Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
Convert Audit to use the new LSM Audit hooks instead of the exported SELinux interface. Basically, use: security_audit_rule_init secuirty_audit_rule_free security_audit_rule_known security_audit_rule_match instad of (respectively) : selinux_audit_rule_init selinux_audit_rule_free audit_rule_has_selinux selinux_audit_rule_match Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This commit is contained in:
Ahmed S. Darwish
James Morris
Родитель
03d37d25e0
Коммит
d7a96f3a1a
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@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
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*
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* Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
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*
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* Goals: 1) Integrate fully with SELinux.
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* Goals: 1) Integrate fully with Security Modules.
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* 2) Minimal run-time overhead:
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* a) Minimal when syscall auditing is disabled (audit_enable=0).
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* b) Small when syscall auditing is enabled and no audit record
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@ -55,7 +55,6 @@
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#include <net/netlink.h>
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#include <linux/skbuff.h>
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#include <linux/netlink.h>
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#include <linux/selinux.h>
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#include <linux/inotify.h>
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#include <linux/freezer.h>
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#include <linux/tty.h>
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@ -882,10 +881,6 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
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audit_enabled = audit_default;
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audit_ever_enabled |= !!audit_default;
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/* Register the callback with selinux. This callback will be invoked
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* when a new policy is loaded. */
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selinux_audit_set_callback(&selinux_audit_rule_update);
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audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized");
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#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
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@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/inotify.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/selinux.h>
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#include "audit.h"
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/*
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@ -39,7 +38,7 @@
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* Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist
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* data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access
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* contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque
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* selinux rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
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* LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
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* must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist.
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* An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may
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* be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held.
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@ -141,7 +140,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
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for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
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struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
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kfree(f->se_str);
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selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
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security_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
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}
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kfree(e->rule.fields);
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kfree(e->rule.filterkey);
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@ -598,12 +597,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
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goto exit_free;
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entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
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err = selinux_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
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&f->se_rule);
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err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
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(void **)&f->se_rule);
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/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
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* become valid after a policy reload. */
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if (err == -EINVAL) {
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printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux "
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printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM "
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"\'%s\' is invalid\n", str);
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err = 0;
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}
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@ -863,9 +862,9 @@ out:
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return new;
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}
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/* Duplicate selinux field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
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/* Duplicate LSM field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
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* re-initialized. */
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static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
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static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
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struct audit_field *sf)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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@ -878,12 +877,12 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
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df->se_str = se_str;
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/* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
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ret = selinux_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
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&df->se_rule);
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ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
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(void **)&df->se_rule);
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/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
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* become valid after a policy reload. */
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if (ret == -EINVAL) {
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printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux \'%s\' is "
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printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is "
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"invalid\n", df->se_str);
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ret = 0;
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}
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@ -892,7 +891,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
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}
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/* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception
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* of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The selinux specific fields
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* of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The LSM specific fields
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* will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old
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* rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule.
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* The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from
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@ -945,7 +944,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
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case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
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err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
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err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i],
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&old->fields[i]);
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break;
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case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
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@ -1763,38 +1762,12 @@ unlock_and_return:
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return result;
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}
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/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields. Returns 1 if there
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are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */
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static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
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struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
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switch (f->type) {
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
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return 1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
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* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain selinux
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* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
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* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
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* selinux field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
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* LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
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* updated rule. */
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int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
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int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
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{
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struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry;
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struct audit_watch *watch;
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@ -1806,7 +1779,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
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for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
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list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
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if (!audit_rule_has_selinux(&entry->rule))
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if (!security_audit_rule_known(&entry->rule))
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continue;
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watch = entry->rule.watch;
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@ -1817,7 +1790,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
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* return value */
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if (!err)
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err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
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audit_panic("error updating selinux filters");
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audit_panic("error updating LSM filters");
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if (watch)
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list_del(&entry->rule.rlist);
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list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
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@ -61,7 +61,6 @@
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/list.h>
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#include <linux/tty.h>
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#include <linux/selinux.h>
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#include <linux/binfmts.h>
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#include <linux/highmem.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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@ -533,7 +532,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
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security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
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need_sid = 0;
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}
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result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
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result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
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f->op,
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f->se_rule,
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ctx);
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@ -549,12 +548,12 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
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if (f->se_rule) {
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/* Find files that match */
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if (name) {
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result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
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result = security_audit_rule_match(
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name->osid, f->type, f->op,
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f->se_rule, ctx);
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} else if (ctx) {
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for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
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if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
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if (security_audit_rule_match(
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ctx->names[j].osid,
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f->type, f->op,
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f->se_rule, ctx)) {
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@ -570,7 +569,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
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aux = aux->next) {
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if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
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struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
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if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
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if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
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++result;
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break;
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}
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