to a +mapping which will cause a VMEXIT on access, and then the hypervisor +emulates the access. That is not possible in TDX guests because VMEXIT +will expose the register state to the host. TDX guests don't trust the host +and can't have their state exposed to the host. + +In TDX, MMIO regions typically trigger a #VE exception in the guest. The +guest #VE handler then emulates the MMIO instruction inside the guest and +converts it into a controlled TDCALL to the host, rather than exposing +guest state to the host. + +MMIO addresses on x86 are just special physical addresses. They can +theoretically be accessed with any instruction that accesses memory. +However, the kernel instruction decoding method is limited. It is only +designed to decode instructions like those generated by io.h macros. + +MMIO access via other means (like structure overlays) may result in an +oops. + +Shared Memory Conversions +========================= + +All TDX guest memory starts out as private at boot. This memory can not +be accessed by the hypervisor. However, some kernel users like device +drivers might have a need to share data with the hypervisor. To do this, +memory must be converted between shared and private. This can be +accomplished using some existing memory encryption helpers: + + * set_memory_decrypted() converts a range of pages to shared. + * set_memory_encrypted() converts memory back to private. + +Device drivers are the primary user of shared memory, but there's no need +to touch every driver. DMA buffers and ioremap() do the conversions +automatically. + +TDX uses SWIOTLB for most DMA allocations. The SWIOTLB buffer is +converted to shared on boot. + +For coherent DMA allocation, the DMA buffer gets converted on the +allocation. Check force_dma_unencrypted() for details. + +References +========== + +TDX reference material is collected here: + +https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html