Revert "fs: Allow unprivileged linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) aka flink"

This reverts commit bb2314b479.

It wasn't necessarily wrong per se, but we're still busily discussing
the exact details of this all, so I'm going to revert it for now.

It's true that you can already do flink() through /proc and that flink()
isn't new.  But as Brad Spengler points out, some secure environments do
not mount proc, and flink adds a new interface that can avoid path
lookup of the source for those kinds of environments.

We may re-do this (and even mark it for stable backporting back in 3.11
and possibly earlier) once the whole discussion about the interface is done.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

fs/namei.c

@@ -3671,11 +3671,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(linkat, int, olddfd, const char __user *, oldname,
 	if ((flags & ~(AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH)) != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	/*
-	 * Using empty names is equivalent to using AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW
-	 * on /proc/self/fd/<fd>.
+	 * To use null names we require CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
+	 * This ensures that not everyone will be able to create
+	 * handlink using the passed filedescriptor.
 	 */
-	if (flags & AT_EMPTY_PATH)
+	if (flags & AT_EMPTY_PATH) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+			return -ENOENT;
 		how = LOOKUP_EMPTY;
+	}
 
 	if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW)
 		how |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;