- Add support for handling hw errors in SGX pages: poisoning, recovering
from poison memory and error injection into SGX pages - A bunch of changes to the SGX selftests to simplify and allow of SGX features testing without the need of a whole SGX software stack - Add a sysfs attribute which is supposed to show the amount of SGX memory in a NUMA node, similar to what /proc/meminfo is to normal memory - The usual bunch of fixes and cleanups too -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmHcDQMACgkQEsHwGGHe VUq42xAAjWM0AFpIxgUBpbE0swV3ZMulnndl3/vA5XN+9Yn7Q52+AFyPRE0s7Zam Ap+cInh2Il7d/sv54rZ4x/j7+TH4i7s8fWPVU/XiPALQuOuw0/B1wJJ+jmMiPFiU 3jr7DkUPyWjWTHduMY/tk+xMOpkx1XsxJheYnKvsKVW+fjJ0vPuftAZtfu2z2VOh 3JLcp5cAXPxW0UK9gdoF5bCBQhBu0NRguTbhHhbByAixQO2GyVSKLSRovUdj0a+y QRrQ6hgcvpTOsVHJoWJ7yIX4SBzQTe9Bg6dT9DghOxE4Sc2GH89hu7wRztGawBJO nLyzWgiW9ttjQutDpBvZANNVcFAPAdtDWczrzZpREbrGKkzT+kOBnIIL1LWITWOy 2YWTO3ytW0KNIK85GzMjSVOKRMgaHJeBaGuYZ7Z0kb3GuUPJ9zRlaRxNapKQFuzA 0PGoA4IDT+2Afy7VYBBNUA2d/WverFQuXKusSxK6b5zJ173o5/DXL2q0d3gn/j8Z hhxJUJyVOsfRXSG4NKrj4se4FiA0n/RL4oyUZR9iJ8kWzzZTd0eZTAn468bpGIp5 yiOlPOLgsmu0xzVmAtG1+4d2+S2x+Ec5YE0sP1V/JLNciYk3Ebp7UyfnS3tn33Xc cpdWjELvD1LJVpMEURnbjRrwU6OiiAekYJCP/9lmK9zfOGpwRHc= =vFTM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_sgx_for_v5.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 SGX updates from Borislav Petkov: - Add support for handling hw errors in SGX pages: poisoning, recovering from poison memory and error injection into SGX pages - A bunch of changes to the SGX selftests to simplify and allow of SGX features testing without the need of a whole SGX software stack - Add a sysfs attribute which is supposed to show the amount of SGX memory in a NUMA node, similar to what /proc/meminfo is to normal memory - The usual bunch of fixes and cleanups too * tag 'x86_sgx_for_v5.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (24 commits) x86/sgx: Fix NULL pointer dereference on non-SGX systems selftests/sgx: Fix corrupted cpuid macro invocation x86/sgx: Add an attribute for the amount of SGX memory in a NUMA node x86/sgx: Fix minor documentation issues selftests/sgx: Add test for multiple TCS entry selftests/sgx: Enable multiple thread support selftests/sgx: Add page permission and exception test selftests/sgx: Rename test properties in preparation for more enclave tests selftests/sgx: Provide per-op parameter structs for the test enclave selftests/sgx: Add a new kselftest: Unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed selftests/sgx: Move setup_test_encl() to each TEST_F() selftests/sgx: Encpsulate the test enclave creation selftests/sgx: Dump segments and /proc/self/maps only on failure selftests/sgx: Create a heap for the test enclave selftests/sgx: Make data measurement for an enclave segment optional selftests/sgx: Assign source for each segment selftests/sgx: Fix a benign linker warning x86/sgx: Add check for SGX pages to ghes_do_memory_failure() x86/sgx: Add hook to error injection address validation x86/sgx: Hook arch_memory_failure() into mainline code ...
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
Коммит
bfed6efb8e
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|
@ -176,3 +176,9 @@ Contact: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
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Description:
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The cache write policy: 0 for write-back, 1 for write-through,
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other or unknown.
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What: /sys/devices/system/node/nodeX/x86/sgx_total_bytes
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Date: November 2021
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Contact: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Description:
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The total amount of SGX physical memory in bytes.
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|
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@ -181,5 +181,24 @@ You should see something like this in dmesg::
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[22715.834759] EDAC sbridge MC3: PROCESSOR 0:306e7 TIME 1422553404 SOCKET 0 APIC 0
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[22716.616173] EDAC MC3: 1 CE memory read error on CPU_SrcID#0_Channel#0_DIMM#0 (channel:0 slot:0 page:0x12345 offset:0x0 grain:32 syndrome:0x0 - area:DRAM err_code:0001:0090 socket:0 channel_mask:1 rank:0)
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Special notes for injection into SGX enclaves:
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There may be a separate BIOS setup option to enable SGX injection.
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The injection process consists of setting some special memory controller
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trigger that will inject the error on the next write to the target
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address. But the h/w prevents any software outside of an SGX enclave
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from accessing enclave pages (even BIOS SMM mode).
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The following sequence can be used:
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1) Determine physical address of enclave page
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2) Use "notrigger=1" mode to inject (this will setup
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the injection address, but will not actually inject)
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3) Enter the enclave
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4) Store data to the virtual address matching physical address from step 1
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5) Execute CLFLUSH for that virtual address
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6) Spin delay for 250ms
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7) Read from the virtual address. This will trigger the error
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For more information about EINJ, please refer to ACPI specification
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version 4.0, section 17.5 and ACPI 5.0, section 18.6.
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Overview
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Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) hardware enables for user space applications
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to set aside private memory regions of code and data:
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* Privileged (ring-0) ENCLS functions orchestrate the construction of the.
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* Privileged (ring-0) ENCLS functions orchestrate the construction of the
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regions.
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* Unprivileged (ring-3) ENCLU functions allow an application to enter and
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execute inside the regions.
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@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ In addition to the traditional compiler and linker build process, SGX has a
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separate enclave “build” process. Enclaves must be built before they can be
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executed (entered). The first step in building an enclave is opening the
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**/dev/sgx_enclave** device. Since enclave memory is protected from direct
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access, special privileged instructions are Then used to copy data into enclave
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access, special privileged instructions are then used to copy data into enclave
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pages and establish enclave page permissions.
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.. kernel-doc:: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
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@ -126,13 +126,13 @@ the need to juggle signal handlers.
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ksgxd
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=====
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SGX support includes a kernel thread called *ksgxwapd*.
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SGX support includes a kernel thread called *ksgxd*.
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EPC sanitization
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----------------
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ksgxd is started when SGX initializes. Enclave memory is typically ready
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For use when the processor powers on or resets. However, if SGX has been in
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for use when the processor powers on or resets. However, if SGX has been in
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use since the reset, enclave pages may be in an inconsistent state. This might
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occur after a crash and kexec() cycle, for instance. At boot, ksgxd
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reinitializes all enclave pages so that they can be allocated and re-used.
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@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ Page reclaimer
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Similar to the core kswapd, ksgxd, is responsible for managing the
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overcommitment of enclave memory. If the system runs out of enclave memory,
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*ksgxwapd* “swaps” enclave memory to normal memory.
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*ksgxd* “swaps” enclave memory to normal memory.
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Launch Control
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==============
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@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ SGX provides a launch control mechanism. After all enclave pages have been
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copied, kernel executes EINIT function, which initializes the enclave. Only after
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this the CPU can execute inside the enclave.
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ENIT function takes an RSA-3072 signature of the enclave measurement. The function
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EINIT function takes an RSA-3072 signature of the enclave measurement. The function
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checks that the measurement is correct and signature is signed with the key
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hashed to the four **IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}** MSRs representing the
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SHA256 of a public key.
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@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ CPUs starting from Icelake use Total Memory Encryption (TME) in the place of
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MEE. TME-based SGX implementations do not have an integrity Merkle tree, which
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means integrity and replay-attacks are not mitigated. B, it includes
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additional changes to prevent cipher text from being returned and SW memory
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aliases from being Created.
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aliases from being created.
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DMA to enclave memory is blocked by range registers on both MEE and TME systems
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(SDM section 41.10).
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|
|
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@ -1312,6 +1312,10 @@ config ARCH_HAS_PARANOID_L1D_FLUSH
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config DYNAMIC_SIGFRAME
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bool
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# Select, if arch has a named attribute group bound to NUMA device nodes.
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config HAVE_ARCH_NODE_DEV_GROUP
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bool
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source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig"
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source "scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig"
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|
|
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@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ config X86
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select HAVE_ARCH_KCSAN if X86_64
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select X86_FEATURE_NAMES if PROC_FS
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select PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS if PROC_FS
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select HAVE_ARCH_NODE_DEV_GROUP if X86_SGX
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imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if EFI
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config INSTRUCTION_DECODER
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@ -1921,6 +1922,7 @@ config X86_SGX
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select SRCU
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select MMU_NOTIFIER
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select NUMA_KEEP_MEMINFO if NUMA
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select XARRAY_MULTI
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help
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Intel(R) Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions
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that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code
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|
|
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@ -855,4 +855,12 @@ enum mds_mitigations {
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MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV,
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};
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX
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int arch_memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int flags);
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#define arch_memory_failure arch_memory_failure
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bool arch_is_platform_page(u64 paddr);
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#define arch_is_platform_page arch_is_platform_page
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#endif
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#endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
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|
|
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|
|
@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
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#ifndef _ASM_X86_SET_MEMORY_H
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#define _ASM_X86_SET_MEMORY_H
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <asm/page.h>
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#include <asm-generic/set_memory.h>
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|
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|
|
@ -99,6 +100,9 @@ static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap)
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unsigned long decoy_addr;
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int rc;
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/* SGX pages are not in the 1:1 map */
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if (arch_is_platform_page(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT))
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return 0;
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/*
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* We would like to just call:
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* set_memory_XX((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
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|
|
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|
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@ -6,11 +6,13 @@
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#include <linux/highmem.h>
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#include <linux/kthread.h>
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#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
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#include <linux/node.h>
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#include <linux/pagemap.h>
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#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
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#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
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#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/sysfs.h>
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#include <asm/sgx.h>
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#include "driver.h"
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#include "encl.h"
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|
|
@ -20,6 +22,7 @@ struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS];
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static int sgx_nr_epc_sections;
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static struct task_struct *ksgxd_tsk;
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static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(ksgxd_waitq);
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static DEFINE_XARRAY(sgx_epc_address_space);
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/*
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* These variables are part of the state of the reclaimer, and must be accessed
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|
|
@ -60,6 +63,24 @@ static void __sgx_sanitize_pages(struct list_head *dirty_page_list)
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page = list_first_entry(dirty_page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list);
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/*
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* Checking page->poison without holding the node->lock
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* is racy, but losing the race (i.e. poison is set just
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* after the check) just means __eremove() will be uselessly
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* called for a page that sgx_free_epc_page() will put onto
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* the node->sgx_poison_page_list later.
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*/
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if (page->poison) {
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struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section];
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struct sgx_numa_node *node = section->node;
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spin_lock(&node->lock);
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list_move(&page->list, &node->sgx_poison_page_list);
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spin_unlock(&node->lock);
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continue;
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}
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ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page));
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if (!ret) {
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/*
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|
|
@ -471,6 +492,7 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_node(int nid)
|
|||
|
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page = list_first_entry(&node->free_page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list);
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list_del_init(&page->list);
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page->flags = 0;
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||||
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||||
spin_unlock(&node->lock);
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atomic_long_dec(&sgx_nr_free_pages);
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|
|
@ -624,7 +646,12 @@ void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
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|||
|
||||
spin_lock(&node->lock);
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||||
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||||
list_add_tail(&page->list, &node->free_page_list);
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||||
page->owner = NULL;
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if (page->poison)
|
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list_add(&page->list, &node->sgx_poison_page_list);
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else
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list_add_tail(&page->list, &node->free_page_list);
|
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page->flags = SGX_EPC_PAGE_IS_FREE;
|
||||
|
||||
spin_unlock(&node->lock);
|
||||
atomic_long_inc(&sgx_nr_free_pages);
|
||||
|
|
@ -648,17 +675,102 @@ static bool __init sgx_setup_epc_section(u64 phys_addr, u64 size,
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
section->phys_addr = phys_addr;
|
||||
xa_store_range(&sgx_epc_address_space, section->phys_addr,
|
||||
phys_addr + size - 1, section, GFP_KERNEL);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
|
||||
section->pages[i].section = index;
|
||||
section->pages[i].flags = 0;
|
||||
section->pages[i].owner = NULL;
|
||||
section->pages[i].poison = 0;
|
||||
list_add_tail(§ion->pages[i].list, &sgx_dirty_page_list);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool arch_is_platform_page(u64 paddr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return !!xa_load(&sgx_epc_address_space, paddr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_is_platform_page);
|
||||
|
||||
static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_paddr_to_page(u64 paddr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct sgx_epc_section *section;
|
||||
|
||||
section = xa_load(&sgx_epc_address_space, paddr);
|
||||
if (!section)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
return §ion->pages[PFN_DOWN(paddr - section->phys_addr)];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Called in process context to handle a hardware reported
|
||||
* error in an SGX EPC page.
|
||||
* If the MF_ACTION_REQUIRED bit is set in flags, then the
|
||||
* context is the task that consumed the poison data. Otherwise
|
||||
* this is called from a kernel thread unrelated to the page.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int arch_memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int flags)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct sgx_epc_page *page = sgx_paddr_to_page(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
|
||||
struct sgx_epc_section *section;
|
||||
struct sgx_numa_node *node;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* mm/memory-failure.c calls this routine for all errors
|
||||
* where there isn't a "struct page" for the address. But that
|
||||
* includes other address ranges besides SGX.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!page)
|
||||
return -ENXIO;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If poison was consumed synchronously. Send a SIGBUS to
|
||||
* the task. Hardware has already exited the SGX enclave and
|
||||
* will not allow re-entry to an enclave that has a memory
|
||||
* error. The signal may help the task understand why the
|
||||
* enclave is broken.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED)
|
||||
force_sig(SIGBUS);
|
||||
|
||||
section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section];
|
||||
node = section->node;
|
||||
|
||||
spin_lock(&node->lock);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Already poisoned? Nothing more to do */
|
||||
if (page->poison)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
page->poison = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If the page is on a free list, move it to the per-node
|
||||
* poison page list.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_IS_FREE) {
|
||||
list_move(&page->list, &node->sgx_poison_page_list);
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* TBD: Add additional plumbing to enable pre-emptive
|
||||
* action for asynchronous poison notification. Until
|
||||
* then just hope that the poison:
|
||||
* a) is not accessed - sgx_free_epc_page() will deal with it
|
||||
* when the user gives it back
|
||||
* b) results in a recoverable machine check rather than
|
||||
* a fatal one
|
||||
*/
|
||||
out:
|
||||
spin_unlock(&node->lock);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* A section metric is concatenated in a way that @low bits 12-31 define the
|
||||
* bits 12-31 of the metric and @high bits 0-19 define the bits 32-51 of the
|
||||
|
|
@ -670,6 +782,48 @@ static inline u64 __init sgx_calc_section_metric(u64 low, u64 high)
|
|||
((high & GENMASK_ULL(19, 0)) << 32);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
|
||||
static ssize_t sgx_total_bytes_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lu\n", sgx_numa_nodes[dev->id].size);
|
||||
}
|
||||
static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(sgx_total_bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
static umode_t arch_node_attr_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj,
|
||||
struct attribute *attr, int idx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Make all x86/ attributes invisible when SGX is not initialized: */
|
||||
if (nodes_empty(sgx_numa_mask))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
return attr->mode;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static struct attribute *arch_node_dev_attrs[] = {
|
||||
&dev_attr_sgx_total_bytes.attr,
|
||||
NULL,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const struct attribute_group arch_node_dev_group = {
|
||||
.name = "x86",
|
||||
.attrs = arch_node_dev_attrs,
|
||||
.is_visible = arch_node_attr_is_visible,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static void __init arch_update_sysfs_visibility(int nid)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct node *node = node_devices[nid];
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = sysfs_update_group(&node->dev.kobj, &arch_node_dev_group);
|
||||
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
pr_err("sysfs update failed (%d), files may be invisible", ret);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else /* !CONFIG_NUMA */
|
||||
static void __init arch_update_sysfs_visibility(int nid) {}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx, type;
|
||||
|
|
@ -713,10 +867,16 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void)
|
|||
if (!node_isset(nid, sgx_numa_mask)) {
|
||||
spin_lock_init(&sgx_numa_nodes[nid].lock);
|
||||
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sgx_numa_nodes[nid].free_page_list);
|
||||
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sgx_numa_nodes[nid].sgx_poison_page_list);
|
||||
node_set(nid, sgx_numa_mask);
|
||||
sgx_numa_nodes[nid].size = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Make SGX-specific node sysfs files visible: */
|
||||
arch_update_sysfs_visibility(nid);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sgx_epc_sections[i].node = &sgx_numa_nodes[nid];
|
||||
sgx_numa_nodes[nid].size += size;
|
||||
|
||||
sgx_nr_epc_sections++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -26,9 +26,13 @@
|
|||
/* Pages, which are being tracked by the page reclaimer. */
|
||||
#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED BIT(0)
|
||||
|
||||
/* Pages on free list */
|
||||
#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_IS_FREE BIT(1)
|
||||
|
||||
struct sgx_epc_page {
|
||||
unsigned int section;
|
||||
unsigned int flags;
|
||||
u16 flags;
|
||||
u16 poison;
|
||||
struct sgx_encl_page *owner;
|
||||
struct list_head list;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
|
@ -39,6 +43,8 @@ struct sgx_epc_page {
|
|||
*/
|
||||
struct sgx_numa_node {
|
||||
struct list_head free_page_list;
|
||||
struct list_head sgx_poison_page_list;
|
||||
unsigned long size;
|
||||
spinlock_t lock;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -545,7 +545,8 @@ static int einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2,
|
|||
((region_intersects(base_addr, size, IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM, IORES_DESC_NONE)
|
||||
!= REGION_INTERSECTS) &&
|
||||
(region_intersects(base_addr, size, IORESOURCE_MEM, IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY)
|
||||
!= REGION_INTERSECTS)))
|
||||
!= REGION_INTERSECTS) &&
|
||||
!arch_is_platform_page(base_addr)))
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
|
||||
inject:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ static bool ghes_do_memory_failure(u64 physical_addr, int flags)
|
|||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
pfn = PHYS_PFN(physical_addr);
|
||||
if (!pfn_valid(pfn)) {
|
||||
if (!pfn_valid(pfn) && !arch_is_platform_page(physical_addr)) {
|
||||
pr_warn_ratelimited(FW_WARN GHES_PFX
|
||||
"Invalid address in generic error data: %#llx\n",
|
||||
physical_addr);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -581,6 +581,9 @@ static const struct attribute_group node_dev_group = {
|
|||
|
||||
static const struct attribute_group *node_dev_groups[] = {
|
||||
&node_dev_group,
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_NODE_DEV_GROUP
|
||||
&arch_node_dev_group,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
NULL
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -3231,6 +3231,19 @@ extern void shake_page(struct page *p);
|
|||
extern atomic_long_t num_poisoned_pages __read_mostly;
|
||||
extern int soft_offline_page(unsigned long pfn, int flags);
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef arch_memory_failure
|
||||
static inline int arch_memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int flags)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return -ENXIO;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef arch_is_platform_page
|
||||
static inline bool arch_is_platform_page(u64 paddr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Error handlers for various types of pages.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -58,4 +58,8 @@ static inline int phys_to_target_node(u64 start)
|
|||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_NODE_DEV_GROUP
|
||||
extern const struct attribute_group arch_node_dev_group;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* _LINUX_NUMA_H */
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1646,21 +1646,28 @@ int memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int flags)
|
|||
if (!sysctl_memory_failure_recovery)
|
||||
panic("Memory failure on page %lx", pfn);
|
||||
|
||||
mutex_lock(&mf_mutex);
|
||||
|
||||
p = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
|
||||
if (!p) {
|
||||
res = arch_memory_failure(pfn, flags);
|
||||
if (res == 0)
|
||||
goto unlock_mutex;
|
||||
|
||||
if (pfn_valid(pfn)) {
|
||||
pgmap = get_dev_pagemap(pfn, NULL);
|
||||
if (pgmap)
|
||||
return memory_failure_dev_pagemap(pfn, flags,
|
||||
pgmap);
|
||||
if (pgmap) {
|
||||
res = memory_failure_dev_pagemap(pfn, flags,
|
||||
pgmap);
|
||||
goto unlock_mutex;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
pr_err("Memory failure: %#lx: memory outside kernel control\n",
|
||||
pfn);
|
||||
return -ENXIO;
|
||||
res = -ENXIO;
|
||||
goto unlock_mutex;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
mutex_lock(&mf_mutex);
|
||||
|
||||
try_again:
|
||||
if (PageHuge(p)) {
|
||||
res = memory_failure_hugetlb(pfn, flags);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ $(OUTPUT)/sign_key.o: sign_key.S
|
|||
$(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
|
||||
|
||||
$(OUTPUT)/test_encl.elf: test_encl.lds test_encl.c test_encl_bootstrap.S
|
||||
$(CC) $(ENCL_CFLAGS) -T $^ -o $@
|
||||
$(CC) $(ENCL_CFLAGS) -T $^ -o $@ -Wl,--build-id=none
|
||||
|
||||
EXTRA_CLEAN := \
|
||||
$(OUTPUT)/test_encl.elf \
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -19,13 +19,38 @@
|
|||
#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h"
|
||||
|
||||
enum encl_op_type {
|
||||
ENCL_OP_PUT,
|
||||
ENCL_OP_GET,
|
||||
ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER,
|
||||
ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER,
|
||||
ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS,
|
||||
ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS,
|
||||
ENCL_OP_NOP,
|
||||
ENCL_OP_MAX,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct encl_op {
|
||||
struct encl_op_header {
|
||||
uint64_t type;
|
||||
uint64_t buffer;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct encl_op_put_to_buf {
|
||||
struct encl_op_header header;
|
||||
uint64_t value;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct encl_op_get_from_buf {
|
||||
struct encl_op_header header;
|
||||
uint64_t value;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct encl_op_put_to_addr {
|
||||
struct encl_op_header header;
|
||||
uint64_t value;
|
||||
uint64_t addr;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct encl_op_get_from_addr {
|
||||
struct encl_op_header header;
|
||||
uint64_t value;
|
||||
uint64_t addr;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* DEFINES_H */
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
|
|||
|
||||
void encl_delete(struct encl *encl)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct encl_segment *heap_seg = &encl->segment_tbl[encl->nr_segments - 1];
|
||||
|
||||
if (encl->encl_base)
|
||||
munmap((void *)encl->encl_base, encl->encl_size);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -30,6 +32,8 @@ void encl_delete(struct encl *encl)
|
|||
if (encl->fd)
|
||||
close(encl->fd);
|
||||
|
||||
munmap(heap_seg->src, heap_seg->size);
|
||||
|
||||
if (encl->segment_tbl)
|
||||
free(encl->segment_tbl);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -107,11 +111,14 @@ static bool encl_ioc_add_pages(struct encl *encl, struct encl_segment *seg)
|
|||
memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
|
||||
secinfo.flags = seg->flags;
|
||||
|
||||
ioc.src = (uint64_t)encl->src + seg->offset;
|
||||
ioc.src = (uint64_t)seg->src;
|
||||
ioc.offset = seg->offset;
|
||||
ioc.length = seg->size;
|
||||
ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
|
||||
ioc.flags = SGX_PAGE_MEASURE;
|
||||
if (seg->measure)
|
||||
ioc.flags = SGX_PAGE_MEASURE;
|
||||
else
|
||||
ioc.flags = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
rc = ioctl(encl->fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES, &ioc);
|
||||
if (rc < 0) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -122,11 +129,10 @@ static bool encl_ioc_add_pages(struct encl *encl, struct encl_segment *seg)
|
|||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl)
|
||||
bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl, unsigned long heap_size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const char device_path[] = "/dev/sgx_enclave";
|
||||
struct encl_segment *seg;
|
||||
Elf64_Phdr *phdr_tbl;
|
||||
off_t src_offset;
|
||||
Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr;
|
||||
|
|
@ -178,6 +184,8 @@ bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl)
|
|||
ehdr = encl->bin;
|
||||
phdr_tbl = encl->bin + ehdr->e_phoff;
|
||||
|
||||
encl->nr_segments = 1; /* one for the heap */
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++) {
|
||||
Elf64_Phdr *phdr = &phdr_tbl[i];
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -193,7 +201,6 @@ bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl)
|
|||
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++) {
|
||||
Elf64_Phdr *phdr = &phdr_tbl[i];
|
||||
unsigned int flags = phdr->p_flags;
|
||||
struct encl_segment *seg;
|
||||
|
||||
if (phdr->p_type != PT_LOAD)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
|
@ -216,6 +223,7 @@ bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl)
|
|||
|
||||
if (j == 0) {
|
||||
src_offset = phdr->p_offset & PAGE_MASK;
|
||||
encl->src = encl->bin + src_offset;
|
||||
|
||||
seg->prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
|
||||
seg->flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS << 8;
|
||||
|
|
@ -228,15 +236,27 @@ bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl)
|
|||
|
||||
seg->offset = (phdr->p_offset & PAGE_MASK) - src_offset;
|
||||
seg->size = (phdr->p_filesz + PAGE_SIZE - 1) & PAGE_MASK;
|
||||
seg->src = encl->src + seg->offset;
|
||||
seg->measure = true;
|
||||
|
||||
j++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assert(j == encl->nr_segments);
|
||||
assert(j == encl->nr_segments - 1);
|
||||
|
||||
encl->src = encl->bin + src_offset;
|
||||
encl->src_size = encl->segment_tbl[j - 1].offset +
|
||||
encl->segment_tbl[j - 1].size;
|
||||
seg = &encl->segment_tbl[j];
|
||||
seg->offset = encl->segment_tbl[j - 1].offset + encl->segment_tbl[j - 1].size;
|
||||
seg->size = heap_size;
|
||||
seg->src = mmap(NULL, heap_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
|
||||
MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
|
||||
seg->prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
|
||||
seg->flags = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG << 8) | seg->prot;
|
||||
seg->measure = false;
|
||||
|
||||
if (seg->src == MAP_FAILED)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
encl->src_size = encl->segment_tbl[j].offset + encl->segment_tbl[j].size;
|
||||
|
||||
for (encl->encl_size = 4096; encl->encl_size < encl->src_size; )
|
||||
encl->encl_size <<= 1;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
|
|||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
|
||||
/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */
|
||||
|
||||
#include <cpuid.h>
|
||||
#include <elf.h>
|
||||
#include <errno.h>
|
||||
#include <fcntl.h>
|
||||
|
|
@ -21,6 +22,7 @@
|
|||
#include "main.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static const uint64_t MAGIC = 0x1122334455667788ULL;
|
||||
static const uint64_t MAGIC2 = 0x8877665544332211ULL;
|
||||
vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t vdso_sgx_enter_enclave;
|
||||
|
||||
struct vdso_symtab {
|
||||
|
|
@ -107,12 +109,32 @@ static Elf64_Sym *vdso_symtab_get(struct vdso_symtab *symtab, const char *name)
|
|||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Return the offset in the enclave where the data segment can be found.
|
||||
* The first RW segment loaded is the TCS, skip that to get info on the
|
||||
* data segment.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static off_t encl_get_data_offset(struct encl *encl)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 1; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
|
||||
struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
|
||||
|
||||
if (seg->prot == (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE))
|
||||
return seg->offset;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
FIXTURE(enclave) {
|
||||
struct encl encl;
|
||||
struct sgx_enclave_run run;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
FIXTURE_SETUP(enclave)
|
||||
static bool setup_test_encl(unsigned long heap_size, struct encl *encl,
|
||||
struct __test_metadata *_metadata)
|
||||
{
|
||||
Elf64_Sym *sgx_enter_enclave_sym = NULL;
|
||||
struct vdso_symtab symtab;
|
||||
|
|
@ -122,31 +144,25 @@ FIXTURE_SETUP(enclave)
|
|||
unsigned int i;
|
||||
void *addr;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!encl_load("test_encl.elf", &self->encl)) {
|
||||
encl_delete(&self->encl);
|
||||
ksft_exit_skip("cannot load enclaves\n");
|
||||
if (!encl_load("test_encl.elf", encl, heap_size)) {
|
||||
encl_delete(encl);
|
||||
TH_LOG("Failed to load the test enclave.\n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) {
|
||||
seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i];
|
||||
|
||||
TH_LOG("0x%016lx 0x%016lx 0x%02x", seg->offset, seg->size, seg->prot);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!encl_measure(&self->encl))
|
||||
if (!encl_measure(encl))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!encl_build(&self->encl))
|
||||
if (!encl_build(encl))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* An enclave consumer only must do this.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) {
|
||||
struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i];
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
|
||||
struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
|
||||
|
||||
addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + seg->offset, seg->size,
|
||||
seg->prot, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, self->encl.fd, 0);
|
||||
addr = mmap((void *)encl->encl_base + seg->offset, seg->size,
|
||||
seg->prot, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, encl->fd, 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED);
|
||||
if (addr == MAP_FAILED)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
|
@ -166,8 +182,16 @@ FIXTURE_SETUP(enclave)
|
|||
|
||||
vdso_sgx_enter_enclave = addr + sgx_enter_enclave_sym->st_value;
|
||||
|
||||
memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
|
||||
self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
encl_delete(encl);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
|
||||
seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
|
||||
|
||||
TH_LOG("0x%016lx 0x%016lx 0x%02x", seg->offset, seg->size, seg->prot);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
maps_file = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
|
||||
if (maps_file != NULL) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -181,11 +205,13 @@ FIXTURE_SETUP(enclave)
|
|||
fclose(maps_file);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
if (!sgx_enter_enclave_sym)
|
||||
encl_delete(&self->encl);
|
||||
TH_LOG("Failed to initialize the test enclave.\n");
|
||||
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(sgx_enter_enclave_sym, NULL);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
FIXTURE_SETUP(enclave)
|
||||
{
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(enclave)
|
||||
|
|
@ -215,44 +241,130 @@ FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(enclave)
|
|||
|
||||
TEST_F(enclave, unclobbered_vdso)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct encl_op op;
|
||||
struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
|
||||
struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
|
||||
|
||||
op.type = ENCL_OP_PUT;
|
||||
op.buffer = MAGIC;
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&op, &self->run, false), 0);
|
||||
memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
|
||||
self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
|
||||
|
||||
put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
|
||||
put_op.value = MAGIC;
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, false), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
op.type = ENCL_OP_GET;
|
||||
op.buffer = 0;
|
||||
get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
|
||||
get_op.value = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&op, &self->run, false), 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, false), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(op.buffer, MAGIC);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
|
||||
EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(enclave, clobbered_vdso)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* A section metric is concatenated in a way that @low bits 12-31 define the
|
||||
* bits 12-31 of the metric and @high bits 0-19 define the bits 32-51 of the
|
||||
* metric.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static unsigned long sgx_calc_section_metric(unsigned int low,
|
||||
unsigned int high)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct encl_op op;
|
||||
return (low & GENMASK_ULL(31, 12)) +
|
||||
((high & GENMASK_ULL(19, 0)) << 32);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
op.type = ENCL_OP_PUT;
|
||||
op.buffer = MAGIC;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Sum total available physical SGX memory across all EPC sections
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Return: total available physical SGX memory available on system
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static unsigned long get_total_epc_mem(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
|
||||
unsigned long total_size = 0;
|
||||
unsigned int type;
|
||||
int section = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&op, &self->run, true), 0);
|
||||
while (true) {
|
||||
__cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, section + SGX_CPUID_EPC, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
|
||||
|
||||
type = eax & SGX_CPUID_EPC_MASK;
|
||||
if (type == SGX_CPUID_EPC_INVALID)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
if (type != SGX_CPUID_EPC_SECTION)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
total_size += sgx_calc_section_metric(ecx, edx);
|
||||
|
||||
section++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return total_size;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(enclave, unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
|
||||
struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
|
||||
unsigned long total_mem;
|
||||
|
||||
total_mem = get_total_epc_mem();
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(total_mem, 0);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(total_mem, &self->encl, _metadata));
|
||||
|
||||
memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
|
||||
self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
|
||||
|
||||
put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
|
||||
put_op.value = MAGIC;
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, false), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
op.type = ENCL_OP_GET;
|
||||
op.buffer = 0;
|
||||
get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
|
||||
get_op.value = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&op, &self->run, true), 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, false), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(op.buffer, MAGIC);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
|
||||
EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(enclave, clobbered_vdso)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
|
||||
struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
|
||||
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
|
||||
|
||||
memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
|
||||
self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
|
||||
|
||||
put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
|
||||
put_op.value = MAGIC;
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, true), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
|
||||
get_op.value = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, true), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
|
||||
EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -267,27 +379,179 @@ static int test_handler(long rdi, long rsi, long rdx, long ursp, long r8, long r
|
|||
|
||||
TEST_F(enclave, clobbered_vdso_and_user_function)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct encl_op op;
|
||||
struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
|
||||
struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
|
||||
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
|
||||
|
||||
memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
|
||||
self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
|
||||
|
||||
self->run.user_handler = (__u64)test_handler;
|
||||
self->run.user_data = 0xdeadbeef;
|
||||
|
||||
op.type = ENCL_OP_PUT;
|
||||
op.buffer = MAGIC;
|
||||
put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
|
||||
put_op.value = MAGIC;
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&op, &self->run, true), 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, true), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
op.type = ENCL_OP_GET;
|
||||
op.buffer = 0;
|
||||
get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
|
||||
get_op.value = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&op, &self->run, true), 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, true), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(op.buffer, MAGIC);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
|
||||
EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Sanity check that it is possible to enter either of the two hardcoded TCS
|
||||
*/
|
||||
TEST_F(enclave, tcs_entry)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct encl_op_header op;
|
||||
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
|
||||
|
||||
memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
|
||||
self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
|
||||
|
||||
op.type = ENCL_OP_NOP;
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&op, &self->run, true), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Move to the next TCS. */
|
||||
self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base + PAGE_SIZE;
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&op, &self->run, true), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Second page of .data segment is used to test changing PTE permissions.
|
||||
* This spans the local encl_buffer within the test enclave.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 1) Start with a sanity check: a value is written to the target page within
|
||||
* the enclave and read back to ensure target page can be written to.
|
||||
* 2) Change PTE permissions (RW -> RO) of target page within enclave.
|
||||
* 3) Repeat (1) - this time expecting a regular #PF communicated via the
|
||||
* vDSO.
|
||||
* 4) Change PTE permissions of target page within enclave back to be RW.
|
||||
* 5) Repeat (1) by resuming enclave, now expected to be possible to write to
|
||||
* and read from target page within enclave.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
TEST_F(enclave, pte_permissions)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
|
||||
struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
|
||||
unsigned long data_start;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
|
||||
|
||||
memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
|
||||
self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
|
||||
|
||||
data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
|
||||
encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) +
|
||||
PAGE_SIZE;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Sanity check to ensure it is possible to write to page that will
|
||||
* have its permissions manipulated.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/* Write MAGIC to page */
|
||||
put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
|
||||
put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
|
||||
put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Read memory that was just written to, confirming that it is the
|
||||
* value previously written (MAGIC).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
get_addr_op.value = 0;
|
||||
get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
|
||||
get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
|
||||
EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Change PTE permissions of target page within the enclave */
|
||||
ret = mprotect((void *)data_start, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
perror("mprotect");
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* PTE permissions of target page changed to read-only, EPCM
|
||||
* permissions unchanged (EPCM permissions are RW), attempt to
|
||||
* write to the page, expecting a regular #PF.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
put_addr_op.value = MAGIC2;
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x7);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
|
||||
|
||||
self->run.exception_vector = 0;
|
||||
self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
|
||||
self->run.exception_addr = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Change PTE permissions back to enable enclave to write to the
|
||||
* target page and resume enclave - do not expect any exceptions this
|
||||
* time.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
ret = mprotect((void *)data_start, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
perror("mprotect");
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0,
|
||||
0, ERESUME, 0, 0, &self->run),
|
||||
0);
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
get_addr_op.value = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC2);
|
||||
EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,11 +6,15 @@
|
|||
#ifndef MAIN_H
|
||||
#define MAIN_H
|
||||
|
||||
#define ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT 4096
|
||||
|
||||
struct encl_segment {
|
||||
void *src;
|
||||
off_t offset;
|
||||
size_t size;
|
||||
unsigned int prot;
|
||||
unsigned int flags;
|
||||
bool measure;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct encl {
|
||||
|
|
@ -31,7 +35,7 @@ extern unsigned char sign_key[];
|
|||
extern unsigned char sign_key_end[];
|
||||
|
||||
void encl_delete(struct encl *ctx);
|
||||
bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl);
|
||||
bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl, unsigned long heap_size);
|
||||
bool encl_measure(struct encl *encl);
|
||||
bool encl_build(struct encl *encl);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -289,15 +289,17 @@ static bool mrenclave_eextend(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint64_t offset,
|
|||
static bool mrenclave_segment(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, struct encl *encl,
|
||||
struct encl_segment *seg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
uint64_t end = seg->offset + seg->size;
|
||||
uint64_t end = seg->size;
|
||||
uint64_t offset;
|
||||
|
||||
for (offset = seg->offset; offset < end; offset += PAGE_SIZE) {
|
||||
if (!mrenclave_eadd(ctx, offset, seg->flags))
|
||||
for (offset = 0; offset < end; offset += PAGE_SIZE) {
|
||||
if (!mrenclave_eadd(ctx, seg->offset + offset, seg->flags))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!mrenclave_eextend(ctx, offset, encl->src + offset))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
if (seg->measure) {
|
||||
if (!mrenclave_eextend(ctx, seg->offset + offset, seg->src + offset))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,6 +4,11 @@
|
|||
#include <stddef.h>
|
||||
#include "defines.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Data buffer spanning two pages that will be placed first in .data
|
||||
* segment. Even if not used internally the second page is needed by
|
||||
* external test manipulating page permissions.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static uint8_t encl_buffer[8192] = { 1 };
|
||||
|
||||
static void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n)
|
||||
|
|
@ -16,20 +21,51 @@ static void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n)
|
|||
return dest;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void do_encl_op_put_to_buf(void *op)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct encl_op_put_to_buf *op2 = op;
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(&encl_buffer[0], &op2->value, 8);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void do_encl_op_get_from_buf(void *op)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct encl_op_get_from_buf *op2 = op;
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(&op2->value, &encl_buffer[0], 8);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void do_encl_op_put_to_addr(void *_op)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct encl_op_put_to_addr *op = _op;
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy((void *)op->addr, &op->value, 8);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void do_encl_op_get_from_addr(void *_op)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct encl_op_get_from_addr *op = _op;
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(&op->value, (void *)op->addr, 8);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void do_encl_op_nop(void *_op)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void encl_body(void *rdi, void *rsi)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct encl_op *op = (struct encl_op *)rdi;
|
||||
const void (*encl_op_array[ENCL_OP_MAX])(void *) = {
|
||||
do_encl_op_put_to_buf,
|
||||
do_encl_op_get_from_buf,
|
||||
do_encl_op_put_to_addr,
|
||||
do_encl_op_get_from_addr,
|
||||
do_encl_op_nop,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
switch (op->type) {
|
||||
case ENCL_OP_PUT:
|
||||
memcpy(&encl_buffer[0], &op->buffer, 8);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
struct encl_op_header *op = (struct encl_op_header *)rdi;
|
||||
|
||||
case ENCL_OP_GET:
|
||||
memcpy(&op->buffer, &encl_buffer[0], 8);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
default:
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (op->type < ENCL_OP_MAX)
|
||||
(*encl_op_array[op->type])(op);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
|
|||
|
||||
.fill 1, 8, 0 # STATE (set by CPU)
|
||||
.fill 1, 8, 0 # FLAGS
|
||||
.quad encl_ssa # OSSA
|
||||
.quad encl_ssa_tcs1 # OSSA
|
||||
.fill 1, 4, 0 # CSSA (set by CPU)
|
||||
.fill 1, 4, 1 # NSSA
|
||||
.quad encl_entry # OENTRY
|
||||
|
|
@ -23,10 +23,10 @@
|
|||
.fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # GSLIMIT
|
||||
.fill 4024, 1, 0 # Reserved
|
||||
|
||||
# Identical to the previous TCS.
|
||||
# TCS2
|
||||
.fill 1, 8, 0 # STATE (set by CPU)
|
||||
.fill 1, 8, 0 # FLAGS
|
||||
.quad encl_ssa # OSSA
|
||||
.quad encl_ssa_tcs2 # OSSA
|
||||
.fill 1, 4, 0 # CSSA (set by CPU)
|
||||
.fill 1, 4, 1 # NSSA
|
||||
.quad encl_entry # OENTRY
|
||||
|
|
@ -40,8 +40,9 @@
|
|||
.text
|
||||
|
||||
encl_entry:
|
||||
# RBX contains the base address for TCS, which is also the first address
|
||||
# inside the enclave. By adding the value of le_stack_end to it, we get
|
||||
# RBX contains the base address for TCS, which is the first address
|
||||
# inside the enclave for TCS #1 and one page into the enclave for
|
||||
# TCS #2. By adding the value of encl_stack to it, we get
|
||||
# the absolute address for the stack.
|
||||
lea (encl_stack)(%rbx), %rax
|
||||
xchg %rsp, %rax
|
||||
|
|
@ -81,9 +82,15 @@ encl_entry:
|
|||
|
||||
.section ".data", "aw"
|
||||
|
||||
encl_ssa:
|
||||
encl_ssa_tcs1:
|
||||
.space 4096
|
||||
encl_ssa_tcs2:
|
||||
.space 4096
|
||||
|
||||
.balign 4096
|
||||
.space 8192
|
||||
# Stack of TCS #1
|
||||
.space 4096
|
||||
encl_stack:
|
||||
.balign 4096
|
||||
# Stack of TCS #2
|
||||
.space 4096
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
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